



Indonesian Muslim Intelligentsia and Power

Yudi Latif





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GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS

<i>Abangan</i>	Nominal(ly) Muslim, strongly influenced by Hindu-Buddhist and animist religious ideas
<i>Adat</i>	Local customs, the mores and behaviour of various cultural groups throughout Indonesia
<i>Algemeene Studieclub (ASC)</i>	General Study Club. The name of a study club of nationalist intellectuals, established in Bandung in 1926.
<i>AMS</i>	<i>Algemeene Middelbare School</i> [General Secondary School]. Upper Secondary School
<i>Ansor</i>	<i>Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)</i> organization for young men. See <i>NU</i>
<i>ASC</i>	See <i>Algemeene Studieclub</i>
<i>Azas tunggal</i>	Sole Foundation; it refers to <i>Pancasila</i> as the sole foundation of Indonesian socio-political organizations. See <i>Pancasila</i>
<i>BAIS</i>	<i>Badan Intelijen Strategis</i> (Strategic Intelligence Body)
<i>Bakin</i>	<i>Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara</i> [State Intelligence Coordinating Body]
<i>Bangsawan pikiran</i>	The nobility by intellect
<i>Bangsawan oesoel</i>	The nobility by birth; original aristocrat
<i>Bappenas</i>	<i>Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional</i> [National Development Planning Board]
<i>Bestuursacademie</i>	Administrative Academy
<i>Boemipoetera</i>	Literally son of the earth/island; native. Originally referring to a Muslim, later on gradually losing its religious character, and denoting just native
<i>BPK</i>	<i>Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan</i> (the Audit Board for State Finance)

<i>BU</i>	<i>Budi Utomo</i> [Glorious Endeavour]. An association of Javanese students and <i>priyayi</i> established in 1908. See <i>priyayi</i>
<i>Budi Utomo</i>	See BU
<i>Cendekiawan</i>	Intellectual/Intelligentsia
<i>CIDES</i>	Center for Information and Development Studies
<i>CGMI</i>	<i>Consentrasi Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia</i> [The Unified Movement of Indonesian University Students]. An association of communist students
<i>CSIS</i>	Center for Strategic and International Studies
<i>Daidancho</i>	Battalion Commander of Peta. See <i>Peta</i>
<i>Dakwah</i>	Call or invitation; Islamic outreach or missionary endeavour
<i>DDII</i>	<i>Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia</i> [Indonesian Council of Islamic <i>Dakwah</i>]; see <i>dakwah</i>
<i>Dewan Mahasiswa</i>	Student Council
<i>DI/TII</i>	<i>Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia</i> ['House of Islam'/Islamic Army of Indonesia]. The name of an Indonesian political movement which, in 1948, declared the idea of transforming Indonesia into an Islamic state
<i>DPA</i>	<i>Dewan Pertimbangan Agung</i> [Supreme Advisory Council]; the presidential advisory council
<i>DPR</i>	<i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat</i> . House of the People's Representatives; Parliament
<i>Dokter-Djawa School</i>	Native Paramedical School
<i>Djama'ah Chairijah</i>	<i>Djama'ah al-Chairiah al-Talabiyyah al-Azhariah al-Djawah</i> [Welfare Association of the Indo-Malayan students in Egypt]
<i>Eerste Klasse School</i>	First Class Native (elementary) School
<i>ELS</i>	<i>Europeesche Lagere School</i> [European Primary School]
<i>Gemsos</i>	<i>Gerakan Mahasiswa Sosialis</i> [the Socialist University Student Movement]
<i>Germindo</i>	<i>Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia</i> [Indonesian

	University Student Movement]. A student affiliate of <i>Partindo</i> . See <i>Partindo</i>
<i>Gestapu</i>	<i>Gerakan Tiga Puluh September</i> . 30 September movement of the PKI. See <i>PKI</i>
<i>GHS</i>	<i>Geneeskundige Hoogeschool</i> [Medical College]
<i>GMKI</i>	<i>Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia</i> [the Indonesian Christian University Student Movement]
<i>GMNI</i>	<i>Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia</i> [Indonesian Nationalist University Student Movement]. A student affiliate of PNI
<i>Golkar</i>	<i>Golongan Karya</i> [Functional Groups]. The political party of the New Order government
<i>Gotong-royong</i>	Mutual assistance
<i>GPII</i>	<i>Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia</i> [The Movement of Indonesian Islamic Youth]
<i>Hadji/Haji</i>	A Muslim who has undertaken the pilgrimage to Mecca
<i>Hadj/hajj</i>	The pilgrimage to Mecca
<i>HBS</i>	<i>Hoogere Burger School</i> [Higher Civil School]. European Secondary School
<i>HIS</i>	<i>Hollandsch-Inlandsche School</i> [Dutch Native School]; Dutch speaking native (primary) school
<i>Hizbullah</i>	[Army of God]; the <i>Masjumi</i> youth front
<i>HMI</i>	<i>Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam</i> [Islamic University Students' Association]
<i>IAIN</i>	<i>Institut Agama Islam Negeri</i> [State Islamic Institute]; The state college of Islamic studies
<i>ICMI</i>	<i>Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Se-Indonesia</i> [Association of Indonesian Muslim Intelligentsia] established in 1990
<i>IMM</i>	<i>Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah</i> [Union of the <i>Muhammadiyah</i> University Students]
<i>Indonesische Studieclub (ISC)</i>	Indonesian Study Club. The name of a study club of nationalist intellectuals, established in Surabaya in 1924.
<i>IPB</i>	<i>Institut Pertanian Bogor</i> [Bogor Institute of Agriculture]

<i>IPNU</i>	<i>Ikatan Peladjar Nahdlatul Ulama</i> [Union of the NU Students]. See <i>NU</i>
<i>ISC</i>	See <i>Indonesische Studieclub</i>
<i>ISDV</i>	<i>Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereeniging</i> [Indies Social Democratic Association], established in 1914 as an embryo of the PKI Young Islamic Community who had an ambition to rejuvenate the Indies society based on the ideology of Islamic reformism-modernism. See <i>Kaoem Moeda</i>
<i>ITB</i>	<i>Institut Teknologi Bandung</i> [Bandung Institute of Technology]
<i>ITS</i>	<i>Institut Teknologi Surabaya</i> [Surabaya Institute of Technology]
<i>JIB</i>	<i>Jong Islamieten Bond</i> [Young Muslims' League]
<i>Kadi</i>	A judge of religious court
<i>KAMI</i>	<i>Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia</i> [Indonesian University Students' Action Front]; established in 1965
<i>KAMMI</i>	<i>Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia</i> [United Front of Indonesian Islamic University Students], established in 1998
<i>Kaoem</i>	Group, community
<i>Kaoem Mardika</i>	Free People; People whose livelihood did not derive from service to the colonial government [Young Group] (Community). A collective entity of those who shared a common ambition to rejuvenate the Indies society along the <i>kemadjoean</i> line. See <i>kemadjoean</i>
<i>Kaoem Moeda</i>	[Old Group] (Community). Traditionalists or followers of (indigenous) conservative values
<i>Kaoem Toea</i>	<i>Kesatuan Aksi Pemuda Peladjar Indonesia</i> [Indonesian Student Youths' Front], established in 1966
<i>KAPPI</i>	
<i>KASI</i>	<i>Kesatuan Aksi Sarjana Indonesia</i> [Indonesian University Graduates' Front]; established in 1966
<i>Kauman</i>	The district surrounding the principal mosque of Javanese town, usually occupied by <i>santri</i>

<i>Kemadjoean</i>	[Progress]. An ideal loftiness of one's social status encompassing many other things: Educational improvement, modernization (associated with Westernization), respectability, and success in life
<i>Kjail/kyai</i>	Title of respect for holy persons and sacred objects; widely used specifically (in Java) for Islamic teacher (of the traditionalist type).
<i>KKN</i>	<i>Korupsi, Kolusi, dan Nepotisme</i> [Corruption, Collusion, and Nepotism]
<i>IKNIL</i>	<i>Koninklijk Netherlands Indisch Leger</i> [Royal Netherlands Indies Army]
<i>KNIP</i>	Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat [Central Indonesian National Committee]
<i>Kweekschool</i>	Teachers' Training School
<i>LDK</i>	<i>Lembaga Dakwah Kampus</i> [Campus Mosque Dakwah Body]; see <i>dakwah</i>
<i>LKIS</i>	<i>Lembaga Kebajikan Islam Samanhudi</i> [Samanhudi Institute for Islamic Benevolent Service]
<i>LDMI</i>	<i>Lembaga Dakwah Mahasiswa Islam</i> [Dakwah Institute of Islamic Students]; the HMI's <i>dakwah</i> body; see <i>dakwah</i>
<i>LMD</i>	<i>Latihan Mujahid Dakwah</i> [Training of the Dakwah Cadre]; see <i>dakwah</i>
<i>LP3ES</i>	<i>Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial</i> [The Social and Economic Research, Education, and Information Institute]
<i>LSM</i>	<i>Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat</i> [Self-Reliant Community Institution]; the Indonesian version of NGO. See <i>NGO</i>
<i>LSP</i>	<i>Lembaga Studi Pembangunan</i> [Institute of Development Studies]
<i>MA</i>	<i>Mahkamah Agung</i> [Supreme Court]
<i>Madrasah</i>	Literally School. Modernised Islamic school offering both religious and general subjects
<i>Manipol</i>	<i>Manifesto Politik</i> . Political Manifesto, the ideology for Guided Democracy, introduced

	by Sukarno on 17 August 1959; it called for the revival of the spirit of the 1945 Revolution
<i>Masjumi</i>	<i>Madjelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia</i> [Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims]
<i>MIAI</i>	<i>Madjlislul Islam A'laa Indonesia</i> [Supreme Islam Council of Indonesia]
<i>MMI</i>	<i>Majelis Mahasiswa Indonesia</i> [Indonesian University Student Assembly]
<i>MPR</i>	<i>Madjelis Persmusjawaratan Rakjat</i> [People's Consultative Assembly]
<i>MPRS</i>	<i>Majelis Permusyawaratan Indonesia Sementara</i> [The Provisional People's Consultative Assembly]
<i>MUI</i>	<i>Majelis Ulama Indonesia</i> [Council of Indonesian Islamic Scholars]
<i>MULO</i>	<i>Meer Uitgebreid Lager Onderwijs</i> [More Extended Elementary Education]; Lower Secondary School
<i>Muhammadiyah</i>	Reformist-modernist Islamic social and educational association
<i>Nasakom</i>	<i>Nasionalisme, Agama, Komunis</i> [Nationalism, Religion, and Communism]; A united front of proponents of Guided Democracy
<i>NIAS</i>	<i>Nederlandsch-Indische Artsenschool</i> [Netherlands Indian Doctors' School]
<i>NEI</i>	Netherlands East Indies
<i>NGO</i>	Non-Government Organization
<i>NKK</i>	<i>Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus</i> [Normalization of Campus Life]
<i>NICA</i>	Netherlands Indies Civil Administration
<i>NU</i>	<i>Nahdlatul Ulama</i> [Renaissance of the Religious Scholars]. A traditionalist Islamic association
<i>Orde Baru (Orba)</i>	[New Order]. The period of Suharto's government (1966–98)
<i>Orde Lama (Orla)</i>	[Old Order]. The period of Sukarno's Guided Democracy
<i>OSVIA</i>	<i>Opleidingsschool voor Inlandsche Ambtenaren</i> [Training School for Native Administration]

<i>Pagujuban Pasundan</i>	Sundanese Association
PAN	<i>Partai Amanat Nasional</i> [National Mandate Party]
<i>Pancasila</i>	[Five Pillars]. The national philosophy of the Republic of Indonesia, consisting of five principles: belief in the One God; a just and civilised humanity; a united Indonesia; popular rule through policies formed after representative consensus; and social justice for the whole Indonesian population
<i>Parkindo</i>	<i>Partai Kristen Indonesia</i> [Indonesian Christian/Protestant Party]
<i>Parmusi</i>	<i>Partai Muslimin Indonesia</i> [Indonesian Muslim Party]
<i>Partindo</i>	<i>Partai Indonesia</i> [Indonesian Party]. A nationalist political party, founded in 1931 and re-established in 1959
PBB	<i>Partai Bulan Bintang</i> [Crescent and Star Party]
PDI	<i>Partai Demokrasi Indonesia</i> [Indonesian Democratic Party]
PDI-P	<i>Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan</i> [Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle]
<i>Peranakan</i>	A locally born person of foreign extraction; Indonesian-born foreigner
<i>Pembangunan</i>	Development
<i>Penghulu</i>	In Minangkabau the head of family or <i>adat</i> chief In Java a person in charge of a major mosque During the Dutch colonial period, it was a title of a religious official supported by stipend from the Dutch government
<i>Perhimi</i>	<i>Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia</i> [Indonesian University Student Association]
<i>Persami</i>	<i>Persatuan Sardjana Muslim Indonesia</i> [Association of Indonesian Muslim <i>Sardjana</i>]. See <i>sardjana/sarjana</i>
<i>Perti</i>	<i>Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamijah</i> [Islamic Educational Association]; the West Sumatra-based traditionalist association

<i>Pesantren</i>	Traditional (boarding) Islamic school; place for religious instruction in Java. See <i>surau</i>
<i>Pesantren Luhur</i>	Advanced <i>Pesantren</i>
<i>Peta</i>	<i>Pembela Tanah Air</i> . Fatherland Defence Force (set up during the Japanese Occupation)
<i>PI</i>	<i>Perhimpunan Indonesia</i> [Indonesian Association]
<i>PII</i>	<i>Peladjar Islam Indonesia</i> [Union of Indonesian Islamic High School Students]
<i>PK</i>	<i>Partai Keadilan</i> [Justice Party]
<i>PKB</i>	<i>Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa</i> [National Awakening Party]
<i>PKI</i>	<i>Partai Komunis Indonesia</i> [Indonesian Communist Party]
<i>PMII</i>	<i>Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia</i> [Indonesian Islamic University Student Movement]; A union of NU university students
<i>PMKRI</i>	<i>Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katolik Indonesia</i> [Union of Indonesian Catholic University Students]
<i>PNI</i>	<i>Partai Nasional Indonesia</i> [Indonesian National Party]
<i>PPKI</i>	<i>Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia</i> [Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence]
<i>PPMI</i>	<i>Perserikatan Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia</i> [The Federation of Indonesian University Student Organizations]
<i>PPP</i>	<i>Partai Persatuan Pembangunan</i> [United Development Party]
<i>PPPKI</i>	<i>Permufakatan Perhimpunan-Perhimpunan Politik Kebangsaan Indonesia</i> [Federation of Political Organizations of Indonesian People]
<i>P3M</i>	<i>Perkumpulan Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat</i> [Association for <i>Pesantren</i> and Community Development]
<i>Prijaji/Priyayi</i>	Javanese nobility; member of the Javanese official (administrative) class

<i>PSI</i>	<i>Partai Sosialis Indonesia</i> . Indonesian Socialist Party
<i>PSII</i>	<i>Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia</i> [Indonesian Islamic Union Party]. See <i>SI</i>
<i>Reformasi</i>	[Reform]; generally meaning political liberalization and economic transparency. Also used to refer to the period following Suharto's fall
<i>Repelita</i>	<i>Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun</i> [Five-Year Development Plan]
<i>RHS</i>	<i>Rechtschool</i> [College of Law]
<i>RUSI</i>	The Republic of the United States of Indonesia
<i>Santri</i>	Student, pupil (of the <i>pesantren</i> or religious school in Java); also member of the devout Islamic community
<i>Sardjana/sarjana</i>	Degree holders or scholars
<i>Sarekat Dagang Islam</i>	See <i>SDI</i>
<i>Sarekat Islam</i>	See <i>SI</i>
<i>SDI</i>	<i>Sarekat Dagang Islam</i> [Islamic Commercial Association]
<i>Sekolah</i>	[School]. The (modern) schools following the Western educational system
<i>SI</i>	<i>Sarekat Islam</i> [Islamic Union]; A proto-nationalist association with Islamic colour, established in 1912
<i>SIS</i>	<i>Studenten Islam Studieclub</i> [Muslim Students' Study Club]
<i>Sorogan</i>	A method of teaching in <i>pesantren</i> based on individual-centred learning in which a student [<i>santri</i>] sits in front of a religious scholar [<i>kjai</i>] to read a religious text
<i>STI</i>	<i>Sekolah Tinggi Islam</i> [Advanced Islamic School]
<i>STOVIA</i>	<i>School tot Opleiding van Inlandsche Artsen</i> [Training School for Native Doctors]
<i>Surau</i>	Traditional Islamic school or place for religious instruction in Central Sumatra: equivalent of Javanese <i>pesantren</i> .

<i>THS</i>	<i>Technische Hoogeschool</i> [College of Engineering]
<i>TNI</i>	<i>Tentara Nasional Indonesia</i> [Indonesian National Military]
<i>Tweede Klasse School</i>	Second Class Native (elementary) School
<i>UGM</i>	<i>Universitas Gadjah Mada</i> [Gadjah Mada State University]
<i>UI</i>	<i>Universitas Indonesia</i> [University of Indonesia]
<i>UII</i>	<i>Universitas Islam Indonesia</i> [Islamic University of Indonesia]
<i>Ulama</i>	Islamic scholars; in Indonesia, it specifically refers to scholars of religious knowledge
<i>Ummat/Ummah</i>	Islamic community
<i>USDEK</i>	<i>Undang-Undang Dasar 1945</i> [the 1945 Constitution], <i>Sosialisme Indonesia</i> [Indonesian socialism], <i>Demokrasi terpimpin</i> [guided democracy], <i>Ekonomi terpimpin</i> [guided economy], and <i>Kepribadian Indonesia</i> [Indonesian identity]. Sukarno's ideology of the 1960s.
<i>YLBHI</i>	<i>Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia</i> [Foundation of Indonesian Legal Aid Institutions]
<i>Weton(an)</i>	A method of teaching in <i>pesantren</i> in which students sit in a circle in front of the scholar working on various texts. The <i>kjai</i> calls on various students to recite and clarify what they are reading

FOREWORD

Yudi Latif's *Indonesian Muslim Intelligentsia and Power* is a study of great scope and importance. There is no comparable study of its kind in the extensive literature on Indonesia. Given its considerable scope and its critical historical argument, it is a book that should be essential reading for an understanding of Indonesian society and its current political development.

As a fundamental sociological inquiry, this book defines and discovers its subject. Its focus is on Indonesia's Muslim "intelligentsia" and its argument is that this "stratum" of society — barely recognized as such by other writers — has provided the critical Islamic discourse within the public sphere that enabled Muslims to define themselves and give direction to the Indonesian nation. This offers a new perception of Indonesia's history and it gives credit both to the centrality of ideas and to the role of those key historical figures in Indonesia who fostered this on-going intellectual discourse.

As a work of intellectual history, this book begins in the nineteenth century, setting out the colonial context within which individual Muslim intellectuals sought to obtain an education and create a place for themselves in colonial society. It then carries on into and through the twentieth century with the emergence of an "intelligentsia" and its varied struggle to gain recognition and political authority. As such, the book charts a succession of generations whose popular designations, in each period, give a sense of the historical embeddedness of their intellectual horizons. From *kaum moeda*, *bangsawan pikiran*, and *pemoeda peladjar* to *sarjana* and *cendiakawan*, successive generations of Indonesian Muslims have struggled both to take their place in a national setting and to engage with issues of significance for the Muslim world as a whole.

It is particularly pertinent to recognize that this book is itself an engagement with the discourse that it examines. Like those he studies, Dr Latif is an engaged intellectual. The critical analytic concepts that inform this book are drawn from a variety of intellectual sources. Thus, for example, Dr Latif draws upon the ideas of Mannheim, Gramsci, Foucault, and

Habermas — to name a few of his sources of inspiration. He refashions and refocuses these ideas for his own analytic purposes and presents a coherent perception of the nation's past that complements classic studies of Indonesia by such writers as Benda, Feith, Legge or McVey.

Now is an appropriate time to reconsider Muslim intellectual discourse in Indonesia and to recognize how much it has always been linked to a wider global discourse. By considering the foundations of this public discourse and by tracing its development through the twentieth century to the present-day, this book provides a pivot for continuing discussions on the role of Islam in the twenty-first century. More than just a summary of the past, this book is a starting point for considering the future.

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1

INTRODUCTION

The intellectuals have created the political life of the underdeveloped countries; they have been its instigators, its leaders, and its executants.

Edward Shils (1972)¹

The intelligentsia stratum develops...when educated members of the establishment are unable to face and solve the nation's growing problems. In response, the intelligentsia appears as a new element of the social structure, as a stratum placed between the 'power establishment' on the one hand, and all other classes on the other.

Aleksander Gella (1976)²

Indonesian Islam is a reality that scholars can no longer ignore. The wave of Islamic resurgence that has swept the country in the past two decades makes it increasingly difficult to portray Islam as a marginal force on the edges of Indonesian civilization.

Mark R. Woodward (1996)³

Out of the galactic crisis of the Indonesian polity at the twilight of the previous century, a new crescent began shining in the sky of Jakarta: the emergence of the Muslim intelligentsia as the rising political and bureaucratic elite.

In the late Suharto era, following the demoralization of Muslim politics from the 1960s, various figures of the Muslim intelligentsia surprisingly took centre stage in Indonesian socio-political discourse.⁴ About the same time, many other members of the Muslim intelligentsia were appointed to the upper echelons of the government bureaucracy.⁵ Issues surrounding this Muslim intelligentsia produced extensive media coverage and provoked

public debates following the establishment, in December 1990, of the *Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Se-Indonesia* [ICMI, the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intelligentsia].

By the time of the emergence of the reform [*reformasi*] movement in 1997/98, some figures of the Muslim intelligentsia played crucial roles in the process of President Suharto's resignation. This political significance of the Muslim intelligentsia was accentuated during the period of President Habibie's interregnum when the cabinet and senior administration were composed largely of ICMI members. At the same time, the leadership of the Golkar party (as the heir to the New Order's political machine) came to be dominated by former activists of the Islamic University Students' Association (HMI). This culminated in the selection of Abdurrahman Wahid (former chairman of *Nahdlatul Ulama*) as President succeeding Habibie, along with the appointment of Muslim figures as senior state officials.

Although the Muslim intelligentsia in the late twentieth century was able to achieve greater intellectual credibility as well as better political and bureaucratic positions, Muslim politics as a whole suffered from a relative decline of its mass political base. In the 1998 election, the vote for all Muslim parties, including parties which adhered to *Pancasila* principles, was only 36.38 per cent, thus providing only 37.46 per cent of the total seats in the DPR (Parliament — 173 out of a total of 462 seats).⁶ Furthermore, as the Muslim intelligentsia's political and bureaucratic position improved, most senior Islamic leaders became less-obsessed with Islamic claims. Their obsession with the agenda of reinstalling the so-called "Jakarta Charter"⁷ in the state constitution lessened.

This picture of the Muslim intelligentsia in the late twentieth century stands in contrast to that in the early twentieth century. During the early decades of the century, only a few of the best educated segments of Indonesian intelligentsia joined Islamic associations such as *Sarekat Islam* [SI, Islamic Union], for most of them preferred to join organizations with *priyayi* links such as *Budi Utomo* [Glorious Endeavour]. In championing the voice of the oppressed people, however, the SI emerged as the first Indies association with an Indies-wide constituency, attracting the largest membership among the existing associations. By late twentieth century, a vast number of the best educated segments of Indonesian society had joined associations of Muslim students and intelligentsia (such as HMI, ICMI, and KAMMI) as well as Muslim parties. However, the attraction of Muslim politics at the grass-roots level tended to wane.

Despite the political preponderance of the Muslim intelligentsia and the strengthening of Muslims' political inclusivism, Islamic parties and

communal identities were sustained. The survival of this Muslim identity politics can be seen from the efforts of particular segments of the Muslim intelligentsia, especially those of the younger generation, to struggle for the implementation of Islamic Law (*shari'a*). At the same time, Islamic labels were still widely used as names of intellectual and political organizations.⁸

Alongside the emergence of liberal and illiberal Muslim parties, the contestation of political ideologies and identities both between and within intellectual traditions continued with different agendas and with varying intensity and expression. Muslim politics experienced an unprecedented internal fragmentation evident in the emergence of a plethora of Muslim political parties. During the reform era, even the Muslim intelligentsia who had united under ICMI split into various party orientations.

All these features reflect the continuity and changes in the development of Muslim intelligentsia. This diachronic and synchronic presentation of the Muslim intelligentsia deserves serious academic attention. The Indonesian intelligentsia has been, to use Shils' words, the "instigator", "leader", and "executant" of national politics (Shils 1972, p. 387). For one reason or another, the high degree of the Indonesian intelligentsia's political involvement and preoccupation with authority continued to be a basic feature of Indonesian politics. Thus, endeavouring to understand the continuity and changes in the development of the Muslim intelligentsia is crucial to understanding the continuity and changes in the formation of the Indonesian elite and its politics.

Moreover, the transformation of the Muslim intelligentsia from the margins to the centre of the Indonesian polity and bureaucracy appears perplexing in the context of existing studies on the modern Indonesian elite and politics. Clifford Geertz in his seminal work, *The Religion of Java* (1960, 1976), depicted the aristocratic and bureaucratic elements (*priyayi*) of Javanese society as representing a pre-Islamic worldview. He even tended to portray the *priyayi* and the *santri* (pious Muslim element) as mutually exclusive categories.⁹ Robert van Niel (1970) portrayed the modern Indonesian elite as "imitators of Western ways" which gradually pulled "its roots out of Indonesian society" (1970, pp. 23–27). R. William Liddle (1973) highlighted the dominance of "secular modernising intellectuals" during the rise of the New Order. Donald K. Emmerson (1976) noticed that "in the late 1960's and early 1970's, Indonesia's military, technocratic, and bureaucratic regime could be called Muslim neither in name nor in practice" (1976, p. 23).¹⁰ Ruth McVey (1989) described "faith" (Islam) as the outsider in the Indonesian polity.

The growing influence of the Muslim intelligentsia, intellectually, politically and bureaucratically, after the long period of the marginalization of political Islam, offers new insights into the importance of considering multiple determinations of politics and multiple arenas of power relations. On the other hand, the weakening of Muslim parties' attraction to grass-roots voters and the changing political attitude among senior members of the Muslim intelligentsia in the late twentieth century indicate the importance of considering synchronic states within a diachronic development of the Muslim intelligentsia.

This book examines the genealogy of Muslim intelligentsia (and power) in twentieth century Indonesia. In this effort, the *longue durée* approach is combined with an interactive, inter-disciplinary and inter-textual method to better understand the various underlying impulses and interactions contributing to continuity and change in the long-term development of the Muslim intelligentsia and its relation to power.

FOUNDATIONS OF ANALYSIS

In this study of the "genealogy of the Muslim intelligentsia (and power) in twentieth century Indonesia", there are at least five conceptual terms that require further clarification: genealogy, Muslim, intelligentsia, power, and Indonesia.

Genealogy

The term "genealogy" here is defined in terms both of its conventional and Foucauldian senses. In following traditional historical and anthropological studies, "genealogy" can be defined as the study of the evolution and network of a particular group of people over several generations. This notion of genealogy is meaningful to consider the diachronic development and inter-generational intellectual chain of the Muslim intelligentsia.

In a Foucauldian sense, "genealogy" is history written in the light of current concerns. In Foucault's view, history is always written from the perspective of the present; history fulfils a need of the present. The fact that the present is always in a process of transformation means that the past must be continually re-evaluated. In his sense, "genealogy does not pretend to go back in time to restore an unbroken continuity". On the contrary, "it is to identify the accidents, the minute deviations". It focuses on ruptures, synchronic states and the union of erudite knowledge and local memories (Foucault 1994, 1996; Lechte 1995, pp. 110–15). "Genealogy" in this sense

is meaningful to consider the dynamics, transformation and discontinuity in the historical development of the Muslim intelligentsia.

Thus, the genealogical reading of this work will situate synchronic states in diachronic time. The celebration of the Saussurean and Foucauldian emphasis upon the importance of studying synchronic moments will be balanced by the attention to a long-span diachronic process. As Penelope J. Corfield rhetorically questions (1991, p. 6): “How successfully can synchronic structures be studied without reference to the inexorable flow of space-time?” If the study of synchronic moments expresses the historical disjuncture of social formation, the study of diachronic time may explain the persisting network of traces and memories of a longer contested history.¹¹ “Every historical state of affairs presented dialectically”, said Walter Benjamin, “polarizes and becomes a force field (*Kraftfeld*) in which the conflict between fore- and after-history plays itself out” (1980, p. 60).

The study of diachronic continuity in combination with synchronic change is important to look at the “structuration” of intellectual traditions in Giddens’ sense (1984). The intellectual ideas, role and self-perception depend to a great extent upon the historically structured constraints of particular cultural and intellectual traditions on the possibility of action and the desires of human agencies. Intelligentsia and/or intellectuals are part of an historical process in which human actors reinvent cultural and intellectual traditions in different contexts (Eisenstadt 1973).

The concern in this book with the diachronic process of the development of Muslim intelligentsia and power is meaningful as mainstream analysts of Indonesian politics have given too much attention to synchronic states in political Islam. The concentration of political analysis on day-to-day political events risks focusing too much attention on, to borrow Fernand Braudel’s view (1980), individual time, the time of the “conjuncture” for its own sake, without considering the time of the “*longue durée*”.

In disregarding the time of the “*longue durée*”, Geertz’s trichotomy of “*santri-abangan-priyayi*”¹² failed to see the backward and forward construction of the *priyayi* worldview. He might wonder that long before he conducted his fieldwork in the 1950s, some figures of the newly born Indies intelligentsia of the early twentieth century such as Tjipto Mangunkusumo, Tirta Adhi Surjo, Agus Salim, Tjokroaminoto, the Djajadiningrat brothers and Sutomo were actually sons of *priyayi* families with strong *santri* religious backgrounds (see chapter 3). He might also wonder that some decades after his research, the image of the *santri* as the trading element of Indonesian society came to be overshadowed by the image of the *santri* as neo-bureaucrat.

On the other hand, the concern with synchronic change is important to save intellectual history from the assumption of essentialism. Mochtar Pabottingi (1982), for instance, in his study on Indonesian intellectuals before the revolution of 1945, came to the conclusion that the Indonesian intellectual had always been attached to, and never been alienated from, the masses. In fact, there had been a moment for intellectuals of the first generation of Indonesian intelligentsia, when their public sphere was initially confined to a nucleus of educated *priyayi*, while the public, in the wider sense of the masses, was an anonymous, faceless and indifferent, third party.

Attention to synchronic changes will also reveal that the Muslim intelligentsia's political identities are not a fixed and stable construction, unfolding from beginning to end through all the vicissitudes of history without change. To borrow Stuart Hall words (1997, p. 4): "Identities are about questions of using the resources of history, language and culture in the process of becoming.... They are subject to a radical historicization, and constantly in the process of change and transformation." Individuals are also made up of many identities, and this multiplicity is constructed in different contexts (Mouffe 2000). In this process of transformation and construction, discursive practices play a decisive role. As Hall noted (1997, p. 4): "Identities are constructed within, not outside, discourse, we need to understand them as produced in specific historical and institutional sites within specific discursive formation and practices."

Muslim

The term "Muslim" in this book is not a signifier for everyone who embraces the Islamic religion and is not a reference to religious piety. Those who belong to the Muslim intelligentsia are not necessarily pious Muslims, and those who do not belong to the Muslim intelligentsia are not necessarily impious Muslims. "Muslim" here is a signifier for the Islamic-oriented, intellectual-political traditions constructed by discursive practices in a particular historical moment of Indonesian history. "Islamic orientation" refers to the association (of these intellectual-political traditions) with Islamic ideologies and/or collectivities. These Islamic ideologies are diverse and divergent because of the presence of contestation and various opposing positions, while Islamic collectivities include Islamic "epistemic communities" (schools, religious outreach and orders, etc.), Islamic associations (foundation, societies and political parties) and Islamic action groups. The notion of "Islamic" as the adjective of these collectivities is again constructed in specific historical and institutional sites within specific

discursive formation and practices. As such it is subject to contestation, change and transformation.

The term “Muslim” develops out of competing discourses and clashes with other identities, and because of this, there is a political dimension. The term has been politicized for several reasons. First, this could be a reflection of a fragmented nationalism. This fragmentation emanated from the plurality of the nation and the diversity of collective memories and identities as well as the multifarious nature of subject positions, intellectual traditions and networks of Indonesian society.

From the vantage point of these perspectives, the preoccupation with Islamic identity politics and symbols signifies a double-bind situation. On the one hand, it can be interpreted as what Alain Touraine might call a “historical action” of a particular collective identity in the “struggle for historicity” (Touraine 1981). On the other hand, it indicates a recurring tendency of the post-colonial pathology signified by continuous contradictions arising from its indisputable historical belatedness. According to Albert Memmi (the Tunisian anti-colonial revolutionary and intellectual), this pathology of post-colonial limbo between “the visible apparatus of freedom and the concealed persistence of unfreedom”, “arrival and departure”, “independence and dependence”, has its roots in “the residual traces and memories of subordination” (Gandhi 1998, pp. 6–7).

Second, this politicization of Islamic symbolism seems to be the infectious residue of what W.F. Wertheim (1980) once called the “majority with minority mentality” syndrome, emanating from the ironical stance of Islam in this nation:

A great majority of Indonesians profess the Islamic religion. From a quantitative point of view Indonesia could even count as the largest “Islamic country” in the world. Yet, the attitudes of the Moslem community (the *ummat* Islam) in that country are typically those of a minority group. This is largely due to the fact that, in the political field, throughout the history of the past centuries, the representatives of the Moslem community have rather consistently been assigned an outsider’s role. (Wertheim 1980, p. 1)

Third, the term “Muslim” has been frequently politicized because of internal conflicts within the Muslim community in the contestation for the “true” representation of Islam. The heterogeneity of Indonesian Muslim backgrounds, in terms of ethnicity, culture, geography and religious schools, in combination with the lesser pressure of non-Muslims (at least in terms of number) in most Indonesian regions, has provided a greater opportunity for internal variations within the Islamic community. As a result, Indonesian

Muslim politics have been characterized by diversity, by contestation, and by various opposing positions, which often stimulated an intense politicization of Islam.

Last but not least, for many Muslims of the younger generation, especially those who grew up during the late New Order modernization, the obsession with Islamic symbolism might also be encouraged by the intrusion of the post-modern condition and the global penetration of mass culture. Living in a post-modern world, as Baudrillard (1992) has reminded us, is living in an interpenetration of cultural experiences and pluralization of life-worlds with the indefinite reproduction of ideals and proliferation of consumer lifestyles leading to the differentiation and fragmentation of worldview. These developments have had a severe impact on Indonesian Muslims, as on any other religious communities in the world, representing for Muslim activists a new threat of indirect colonial penetration in the form of the secularization of culture. Thus, a return to “Muslim identity”, to borrow Turner’s view, is “an attempt to create a new *gemeinschaft*, a new version of the traditional household which would close off the threat of postmodernity by re-establishing a communal ideology” (Turner 1994, p. 93).

In other words, the preoccupation with Islamic identities and symbols is an indication of what Geertz called the relentless Muslims’ “struggle for the real” (1972, p. 324),¹³ as a reflection of huge discrepancies and long-term struggles between Islamic ideals and realities. An allusion to this point of view has been made by Abu-Rabi’: “Islamism, thus, is a reflection of a pathological crisis that is deeply rooted in Muslim society” (Abu-Rabi’ 1996, p. 59).

Intelligentsia and Intellectual

The main concern of this book is with the genealogy of the collective entity of Muslim “intelligentsia” — as a sub-stratum of Indonesia’s (modern-educated) intelligentsia — rather than that of individual Muslim “intellectuals”. In describing the development of a particular group of the intelligentsia, however, attention to the role of individual intellectuals as formulators and articulators of collective identities and ideologies is unavoidable.

To define an “intelligentsia” and “intellectual” is notoriously problematic. Both terms have been widely and ambiguously used in the discourse on Indonesian history and politics. There has been a lack of understanding that each has its own genealogy and specific social formation, and refers to a distinct social concept and phenomenon. Mohammad Hatta, in his historic speech before the *civitas academica* of the University of Indonesia on 11 June 1957, “*Tanggung Jawab Moril Kaum Inteligensia*” [The Moral Responsibility

of the Intelligentsia], interpreted “intelligentsia” as synonymous with “intellectual” and used Benda’s conception of intellectual in *La Trahison des Clercs* [The Betrayal of Intellectuals] as his conceptual framework (Hatta 1957). Selo Soemardjan wrote “The Changing Role of Intellectuals in Indonesian National Development” (1981) to indicate the role of intelligentsia. He argued: “...the concept of ‘intellectual’ in the sense of those who are regarded or regard themselves as intellectuals should be taken as identical with the word ‘intelligentsia’ ” (Soemardjan 1981, pp. 139–40). At the same time, Arief Budiman wrote “Students as Intelligentsia: The Indonesian Experience” (1981) using the framework of Western European literatures on “intellectual”, in which the term “intellectual” and “intelligentsia” had been used interchangeably. At one point, he stated that Indonesian students belong to “the intellectual group” (p. 224). At another point, he depicted the students as the intelligentsia (p. 225). Just a few months before I completed this work, Daniel Dhakidae published his book on Indonesian intellectuals during the New Order, *Cendekiawan dan Kekuasaan dalam Negara Orde Baru* (2003). Yet, he made no clear distinction between the concept of “intellectual” and “intelligentsia”. While associating the term “*cendekiawan*” with “intellectual”, he used the Russian “intelligentsia” as an example of the presentation of intellectuals (pp. 8–9).

Such ambiguity is not only evident in the study of Indonesia but also commonly occurs in Western (scientific) discourse. According to Aleksander Gella (1976), Western sociologists for a considerable time “did not even notice the difference between intellectuals in the West and that unique social formation which, under the name intelligentsia, began to develop in Russia and Poland during the middle of the nineteenth century”. He pointed out that the term “intelligentsia” did not receive a separate entry either in the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* or in the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*. Moreover, he noticed that in the work of Robert Michels (1932) and Edward Shils (1968) both terms were not regarded as different concepts. While Michels used these terms interchangeably, Shils “was more consistent and wrote exclusively about intellectuals, omitting nearly all reference to their East-European counterparts” (Gella 1976, p. 19).

Gella’s description is an indication of the existence of contrasting approaches in tackling the term “intellectual” and “intelligentsia”, between the formalistic and historical approach. The first approach is quite typical of sociologists of Western Europe and America, who are generally inclined to identify the intelligentsia with intellectuals. In this approach both intellectual and intelligentsia denote an individual or group of individuals dealing with ideas, and fulfilling a social role as men and women of ideas. The second

approach is maintained mainly by sociologists and historians of Eastern Europe who tend to see the intelligentsia as a unique and particular phenomenon. In this approach, both terms are perceived as belonging to specific social formations and as such cannot be used interchangeably, for they have their own historical trajectories and social consequences (Gella 1976, pp. 11–12).

Intelligentsia

In contrast to groups of intellectuals, the intelligentsia appeared from its beginning as a social stratum.¹⁴ This stratum emerged in Poland and Russia during the reign of Peter the Great (but it did not have much shape until the 1860s), composed of the better educated segment of society but distinct from other educated people of the upper classes. The main constitutive element of this rising stratum was an education in and orientation towards European culture, especially in the realm of technical knowledge and science, which exceeded the already established adoption of European manners and mannerism by the nobility (Gella 1976; Eyerman 1994).

It is said that until the eighteenth century, Russian intellectual life was religious in character. In the following centuries, however, the Russian Muscovites (*intelligenty*) came increasingly under secular influence of Western Europe as a consequence of the expansion of Russia by military conquests and annexation, the “new window” opening on to the West, and the establishment of more enduring contacts with the countries “beyond the seas”. This process of Westernization-cum-secularization was considerably enlarged during the reign of Peter the Great, through his policy of extensive cultural borrowings which left the *Muscovy* fully exposed to Western influences in the fields of technical knowledge and science (Nahirny 1983, pp. 19–20). The initial bearer of this *mission sacre* of cultural borrowings was the gentry — the stratum whose members were charged with serving the state. Yet the reliance on the gentry as the principal bearers of the mission was doomed to fail, as it was the stratum of society which was least disposed to assume this role. By the second half of the nineteenth century, people from more diverse classes and social strata subsequently engaged in the process,¹⁵ which led to the constitution of the distinct strata of intelligentsia (Nahirny 1983, pp. 22–24).

Vladimir C. Nahirny (1983) and Aleksander Gella (1976) share a common understanding of the main characteristic of this stratum. According to Nahirny, the intelligentsia, as a distinct group of people, admittedly stood

above, and outside of, the established social order — either class or estate system. He then described it further:

By virtue of this position, the members of the intelligentsia were neither bound together by class or occupational interests nor formed a status group of individuals enjoying definite rights and immunities derived from custom and/or law. To that extent the intelligentsia differed from conventional social formations — personal cliques, occupational status groups, associations of professional people, or corporate bodies. Although it is true that matrix of the intelligentsia was the educated stratum of society, individual members of this stratum belonged to the ranks of the intelligentsia neither by virtue of their education and professional competence, nor their intellectual accomplishment alone. (Nahirny 1983, pp. 7–8)

In parallel to Nahirny, Gella argues that to be a social stratum, the intelligentsia is much more than just a group of people united by certain intellectual interests, educational levels or occupational relations. “The old intelligentsia was united neither by economic standard of life and income nor by occupational vested interests, but mainly by sharing certain attitudes, and accepting a cultural heritage larger than the national one” (Gella 1976, p. 13). In addition: “Members of the intelligentsia, without respect to their occupations and economic status, were united by one common calling: ‘serve your nation’ ” (p. 14). This calling in the Russian experience was galvanized by the impetus to abolish Tsarism, to destroy the old state by peaceful or revolutionary means. In Poland, the motivation was a double one: to abolish the empires of the oppressors as well as to rebuild the independent Polish state (p. 15).

Unlike Russia and Poland, in the free-market societies of Western Europe, educated people did not form a separate stratum. In most Western free-market societies, educated people (intellectuals) appear as an organic part of classes. They can be attached to the middle and upper or even proletariat classes (Konrád and Szelényi 1979; Gella 1976, p. 20). Thus, to be an intellectual in the Western European societies is by no means to change one’s class attachment or class-consciousness. In Poland and Russia, however, the intelligentsia formed a stratum in their own right by assuming a collective identity emanating from common psychological characteristics, manners, lifestyle, social status, value system and historical calling (Gella 1976, p. 13).

The leadership of this stratum was articulated by a relatively small group of moral and intellectual leaders. In Gella’s words: “The beliefs, the moral attitudes, and the political behaviour of these leaders were not fully duplicated by all members of the intelligentsia” (Gella 1976, p. 13). By and large,

however, an average member of intelligentsia maintained the intelligentsia's collective identity by imitating the manners and, at least verbally, the basic mores and value goals of the intellectual leaders of this stratum. In short, this stratum of the intelligentsia had its own intellectuals who performed the role of formulators and articulators of a collective identity.

Intellectual

The last sentence links the discourse of intelligentsia with the discourse of intellectuals in Western societies. The term "*les intellectuels*" which was coined by Clemenceau acquired widespread usage in France in 1898 as a repercussion of the "*manifeste des intellectuels*" awakened by the Dreyfus Case (Feuer 1976, p. 48; Gella 1976, p. 19). In 1896, Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish captain in the French army was convicted of espionage and stripped of his rank by a military tribunal and sentenced to jail for the rest of his life. In protesting against the arbitrariness of the decision, Emile Zola, a well-known popular novelist, published an open letter on the front page of a small Parisian newspaper, accusing members of the French army of fabricating evidence, manipulating and covering up the facts of the case. This letter, which came to be known as the "*manifeste des intellectuels*" (the Manifesto of the intellectuals) caused a split among the French *litterati* who formed two groups: Dreyfusards (the defenders of Dreyfus) and anti-Dreyfusards. Out of this polarization the term "intellectual" emerged, initially as an abusive term with a negative connotation. To the anti-Dreyfusards, who spoke from the point of view of the established institutions of the state, the term "intellectual" was used to indicate market-oriented writers and celebrities linked with the Dreyfusards. The effect of this labelling, however, was to galvanize the Dreyfusards, giving them a name and consciousness of their own new social identity. Since that time, the word "intellectual" not only became a popular term but also a model for a new form of intervention into public life as well as a role to be played (Eyerman 1994, pp. 23–53).

Thus, the intellectual in its incipience refers to an identifiable group with a self-proclaimed mission to defend a collective conscience on basic political questions. In later developments, however, definitions of the intellectual multiplied and became more diverse. "Every definition they propose," Zygmunt Bauman argued, "is an attempt to draw a boundary of their own identity. Each boundary splits the territory into two sides: here and there, in and out, us and them" (Bauman 1989, p. 8).

In following Eyerman (1994, p. 1), those various definitions can be put into two categories. First, the definition which interprets the intellectual in

terms of personal characteristics, such as “a person for whom thinking fulfils at once the function of work and play” (Lasch 1965) or those “who never seem satisfied with things as they are” (Coser 1965, p. viii). Michael Walzer (1989) and Paul Johnson (1988) followed and developed this kind of definition. Second, the definition which links the term to a particular social structure and function. This has been shared, for instance, by Seymour Martin Lipset who defined intellectuals as those “who create, distribute, and apply culture” (1960, p. 311), Alvin Gouldner (1979), George Konrád and Ivan Szelényi (1979), Pierre Bourdieu (1984, 1988), and Antonio Gramsci (1971).

In addition to Eyerman, theories about the social function of intellectuals can be divided by and large into two contending perspectives. On the one hand, political theorists influenced by Marx and Lenin saw the positions of intellectuals as determined mainly by their relationship to power or economic structure. On the other hand, sociologists influenced by Weber’s ideas saw the positions of intellectuals in terms of their relationship to knowledge (Miller 1999).

The most influential exponent of the first perspective was Gramsci. For him, it was highly problematic to identify intellectuals as people with certain allegedly innate special qualities.¹⁶ In his view, everyone “carries on some form of intellectual activity”, “but not all men have in society the function of intellectuals” (Gramsci 1971, pp. 8–9). Thus, the determining factor whether someone is to be categorized as an intellectual or manual worker lies in “social function”. In contrast to the liberal view of intellectuals as somehow “above” or “outside” society, Gramsci views the intellectual as an integral part of the concrete materiality of those processes that constitute societies. On the basis of the social function and social affinity of intellectuals, Gramsci distinguished two categories of intellectuals: “traditional” and “organic” intellectuals. Under the category of traditional intellectuals, he included not only philosophers, *literati*, scientists and other academics, but also lawyers, doctors, teachers, clerics and military leaders (Gramsci 1971, pp. 7, 9). In his judgement, traditional intellectuals unavoidably acted as accomplices of the ruling group. Even when they were critical of the *status quo*, they ultimately allowed the dominant value system to shape the terms of their debates (Gramsci 1971, pp. 7–8, 12). For him, organic intellectuals referred to intellectuals who function as the formulators and articulators of class ideologies and interests with a specific emphasis on those of the rising class (the working class). He argued that all social groups that played a historically significant economic role created their own intellectuals to justify that role: “Every social group, coming into existence on the original terrain of an essential function, creates together with itself, organically, one or more strata of intellectuals which give

it homogeneity and awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields” (Gramsci 1971, p. 5).

Gramsci’s notion of organic intellectual drew on the Marxist interpretation of social formation in the European context which subsumes questions of status to class interests. He thus incorporates organic intellectual into the class structure. In countries where class formation was far less clear-cut or consolidated than in Europe, however, Weber’s argument that status cannot satisfactorily be reduced to class found its justification.¹⁷ In Indonesia, for instance, where class formation had never become the main basis of social incorporation, many intellectuals attached themselves to cultural solidarity groupings rather than to class. Another problem comes from Gramsci’s notion that the intellectual activities of organic intellectuals are directed entirely toward furthering the interests of their own class. Thus, the organic intellectuals of the proletariat would be people of working class origins. This is problematic, especially in the context of non-European countries such as in Latin America and in Indonesia, for the overwhelming majority of intellectuals, even most intellectuals of the working-class (the Communist Party), have been people of aristocrat and (petty) bourgeois origin.

The limitations of the Gramscian notion of the intellectual leaves room for the Weberian conception. In Weber’s view, the sphere of ideas is relatively autonomous from that of economics; so that intellectuals as the sounding board of the sphere of ideas do not necessarily advocate ideas that are conducive to their material interests. In Sadri’s *Max Weber’s Sociology of Intellectuals* (1992), it is said that the intellectuals’ attitude towards ideas is less determined by practical considerations. This is not meant to imply that intellectuals are more apt to disregard their own interests for the sake of ideas. Rather, it means that their “ideal interests” (in tracing the immanent process of rationalization) counterbalance, occasionally precede, and may even contradict their material interests (Sadri 1992, p. 70). According to the Weberian perspective, intellectuals were, by the nature of their commitment to the pursuit of truth and their shared discourse of critical reason, distanced if not altogether divorced from society and maintained a critical perspective on power (Miller 1999, p. 13). Weber tolerated participation of intellectuals in “politics” if they were individuals and individualists with the commitment to save the world from becoming the prison of individuality and the graveyard of freedom (Sadri 1992, pp. 84 and 97). Julien Benda’s classical book *La Trahison des Clercs* [The Betrayal of the Intellectuals]¹⁸ is a representative par excellence of the conception of intellectual in this perspective. Intellectuals, for him, should be “essentially those whose activity is *not* the pursuit of practical aims” (Benda 1959, p. 30).

The critique of this perspective has been argued by Gramsci. In addition, this perspective is also problematic in the context of post-colonial and Third World countries where intellectuals have become not only organic parts of social and political forces but also as instigators and leaders of national politics. Fredric Jamison even tends to exaggerate the situation by saying that “in the third-world situation the intellectual is always a political intellectual” (Robbins 1990, p. ix).

As a response to the shortcomings of both perspectives, a middle way conception has emerged since the 1970s which recognizes the inter-relationship between power and knowledge. This synthesis emerged from scholars of the Marxist tradition (Raymond Williams’ development of cultural history (1958)), of the sociological tradition (Pierre Bourdieu’s work on cultural and political “fields” (1984)) and French post-structuralism (most notably Michel Foucault (1980)).¹⁹ Eyerman’s description of “intellectual” (1994) represents not only a synthesis but also highlights the importance of considering intellectual traditions in particular socio-spatial contexts. For him, it is true that the production/market relations and the capacity of individual human capital have a significant impact on the constitution of the intellectual, but the main formative element of the intellectual is the commitment to norms and traditions; that is the commitment to articulate the fundamental notions of a collective identity and conscience, by embodying and practising the unity of truth, moral values and aesthetic judgment. It is in the process of giving voice to the collective conscience and tradition that an individual intellectual response may lead to collective action (Eyerman 1994, p. 6).

Beyond these perspectives, there has been a recent attempt to conceptualize “intellectuals” as a distinct collective entity in the form of class in its own right. This notion based on an assumption that the processes of modernization and industrialization have been followed by the expansion of non-manual occupations, overstepping the footprint of what Gramsci calls “traditional” intellectuals, such as teachers, clergies, literary and scientific professions. The upper levels of these non-manual occupations, composed of activities based on “mental skills” or sometimes called “human” or “cultural” capital, are the ground for what can be called “intellectual labour”. It is from the growing significance of this intellectual labour that the definition of the intellectual as a distinct social class takes its basis. As the bargaining position of this intellectual labour in the production and/or market relations is more and more powerful, some have assumed the emergence of a “new class” (Gouldner 1979) or “knowledge class” (Bell 1973).

This notion of intellectual as a new class, however, is problematic. Not only does the concept remain academically debatable — because of the

substantial internal differentiation within its ranks,²⁰ but it does not fit with conditions of many developing countries such as Indonesia. According to Alvin Gouldner, the possessor of cultural capital could emerge as a class in its own right for it has “considerable *de facto* control over the mode of production and hence considerable leverage with which to pursue its interest” (Gouldner 1979, p. 12). In fact, the Indonesian intelligentsia from its emergence in the early twentieth century up to the end of the century did not possess such a powerful control over the mode of production. They were predominantly government employees and humanistic intellectuals who had no strong connection to the productive sector of the economy.

At this point we may draw some conclusions about the main differences between intelligentsia and intellectual. From the very beginning, the term “intelligentsia” referred to a social stratum and indicated the “collective response” of a particular collective identity, as a reflection of common educational criteria, psycho-socio-graphics, value system, *habitus* and collective memory. On the other hand, the term “intellectual” originally referred to the “individuality” of people of ideas and indicated the individual response of people of ideas to a specific historical “call” or social function. The collectivity of intellectuals is made possible by a common response to a particular historical call, such as the collectivity of French intellectuals evoked by a common response to the Dreyfus affair, or a collective action in articulating tradition and interests of a particular established class or other social groupings. With the coming of the so-called post-industrial society, there has been an attempt to conceptualize “intellectual labour” within a collective entity, namely, the “new class” or “knowledge class”. This term, however, remains debatable academically and has little relevance to the Indonesian reality.

Intelligentsia and Intellectual in the Indonesian Context

How should we ground the term “intelligentsia” and “intellectual” in an Indonesian social formation and historical context? There is no doubt that the intellectual role or specific social function of people of ideas in the archipelago has long been performed by the courtly-oriented “*pandita*” [priest], “*resi*” [ascetic guru], “*kyia*” or “*ulama*” [religious scholars]. Nevertheless, the understanding of the term “intellectual” or “intelligentsia” and its cognates in the modern Indonesian context refers to a specific social formation and historical trajectory, resulting from the introduction of a Western education system in this country — initially by Christian missionaries and the Dutch colonial administration and then by other social agencies.

The genesis of the modern Indonesian educated-elite is more or less similar to the genesis of intelligentsia in the Polish and Russian historical context. Although the socio-historical conditions for the development of the Indonesian *intelligenty* have been very different from those in nineteenth century Eastern Europe, there is one basic formal similarity. This similarity, to borrow Gella's view, is the appearance of a generation educated and influenced by an imported Western body of ideas and knowledge (Gella 1976, p. 17). Moreover, in common with the Russian experience, the prototypes of East Indies (now Indonesian) Western-educated people that emerged in late nineteenth century also came largely from the nucleus of noble families. With the expansion of colonial government and private-capitalist bureaucracy, however, people of diverse status groups were gradually exposed to modern education. By the early twentieth century, these *homines novi* with Western education emerged as a stratum in their own right,²¹ who shared a common occupational orientation, habitus, language, cognitive structure and sense of social responsibility.

While the old intelligentsia of Eastern Europe came into being as a relatively homogenous stratum with common traditions, the Indonesian intelligentsia from its early formation has been heterogenous both in terms of social position and traditions. This heterogeneity reflects not only the diversity of its social-class origin but also the plurality of its religio-cultural, ethnic and territorial backgrounds. As a result of this internal fragmentation, the Indonesian intelligentsia has never formed a unified social stratum. In addition, while the Czarist state as promoter of the intelligentsia in the Russian context was an integral part of the Russian society, the colonial state as a promoter of the East Indies intelligentsia was an "alien" state with various discriminative and segregative policies. In discriminative and segregative situations, the attempts to create a modern educated elite with Western secular values and principles was subject to antithetical tendencies once members of the intelligentsia found a way back to their own moorings. Some of those who came from strong Muslim family backgrounds, for instance, because of their disenchantment with the colonial situation and/or their encounter or re-encounter with Islamic figures and their epistemic community and associations, reattached themselves to the Islamic intellectual community. In this reattachment, they began to enrich their religious knowledge resulting in the emergence of the so-called *intelek-ulama* [intelligentsia who were literate in religious knowledge].

Moreover, the colonial-state promotion of Western education constructed the colonial hierarchies of knowledge and values that reinforced what Edward Said calls the "dreadful secondariness" of some segments of

society and cultures (Said 1989, p. 207). This provided the impetus for the insurrection of subjugated knowledges by using, among other things, the strategy of mimicry and appropriation. The Islamic epistemic community, for instance, made every effort to adopt modern educational apparatus, methods and curriculum as the vehicle to revitalise Islamic teachings and endurance. There emerged the so-called *madrasah* educational system in which modern apparatuses and methods were introduced and religious subjects were taught side by side with secular ones. This led to the emergence of a “clerical-intelligentsia” that came to be known as *ulama-intelekt* [Islamic clerics who were literate in modern knowledge].

As members of the Indonesian intelligentsia began to formulate an ideological response to the repressive colonial state, the plurality of their socio-cultural backgrounds gave rise to ideological differences. Consequently, members of the intelligentsia were divided into several intellectual political traditions. Thus, there emerged a group of Muslim intelligentsia, communist intelligentsia, nationalist intelligentsia, socialist intelligentsia, Christian intelligentsia and so on. In conflicts among these intellectual traditions, each group attempted to expand its followers by attaching itself to established status groups (cultural solidarity groups). In these circumstances, the Indonesian intelligentsia became a fractured social stratum that made it difficult to identify it as a distinct social stratum. Even so, they continued to share common social privilege, language, habitus, educational features and occupational orientation. In other words, the Indonesian intelligentsia reflects a collective expression in terms of “identity in difference” and “difference in identity”.

However huge the differences among them, the Indonesian intelligentsia belonged to a minority group of the modern Indonesian elite who were able to hold leadership positions in Indonesian society, polity and bureaucracy. The term “elite” here means “minorities of people who are especially influential in shaping society’s various institutional structures or spheres of activity. In modern society such structures and spheres include politics, administration, the economy, the military and the sphere of culture” (Etzioni-Halevy 1985, p. 15). Since the Indonesian intelligentsia as a social stratum became blurred, the term “elite” could also be used to describe the intelligentsia’s social formation after the 1920s. The Indonesian intelligentsia was part of Indonesian historical dynamics, and therefore its social formation was subject to historicization and transformation.

The first Indonesian (Malay) terminology to indicate the genesis of the Indies intelligentsia was “*bangsawan pikiran*” [the nobility by intellect] that began to emerge in the public sphere in the first decade of the twentieth

century. This term was a code for the new generation of modern-educated Indies people associated with the movement towards *kemadjoean* [progress], in contrast to the term “*bangsawan oesoel*” [the nobility by birth], which was associated with the old aristocracy. The term “*bangsawan pikiran*” was used either as a reference to individual intellectuals or to the collective entity of new Indies intelligentsia. To emphasize the presence of the imagined community of the intelligentsia, the collectivity of “*bangsawan pikiran*” was called “*kaoem moeda*” [the new progressive community], while that of “*bangsawan oesoel*” was called “*kaoem toea*” or “*kaoem koeno*” [the old community]. In the 1910s, the opposition of members of the intelligentsia to the old aristocracy led to an effort to dissociate the word “*pikiran*” [intellect] from the word “*bangsawan*” [the nobility], since the term “*bangsawan*” implied a glorification of the old aristocratic privilege. There soon emerged the term “*kaoem terpeladjar*” [educated community], “*pemoeda-peladjar*” [educated-youth] or *jong* [in Dutch]. These terms were used as references to a collective entity of modern educated people.

While the social formation of the modern Indonesian educated-elite resembled the constitution of the intelligentsia in the Eastern European context, the intellectual and conceptual framework of the Indonesian intelligentsia was heavily influenced by theoretical literatures of Western Europe. The word “Dreyfusiana” — referring to — Western Europe’s intellectual’s hero, Alfred Dreyfus — was used by an Indies vernacular paper, *Pembrita Betawi* (1901–03), as the name of one of its columns. The Dutch term “*intellectueel(en)*” for “intellectual(s)” was adopted in the writings of members of the Indies intelligentsia by the 1910s and began to gain its popularity in the public sphere by the 1920s. This was signalled by the establishment in 1923 of the first East Indies association to use the word “*intellectueelen*”, namely the “*Bond van Intellectueelen*” [The Intellectual Union]. On the other hand, the term “*intelligensia*” [intelligentsia] only began to be adopted in Indies writings in the 1930s and to be frequently used in intellectual discourse from the late 1940s, but it never gained the same popularity as the term “*intellectueel(en)*”.²² The Indonesian tendency to use the term “*intellectueelen*” interchangeably with the term “*intelligensia*” followed a similar tendency in Western Europe. Thus, it was quite common in Indonesian intellectual discourse to use the term “*intellectueel(en)*” (with various spellings) to refer to the collective entity of a particular group of the intelligentsia, or to use the term “*intelligensia*” as a reference to an individual intellectual.

The Indonesian difficulty in distinguishing between “intelligentsia” and “intellectual” becomes even more serious in the face of the popularity of the

term “*cendekiawan*”. This term is in fact an Indonesian neologism, synonymous with both the term “intelligentsia” and “intellectual” (Kridalaksana 1994). It is a neologism because the early meaning of the term was very different from its later and current associations. As a neologism it was subject to competing signification and discursive formation.

According to R.J. Wilkinson’s dictionary of pre-twentieth century Malay (1903; 1985), the term etymologically derives from the Hindustani “*chhandikiya*” or “*chandakiya*” — which when adopted into classical Malay (pre-twentieth century), meant “*penipu*” [deceiver] or “*pendaya*” [slanderer]. This word for instance was used in the traditional Malay text *Hikayat Gul Bakuwali*, in expressions such as “*chandakiya mana*”, which means “what deceiver”, “what slander”. Sir Richard Winstedt in his dictionary (1960) has also described that the word “*chēndēkia*” in Malay as a further form of the word “*chandakia*” meaning “*penipu*” [deceiver] or “*pendaya*” [slanderer], but in the Negeri Sembilan region,²³ means “*cherdek*” [smart] or “*pintar*” [clever].

In Indonesia, the word “*tjendekia*” appeared in W.J.S. Poerwadarminta’s dictionary, *Kamus Umum Bahasa Indonesia* (1951), where it is reported to mean “*berakal*”, “*pandai*”, “*tjerdik*” [intelligent, clever, smart] and “*litjik*” [slander], and in Sutan Mohammad Zain’s dictionary, *Kamus Modern Bahasa Indonesia* (1960), where it means “*tjerdik*” [smart]. Furthermore, Zain indicates that the word is associated with Tjanakja, the former prime minister of a kingdom in pre-modern India, who was quite well known for cleverness in rhetoric. Finally, J. Gonda in *Sanskrit in Indonesia* (1952) argued that the word “*cendekia*” or “*candakiya*” (in classical Malay) derives from the word “*canakya*”. This word might refer to the name of a minister in the government of Candra Gupta in India (in the fourth century), who was well known because he was both smart and clever in rhetoric. Alternatively, he added, the word “*canakya*” can also be derived from the Hindi word “*chandi*”, which means tricky and deceitful. Thus, in the Minangkabau world, the word has been used to describe an extraordinarily smart or tricky person.

In the 1960s, the term “*cendekiawan*” (or “*tjendekiawan*” in the old spelling) began to have political connotations synonymous with the concept of “intellectual” or “intelligentsia”. This was signalled by the emergence of a leftist intellectual association, *Organisasi Tjendekiawan Indonesia* (OTI, Indonesian Intellectual Organization), in early 1965. Not long afterwards, the resistance journal of the Bandung chapter of the United Front of Indonesian Scholars (KASI), *Tjendekiawan Berdjuaug* (Intellectual in Struggle), appeared in 1966. By the 1970s the term was regularly used in Indonesian public discourse through the New Order’s policy of replacing Western words and

terminologies with indigenous ones. On 29 March–29 April 1976 there was a national seminar in Manado on “*Peranan dan Tanggung Jawab Cendekiawan dalam Pembangunan*” [The Role and Responsibility of “*Cendekiawan*” in Development]. A few months later (November 1976) *Prisma* (the most famous Indonesian socio-economic journal throughout 1970s–1980s) published a special edition (no. 11) entitled “*Cendekiawan*”. In both cases, the term “*cendekiawan*” was used to refer both to individual “intellectuals” (ranging from *ulama* and local geniuses to the modern-educated intellectual) and to the collective representation of intelligentsia.²⁴

During the 1980s–1990s, the term “*cendekiawan Muslim*” [Islamic-oriented *Cendekiawan*] was widely used in public discourse. The attachment of *cendekiawan* to the adjective “Muslim” in this period reflects the growing influence of the Muslim intelligentsia, as a result of the increasing numbers of Muslim *sarjana* (degree holders), the invention of the Muslim intelligentsia’s communicative sphere centred in mosques of secular universities, the growing influence of Muslim intellectuals with Western university backgrounds, and the deepening accommodation of the Muslim intelligentsia by the New Order bureaucracy and polity. In this context, the term “*cendekiawan*” was mainly attached to particular collective identities emanating from a common social habitus, value system, cognitive structure and collective memories, rather than from some specific historical “call” or social function (as the ground of an intellectual collectivity).

The adjective “Muslim” as an icon of a particular collective identity/tradition was frequently activated in the power struggle both in the axis of state-society relations and in clashes of groups within society. The establishment of various associations of Muslim educated people such as JIB (1925), SIS (est. 1934), GPII (est. 1945), HMI (est. 1947), PII (est. 1947), IPNU (est. 1954), PMII (est. 1960), IMM (est. 1964), *Persami* (est. 1964), ICMI (est. 1990), and KAMMI (est. 1998) can be seen as monuments to the reproduction of the Muslim intelligentsia’s collective traditions and identities in the struggle for historicity.

In this regard, it is clear that the collectivity of Muslim educated people in these various associations as well as in many other cultural and political organizations is best understood as the collectivity of “intelligentsia” rather than the collectivity of “intellectuals”. Even so, it is important to note that there is no collectivity without intellectuals. To quote Gramsci’s view (1959, p. 67): “There is no organization without intellectuals, that is, without organisers and leaders, without the theoretical aspect of the theory-practice nexus distinguishing itself concretely in a stratum of people who ‘specialise’ in its conceptual and philosophical elaboration.”

To describe the individual intellectuals who serve as the re-formulators and articulators of collective ideologies and traditions, this study will adopt Gramsci's term "organic intellectual". Differing slightly from Gramsci's conception (which grounded the term on fundamental social class), "organic intellectual" here will be attached especially to cultural solidarity groupings. While Gramsci theorized that organic intellectuals of a particular class (or group in the context of this study) have to emerge from their own class (group), which was not the case in the Indonesian context. Many leaders of the communist party, for instance, came from (lesser) *priyayi* and (petty) bourgeois families. At the same time, organic intellectuals of the *santri* group might come from non-*santri* origins. In the face of social encounters and inter-relationships, identities are subject to change and transformation. Thus, "organic" in this sense is simply to indicate that this kind of intellectual is an integral part of social forces and to challenge the Weberian notion of the intellectual as divorced from society.

On the other hand, the fact that leaders of the Indonesian Communist Party mostly came from non-working-class origins indicates the importance of considering the Weberian emphasis on the cultural sources of an intellectual's legitimation. The acquisition of knowledge through secular and religious educational institutions is invariably one component of being an intellectual, even if the type of knowledge and educational institution that acquires social prestige may vary widely at different times and in different socio-cultural contexts (Miller 1999, p. 26). Thus, organic intellectuals of the modern Muslim collectivities emerged from members of the intelligentsia and "clerical-intelligentsia" who acquired educational qualifications as sources of (intellectual) legitimation.

Power

Following Foucault, the term "power" here refers to "the total structure of actions" bearing on the actions of individuals who are free; power is exercised over those who are in a position to choose, and it aims to influence what their choices will be. Thus, it involves 'strategic games between liberties' (Foucault 1980, p. 220; Hindess 1996, pp. 99–100).

Foucault criticized the traditional political theory of power for at least three reasons.²⁵ First, orthodox domination theory or the "sovereignty theory" of power views power as fundamentally occasional. Power is a possession of the powerful, and it is at their discretion whether it is used or not. This notion of power, according to Foucault, risks masking its increasing interventions in social life (Foucault 1980, pp. 92–114; Pasewark 1993, pp. 7–9).

Second, the traditional conception, as in Marxist theories, views power as fundamentally tied to the state and as the possession of a few. This monolithic view of power has been criticized by Foucault for concealing the practice of power by a diverse range of social actors and forces as well as impending efforts to analyse strategies of resistance to power (Foucault 1980, p. 156; Pasewark 1993, p. 9). To shift from this view, Foucault developed a different model of power which does not locate power as a possession within the hands of a monolithic state. Foucault states: "I don't want to say that the State isn't important; what I want to say is that relations of power...necessarily extended beyond the limits of the State" (1979, p. 38). Thus, Foucault seems not to minimize the importance of the power of the state; he would rather suggest that power operates around and through the networks which are generated around the institutions of the state; in some senses power has always been more thoroughly dispersed throughout society than has been realized. Power is regarded as a ubiquitous feature of human interaction. It is everywhere and is available to anyone (Mills 1999, p. 39; Hindess 1996, p. 100).

Third, sovereignty theory places power and knowledge in an external relationship to each other. Knowledge is associated not with power but only with reason. This division, in Foucault's view, hides the involvement of power with knowledge. Knowledge is conceived as a sphere of its own, as if it is uninterested in power. For Foucault, knowledge is inseparable from power, as modern power invades all aspects of social life. Knowledge is recognized as an instrument as well as an effect of power (Foucault 1979a, pp. 27, 257–308; Pasewark 1993, pp. 8–9).

Foucault then makes a distinction between the relationship of power as strategic games between liberties and two other types of power relationships, namely, "domination" and "government" (Foucault 1988, p. 19). The reference to power as strategic games between liberties is at the core of his understanding of power in general. In this conception, power "designates relationship between partners" in an ensemble of actions (Foucault 2000, p. 17). It depends on freedom and is exercised over free subjects who are in the position to choose and to influence. Thus, "where there is no possibility of resistance there can be no relation of power". "For this reason, relationships of power will often be unstable, ambiguous and reversible" (Hindess 1996, p. 101).

Where power has been consolidated into "domination", resistance remains possible, but it becomes much more difficult. Domination refers to those asymmetrical relationships of power in which subordinated persons have little room for manoeuvre because their "margin of liberty is extremely limited" by the effect of power (Foucault 1988, p. 12; Hindess 1996, p. 103).

Power exercised in “government” lies between “domination” and strategic games between liberties. “Government” is particularly associated with notions of “conducting” (in the sense of leading and or controlling a series of actions). It refers to a certain less spontaneous exercise of power over others (in more calculated and considered ways) and, particularly, to the use and invention of technologies for the regulation of conduct. In Foucault’s view, “there has been an expansion of government itself relative to straightforward domination on the one hand and to unstable and reversible relations of power on the other” (Hindess 1996, p. 107). Authoritarian governments extensively exercise domination, while democratic governments give more room for reversible power relations.

Based on Foucault’s distinction of the three types of power relationship, it will be highlighted in this study that the problem of power relations in Indonesia is that the “state-government power” for most of Indonesian history has extensively exercised domination rather than reversible power relations. Since the practice of domination has always been accompanied by the practice of discrimination and favouritism, this in turn affected power relations between individuals and groups within society. Thus, “domination” has been exercised not only in state-society interactions but also in power relations within society.

Foucault’s conception of power is important in this book. With the notion of moving away from a fixation on the state and the few, it is possible to view the power struggle of the Indonesian Muslim intelligentsia not only along the axis of state and society relations, but also through clashes of individuals and groups within society. The development and performance of the Muslim intelligentsia can be seen to be influenced by the presentation of significant “others”. The type of power relations exercised by the state-government and other social forces affected the power strategies of Muslim intelligentsia.

The notion of knowledge as inseparable from power provides this study with the insight that the cultural struggle of Muslim intelligentsia might not be merely oriented for the sake of “truth” or religious ends but also for the sake of power interests. Thus, in the recurring emergence of the Indonesian Muslims’ slogan of the return to “*gerakan kebudayaan*” [cultural movement], there could be submerged political motives and strategies.

The notion of power as contestable and reversible enables us to view the possibility of subordinated groups resisting the hegemonic state and governmental power as well as of the prevailing power interplay and interpenetration among various groups of intelligentsia within Indonesian society. No hegemony is so powerful that it exhausts all resources for resistance. “Every power relationship,” said Foucault, “implies, at least

in potentia, a strategy of struggle, in which the two forces are not superimposed, do not lose their specific nature, or do not finally become confused. Each constitutes for the other a kind of permanent limit, a point of possible reversal” (Foucault 2000, p. 25). Even a minority group does not necessarily become the loser in all dimensions of power relations, as politics and societies is comprised of an often complex balance of forces and cannot be reduced to the use of legitimate force alone. Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori put this as follows (1996, p. 8):

Societies, whether European industrial democracies, Third World developing countries, or bedouin tribal communities, are comprised of an often complex balance of forces...While it is true that the highest decision-making body — a parliament, oligarchic elite, ruling junta, or tribal council — often imposes its will and enforces decisions on subordinates, the use of force may sometimes be counterproductive, risking greater instability than is already present. For the sake of collective order, authorities must often mediate differences among various groups in society. They may even find themselves in the position of needing to negotiate social, economic, or political policy with ostensibly subordinate groups.

Thus, despite the preponderance of Muslim intelligentsia in the formal political and bureaucratic structures in the late twentieth century, the attraction of Muslim politics at the grass-roots level tended to wane. At the same time, most senior Muslim leaders tended to be less obsessed with Islamic claims. This indicates the triumph of secular intelligentsia in other arenas of power relations. The winning of a power struggle in a particular sector can lead to the limiting of power in another sector.

The notion of power as a ubiquitous feature of human interaction practised by a diverse range of social actors and forces broadens the horizon of the political sphere and anticipates multiple determinations of politics. Politics as a power practice can be seen as a potentiality in every aspect of social life. Politics as an arena of power relations, actions, and contestations resides not only in the mastery of socio-political capital (party, election, parliament, etc.) or in the ownership of economic capital (money and other economic resources), but also in the control of cultural-symbolic capital (education, discursive formation, and other systems of signification).

For a long time, mainstream analysts of Indonesian politics who attempted to make sense of Indonesian political history and development failed to see beyond surface political phenomena. As David Levine noted (1969, p. 5), most Indonesian political observers limited their concerns to the purely political level and a month-by-month cataloguing of political

events. Because the concern of political analysts was limited by and large to the purely political level, power relations and contestations in the realm of knowledge and meaning tended to be ignored. As a result, political analysis drew a superficial picture of political developments and ignored the complexity and multiple arenas of power struggle.

Based on the assumption that Indonesian Muslims had frequently failed to establish strong political parties, win elections, and control the parliament, many analysts came to the conclusion that Muslim politics had been defeated. There was a little serious attention given to the Muslim struggles in the educational and symbolic field, which might have considerably increased the Muslim intelligentsia's bargaining power. Most political analysts underestimated the regenerative capacity of Muslim intellectuals and politics because they saw intellectual performance and politics as an end product rather than as a process. To approach politics and intellectual performance as a process, it is important to develop an "interactive" model of analysis which emphasizes the ubiquity of power relations as well as the "inter-textuality" and multiple-determinations of politics.

Indonesia

The term "Indonesia" as a code of for an "imagined community" began to be invented by the Indonesian intelligentsia in the 1920s. Before this period, the terms "Netherlands East Indies" (NEI), "Dutch East Indies" (DEI) and "East Indies" (EI) were used in reference to the territory and people under the Dutch colonial administration. In giving attention to synchronic states of a language, this study will use NEI, DEI, or EI for the historical period up to the 1920s and will apply the term Indonesia/Indonesian after the 1920s.

Under the Dutch colonial administration of the twentieth century, East Indies society — based on the Law of 31 December 1906 — was classified into three groups: Europeans (including Eurasians), Natives (*Boemipoetera*), and Chinese and other foreign Orientals (Maier 1993, p. 39). For these groups the colonial administration applied segregation policies which influenced peoples' perception of communal boundaries. Before the proclamation of Indonesian independence in 1945, the term "East Indies/Indonesian intelligentsia" in this book will specifically refer to the "Native" intelligentsia in the sense of this law. After independence, however, the term will be applied to intelligentsia of all Indonesian citizens, including the Chinese and Arab intelligentsia. This is again consistent with the attention to synchronic states.

In practice, the island of Java was the focal point of the East Indies (Indonesian) society. In Java were centred the political, administrative,

educational and economic activities of the NEI (Indonesia). It was also in Java that the majority of the Indonesian population lived. Thus, the term “Indonesian (Muslim) intelligentsia” in this book basically refers to a Java-centred (Muslim) intelligentsia composed of various ethnic backgrounds, although prominent Sumatrans are also included.

PREVIOUS STUDIES OF THE INDONESIAN (MUSLIM) INTELLIGENTSIA AND INTELLECTUALS

Surprisingly, there has been no single systematic study under the rubric of “Indonesian (Muslim) intelligentsia” (or *inteligensia* in Indonesian). Works under this rubric have appeared only as the text of a speech, an anthology, sections of books and articles in newspapers and journals.²⁶ In all these cases, the term “intelligentsia” was interchangeable with “intellectuals”.

The absence of a systematic study of the Indonesian (Muslim) intelligentsia reflects a Weberian bias in approaching Indonesian people of ideas. This approach has been insensitive to the socio-historical context and social formation of people of ideas. As a result, attention has been given to ideas of individual intellectuals rather than to the structural position and collective representation of various groups of Indonesian intelligentsia. Julien Benda’s conception of intellectual has been frequently used in Indonesian intellectual discourse and in the analysis of Indonesian intellectuals, whereas in fact people of ideas in most cases and in most of Indonesian history have been an integral part of their own community and political collectivities.

There have been only few systematic studies under the rubric of “Indonesian (Muslim) intellectuals” (or *intelektual* and *cendekiawan* in Indonesian). Among the few are the works of J. D. Legge (1988), Daniel T. Sparringa (1997), and Daniel Dhakidae (2003) on Indonesian intellectuals in general;²⁷ and the works of Mohammed Kamal Hassan (1980), Howard M. Federspiel’s book (1992), and M. Syafi’i Anwar (1995) on Indonesian Muslim intellectuals.²⁸ The remaining works on Indonesian (Muslim) intellectuals are only minor works, anthologies and thousands of articles in journals and newspapers.²⁹

With the exception of Legge’s work that deals with the period of the Japanese Occupation, all these books on Indonesian (Muslim) intellectuals focused their temporal attention on the New Order historical period. Thus, in terms of temporal orientation, none of these books is concerned with the time of *longue durée*. Some books did look briefly at the historical antecedents of particular synchronic developments. This is, however, just background to their main temporal focus. In giving attention to the historical roots of

modern Indonesian intellectuals, a common misconception prevailed in presenting the Dutch Ethical Policy of the early twentieth century as the origin of the installation of a Western educational system in this country,³⁰ whereas in fact it originated in the Dutch Liberal Policy of the later part of the nineteenth century. The misconception reflects the inadequacy of a common genealogical reading. In giving attention to the intellectual response and developments in a particular historical period, most of these books do not pay enough attention to the transmission and transformation of intellectual collective memories and traditions across generations. Because of this they failed to reveal how the past continues implicitly to penetrate or inspire the construction of intellectual ideas and identities of the present.

Apart from their emphasis on a particular historical period, most of these books also limit their attention to a partial aspect of intellectuals' and intellectual development. With the exception of Legge's and Anwar's works, these books do not take into serious consideration the educational field as the cultural basis of intellectual development. Dhakidae did pay attention to the influence of the Dutch Ethical Policy on the genesis of modern Indonesian intellectuals. Nevertheless, in focusing his study on the New Order period, he almost omits to take into consideration the New Order's educational features and development as the cultural basis of intellectual presentation in this period. With the exception of Dhakidae's and Hassan's works, these books also give little attention to the structure of discursive practices as a constructive factor in intellectual development and contestation. Attention has been given to the political setting of particular historical periods and how intellectuals reacted to it, but there has been little awareness of how the structural position of intellectuals, the public sphere and political opportunity structure have affected intellectual expressions and strategies. The lack of this latter consideration has given rise to the essentialist notion of intellectual imperatives à la Weber.

Beyond the term "intelligentsia" and "intellectual", the Indonesian (Muslim) intelligentsia have been studied under the general rubric of the "Indonesian elite". Examples of these studies were Robert van Niel's work (1960) on the origins and formation of the nationalist elite in the first quarter of the twentieth century; Herbert Feith's work (1962) on the solidarity makers and administrators of the Indonesian elite during the period of parliamentary democracy (1950–57); Donald K. Emmerson's work (1976) on the political culture of Indonesian elite in early years of the New Order, and Ann Gregory's work (1976) on the recruitment and the factional pattern of the Indonesian political elite during Guided Democracy and the early New Order period.

The term “elite” is supposed to be a broader category than “intelligentsia”. In the East Indies (Indonesian) context it has also to include the old aristocracy and *adat* [local customs] chiefs, traditional scholastic *ulama* and other former (non-Islamic) *clerisies* as well as the old (moneyed) bourgeoisie. In fact, all these books are concerned more with the modern Indonesian elite, which is more or less identical with the intelligentsia. Under the rubric of “elite”, focus of attention is mostly given to the political dimensions of this educated stratum (such as political gains, values, behaviour, and recruitment), rather than to knowledge and cognitive dimensions of this stratum (such as schools, ideas, and discourses).

All works on the Indonesian elite share certain commonalities. They are not intended to deal with the time of *longue durée*, although they do give attention to the historical background of their field of study. All highlight the importance of Western education in the constitution of the modern Indonesian elite. Nevertheless, with their concern on power relations being limited to the purely political and administrative fields, there has been no serious attempt to look at the educational field as an arena for power struggles among various groups of the elite and to figure out the impact of contestation and achievement in this field for the future constitution of the Indonesian elite. In emphasizing the influence of political and bureaucratic positions on decision making processes, these works also gave little attention to power struggles in the discursive formation and symbolic field which would have significant political impacts.

In addition to these commonalities, they have some individual shortcomings. Van Niel tended to ignore how the status-oriented schools and different educational systems became a source of conflict and contestations among the early modern elite. In depicting the modern educated elite as followers of Western ways, he did not attempt to envision the possible followers of Islamic ways from the trajectory of the Western education system. In emphasizing the importance of Western education, he gave little attention to the formation and development of modern-Islamic schools that would also contribute to the constitution of the modern Indonesian elite.

Feith paid attention to discursive practices especially in relations to issues of democracy and constitutional debates in the Constituent Assembly. In focusing on a particular historical period, however, he did not pay enough attention to the interpolation of diachronic inter-generational intellectual memories and ideas in these synchronic debates. He realized that education had become a constituting element of administrators. His attention to this field, however, did not extend beyond the programmes of the cabinets.

In focusing on the political culture of the Indonesian elite in the early New Order period, Emmerson's work did take into consideration the long-term development of the Indonesian elite. In finding that the composition of the Indonesian legislators and administrators had been dominated by the *abangan* elite, however, Emmerson quickly came to conclusion that political Islam was weak. At the same time, he found that the origins of the students in his samples, in comparison to those from the elite, were less Javanese and more urban and *santri*, as well as less intense in feelings of ethnicity and more intense in religious feeling. Even so, he made no attempt to extrapolate this finding as a basis for envisioning the possible elevation of these *santri* students into the future legislative and administrative elite of this nation.

Ann Gregory's work came to the same conclusion as Emmerson's that the political elite had been dominated by the educated *abangan* of the upper status of Central Java. In coming to this conclusion, however, she did not take into consideration Muslim progress in the educational field which would influence the elite recruitment pattern in the future.

Other kinds of works relevant to the study of the Indonesian (Muslim) intelligentsia and intellectuals are works on: (i) intellectual movements, (ii) associations of Indonesian (Muslim) students and intelligentsia; (iii) schools and politics, and (iv) ideas or ideo-political formulation and responses of individual intellectuals or group of intellectuals in a particular historical conjuncture. Two examples of the first one are the works of McVey (1965) on the rise of Indonesian communism and of Deliar Noer (1973) on the modernist Muslim movement in Indonesia, 1900–42; two examples of the second one are works of Akira Nagazumi (1972) on the formation of *Budi Utomo* and of Agussalim Sitompul (1997) on the historical development of HMI; two examples of the third one are the works of Lee Kam Hing (1995) on education and politics in Indonesia, 1945–65 and of Taufik Abdullah (1972) on the *Kaum Muda* schools and politics in West Sumatra; three examples of the fourth one are works of Mochtar Pabottingi (1991) on ideas of nationalism and egalitarianism in Indonesia, 1908–80, of Michael Francis Laffan (2003) on the formation of Islamic nationalism, and of Bahtiar Efendy (1994) on the transformation of Indonesian Islamic political ideas and practices.

Most of these books are historical narratives of particular case studies, which do not offer thorough theoretical frameworks. Works on intellectual movements, student associations, and schools and politics, for instance, surprisingly did not include the theoretical literatures and perspectives on social movements. Moreover, in giving attention to the institutional and ideational dimensions of Indonesian (Muslim) educated people, most of these

studies did not pay attention to the structural position of Indonesian educated people. In giving attention to the educational field, most of these studies tended to be biased to one or another educational system, thus ignoring the diversity of educational trajectories of the modern Indonesian (Muslim) intelligentsia. In cases when some of these studies paid attention to the time of *longue durée*, they failed to consider generational and synchronic dimensions of particular ideas. With the exception of the works of Pabottingi and Laffan, and to some extent of Noer, these works also did not examine discursive practices and their constructive effects as a critical field of analysis.

McVey recognized that early Indonesian nationalist movements did not begin as structured political parties but rather as loosely organized social movements. Without the insight of theories of social movements, however, she did not go further to extrapolate the future shape of Indonesian nationalist movements from the growth of structured political parties from the 1920s.

In giving attention to reformist schools as a focal point of the modernist Muslim movement, Noer gave little attention to the Western education system. As a result, he did not make any extrapolation of the emergence of modernist Muslim intellectuals from the trajectory of Western education system, nor did Laffan's work. On the other hand, with his focus of attention on Budi Utomo, Nagazumi paid no attention to the growth of modern Islamic schools. Abdullah's and Lee Kam Hing's concerns with education and politics were limited respectively to the involvement of particular school communities in a particular political movement and to the transformation of education in line with the transformation in the national politics. Neither saw the educational field as a site of political and power contestations itself.

Sitompul's work tended to over-estimate the individual influence of Lafran Pane (the founding father of the HMI) in the construction of the HMI's ideology of inclusivism, ignoring the generational dimension of this construction. On the other hand, Effendy tended to over-estimate the role of the new generation of Islamic intellectual of the 1970s/1980s' as the first Muslim intellectual generation which offered a "substantialistic" approach to Islamic political ideas. In fact, had diachronic inter-generational influences been considered, it could be seen that the progressive ideas of this new generation developed out of the foundations that had been paved by intellectuals of the previous generation, namely, the third generation of Muslim intelligentsia. Furthermore, while the poly-interpretability of Islam was the core of his argument, he depicted this new generation as a monolithic intellectual representation of the "renewal"-liberal line, ignoring the presence of contestations and conflicting positions within this generation.

Pabottingi offered a useful approach and analysis by tackling the economic, cultural and discursive determinations of Indonesian nationalism and egalitarianism. Nevertheless, he tended to ignore the educational determination of intellectual development and ideas. He did not offer enough discussion on education as a force field of power relations and struggles.

All in all, previous studies in this field have not given sufficient attention to the social formation and structural position of the Indonesian intelligentsia. Most of the studies have ignored the importance of the *longue durée*. In relation to this temporal dimension, there has been little attempt to combine attention to synchronic states in relation to diachronic continuities and the generational dimension of intellectual ideas and movements. In these studies, power relations have been restricted to the purely political and bureaucratic fields. As such, power relations in the educational, symbolic and discursive field have not been taken into serious consideration. Studies on particular groups of the Indonesian intelligentsia have tended to isolate the development, ideologies and identities of these groups from interaction and inter-penetration with other groups. Most of the studies in this field have been historical narratives which have not involved an inter-textual and inter-disciplinary approach. All these characteristics make most of these studies particularistic in terms of their temporal and spatial relevance. Only a few of them make a significant contribution to the enrichment of methodologies and theoretical literatures.

ALTERNATIVE APPROACH, AIM AND METHODOLOGY

This book presents a dynamic, interactive and inter-textual approach to the study of Indonesian Muslim intelligentsia in its relations to power. Its approach can be understood through the following features.

Dynamic

The dynamic approach of this book lies in its attempt to situate synchronic states within a diachronic context. The aim of this approach is to see continuity and change in the development of Muslim intelligentsia and power, especially in the performance of its education, associations, discursive practices, identities, ideologies and political achievement, within the time concept of the *longue durée*; that is from the inception of the Western education system in the East Indies in the second half of the nineteenth century until the end of the twentieth century. Discussion focuses on the development of Muslim intelligentsia in the twentieth century.

Based on the argument that each synchronic state exists in diachronic time, this book will examine the historically structured intellectual traditions and identities and the possibilities of action and the desires of individual or collective agencies to reproduce and reformulate these traditions and identities, within specific conditions of the public sphere. Individual agency as reproducer and re-formulator of these collective traditions and identities is represented by organic intellectuals; while collective agency is represented by generation. The term “generation” here is not simply determined by a commonality in age, but also by historical experience. As Eyerman noted (1994, p. 70):

The sociological notion of generation implies more than being born at approximately the same time: it suggests a commonality of experience which creates a ground for shared outlook, a sense of collective destiny, that unites actors, even those who have never met,...especially if one shares other characteristics, such as social background and values, as well.

In Karl Mannheim’s view, a generation is a form of collective identity growing out of a common set of experiences, which give rise to “an identity of responses, a certain affinity in the way in which all move with and are formed by their common experiences” (Mannheim 1952, p. 306).³¹

For each generation this study will try to find its dominant discourse and special codes of ideational and identity formation which served as signposts for the construction of community and otherness, of tradition and innovation, and of what to expect and what to do. These codes would in turn reflect what Eyerman and Jamison called “the knowledge interest” of a particular intellectual generation (Eyerman and Jamison 1991).³²

Interactive

The interactive approach of this book lies in its attempt to describe the development of Muslim intelligentsia and power as being a result of dynamic interplay between past and present, between and within various intellectual-political traditions, and between various arenas of power relations. The aim of this approach is threefold: first, to raise an awareness about the debt of current intellectual thought to the past and to avoid an over-estimation concerning the production of new ideas or the view that they can be just taken for granted; second, to raise an awareness that the self-perception, identities and idealism of the Muslim intelligentsia cannot be isolated from the presence of significant “others”; third to raise an awareness about the multiple determinations of politico-intellectual bargaining power, politico-

intellectual strategies, and politico-intellectual ideologies. Concerning the first aim, attention will be given to the vertical network of memories and intellectual-political traditions across generations. Concerning the second aim, attention will be given to the interpenetration and conflicting relationships between and within diverse intellectual-political traditions. Concerning the third aim, attention will be given to international environment, political opportunity structure, economic factors, education, discursive practices, public sphere and “power games” (actual political contestations).


With the time-frame and technical limits of this study, discussions of the domestic and international environment, political opportunity structure and economic factors will be presented as a background to the core analysis. The core analysis will be focused on the interplay of power struggles in the educational field, discursive practices, and the public sphere which culminate in power games. Thus, the emphasis is given to cultural and political dimensions of the Muslim intelligentsia’s development (see Figure 1.1).

Education

Education is considered important not only as a source of the intelligentsia’s cultural legitimation, but also as an arena of power struggle. Education provides not only a schemata of class distinction but also a fundamental principle of the established order. As Pierre Bourdieu argued, the dominant class does not dominate overtly: it does not force the dominated to conform to its will. Rather, the influence of the dominant class is embodied in economic and cultural capital, which is imbricated throughout society’s institutions and practices and reproduced especially by educational institutions and practices (Bourdieu 1988, p. 87). In this context, education plays an important role in the construction of *habitus*; that is the collective schemata of experience and perception that delimits the availability of “subjective” ideas, personality, personality traits, and instances of consciousness (Bourdieu 1996, p. 101). On the other hand, Antonio Gramsci argued that the battle for counter hegemony necessitates an alternative educational system which enables the dominated class to obtain access to formal education (Gramsci 1971, pp. 29–43). In addition to Bourdieu and Gramsci, it has to say that even within a particular system of education there is a possibility for competitive power struggles. This is especially true in the context of the public educational system, particularly that of the independent state, which is theoretically open for people from diverse socio-graphic backgrounds.

With education as an arena of power struggle, knowledge is seen as inseparable from power. The rise of human sciences, as Foucault eloquently

FIGURE 1.1
Model of an Interactive Approach



pointed out in *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prisons* (1979a), has been both an instrument and an effect of ever-increasing power interventions in social life. In the Indonesian context, the early introduction of a modern education system and the imported body of Western knowledge can be seen as part of a colonial domination, which created a new social hierarchy based on the colonial hierarchy of knowledge. This forced the subordinated groups to form an alternative school system in their efforts to revitalize subaltern knowledges. As there was more than one educational system introduced in the NEI (Indonesia), education can be regarded as both part of what joined

people in groups and what divided groups. With the passing of colonialism, the power struggle in the educational sphere was far from over. In assuming that economic capital continued to be dominated by foreign and non-indigenous capitalists, the mastery of “cultural capital” through the improvement of educational qualifications became the main vehicle of various groups of Indonesian intelligentsia for the elevation of their bargaining power.

Discursive Practices

Discursive practices as processes of text production, distribution and consumption are considered important as the mediums and instrument of power struggles, social change and social construction. Power struggles occur both in and over discourse. “Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it” (Foucault 1976, p. 101). Thus, changing discursive practices are an important element in social change. Discourse has at least three constructive effects. It contributes to the construction of social “identities”, of social “relational” (relationships between people) and of social “ideational” or systems of knowledge and belief (Fairclough 1999, pp. 55–56, 64–65, 78–79).

This book considers the contestations of various groups of the intelligentsia within and through discursive practices and the influence of a dominant discourse at a particular historical conjuncture on the construction of the social identities, social relation and social ideologies of a particular generation of the Indonesian (Muslim) intelligentsia. The discourse analysis will also identify the influence of particular books, periodicals, newspapers and other publications for the reproduction and reformulation of the Muslim intellectual-political identities, ideologies and traditions.

Public Sphere

The public sphere is considered important as the site where discourses are expressed and where intellectual and political exercises find space for actualization. The term “public sphere” here refers to the domain of social life in which public opinion is formed.

As Jürgen Habermas observed (1989), the establishment of a modern intellectual tradition in the Western European context was part of the emergence of what he called the “bourgeois public sphere” around the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This public sphere was centred around a critical discourse on literary works of the audience-oriented bourgeois family

in the newly formed social institutions of the public realm: clubs, journals, periodicals, coffee houses, salons and cenacles. This kind of public space was a meeting place for the intellectual circles of urbanizing European (mercantile) society in which private individuals assembled “for the free, equal interchange of reasonable discourse, thus welding themselves into a relatively cohesive body whose deliberations might assume the form of a powerful political force” (Eagleton 1997, p. 9).

The new sociability, together with the rational-critical discourse that grew in social institutions of the public realm, depended on the rise of national and territorial power states on the basis of an early mercantile capitalist economy. This process led to an idea of society separate from the ruler (or the state) and of a private realm separate from the public (Habermas 1989, pp. 23–26; Calhoun, 1992, p. 7).

The early bourgeois public sphere was composed of narrow segments of the European population, comprised mainly of educated and propertied men, in which aristocrats played leading roles. They conducted a discourse in an exclusive way with prejudice to the interests of those excluded. Habermas names this public sphere as the “bourgeois public sphere” not simply because of the class composition of its members. Rather, he suggests that the rise of a new bourgeois society around the seventeenth century Europe produced a certain form of public sphere. In further developments, this bourgeois public sphere experienced a continual expansion to include more and more participants (as well as the development of large scale organizations as mediators of individual participation). This situation brought degeneration to the quality of discourse (Habermas 1989, pp. 22–23; Calhoun 1992, pp. 3, 7).

The ideal of the public sphere, in Habermas’ view, is that equality and rational critical argument prevail. Participants in public discourse are unconstrained by inequalities of power or money; citizens could exercise influence on the state without being subject to coercion. This influence is, for the most part, informal; it only becomes formal periodically, during general elections. In contemporary society, however, his view is that the public sphere no longer functions as the domain of rational debate. The liberal public sphere, although it presumed the participation of all, was actually limited to men with property. In the nineteenth century it expanded beyond these limits to include working-class men. With the growth of the welfare state, in particular, these changes meant that the public sphere was no longer the site of discussion between private individuals. It had now become the area for conflicts of interests between groups and organizations (Habermas 2000, pp. 289–94; Nash 2000, pp. 283–84).³³

The genesis of the modern Indonesian (East Indies) public sphere in the early twentieth century shows some similarities and some differences with that of the Europe. Similar to the early European public sphere, the early “Indonesian” public sphere was composed of a narrow segment of the East Indies population, mainly educated people (of aristocratic and petty bourgeois families) and aristocrats, with the powerful influence of old aristocracy. These early modern educated East Indies people also conducted a discourse in an exclusive way with prejudice to the interests, ideas, and values of conservative groups. However, while the emergence of the modern public sphere in the European context was an organic part of the rise of the (moneyed) bourgeois class, in the Indies context, it was part of the rise of the new stratum of intelligentsia. Thus, it is more appropriate to depict the early (modern) “Indonesian” public sphere as the “intelligentsia public sphere” rather than the “bourgeois public sphere”.

Furthermore, while the early public sphere in the European context was centred around a critical discourse on literary works, the early public sphere in the “Indonesian” context centred around a discourse on the issue of *kemadjoean* [progress]; that is how to catch up with the progress of other civilizations, especially Western societies. Last but not least, the degree of freedom of the early Indonesian public sphere was a far cry from that of the Europe, for it was operated under colonial domination.

The use of Habermas’ notion of public sphere in the Indonesian context needs a certain adjustment. First, in agreement with the critique of contemporary theorists of the public sphere, the very emphasis of Habermas’ notion of the public sphere on rational-critical debate implies an incapacity to deal fairly with “identity politics” and concerns for difference (Calhoun 1992, p. 3). In the Indonesian context, the public sphere has been used not only for expressing rational-critical arguments but also, in most cases, for expressing the rationalization of identity politics and ideologies of competing social forces.³⁴ Second, while the transformation of the public sphere in Habermas’ view only means the transformation in the scope of its participants, this transformation in the Indonesian context involved not only its scope but also its degree of freedom: from restriction to openness and *vice versa*. Third, Habermas’s notion of the public sphere remained biased toward the traditional conception of power relations, such as Marxist theories, which view power as fundamentally tied to the state. Thus in his view, critical discourse in the public sphere is primarily intended to influence the state: Habermas tends to undervalue its function in influencing power relations among conflicting groups within society. For a plural society like Indonesia, where elements of the social orders seldom mingle as one political

unit (Furnival 1980), discursive practices in the public sphere, especially in the absence of a common enemy, are directed first and foremost to influence power relations within society.

Power Games

Power games, as actual political contestations, are the climax of an ensemble of power struggles in various arenas of power relations at a particular historical conjuncture. Power games reflect and affect consolidation as well as severe contestation in a series of power struggles both in state-society relations and in clashes among various groups (of intelligentsia) within society.

These power games produce specific historic (political) “monuments” of each generation of the intelligentsia. These monuments in turn became touchstones for the reproduction and reformulation of intellectual traditions by the following generation of intelligentsia.

Inter-textual

The genealogy of the Indonesian Muslim intelligentsia can be incorporated academically into the field of the “social history of intellectuals”. According to an American specialist in this field, Martin Jay, the social history of intellectuals “can be fruitfully understood as a force field of different impulses” which functions at “the shifting intersection of different, often conflicting discourses”. Intellectual historians, in his view, tend to value a productive exchange between these impulses and discourses rather than an either/or choice (Jay 1993, pp. 2–3).

In using the concept of the *longue durée*, this study will also follow a Braudelian emphasis on the importance of an interdisciplinary approach. In Braudel’s view, no particular discipline has a monopoly on the truth about human or natural existence. He argued that all social sciences should be mobilized because it is essential that a history based on the *longue durée* be truly multi-faceted (Braudel 1980; Lechte 1994, pp. 89–90).

In following the Braudelian emphasis on the *longue durée* and on an interdisciplinary approach, this study is not intended to follow all of Braudel’s approaches to historical writing. The time-frame expected by Braudel’s *longue durée* is probably much longer than that covered in this book. Braudelian historical writing is concerned with the details of particular events and realities, while the concern of this book is not on the detail but rather on finding a general pattern of historical events and realities. Furthermore, while the interdisciplinary approach of Braudelian historical writing mobilizes broad

academic disciplines such as economics, geography, anthropology, sociology, the inter-disciplinary approach in this book will involve more limited academic disciplines. Geography, for instance, will not be included in the analysis, while economics will be used in a very limited sense.

The inter-disciplinary approach here will be based by and large on sociology (especially sociology of knowledge and political sociology — including the sociology of social movements), cultural studies, post-colonial studies, socio-linguistics, and discourse analysis. A new sociology of knowledge³⁵ for its great concern with microsociology, with the everyday intellectual life of small groups, circles, networks and epistemic communities is important to understand the fundamental units which construct and disseminate knowledge and ideologies (Burke 2000, p. 8). A new political sociology³⁶ with its emphasis on the contestation of social relationships in culture: in everyday life, media representations, and institutional practices — in addition to the traditional concern of political sociology on the relations between society and the state — helps to understand politics as a potentiality in every aspect of social life. Politics in this sense can be seen as cultural. “Where social life is based on signification, the manipulation and contestation of meanings is itself political” (Nash 2000, pp. x–xii). The sociology of social movements because of its concern with a network of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations (Diani 2000, p. 161) is useful to understand the creation and reproduction of a shared set of beliefs and a sense of belongingness, as well as of collective solidarity and identities of particular traditions of the intelligentsia. Cultural studies with its concern for the construction, inter-penetration, and transformation of cultures and identities provides an insight into the creation and changes of Muslim individual and collective identities. Post-colonial studies provide an insight into the longer-term implications of the colonial hierarchy of knowledge and residual traces and memories of subordination for the development of the Muslim intelligentsia. Socio-linguistics is helpful to understand the social specificity and transformation of language: that language in its social dimension is constantly reflecting and transforming class, institutional, and group interests (Bakhtin and Volisinov 1986, p. 66). Finally, discourse analysis is important to identify power struggles over and within discourse and their constructive effects on social identities, social relationships and ideologies of the Muslim intelligentsia.

In line with this inter-disciplinary approach, ideas and theoretical frameworks of particular great thinkers and theoreticians such as Antonio Gramsci, Max Weber, Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu, and Jürgen Habermas will be adopted partially — as far as their relevance is appropriate

to the understanding of the subject matter and particular issues in this book — rather than as a total package. When parts of their ideas are adopted, they are also subject to modification. This is for the simple reason that all social phenomena are socially and historically grounded (Turner 1994, p. 146). As such no single grand narrative and theory in its totality and its original construction can be applied to the whole of particular social phenomena and historical realities. Furthermore, Indonesia as a plural society with diverse social memories and identities, modes of production, systems of signification and subject positions is too complex to be approached and explained by a single theory and narrative.

This book also employs an “inter-textual” approach. This last term refers to notions of the relationality, inter-connectedness and inter-dependence of texts and discourses. In the view of modern literary theorists such as M. M. Bakhtin, Julia Kristeva, and Roland Barthes, texts, whether they be literary or non-literary, can be viewed as lacking in independent meaning. A particular text or work of literature, after all, is built from systems, codes and traditions established by previous texts and works of literature and is influenced by different systems, codes and traditions of other contemporary texts and works of literature. To quote from Graham Allen (following Bakhtin): “All utterances are dialogic, their meaning and logic dependent upon what has previously been said and on how they will be received by others” (Allen 2000, p. 19).³⁷

Based on this theoretical perspective, to interpret texts and utterances of Muslim intellectuals and to discover their meaning, or meanings, is to trace those relations. In this regard, attention will be given to the interplay of inter-generational texts of Muslim intellectual traditions, to the relationality of diverse and often conflicting texts and discourses, and to the interdependence of discursive and non-discursive formations.

The aim of this inter-disciplinary and inter-textual approach is to see the development of Muslim intelligentsia from many different positions and perspectives as well as to see the diversity of impulses and interactions in influencing the development of the Muslim intelligentsia.

Methodology

In attempting to situate synchronic states within a diachronic context, the organization of this book will be based on chronology. In presenting an interactive approach, however, this chronological method will be combined with a thematic organization of writing. Thus, it is a chronology expressed through sub-topics of each chapter. Each sub-topic might return the chronology to its early stage. The sub-topics of every chapter will include a

description of the political and economic setting as background; education; discursive practices; the public sphere; power games; and the inter-generational linkage of Muslim intellectual traditions.

Primary data will be explored when data on particular matters are unavailable in the secondary sources. The book's priority is not on presenting primary sources, but rather on the reconstruction and reinterpretation of the scattered secondary data found in various secondary sources within the framework of its study.

As far as the primary data are a concern, some material was collected through the use of a documentary and database survey, interviews, a questionnaire, and direct observation. The documentary survey was intended especially to find out specific codes, publications, main issues and polemics of particular generations and their specific meaning at a particular historical conjuncture. This investigation was carried out mainly through the reading of hard copy and microfilm of Indonesian newspapers and periodicals, especially collections in the Menzies Library of The Australian National University, the National Library of Australia, the National Library of Indonesia and the Library of the Jakarta-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

The database survey was intended to obtain unpublished statistics and data on membership or participants of particular communities, associations and training programs. The unpublished statistics especially on educational attainment by religion were obtained from the database of the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics (BPS). The unpublished data on former recruits of the Salman mosque and its *dakwah* trainings (LMD) were obtained from the database of the Salman executive board. The unpublished data on ICMI membership were obtained from the ICMI database. The unpublished data on IAIN lecturers who pursued postgraduate study in Western universities was obtained from the database of the Ministry of Religious Affairs.

Interviews were designed to gain first hand information and views about individual intellectual biographies, particular events, associations, and movements of the Muslim intelligentsia at a particular historical conjuncture. These interviews were mostly conducted during my first fieldwork in Indonesia — for achieving a masters degree (July–December 1998) and during my second fieldwork — for achieving a Ph.D. degree (October 2001–April 2002). In addition, interviews were also conducted on several occasions such as during my short trips to Indonesia (October–December 1999 and October–December 2000) and during the visits of Indonesian Muslim intellectuals to Australia or *via* email correspondence. As a result, more than seventy Muslim intellectuals and activists were interviewed, though only some of the opinions are explicitly recorded in this book.

The questionnaire was specifically intended to understand the socio-religious background and religio-political perceptions of ICMI members. For this purpose, some 500 questionnaires were distributed *via* post to members of ICMI throughout Indonesia from September until December 1998, by using the cluster-random sampling method. This number of questionnaires is equal to 2.7 per cent of total registered ICMI members up to June 1998; that is 18,377 (ICMI Database 1998). In fact, only 210 out of the 500 questionnaires were returned by respondents.

Direct observation was intended to locate myself as a participant observer in order to understand remembrances, motives, ideas, concerns and the political behaviour of the Muslim intelligentsia. I attended meetings of ICMI's boards and also engaged in its seminars and the activities of its autonomous bodies. I also attended discussion forums of Muslim intellectuals such as *Majlis Reboan*, *Paramadina*, and *Masika*. I actively took part in meetings of Islamic student activists and established a close relationship with leaders or former leaders of Islamic student organizations such as HMI, KAMMI, IMM and PMII.

All these primary and secondary data were analysed using descriptive-analytic methods in combination with discourse analysis and a modified version of Foucault's "inter-discursive" and "extra-discursive" analysis (Foucault 1991, p. 58). The first is an inter-discursive analysis of difference, often conflicting academic discourses: such as the inter-dependency between perspectives of history, sociology, politics, cultural studies, and socio-linguistic. The second is extra-discursive dependency between discursive transformations and the transformations outside of discourse, as for instance, the correlations between religious discourse and a whole play of economic, political and social change.

Organization of the Writing

This book comprises seven chapters. With the exception of Chapter 1 (Introduction) and Chapter 7 (Conclusion), each chapter will include some of the following sub-sections: political and economic settings, education (secular and Islamic schools), discursive practices, the public sphere, power games (consolidation and contestation), the specific development (or response) of political Islam and the Muslim intelligentsia, and the transmission of Islamic intellectual-political traditions.

Following the introductory chapter, Chapter 2 focuses on the formation of the first generation of Indies intelligentsia. Although emphasis is given to the formation of the Indies intelligentsia in the first two decades of the

twentieth century, this chapter will consider the roots of its gestation in the installation of the Western educational system and the Western-influenced public sphere in the late nineteenth century Liberal era. While tracing the Western educational roots of the Indies intelligentsia, this chapter will pay attention to the modernization of Islamic schools as a basis for the constitution of the Muslim intelligentsia. Discussions will then deal with the genesis of an intelligentsia as a new stratum of Indies society along with its ideas, collective identities and its public sphere. This will be followed by discussions of the impact of differences in economic relations and cultural-ideological orientations on the early fragmentation of the Indies intelligentsia. Finally the chapter discusses the rise of proto-nationalism.

Chapter 3 focuses on the formation of Indonesia as an imagined community and as an “historical bloc” as well as the formation of various competing intellectual-political traditions. This chapter covers the time-frame from 1920 to 1945; a period when the notion of Indonesian nationalism and the state were discussed among competing groups of the intelligentsia and when the intelligentsia of higher learning began to assume a major role in the leadership of the nation. Discussions will show that it was during this period that the notion of “Muslim intelligentsia” was consolidated within the construction of Muslim intellectual-political traditions. The boundary between “Muslim” and “non-Muslim” was constructed through the discursive practices, the formulation of Islamic political ideologies, and the emergence of Islamic parties and associations of Muslim students. This chapter will also reveal that this period heralded an acute internal fragmentation within the Islamic community. It concludes with a discussion of the failure of political Islam in the newly (self-proclaimed) independent Indonesia.

Chapter 4 focuses on the role of the intelligentsia as a political elite in the fully sovereign Indonesian Republic, stretching from early months of Indonesian independence in 1945 until the fall of the Sukarno regime in 1965. During this period, contestations of various intellectual traditions were translated into contestations of various political parties in the struggle for control of state leadership. The chapter will discuss the failure of the civilian intelligentsia to exercise parliamentary democracy in the 1950s as well as predicaments of democratic experiments in this period. It will also pay attention to the acceleration of educational development that gave rise to the quantitative explosion of the Muslim intelligentsia. Special attention will be given to the rise and fall of the Muslim intelligentsia as political leaders of the nation. Discussions of the rising tide of a new generation of Muslim intelligentsia will form the climax of this chapter.

Chapter 5 focuses on the rise of the New Order as a repressive-developmental regime and its impact on the development of Muslim intelligentsia. Discussions will deal with various conflicting Muslim intellectual responses to the New Order's modernization and the marginalization of political Islam. Attention will be given to the variety of responses based on generational criteria as well as on internal fragmentation within a new generation of the Muslim intelligentsia. This will be followed by discussions of the implication of these differences on Muslim intellectual movements and the polarization within the community of Muslim intelligentsia. Finally, the chapter will examine the impact of the New Order's promotion of education and advanced training in Western countries as well as the changes in the international environment on the performance of various Islamic intellectual movements.

Chapter 6 focuses on a specific case: the rise and decline of ICMI. This chapter will cover the historical period from the rise of ICMI in 1990 until the end of the twentieth century. Attention will be given to the changing political opportunity structure that made possible ICMI's establishment and its decline and to the Muslim intelligentsia's creation of cultural capital. Discussions will deal with controversies surrounding its emergence and its political manoeuvres, followed by an assessment of ICMI's political and cultural achievements. The chapter ends with a discussion of the role of Muslim intellectuals in the reform [*reformasi*] movement and the impact of Suharto's resignation on the political position and attitude of Muslim intelligentsia.

Chapter 7 offers the conclusions of this study. An attempt is made to highlight important issues and their possible implications for the future development of the Muslim intelligentsia and Indonesian politics.

A NOTE ON THE SPELLING

Indonesian studies often face problems of transliteration. Basically, both the old Dutch-oriented spelling system and the new Indonesian official spelling system inaugurated in 1972 are employed in this book, since they both occur in the printed sources extending from the 1900s to the present. Even so, there are some exceptions. In general, the spelling *oe* (in old/Dutch spelling) will be replaced by *u*, except when it is used in direct quotations, in names of publications and authors, and also in specific "codes" of particular historical moments — such as the term "*kemadjoean*" as a code of the first generation of intelligentsia.

The spelling of personal names will follow the spelling employed by the individuals themselves wherever possible, but in general the letters *oe* will be

replaced by *u*. Thus, *Soekarno* will be spelled *Sukarno*. Some exceptions are (Mohamad) Roem, Pramoedya (Ananta) Toer, (Deliaa) Noer, and (Wiratmo) Soekito, because they consistently used that spelling for their names until the late twentieth century. Indonesian names adopted from Arabic words will be spelled in the (old and new) Indonesian spelling system (but again *oe* will be replaced by *u*) as employed by individuals themselves. Thus, Ahmad Dahlān (the founder of *Muhammadiyah*) will be spelled Achmad Dachlan. On the other hand, the names of (non-Indies) Arab peoples will be spelled according to the romanized Arabic spelling system.

Names of organizations and institutions will be spelled according to the historical contexts of their existence (but the letter *oe* will be replaced by *u*). For consistency, however, names of organizations as well as the state institutions and principles that continued to exist until the end of the twentieth century will be spelled according to the new Indonesian spelling system. Thus, *Moehammadiyah* will be spelled *Muhammadiyah*; *Madjelis Permusjawaratan Rakjat* will be spelled *Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*; *Pantja Sila* will be spelled *Pancasila*.

Finally, the spelling of names of cities and other places will use the new Indonesian spelling system, so that *Djakarta*, *Soerabaja*, and *Tjirebon*, for instance, will be spelled *Jakarta*, *Surabaya* and *Cirebon*.

Notes

1. Shils (1972, p. 387).
2. Gella (1976, p. 25).
3. Woodward (1996, p. 34).
4. Among public figures of the Muslim intelligentsia in the late Suharto era were Nurcholish Madjid, Abdurrahman Wahid, Amien Rais, Dawam Rahardjo, Adi Sasono, Imaduddin Abdulrahim, Djalaluddin Rakhmat, Sri Bintang Pamungkas and Emha Ainun Nadjib.
5. Examples of these figures were Mar'ie Muhammad, Beddu Amang, Muslimin Nasution, Sutjipto Wirosardjono, Setyanto P. Santoso, Sajuti Hasibuan, Marzuki Usman, Dipo Alam and many others.
6. For a more elaborate description of the result of Muslim parties in the 1998 election, see Chapter 6.
7. Drafted in the lead up to the Indonesian proclamation of independence of the 1945, this charter contains among other things, a special provision that the phrase of the Belief in One God as the first of Indonesian's five principles (*Pancasila*) should be expanded by the insertion of the clause "with the obligation for the adherents of Islam to practise Islamic law". This clause came to be known as "the seven words".

8. More than eighty years after the word “Islam” was first explicitly used as the name of an association by the *Sarekat (Dagang) Islam*, the same word or its derivative such as “Muslim” was still widely used as names of political parties and action groups. More than seventy years after the word “Islam” (*Islamieten* in Dutch) was first used as the name of a student organization, *Jong Islamieten Bond* (JIB), the same term continued to be used by many student-intellectual collectivities such as *Ikatan Cendekiawan “Muslim” Se-Indonesia* (ICMI) and *Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa “Muslim” Indonesia* (KAMMI).
9. Thus, after depicting the “*penghulu*” as a kind of “*santri aristocracy*”, he soon questioned his analysis for it might contain “a contradiction in terms” (1976, p. 133). Although he had seen among followers of Islamic parties (NU and Masjumi) that “the young, the educated, the urban, and the weakly religious” tended to “be more modern” (1976, p. 163), he had never imagined that this young educated Muslim generation would in turn flood the modern bureaucracy. Being *santri* for him was the antithesis to being a bureaucrat: “The problem is particularly acute among the *santris*, whose values are so anti-bureaucratic, “independent”, and “equalitarian” in nature; for they realize that as their leaders become civil servants due to *santri* political power, they become also less *santri* in outlook” (1976, p. 373).
10. In Emerson’s view, political Islam by this time had been defeated constitutionally, physically, electorally, bureaucratically, and symbolically (1989).
11. This is especially important for the study of post-colonial societies. It is said that the post-coloniality is a historical condition marked by the visible apparatus of freedom and the concealed persistence of unfreedom, and the longevity of tensions between arrival and departure, independence and dependence. Thus, “the postcolonial dream of discontinuity is ultimately vulnerable to the infectious residue of its own unconsidered and unresolved past” (Gandhi 1998, pp. 6–7).
12. In Clifford Geertz’s *The Religion of Java* (1960), Javanese society consists of three systems of meaning grouped into *aliran* (vertical structures of identity and organization): *priyayi*, *abangan* and *santri*. The *priyayi* tradition is said to be an ideology of the court and literati oriented to Hindu-Buddhist and Javanese mystical worldviews. The *abangan* tradition is a more popular syncretic ideology of the peasantry heavily influenced by Javanese animism, while the *santri* tradition is a pious Islamic worldview shared by elements in both Javanese and Outer Island society.
13. The struggle for the real is “the attempt to impose upon the world a particular conception of how things at bottom are and how men are therefore obliged to act” (Geertz 1972, p. 324).
14. The early use of the term “intelligentsia” is a matter of controversy. Some historians assume that it was coined by Peter Boborykin, a Russian author, in 1860. This, however, has been opposed by Waclaw Lednicki, who found that the term was used in Russian literature especially in the work of V. G. Belinsky in 1846. Moreover, he also noticed that the term was used approximately at

the same time in Poland and concluded that Russia and Poland were the birthplace of this stratum, and their languages created the term "intelligentsia". Richard Pipes questioned that the term was coined by Boborykin based on his finding that the German word "intelligenz" was used as early as 1849 to point to the same phenomenon as intelligentsia in Poland and Russia. Finally, Aleksander Gella has shown that the term was first used in Polish literature by Karol Libelt in 1844 (Gella 1976, p. 12).

15. It is said that whereas the gentry tended to be interested in literary and military pursuits, individuals of clerical origin were expected to enter scholarly and professional occupations, while the best opportunity for commoners was in the fields of art (painters, sculptors, musicians) and theatre (actors, singers) (Nahirny 1983, p. 27).
16. In his view, it is impossible to define with any precision attributes such as "an unusual sensitivity to the sacred [or] an uncommon reflectiveness about the nature of their universe". It is also hard to see why they should not be present in a person who had received little or not formal education. According to him, "there is no human activity from which every form of intellectual participation can be excluded: *homo faber* cannot be separated from *homo sapiens*." All people, in his view, use their intellects to some extent: the difference is one of degree, not of kind (Gramsci 1971, pp. 8–9; Miller 1999, p. 25).
17. Weber distinguishes two other basic aspects of the distribution of power within a community besides *class*. One he calls *status* and the other *party*. *Status* refers to a different degree of social prestige between social groups within a community. In Weber's own words, status ("status situation") is described as "every typical component of the life fate of men that is determined by a specific, positive or negative, social estimation of *honor*" (Weber 1967, p. 24). Whereas class refers to the unequal distribution of economic rewards, status refers to the unequal distribution of "social honour". While class is objectively given, status depends upon people's subjective evaluations of social differences (Giddens 1990, p. 212). The conception of *Party* refers to power over the actions or collective decisions of any organized groups, oriented toward the acquisition of social "power", that is to say, toward influencing a communal action no matter what its content may be (Weber 1967, p. 27). While Marx tended to explain both status differences and party organization in terms of class, Weber argues that neither, in fact, can be reduced to class divisions. Although the influence of class situation on both "status" and 'party' is obvious, the reverse is also true. That is, "status" and "party" can influence the economic circumstances of individuals and groups, thus in turn affecting class as well. Furthermore, Weber argued that in any given society class, status and party relationships could be found cross-cutting each other (Weber 1967, pp. 24–27).
18. This book was first published in Paris in 1927 and was first translated into English in 1928.
19. For a commentary on the three authors' conception of intellectuals, see Miller (1999, p. 13).

20. For the criticism on this concept, see Konrád & Szelényi (1979), Etzioni-Halevi (1985), Ross (1990).
21. As Harry J. Benda observed (1962, p. 240): "It is the exception rather than the rule that the young aristocrat, the landowner's son or for that matter even the scion of a newly-established bourgeois class, once he has acquired a western education of any kind, becomes the defender and spokesman of the class of his social origin."
22. The entrance of the term "intelligentsia" into the Indonesian public sphere was most likely through a detour *via* Western European intellectual influence, instead of being imported directly from Russia or Poland.
23. The area of the Malay Peninsula which is heavily settled by Malays from West Sumatra.
24. The notion of *cendekiawan* as intellectual can be found, for instance, in the work of Harsja W. Bachtiar, "*Kaum Cendekiawan di Indonesia: Suatu Sketsa Sosiologi*" [Cendekiawan in Indonesia: A Sociological Sketch]. The notion of *cendekiawan* as intelligentsia can be found in the work of Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti, "*Cendekiawan Dunia Ketiga: Orang 'Barat' di Dunia 'Timur'*" [The Third World Cendekiawan: The Western People in The Eastern World], and again in Selo Soemardjan's Work, "*Peranan Cendekiawan dalam Pembangunan*" [The Role of "Cendekiawan" in the Development]. All of these articles can be found in a book edited by A. Mahasin and I. Natsir (1983).
25. An excellent summary of the variety of conceptions of power Foucault criticizes is given in Pasewark 1993, pp. 7–13).
26. The only example of the published text of a speech is Hatta's "*Tanggung Jawab Moril Kaum Intelligensia*" [The Moral Responsibility of the Intelligentsia] delivered at the University of Indonesia on 11 June 1957. Dawam Rahardjo's book *Intelektual, Intelligensia, dan Perilaku Politik Bangsa: Risalah Cendekiawan Muslim* [Intellectuals, Intelligentsia, and Political Behaviour of the Nation: Essays on the Muslim Intellectual/Intelligentsia] (1993) is the only example of an anthology. Works by Arief Budiman (1981) and Selo Soemardjan (1981) are examples of articles on Indonesian intelligentsia as sections of a book. Wiratmo Sukito's work, "*Posisi Kaum Intelligensia 'Indonesia Dewasa Ini'*" [The Contemporary Position of the Indonesian Intelligentsia] in *Siasat Baru* (no. 655, 30 December 1959) is an example of articles on Indonesian intelligentsia in journals.
27. Legge's book is entitled *Intellectuals and Nationalism in Indonesia: A Study of the Following Recruited by Sutan Sjahrir in Occupation Jakarta*. Sparringa's dissertation is entitled *Discourse, Democracy and Intellectuals in the New Order Indonesia, a Qualitative Sociological Study*. Dhakidae's book is entitled *Cendekiawan dan Kekuasaan dalam Negara Orde Baru* [Intellectuals and Power in the New Order State].
28. Hassan's book is entitled *Muslim Intellectual Response to 'New Order' Modernization in Indonesia*. Federspiel's book is entitled *Muslim Intellectuals and National Development in Indonesia*. Anwar's book is entitled *Pemikiran dan Aksi*

- Islam Indonesia: Sebuah Kajian Politik tentang Cendekiawan Muslim Orde Baru* [Ideas and Actions of Indonesian Islam: A Political Study on the New Order's Muslim Intellectuals/intelligentsia].
29. Examples of minor works are Ridwan Saidi's book (1990), *Cendekiawan Islam zaman Belanda* [Islamic Intellectuals/Intelligentsia in Dutch Colonial Era], and Fuadi Mardatillah's masters thesis (1997). *Intellectual Responses to the Establishment of Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI), 1990–1995*. Examples of anthologies are works of Dick Hartoko, *Golongan Cendekiawan, Mereka yang Berumah di Angin* [Intellectual Group, Those Who Live in the Wind] (1981); of Aswab Mahasin, ed., *Cendekiawan dan Politik* [Intellectuals/Intelligentsia and Politics] (1983); of Dawam Rahardjo, *'Intelektual, Intelligensia, dan Perilaku Politik Bangsa: Risalah Cendekiawan Muslim* [Intellectuals, Intelligentsia, and Political Behaviour of the Nation: Essays on the Muslim Intellectual/Intelligentsia] (1993); and of A.E. Priyono, ed. *Kebebasan Cendekiawan: Refleksi Kaum Muda* [Intellectual Freedom: Youths' Reflections] (1996). Examples of articles can be found in Appendix A and B.
 30. This kind of misconception can be found in Dhakidae (2003), Anwar (1996), Azra (2000).
 31. Quoted in Eyerman (1994, p. 70).
 32. The "knowledge interest" can be defined as the kind of knowledge that is formed in the context of a particular generation of intellectuals (Eyerman and Jamison 1991, pp. 45–65). In comparison, Weber's view was that ideas are socially situated and shaped by worldviews or "styles of thought". These styles of thought were associated with, among other things, periods and generations (Burke 2000, p. 5).
 33. For these reasons, Habermas' book was entitled *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit* [The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere], first published in Germany in 1962. The English translation of this book was first published in 1989.
 34. It has been argued by Klaus Eder (1993, pp. 20–27) that the key to explaining the path of development leading to modernity in the Western experience lies in the learning process and symbolic practices in the sphere of culture. As a society moves from traditional to modern life, the arena for a collective learning shifts from closed-communal to open-associational bonds, from estates and castes to class society. The changing arena of social learning will in turn change the symbolic universe. In association the symbolic universe is produced by discursive communication which involves a high degree of rationality and equal rights to free thinking and speech. On the other hand, Indonesian society in the twentieth century was still a communal not an associational society. Its cultural solidarity still remained locked in primordial systems (ascribed group affiliation), instead of achieved group affiliation. Associations as a necessary condition for establishing civil society did not yet exist to any great extent. The process of collective social learning had mostly been facilitated by communal

groups, instead of associations. As a result, the production of a symbolic universe, as a mediation for whole social actions, was fostered more by the spirit of communalism rather than by rational measures of association.

35. For the difference between the old and new sociology of knowledge, see Peter Burke (2000).
36. For the difference between the old and new political sociology, see Kate Nash (2000, pp. x–xiv).
37. For a good summary of theories of “inter-textuality”, see Graham Allen (2000).

2

THE FORMATION OF THE INTELLIGENTSIA

The old order is destroyed, a new world is created and all around us is change.

Munshi Abdullah bin Abdul Kadir (1843)¹

A group exists when it is named.

Jérôme Lindon (1988)²

*There is little need to prolong our discussion on the ‘nobility by birth’
because its rise was predestined.*

Abdul Rivai (1902)³

As they entered the nineteenth century, the “clerisy”⁴ of the “land below the winds” stood at a crossroads. The knowledge road to Mecca inherited from previous centuries through the international networks of *ulama* remained.⁵ At the same time, the deepening penetration of Dutch colonialism and capitalism inescapably brought its own regime of knowledge that paved the new intellectual road to the West.

It was the Liberal-capitalist penetration of the second half of the nineteenth century Dutch colonial era that was responsible for the government’s introduction of a Western-style education system to the East Indies. The introduction of the Netherlands right-wing “Ethical” colonial policy in the early decades of the twentieth century brought this educational transformation to a further stage.

Electrified by the pulsing wave of liberal movements and democratic revolution in Europe around the 1840s (Stromberg 1968, pp. 72–78), the Liberal wing in the Netherlands led by Jan Rudolf Thorbecke quickly

responded to the political momentum by successfully shifting the course of Fundamental Law [*grondwetsherziening*] from conservatism towards liberalism. With this Fundamental Law of 1848, the Netherlands became a constitutional monarchy, and the Queen had to be responsible to the parliament. Consequently, the Dutch moved from the rule of absolute authority to the rule of law. Under the provisions of this law, the Liberal wing was able to intervene in colonial matters through parliament. In the educational realm, the Fundamental Law of 1848 guaranteed free education to everyone in the Netherlands and had a trickle down effect, which gradually led to a new attitude towards public education in the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) (Simbolon 1995, pp. 126–27).

Supported by private entrepreneurs and a politically conscious Liberal middle class, this Liberal force became increasingly dissatisfied with financial administration, first in the homeland and then in the colony. The Liberals aimed originally to wield power at home and, later, to have access to, or control over, colonial profits (Furnivall 1944, p. 148). In the context of Liberal aspirations about “free cultivation”, “free labour”, and “individual possession”, to assume control over colonial profits meant to urge the colonial government to secure private capital to obtain land, labour and opportunities to run new businesses or plantations.⁶ The shift towards a Liberal economy in fact necessitated not only institutional reforms but also infrastructure support,⁷ especially the improvement of bureaucratic services, which in turn demanded the improvement of the educational sector of the NEI.

The Liberal colonial era did not last long. Successive social-economic and political events, both in the Netherlands and the NEI, in the late nineteenth century brought new overtones to the colonial treatment of the East Indies. In the Netherlands, these events were specifically the emergence after 1870 of a benevolent new breed of administrators imbued with socialism and a sentimental idealism *à la* Multatuli⁸ in conjunction with the reorientation of political parties along religious lines. This occurred in 1888 when the position of old Conservatives was replaced by an alliance of the anti-revolutionaries and Calvinists with the “Romanists”,⁹ who deserted their old Liberal allies to form a new Clerical Party on the Right against the secularist Left. Perhaps unexpectedly, it was the party of the Right that first declared a new colonial policy proposing that exploitation, whether by the state or by private enterprise, must give way to a policy of moral responsibility (Furnivall 1944, pp. 228–29).

The impetus for the Clerical Party’s creed was the ongoing deterioration of social life in the NEI, resulting from economic stagnation, crop failure, cattle disease, famine and poor health conditions. These various kinds of social

calamity were unintended consequences of the Liberal economy and had given rise to a new climate of opinion in the Netherlands. All parties came to favour state activity in the direction of expansion, efficiency and welfare, placing the welfare of East Indies in the foreground of colonial policy. Thus, after the elections of 1901 that resulted in the victory of the Right wing, liberalism was an outworn creed overshadowed by the Christian spirit of compassion (Furnivall 1944, pp. 225–33).

The Clerical Party came into power as the champion of a moral responsibility. Reflecting this spirit, Queen Wilhelmina in her annual message from the throne on the assembly of parliament in 1901 spoke about “the debt of honour”¹⁰ and the ethical responsibility of the Netherlands to the people of the East Indies (Van Niel 1970, p. 32).¹¹ This new direction of colonial treatment of the East Indian came to be known as the “ethical policy”.

Under the ethical policy, *educatie* [education], *irrigatie* [irrigation] and *ëmigratie* [transmigration]¹² became the priority of the welfare [ethical] programme. Of the three programmes, education was in fact regarded as the most essential. In the eyes of the father of the ethical movement, Th. Van Deventer, improvement of native welfare could hardly be achieved without adequately trained indigenous personnel to carry the burden. He envisioned a rebirth of the East Indies through improved education, while another Ethici, Abendanon, considered education as the tie of friendship and trust which could link all people along the path of progress. Behind such idealistic views lay the goal of education as a means of improving the natives’ welfare within the scope of a Western inspired civilization (Van Niel 1970, pp. 34, 66–67).

The coming of the Ethical Era brought also a new course in the colonial treatment of Islam, particularly under the influence of an outstanding Dutch Arabist and Islamologist, Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, who arrived in the NEI in 1889. In the same year he was appointed as an adviser to the Office for Arabian and Native Affairs [*Kantoor voor Inlandsche zaken*], which he himself proposed and founded,¹³ and began to introduce a new approach to dealing with Islamic matters.

Snouck countered Dutch fears concerning Islam, at both international and local levels, by criticizing former Dutch misconceptions about Islam.¹⁴ He emphasized the peaceful nature of the Islamic religion in the archipelago, but also admitted the potential dangers of a small minority of fanatical *ulama* imbued with the notions of pan-Islam. In this regard, he came out with recommendations for an Islamic policy in the framework of the so-called “*splitsingstheorie*”. This theory envisaged a division of Islam into two parts, one religious, the other political. While the government should respect the first dimension of Muslims’ life-world, it must not tolerate the latter one. In

Snouck's view, "any sign of incitement must, therefore, be resolutely met by force, and all interference in matters Islamic from abroad must be nipped in the bud" (Benda 1958, p. 24).

The shift in the colonial policy on Islam was in fact only the first step in Snouck's prophetic vision for the ideal future of the East Indies. He believed that the future leadership of Indies society could not rely on devout Muslims and chiefs of *adat* [local customs]. According to him, devout Muslims could not be expected to develop a lasting bond between the East Indies and the Netherlands, while chiefs of *adat*, who had long become the most powerful barrier against Islam, were too conservative to be expected to serve as bearers of the long-term purposes of colonial administration. Since a modern East Indies could not be ruled either by Muslims or by *adat* chiefs, Snouck recognized the importance of creating Westernized East Indies elites (Benda 1959, pp. 25–27). These Westernized elites would be expected to foster a modern East Indies society in line with the so-called "association" policy. By association he meant the effort to create "a Dutch state, consisting of two geographically distant, but spiritually connected parts, one of which would be in north-western Europe and the other in Southeast Asia" (Steenbrink 1993, p. 88).

In so doing, Snouck recommended that the colonial government promote the large-scale organization of education on a universal and religiously neutral basis that would be able to "emancipate" the new elite from its religious attachment. To emancipate in this context meant to detach the new elite from Islamic tutelage. Thus the birth of an East Indies national consciousness would be guided through cooperation with, and direction of, the Dutch and not be directed by the politically dangerous Pan-Islamic movement (Lee 1977, p. 157). To use Snouck's rhetoric:

Upbringing and education are the means for achieving that end. Even in countries of a much older Muslim culture than our archipelago we see them working effectively to relieve the Mohammedans of some of the medieval rubbish which Islam has been dragging along in its wake for too long (Quoted in Steenbrink 1993, p. 89).

The introduction of Liberal and ethical policies certainly brought their own political opportunity structure, which could either hamper or enable particular developments in the educational, intellectual, political and religious field of the East Indies. This chapter explores the implications of the Liberal and ethical policies for the formation of the Indies intelligentsia and will focus on the first two decades of the twentieth century. However, to understand the formation of the intelligentsia in this period, some attention will be given

to events in the latter part of the nineteenth century, especially in relation to the early installation of a Western-style education and Western-influenced public sphere. Included in this chapter is a description of Islamic education and the early modernization of some Islamic schools as a basis for the constitution of a Muslim intelligentsia.

Discussions will then deal with early competing discourses, the invention of the modern Indies public sphere, and its expansion by the Islamic *Kaoem Moeda*. This will be followed by an overview of differences in economic relations and cultural-ideological orientations which contributed to the early fragmentation of the Indies intelligentsia. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of political contestations and the rise of proto-nationalism.

THE WESTERN EDUCATIONAL ROOTS OF THE MODERN (MUSLIM) INTELLIGENTSIA

The presence and absence of particular forms of education within a society provides not only a schemata for class distinctions and the fundamental principles of the established order, but also a catalyst for competitive power struggles. This notion of education as a force field of conflicting power relations is well represented by educational situation under Dutch colonial rule. Under the Dutch, education reinforced status differences; it became part of what joined people in groups or what divided groups.

Until the early nineteenth century, the knowledge and educational institutions of the East Indies had resembled those in most traditional religio-political systems all over the world. Knowledge and education in the pre-modern world tended to be subordinate to the sacred. Religion provided the rationale, objectives, and content of traditional education, as well as the teachers and the spatial setting for learning. The ruler patronized learning as part of his overall patronage of the faith (Smith 1970). This was also the situation of education in the East Indies before the introduction of a Dutch-sponsored secular education system. In areas where Islam was heavily entrenched, children of the gentry, Muslim traders, and other religious families were sent to traditional Islamic schools [*pesantren*, *surau*, *meunasah*, *dayah*], or perhaps to centres of Islamic learning in the Middle East.

The authority of United [Dutch] East India Company (VOC)¹⁵ that assumed control over parts of the NEI for almost 200 years (1602–1800) had no interest in interfering with native religious matters and education, except for some haphazard support for missionary schools. With the collapse of the VOC in 1799,¹⁶ hegemony over the region was handed over from the colonial-private enterprise to the colonial-state empire. Under the new regime,

most parts of the islands were gradually and distinctively integrated into the colonial empire, transforming dispersed power centres into a unitary colonial state.¹⁷ Yet, until the mid-nineteenth century, the Dutch colonial state continued to neglect native education and avoided an excessive interference with native religious affairs.

Economic interest and the desire to maintain status distinctions were among reasons behind a long period of colonial lack of interest in native education. In the initial stage the colonial concentration was on capital accumulation. There had been such a feeling of Western superiority among the Dutch that there was no call to impose a Western civilized life-world upon the native cultures, but rather, a wish to maintain the “authentic” exotic garden of the East (*Mooi Indië*).¹⁸ Alongside such sentiments, the Dutch created a boundary between the civilized and uncivilized world by limiting the introduction of Western “high” culture initially to the circle of the European community. Thus, the early installation of European-style public primary schools,¹⁹ scientific infrastructure and social clubs (*Sociëteit*),²⁰ especially in the years immediately following the British restoration of the Indies to the Dutch in 1816,²¹ was oriented exclusively to cater for this community.

In the face of a general colonial lack of interest in native education, the pioneering effort to introduce a modern (Western) education system to limited segments of East Indies’ society was conducted by the Christian missions.²² The missionary zeal in education for evangelical purposes was accentuated following the end of the Napoleonic war in 1816 that coincided with the emergence of the so-called “Age of Mission” (Steenbrink 1993, p. 98).²³ Following in the footprints of the Catholic mission,²⁴ from the 1820s onward the Christian missions and schools ranged broadly throughout the islands — except in areas where Islam was heavily entrenched.²⁵ Apart from stressing education both as a means for spreading the Gospel and attracting converts, these schools also offered other benefits to new believers. “Becoming a Christian”, according to Gavin W. Jones, “also meant becoming westernized, and education was an integral part of westernization” (Jones 1976, p. 38). Later on, when the colonial administration began to pay more attention to native education, the mission schools were used as a springboard for further development (Steenbrink 1994, pp. 5–6).

Western Education under the Liberal Policy

The turning point in the colonial government’s attitude towards native education in the NEI came in the second half of the nineteenth century as a result of the Liberal political influence in colonial matters. In order to advance

the Liberal economic interests in the colony, the enhancement of the government bureaucracy was necessary. In this context, both the European and Native Civil Service of the Dutch colonial administration²⁶ had to improve their capacity and recruit a large number of skilled labours. This in turn prompted the colonial government to pay more attention to education. The Organic Law of 1854 was put into effect imposing the responsibility for native education on the colonial government, and in accordance with the law, a Department of Education was set up in 1867.

For the very nature of the colonial's worldview, education posed a dilemma. On the one hand, it was important to underpin the political economy of industrialization and bureaucratization. On the other hand, it was a potential menace to the "mystique" of colonial superiority.²⁷ Such a dilemma was solved by grounding education along lines of ethnic segregation and status hierarchy.²⁸ In following this segregation and status distinction, the nature of early education policies in the Dutch East Indies was anti-assimilationist, elitist and dualistic in character.

To cater for people of the highest status group, the prototype of the European style of primary education was reorganized to become seven years of primary school — offering instruction in Dutch and teaching other European languages — and was popularly known as the *Europeesche Lagere School* (ELS). Originally, this school was exclusively for European children (or those with equal status to the European). After 1864, however, in line with the colonial policy to incorporate the traditional ruling class (*priyayi*) into the colonial sphere of influence,²⁹ this school was opened to a very select few of the top elite of the indigenous community. Furthermore, after 1891 access to enter the ELS was also offered to "qualified" descendants of the wealthy. The non-Christian native participation in these European elementary schools steadily increased from nearly 400 students in 1883, to 762 in 1898, and rose to 1,870 in 1900 (Sutherland 1979, p. 46; Van der Veur 1969, p. 1).

To meet the needs of indigenous Christians (many of whom were soldiers in the colonial army), particularly in Ambon and other missionary enclaves, the government set up the so-called *Speciale School* [Special School]. The reorganization of former mission schools involved adopting the curricula of the ELS (Van der Veur 1969, p. 2).

Eventually the government established a school for "Natives" [*Boemipoetera*]. Sometime in 1849 there had been an experiment of running two elementary vernacular schools and in 1852 the number of these schools rose to fifteen. Using vernacular languages, these new schools were designed originally to prepare the natives of *priyayi* origin for the colonial administrative

service and also to restrict the native people to enter the ELS (Furnivall 1944, p. 219).³⁰ In fact, children of the *priyayi* favoured schools which offered instruction in the Dutch language so that they would have better prospects of employment and status. To respond to this demand, two types of elementary school for segments of the *Boemipoetera* were introduced in 1893: the *Eerste Klasse School* [First Class Native School] and the *Tweede Klasse School* [Second Class Native School]. The first was designed for the children of the *priyayi* and well-to-do families, and Dutch language was taught in the early years and used as the medium of instruction in the final year. The second one was for the children of the population in general and did not offer the teaching of Dutch (Ricklefs 1993, p. 158).

The Liberal regime also pioneered the introduction of secondary schools. There was no single public middle school in the NEI until 1850. At the end of the nineteenth century there emerged three general secondary schools in Java, which were well known as *Hoogere Burger School* [HBS, Higher Middle Class Schools]. One was the Gymnasium Willem III in Batavia (opened 1860), and others were established in Surabaya (1875) and Semarang (1877). These schools were identical to high schools in the Netherlands. Not only did they offer instruction in Dutch, they also followed a strict and high standard curriculum equal to that of schools in Europe, so that the failure rate (even among Dutch students) was high. However, these secondary schools were intended almost exclusively for European (or equal) children. Only a handful of *Boemipoetera* were allowed to attend these schools, their total number in 1890 being no more than five pupils (Sutherland 1979, p. 46; Van der Veur 1969, pp. 4–5).

While the existing European school system remained highly biased towards Europeans and the higher *priyayi*, the access of the lesser born to better education was made possible by loopholes in the colonial discriminatory policy itself. As the expansion of the liberal bureaucracy necessitated the support of technical staff, the government decided to establish the *Vaksscholen* [Vocational Schools]. The shortage of qualified teachers created a demand for a Native Teacher-training School [*Kweekschool*], which was initially established in Surakarta in 1851–52, with several others following both in and outside Java especially after 1870. The enhancement of government health and hygiene services necessitated semi-skilled medical workers. The medical training that had been set up in 1822 with courses for government vaccinators was expanded in 1851 into the so-called “*Dokter-Djawa*” [native paramedical] School in Menteng (Jakarta).³¹ Meanwhile, the need for a skilled native civil service prompted the government to open the *Hoofdscholen* [Chiefs’ Schools] popularly

called “*Sekolah Radja*” [School for the Native Nobility] which came into existence in 1879 at Bandung, Magelang and Probolinggo.

The vocational schools were initially designed for the sons of chiefs and other prosperous natives to prepare them for the new bureaucratic style of the native administration.³² In fact, in the eyes of children of the higher *priyayi* the position of teachers and vaccinators was not regarded as a prestigious and promising career. Therefore, they preferred the Chiefs’ School and were rarely attracted to teacher-training and the *Dokter-Djawa* School. To attract enrolments to the latter schools, the government had to provide students with incentives such as scholarships and promises of governmental status. Insofar as the *Dokter-Djawa* School was concerned, a special arrangement was made after 1891 to allow students expressing an interest in this school to gain entry to the ELS free of charge. Many of those students came from lesser *priyayi* origins, and even frequently came from merchant and village families (Van Niel 1970, pp. 28, 51).

Western Education under the Ethical Policy

Under the influence of the ethical spirit, the education system of the liberal period was reorganized and adjusted to meet new expectations. There were two complementary approaches in this project. Snouck Hurgronje and the first “ethical” director of education (1900–05), J.H. Abendanon, favoured an elitist education in line with their ambition to transform the traditional aristocracy into a Western educated elite. In their view, offering Western education to the native ruling class was of paramount importance to train a grateful and cooperative native elite whose members could handle some of the work of Dutch civil servants. Moreover, this could also cut administrative expenses, curtail Islamic “fanaticism”, and ultimately create an inspiring example for the lowest levels of East Indian society (Ricklefs 1993, p. 156). On the other hand, the Governor General J.B. Van Heutsz (1904–09) and A.W.F. Idenburg (1909–16) supported more basic and practical education for the broader population to contribute to the success of the ethical policy (Van Niel 1970, p. 47). The combination of such approaches resulted in a variety of educational institutions and played a major role in dividing as well as uniting groups within colonial society.

The early decade of the twentieth century brought with it the beginning of modern education as light rays of the ethical policy, which now began to penetrate the life-world of the commoners and the village. Education based on status differences continued with different kinds of schools being provided for different social levels.

From 1907, for the commoners and villagers, the government instituted a three-year vernacular elementary school called *volksschool* or *desaschool* [village school]. Graduates from this school might proceed to a two-year extension, the *Inlandsche Vervolgschool* [Native Senior School], which began to appear in 1915. Next, the old Second Class Native Schools metamorphosed into so-called *Standaardscholen* [standard schools] in 1908. These schools were intended for those engaged in trade or removed from the agrarian or village life. All of these schools offered instruction in local languages or Malay (Van der Veur 1969, pp. 2, 7; Ricklefs 1993, p. 159; Van Niel 1970, p. 68).

For children of the *priyayi* and well-to-do families, the government made efforts to enlarge their access to the European school system that offered Dutch as the medium of instruction. These efforts were driven by the “association policy” and the growing demand of the *priyayi* and well-to-do families who came to view this kind of school and the mastery of Dutch as a new way of maintaining or elevating their social status. The impetus for this consciousness was the deepening penetration of what Maier terms “Dutchification” in the social life of the NEL.³³ The gravity of “Dutchification” had been responsible for the overcrowding of the existing European schools.³⁴ To deal with those challenges, a new school arrangement for native *priyayi* and well-to-do families was made.

At the primary level, the most important development was the transformation of the existing First Class Native School into the so-called *Hollandsch-Inlandsche School* [HIS, Dutch-Native School] in 1914.³⁵ The medium for teaching in the HIS was local languages or Malay in the early years with a shift to Dutch in the higher grades. In theory, this school was intended for children of native chiefs and other prominent or well-to-do *Boemipoetera*.³⁶ In fact, while the number of these schools increased, the children of higher native chiefs and wealthy local people continued to prefer the ELS. In effect, the majority of HIS pupils derived from lesser *priyayi* and lower levels (the upper ranks of the lower class) of society (Van der Veur 1969, pp. 3, 26–29; Kartodirdjo 1991, p. 339).

At the secondary level, an attempt was made to meet the natives’ demand for the existing HBS,³⁷ through the establishment in 1914 of the *Meer Uitgebreid Lager Onderwijs* [MULO, More Comprehensive Elementary Education]. This was in fact a local adaptation of the three-year Netherlands’ lower secondary school. Then in 1918, the government introduced a three-year upper secondary school, *Algemeene Middelbare School* [AMS, General Middle School], intended to prepare students from MULO for more advanced positions or entry into university entrance level (Van der Veur 1969, p. 4).

During this period, some vocational schools continued to provide an opportunity for descendants of lower status to gain access to higher levels of education. In order to better meet the needs of the government bureaucracy and private firms, in 1900 the government reorganized the old *Hoofdenschool* [Chiefs' School] and transformed it into a five year OSVIA [*Opleidingscholen voor Inlandsche Ambtenaren*, Training Schools for Native Officials]. The descendants of *priyayi* continued to be the main recruits for this school, but it now began to accept any qualified *Boemipoetera* who had finished the ELS (or its equivalent), regardless of their origin (Ricklefs 1993, pp. 156–57).³⁸

In 1900–02, the *Dokter-Djawa* school was turned into STOVIA [*School tot Opleiding Van Inlandsche Artsen*, School for Training Native Doctors]. Soon after this transformation, the length of study in this school became six years of the *Geneeskundige* (the core of medical studies) after three years of the preparatory section, and the course was taught in Dutch.³⁹ After 1913 the course of instruction was extended further to seven years of the *Geneeskundige* after three years of the preparatory section. With this final re-organization the school was now equal to the *Nederlandsch-Indische Artsenschool* (NIAS, Netherlands Indian Doctors' School) that had been established in Surabaya in the same year. Both schools were now equivalent to a lower university level but were still classified as vocational schools, and graduates of these schools received the title “*Indische Arts*” [Indies Doctor] (Van Niel 1970, p. 52). A similar reorganization also took place in the native teacher-training schools [*Kweekschool*].⁴⁰ In addition, the government also introduced new vocational schools.⁴¹

Apart from the reorganization and the introduction of various schools in the NEI, it is worth noting that, on the eve of the twentieth century, there had been a pioneering experiment to send a few highly selected sons of noble families to the Netherlands. Although it had never been deliberate government policy to encourage natives to proceed to Europe, Snouck Hurgronje and J. H. Abendanon made a special effort to pave the road for the sons of leading families to gain entry into the higher level of education in the Netherlands. Thus, in 1900 there had already been some five East Indies students in the Netherlands. In the following years, the number grew more rapidly to reach around twenty-five in 1908.⁴²

Whatever the motive for introducing and reorganizing such a variety of schools, the immediate impact on the life-world of the East Indies was quite noticeable: Western-educated *Boemipoetera* significantly increased. In 1900, the total native enrolment in public and private schools of all types and levels was approximately 101,003. This figure had reached 310,496 in 1910,⁴³ to be multiplied in the succeeding years.⁴⁴

TABLE 2.1
Native Enrolments in the Vernacular and
European School Systems, 1900–10

Year	Vernacular Schools	European School System		Vocational Schools	TOTAL
		Primary School	Secondary School		
1900	98,173	2,441	13	376	101,003
1910	303,868	5,108	50	1,470	310,496

Source: Modified from Paul W. van der Veur (1969, pp. 7, 11–11a).

The growing number of Western-educated *Boemipoetera* had an unintended consequence. The possession of new cultural capital led to an increase in their expectations that put pressure on the government to accommodate their occupational interests as well as their aspirations for progress [*kemadjoean*]. With the introduction of vocational schools and European-style native schools, many children of the lesser *priyayi* and those of lower status origins gained access to better education. It was educated people from these social groups who would become the backbone of the formation of the Indies intelligentsia.

Western Education and the Birth of the Intelligentsia

Based on the figures for native enrolments in modern public and private schools, we may assume that the first generation of the Indies intelligentsia were emerging in the early twentieth century as a result of the liberal policy of the latter part of the nineteenth century and the early stage of the ethical era. Meanwhile, those who began to enter modern primary schools in the late 1900s and the 1910s, who experienced a deeper exposure to the process of “Dutchification”, would constitute the second generation of the Indies intelligentsia. These early generations of the Indies intelligentsia — originating largely from the *priyayi*, shared the common experience of being exposed to Western ideas, spoke (snippets of) Dutch among themselves, and were highly aware of their privileged new roles and status — created a new stratum of Indies society.

The newly born Indies intelligentsia formed a relatively autonomous (but structurally differentiated) social stratum in their own right because they were

able to separate themselves from both the established class and estate system. As Harry J. Benda observed (1962, p. 240): "It is the exception rather than the rule that the young aristocrat, the landowner's son or for that matter even the scion of a newly-established bourgeois class, once he has acquired a western education of any kind, becomes the defender and spokesman of the class of his social origin." Most members of this new stratum became government officials, occupying lower and middle rank positions while the Dutch dominated higher ones.

The early generations of the Indies intelligentsia had been exposed to an intense process of secularization as a result of both the secular nature of the liberal educational policy and the "association" policy of the ethical regime. As a result of this process of secularization, most of this intelligentsia began to detach themselves from the religious community's thought world. Even for children of the devout Muslim *priyayi*, the influence of Western education embodied secularization was hardly escapable. This brought a synchronic rupture in the intellectual development of the NEI.

If we refer to the Geertzian trichotomy [*santri-abangan-priyayi*] of Javanese cultural streams, in which the life-world of the *priyayi* is depicted as non-Islamic,⁴⁵ some of this new intelligentsia in fact came from devout Muslim *priyayi* families. A number of pioneers of the proto-nationalist movements, such as Tjipto Mangunkusumo (1885–1943), Sutomo (1888–1938), Tirta Adhi Surjo (1880–1918), and early products of Snouck's association policy such as the Djajadiningrat brothers (Ahmad, Hasan and Husein) as well as influential figures of the *Sarekat Islam* [SI, the Islamic Union], such as Umar Said Tjokroaminoto (1882–1934) and Agus Salim (1884–1954), were children of the devout Muslim *priyayi*.⁴⁶

After intense exposure to Western secular education, however, the Islamic commitment of such children of the devout Muslim *priyayi* gradually faded. Agus Salim's confession reflects this changing religious attitude: "Although I was born in a devout Muslim family, and given religious instructions in my early childhood, [after entering Dutch school] I soon began to suffer from loss of *iman* [faith]" (Salim 1926, p. 26). Salim frankly admitted that the education he gained at the secondary school (HBS) had distanced himself from Islam (*Panitia Buku Peringatan* 1996, p. 40).

For some of the intelligentsia, however, the waning of their Islamic identity was not a fixed condition.⁴⁷ "Identity", argues Stuart Hall, operates "under erasure" in the interval between reversal and emergence. It is subject to "a radical historicization, and is constantly in the process of change and transformation" (Hall 1997, pp. 2–4). Disenchanted with the aristocratic life-world and the various discriminations of the colonial system, and/or having

an opportunity to encounter or reencounter members of the Islamic epistemic community, individual Muslim figures or Islamic socio-economic networks, some of the intelligentsia were able to rediscover their affinity with Islamic communities and identities.

It is useful to recall relevant fragments of the biographies of Agus Salim, Tjokroaminoto and Tirto Adhi Surjo to better understand the transformation of their identities. Salim began his modern schooling in the ELS of Riau, and continued his study in the HBS in Jakarta, where he lived with a Dutch family. In 1903 he graduated from this school as the top student of the three existing HBS in Java. He wished to proceed to the medical school in Netherlands but his father could not afford this. R.A. Kartini (later known as the “mother” of *kemadjoean*),⁴⁸ who had been granted a scholarship to study there but was not allowed by her father to do so, knowing that Salim was a bright student with a financial problem wrote a letter to Mrs Abendanon asking her to reallocate the scholarship to him. Salim himself tried to get “*gelijkgesteld*” (equal legal status with the Dutch) to pave the road to the Netherlands. All efforts failed. In the meantime, he was unwilling to work as a civil servant for the colonial government.

Snouck Hurgronje offered him a promising alternative. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Netherlands was planning to open a new consulate in Jeddah (the port for Mecca), and Salim was offered a staff position there as a translator. Thinking that he would be working on behalf of Netherlands instead of the colonial government, Salim accepted this offer and arrived there in 1906. Frequent conflicts with his Dutch superior propelled him closer to the Islamic epistemic community in Mecca. It was there he met his uncle Achmad Khatib, the last great Indies *ulama* in the *Haramain*. This encounter was described by Salim as the turning point in rediscovering his Islamic identity (*Panitia Buku Peringatan* 1996, pp. 36–62). On his return home (in 1911), this internal conversion found an opportunity for expression when he met Tjokroaminoto (the then chairman of the Islamic Union, *Sarekat Islam*) in early 1915, which led to his prominent role in the *Sarekat Islam* from late 1915 onwards. Similar experiences in the context of the detachment and re-attachment to Islam can be seen in the biographies of Tjokroaminoto and Tirto Adhi Surjo.⁴⁹

The encounter of some members of the intelligentsia with Islamic networks and figures whether intentionally or unintentionally, for idealistic or pragmatic reasons provided a catalyst for their return to the Islamic community. This return did not necessarily entail radical changes in their religious piety and erudition. It did suffice to reconnect them with the house of Islam.

After the relaxation of the “birth rights” (heredity) requirement in the 1910s, many children of the lesser (devout Muslim) *priyayi* and Muslim petty bourgeoisie (merchants and commercial farmers) obtained access to European-style schools.⁵⁰ An unintended consequence of this educational reform was to increase the numbers of Muslim intelligentsia.

Having had a secular education but unwilling to surrender their faith, these Muslim intelligentsia maintained their links with Islamic intellectual networks. This gave rise to a hybrid intelligentsia that would later lead to the formation of the so-called “*intelek-ulama*” [modern intellectual/intelligentsia who were literate in religious knowledge].

THE ISLAMIC EDUCATIONAL ROOTS OF THE MUSLIM ‘CLERICAL’ INTELLIGENTSIA

The deepening penetration of colonialism and capitalism by no means led to the extinction of the existing Islamic schools. Although Dutch control over coastal trading activities in the archipelago had devastated the socio-economic underpinnings for Islamic development in its early habitat (coastal cities), centres of Islamic studies continued to survive by moving towards the hinterlands and inland areas where the agrarian networks of the *pesantren*-based *ulama* and Sufi brotherhoods, especially in Java, took over the role of Islamic teaching (Lombard 1996b, pp. 124–48).

At the same time, the contribution of the Indo-Malayan “epistemic community” (*Ashhab Al-Jawiyyin*) in the *haramain* (Mecca and Medina) to the reproduction and redistribution of religious knowledge remained. The endurance of this so-called *Jâwah* colony facilitated the continuous transmission of reform ideas from the Middle East to the archipelago and inspired the emergence of reform movements in *tareqat* [Sufi brotherhood], Islamic doctrine, politics, and schools.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, members of the new generation of Indies *ulama* began to realize that the traditional method and mindset of upholding Islam was incapable of dealing with the challenge of colonialism and modern civilization. Inspired by both the rise of Islamic reformism-modernism in the Middle East and the introduction of Western education and associations in the homeland they began to promote the modernization of Islamic schools. By combining the teaching of religious subjects with general subjects and adopting the methods and technological apparatus of Western schools, these modernized Islamic schools represented a new form of Islamic educational system called *madrasah*. It was the *madrasah* that would become the breeding ground for the emergence of “clerical-

intelligentsia” who came to be known as “*ulama-intelekt*” [religious scholars who were literate in modern scientific knowledge].

Islamic Education in the Nineteenth Century

Because of the colonial-state’s lack of interest in native education until the first half of the nineteenth century, traditional Islamic schools were able to serve as the major educational institutions of the NEI. When the Liberal economic forces focused more attention on native education, the contradictory and discriminatory colonial policies towards Islam as well as the distrust of the *santri* [the devout Muslim] community towards Western institutions provided new rationales for the Islamic institutions to keep growing.

The policy of the colonial-state towards Islamic education was ambivalent reflecting the ambiguity of the Dutch colonial attitude. There was a tension between the Dutch desire to avoid excessive involvement with native religious matters and the infectious residue of the unpleasant encounter between Christians and Muslims in the past. There was also a tension between the colonial government’s secular outlook and its effort to curtail potential Islamic threats by supporting Christian missions. Such tensions pushed the politics of “neutrality” towards Islam onto shaky ground.⁵¹

Initially, the colonial government attempted to be consistent with the policy to ensure *Boemipoetera* continued with their own traditional institutions. This, for instance, was reflected in the instruction of the Governor General G. A. G. Ph. van der Capellen (1816–26) to the Residents in 1819 to investigate the possibility of improving traditional native education. Unfortunately, this effort resulted in no more than official reports on the state of the *pesantren* (Steenbrink 1984, p. 159; 1994, p. 1).

When the Liberal movement reached the educational sector, J.A. van der Chijs, who was appointed the first colonial officer to develop native education, conducted research in 1867 particularly in Minahasa and Maluku. This research resulted in the policy in the Christian areas the government would improve and promote Christian missionary schools gradually by enlarging the teaching of “secular” subjects. In the Islamic areas, however, van der Chijs’s fear (mixed with disdain) of Islam led to the decision that the government would only promote Dutch-type public schools for the top elite of the indigenous people, to protect the Dutch from what he called the “Islamic volcano” (Steenbrink 1984, pp. 160–61; Soekadri 1979, p. 80).

Henceforth, while the Christian schools became a springboard for the development of the public school system this was not the case for the traditional Islamic schools. In contrast to the policy of British-Malaya where

the government decided to develop afternoon schools for Qur'anic teaching (Roff 1967, p. 26), the idea of developing Islamic schools in the NEI was rejected. In 1888 the Dutch colonial minister refused to subsidize Islamic schools because the governor-general did not want to spend state finances to develop an education system that might ultimately challenge Dutch authority (Steenbrink 1994, pp. 6–7).⁵² This policy of excluding the Islamic school system was in fact a continuation of earlier favouritism towards non-Muslims and non-*santri* aristocratic families in access to government schools.

The exclusion by the colonial education system of traditional Islamic schools was reciprocated by the general negative attitude of the devout Muslim community towards Western institutions. After a series of bloody native insurrections⁵³ that involved *ulama* and their disciples, the mindset of the *santri* community developed a kind of “outsider” mentality creating a symbolic boundary with the life-world of what they called the “white infidel”. A vivid example of this kind of mindset was expressed by the dictum circulating within the milieu of the Acehnese religious community: “Those who write in the Latin alphabet will find their hands cut off in the hereafter, those who follow the Dutch way belong to the infidels” (Alfian 1987, p. 204).

Being prevented from or reluctant to attend government schools, the most feasible choice for devout Muslim families until the late nineteenth century was to attend traditional Islamic schools. The number of such schools, based on the 1831 government report on native educational institutions in Java, was around 1,853 with about 16,556 students. According to van der Chijs, most of these schools, however, taught students no more than Qur'anic reading with only a small number of them learning Arabic writing (Dhofier 1982, p. 35). From 1873, the Office of Native Education Inspection (established by J.A. van der Chijs) produced annual reports on the number of Islamic schools and students. Based on these reports, the number of *pesantren* was reported as averaging around 20,000–25,000, while the number of students was about 300,000.⁵⁴

Although the official statistics on the development of the traditional Islamic school are questionable, it is safe to say that the number of schools grew significantly throughout the century. This is especially true when considering that most of the outstanding *pesantren* that remain today in East and Central Java were established in the nineteenth century.⁵⁵

As a result of the growing number of traditional Islamic schools combined with the maintenance of intellectual and emotional links between teachers [*kjai*] and pupils [*santri*], and between *pesantren* across regions, traditional Islamic intellectual networks were sustained. This facilitated the continuity of Islamic education. Thus, despite the apparent colonial discrimination

against and restrictions on Islamic teachings, in 1890 Snouck Hurgronje revealed the information that *pesantren* were increasing (Benda 1958, p. 27). If twenty years later he celebrated the early victory of the Western-style schools over their Islamic counterparts he possibly under-estimated the ongoing transformation of the Islamic schools and the ability of Islamic intellectuals to cope with the changing environment.

Apart from the development of Islamic teaching in the archipelago, learning in the Middle East particularly at the *haramain* (Mecca and Medina) was still considered by many devout Muslim families as the best way to achieve high qualifications in Islamic studies. Among the Muslim community of the NEI there had been a perception that however capable one might be in religious knowledge, without having studied for some years in the *haramain*, one could only be regarded as a teacher without real authority.

This perception seemed to be in tune with the wider Muslim tradition of knowledge transmission across generations. Person-to-person transmission was at the heart of the transmission of Islamic knowledge. Muslim scholars all over the world travelled from one centre of learning to another with the *haramain* being the most desired final destination, to receive in person authoritative religious knowledge (Azra 1994; Proudfoot 1997, pp. 167–68).

The influx of East Indies students into the *haramain* that had been taking place at least since the 1500s continued to increase in parallel with the growing numbers of pilgrims. For the *Jâwah* (all people of Malay race) of the time, the pilgrimage to Mecca was intended not merely to visit the Holy City and the holy tombs but more importantly to rectify religious practices and knowledge. As Snouck Hurgronje observed (1931, p. 220): “Older Jâwah, who settle here either for life or for some years, wish to devote their last days to religious practices on the pure soil: younger ones devote themselves to religious studies.”

With the conspicuous involvement of *hadji* in the native insurrections in the archipelago throughout the nineteenth century, the colonial government in 1825, 1831 and 1859 issued various resolutions (*ordonnantie*) intended both to restrict the pilgrimage and to monitor the activity of the returned *hadji* (Dhofier 1982, pp. 11–12; Suminto 1996, p. 10). These restrictions, however, did not discourage the Muslim desire to perform *hadj*. To avoid Dutch regulations, the Indies pilgrims travelled *via* Singapore where British requirements were less stringent (Roff 1967, p. 38).

There were at least two reasons conducive to increasing the numbers of those undertaking the pilgrimage to Mecca in the late nineteenth century. First, the introduction of steamships, the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, and the operation of the profit-oriented private shipping companies assisted

the pilgrim traffic. Second, the worsening socio-economic conditions in the East Indies and the tightening control over religious activities following the native insurrections provided the impetus for the religious revival. As Sartono Kartodirdjo observed (1966, p. 141):

For several decades a large part of Java was swept by a religious revival that demonstrated a tremendous increase in religious activities, such as the observance of daily prayers, undertaking pilgrimages, furnishing traditional Muslim education for the young, establishing branches of *tareqats*, the widespread distribution of sermons, etc.

The impulse of religious revival along with the growing Muslim awareness of the potential shortage of *ulama* (as many of them had been killed in the insurrections) provided additional motivation for wealthy religious families to send their sons to the centres of Islamic learning in the Middle East (Abaza 1999, pp. xvii–xviii). These factors led to the considerable increase of pilgrims in the last decades of the century. While in the 1850s and 1860s, an average of approximately 1,600 East Indies pilgrims travelled annually to Mecca, the number became 2,600 in 1870s, jumped to 4,600 in the 1880s, reaching over 7,000 at the end of the century (Ricklefs 1993, p. 130).

Due to the growing influx of the islands pilgrims to Mecca, the *Jâwah* colony (*Ashhab al-Jawiyyin*) by the end of the century was the biggest and most active one in Mecca (Roff 1970, p. 172). In the view of Hurgronje who stayed in Mecca in 1884–85: “There is scarcely any part of the Moslim world where the proportion between the number of the population and the yearly pilgrimages is as favourable to Mekka, as in the Malay Archipelago” (1931, p. 217). In addition to the significant number of people, Hurgronje added (1931, p. 286), “the considerable number of Malay books printed from 1884 till now in Mekka bears witness to the importance of the *Jâwah* element in the Holy City.”

The islands of Java, Sumatra, Borneo and the Moluccas were the most important sources of pilgrim traffic. Sumatra and the province of Banten (West Java), the regions that had been extensively pounded by the wave of wars and religious revival, delivered the largest percentage of pilgrims and students (Hurgronje 1931, pp. 229, 268–89).

The convergence of the diverse *Jâwah* people in the *haramain* created a collective identity and a consciousness of the unity of their shared Islamized culture. This common identity and consciousness gave rise to the formation of a specific *Jâwah* epistemic community,⁵⁶ centred on outstanding *ulama* whose reputation was recognized even by the local Arabs. Apart from acting as religious counsellors for their fellow compatriots these *ulama* produced

religious works in both Arabic and Malay that became the main reference for Islamic thoughts in the archipelago (Roff 1970, p. 172). Snouck Hurgronje (1931, p. 291) depicted this eloquently:

All other considerations as to consequences arising from the Hadj sink in comparison with the blooming Jâwah colony in Mecca; here lies the heart of religious life of the East-Indian Archipelago, and numerous arteries pump from thence fresh blood in ever accelerating tempo to the entire body of the Moslim populace of Indonesia.

Until the late nineteenth century “Islamic reformism” remained the dominant discourse and ideology of the international *ulama* networks in the *haramain*. This ideology had its origin in the seventeenth and eighteenth century *ulama* and Sufis who led the Muslim response to the social crisis in the Muslim world. Beginning in Arabia and Cairo and then spreading out to other parts of the Muslim territories, informal *ulama* and Sufi study groups espoused a reorganization of Muslim communities and the reform of individual behaviour in terms of fundamental religious principles. This reform called for a purified version of Islamic belief and practice based on the study of the *Qur'an*, *hadith*, and law combined with Sufi asceticism. In this regard, these reformers idealized the Prophet Muhammad as the perfect exemplary centre. As such they sought to abolish saint worship and the more florid religious cults and ceremonies, and to dispel superstitious or magical beliefs and practice, while also opposing the tendency of native rulers of the Muslim countries to collaborate with the colonial infidel (Lapidus 1995, p. 563). The most radical version of this Islamic reformism was the *Wahhābiya* movement founded by Muhammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhāb (1703–92), which assumed control over Mecca early in 1803.⁵⁷ This movement had inspired segments of the East Indies *ulama* to begin a similar project in the region.⁵⁸

Continuing the trajectory of the *ulama* networks of the previous centuries, the East Indies *ulama* who became important figures in the *haramain* in the nineteenth century were, among others, Muhammad Arsjad al-Banjari (1710–1812), Muhammad al-Nawawi al-Bantani (1815–98), and Sjeikh Achmad Khatib (1860–1916).⁵⁹ As part of the international *ulama* networks, the East Indies *ulama* at the *Jâwah* colony could not escape from the dominant ideology of the time. The influence of Islamic reformism is indicated in M. Arsjad al-Banjari’s correction of the *qiblat* [direction of prayer] of some Jakarta mosques and his rejection of the teaching of *wihdatul wujud* [pantheism] practised by a particular *tareqat* [Sufi brotherhood] in Banjarmasin⁶⁰ (Steenbrink 1984, pp. 95–96). This would even become clearer in the works and political attitudes of Nawawi and Khatib.

Nawawi's reputation as a doctor of divinity was based on his monumental work on the principal Shafi'ite manual of Law.⁶¹ During his long life in Mecca, this son of a Banten *penghulu* wrote no less than 20 learned Arabic works.⁶² Some of his early works were published in Cairo, but with the emergence of the printing press in Mecca in the last decade of the nineteenth century he published his works there (Hurgronje 1931, p. 271). In Snouck's view (1931, p. 270): "Under his inspiration, more and more Sundanese, Javanese, and Malays turn to the thorough study of Islam, and the politico-religious ideals of Islam gain, in their most highly developed form, increased circulation." Concentrating himself on literary works, Nawawi did not forget to express his anti-colonial sentiments. In this context Snouck had something more to say: "The resurrection of the Banten sultanate, or of an independent Moslim state, in any other form, would be acclaimed by him joyously" (1931, p. 270).

While Nawawi was celebrated for his erudition in religious knowledge, Achmad Khatib deserves attention for his achievement as the *Imam* of the Shāfiite school of jurisprudence at the *Masjidil Haram* and also as the prototype of an East Indies *ulama* who had some experience of the Dutch (secular) educational system.⁶³ During his long life in Mecca, Khatib wrote some forty-nine books. Many of these books were on his special field, astronomy, and published in the Cairo press (Abdullah 1971, p. 7).⁶⁴ Under the influence of the ideology of "Islamic reformism", he and other fellow *ulama* believed they had to resist colonialism. He frequently depicted the Dutch as the infidels who had poisoned Islam in the heart of its believers. In his view, the relationship with the infidel colonial had been the main reason for the waning of the Islamic spirit (Steenbrink 1984, pp. 146–47). His major contribution to the *Jāwah* epistemic community, however, lay in his position as the last great East Indies *ulama* in the *haramain* from whom East Indian students from diverse socio-religious backgrounds and territories learned traditional Islamic teachings and ideology of the previous generations of the international *ulama* networks in the *haramain*.

Apart from the persistent influence of Islamic reformism, the international *ulama* networks in the late nineteenth century began to be influenced by a new wave of "Islamic modernism". This new ideology was first espoused by the Young Ottomans in the 1860s and 1870s and spread out to other parts of the Muslim world. While committed to the principles of Islam, this young Ottoman group called upon the endangered *khilafah* of the Ottoman regime to transform itself into a constitutional government imitating European forms of the state and civilization. A similar response came from (British) India. A modernist Indian Muslim thinker, Sayyid Ahmad Khan, argued that for the Indian Muslims to survive under British rule, they required new approaches

to education to produce a new generation of Muslim leaders. While remaining loyal to the principles of Islam, these new leaders could also adapt themselves to the political and scientific culture of the modern world. In short, “Islamic modernism” was the ideology of new elites in the Muslim world who were concerned about the renewal of the state and society through the adoption of modern methods, scientific and technological development, while still concerned for maintaining Islam as the cultural basis of power and society (Lapidus 1995, pp. 557–67).

Thus, Islamic modernism is different in some ways from Islamic reformism. Islamic reformism was the *ulama* project started in the seventeenth century in an effort to reorganize Muslim communities and reform individual behaviour. This project was based on the purification of Islamic belief and practice through a return to the perceived authentic source of Islamic orthodoxy (*Qur'an* and *Sunna*) with a strong tendency to reject Western culture. On the other hand, Islamic modernism was the project of the new Western-influenced Islamic generation to adapt themselves to modern civilization while remaining loyal to Islamic culture. In other words, Islamic modernism was an interstitial space between “Islamism” and “secularism”, which might return to the Islamism or transform further into the secularism, such as in Turkey under the Young Turks, or continue to take a moderate position between extremes. In the NEI during the colonial period, as the Dutch attempted to detach the ruling class from Islamic tutelage, the Dutch education that favoured this class transformed the Indies’ elite (in general) into a (moderately) secularized intelligentsia. Consequently, there were only few a Western-educated elite in the Indies who favoured “Islamic modernism”.

In Egypt, Islamic modernism took a different turn in the hands of a new generation of Al-Azhar-based *ulama*. For these *ulama* there were at least two reasons which resulted in an idiosyncratic approach to the issue of modernism. On the one hand, the ancient Al-Azhar Academy in Cairo continued to be a prestigious learning centre for local and foreign students seeking to acquire advanced religious knowledge. In this regard, the *ulama* as the vanguard of Islamic scholarship had a sort of *mission sacrée* to maintain Islamic learning. On the other hand, the strengthening superimposition of Western civilization, particularly after Egypt came under British occupation after 1882, inspired some of the younger *ulama* to take a strategic approach in order to better deal with the challenge of the modern world (Landau 1994, p. 122). To deal with this challenge they promoted the synthesis of the concept of “Islamic reformism” as developed by the previous generation of *ulama* with Islamic modernism as formulated by the new modern-educated Muslim intellectuals. The result of this synthesis was the hybrid “Islamic reformism-modernism”.

This new intellectual movement was inspired by the teachings of a distinguished wandering Islamic thinker, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839–97), who resided in Egypt in the 1870s (just before he started his Pan-Islamic activity).⁶⁵ His major concern was to eliminate the ongoing Islamic paralysis and fragmentation and revive the true glory of Islam. In his view, to free Muslim societies from colonial encroachment necessitated the reform of Islamic belief and practice, because for him religion was the moral basis of technical and scientific achievement as well as of political solidarity and power. He believed that Islam was quintessentially suited to serve as the basis of a modern scientific society, as it had once been the basis of medieval Islamic glory. But to do this required Muslims to employ a rational interpretation of their scripture. These efforts, in his view, should be grounded in the spirit of the Islamic solidarity, since the only way to respond properly to the colonial encroachment was to link the local resistance of Muslim countries to the international all-Muslim union (Lapidus 1995, pp. 578–620; Landau, 1994, pp. 13–15).

Because of his erudition, writing ability, and charismatic oratory, al-Afghani attracted many admirers, some of whom considered themselves his disciples and continued to spread his message. Among his famous disciples was an Egyptian Islamic scholar, Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849–1905). He was born of an educated family and was schooled at Al-Azhar when finally he encountered al-Afghani who often visited the university during the 1870s. Due to his involvement in the ‘Urabi revolt of 1881, ‘Abduh was exiled to France in 1882. It was during his exile that he joined al-Afghani in Paris to publish in 1884 a monumental magazine, *Al-Urwa al-Wuthqā* (the Indissoluble Bond), which would become the cornerstone in the propaganda of the so-called Pan-Islamic movement.⁶⁶

Henceforth, the idea of the Pan-Islamic movement became an embodiment of al-Afghani’s former dream of Islamic solidarity. In the eyes of al-Afghani, Pan-Islam and Nationalism could be mutually complementary in their “liberationist” aspects. The grand design of Pan-Islamic politics in the long run was the establishment of an international Muslim bloc in the form of a confederation of semi-autonomous Muslim states with the Ottoman sultan as their suzerain. In the short term, however, the priority was resistance to foreign aggression. Efforts were made to institute study circles near the mosques or religious schools as catalysts for mobilizing public opinion and linking Pan-Islamic networks. In this respect, ‘Abduh complained that the practice of the pilgrimage had become focussed solely on religious ends and had lost its power as the medium for igniting the spirit of Islamic solidarity (Landau 1994, pp. 13–26).

Both al-Afghani and 'Abduh agreed that the primary purpose of the Islamic movement was political revival. To attain this objective, however, while al-Afghani emphasized the pragmatic need for political alliance, 'Abduh pursued the same goal by emphasizing educational, legal, and spiritual reform. 'Abduh seems to have realized that a united Muslim state was politically impractical. Moreover, on his return to Egypt in 1888, he was appointed judge and later *mufti* (chief of Islamic law) from 1889 to 1905. In such a formal position, it was perhaps important for him to remain on good terms with the British administration. He then withdrew from active involvement in politics, although he did call on Muslims to unite against their enemies. Henceforth, his endeavours as *mufti* were directed toward modernizing Islamic law and revising the curriculum of Al-Azhar to include modern history and geography. His later concern was to maintain the vitality of Islam while Muslims were adopting Western ways. He proposed the reformulation of Islam in order to distinguish the essential from the non-essential, preserve the fundamentals and discard the accidental aspects of the historical legacy. He called for Muslims to return to the *Qur'an* and the *Sunna* as God's guidance, but in matters not expressly covered in both sources he argued that *ijtihad* (independent reasoning and judgement) was essential in order to better respond to the challenge of modern society. Inherent in this project was the conviction that Muslims should not hesitate to draw on modern science and logic to deepen their knowledge and to demonstrate the compatibility of Islam with modern scientific thought and progress. In so doing he became the trailblazer of a hybrid Islamic reformism and modernism under the banner of the so-called *Salafiya* movement (Lapidus 1995, p. 621; Landau 1994, pp. 25–26).

The great tremors of the Pan-Islam and *Salafiya* movements speedily spread out to North Africa and the Middle East providing a new inspiration for various religio-political movements in the region. In the last decade of the nineteenth century their influence had also reached the heart of the Islamic epistemic communities in the *haramain*. For a new generation of Muslim students in the Holy City who had become politically aware of the detrimental effects of Western encroachments in their respective home countries, the idea of Pan-Islam both in the political and educational fields was very stimulating. In the view of Snouck Hurgronje: "Those who at home have studied in the *pesantrèns*, *soeraus*, *mandarsah's* [*sic*] (institutions for the religious instructions of native Moslems) or in the mosques are most open to Pan-Islamic influences" (Hurgronje 1931, p. 249).

Achmad Khatib, as the last great *Jâwah ulama* around the turn of the century, reacted to the growing influence of 'Abduh-inspired reformism-

modernism with scepticism. Although he had been influenced by Islamic reformism, his position as the guardian of traditions of Shāfiite teaching made him critical of ‘Abduh’s notion of *ijtihad* and modernism. He allowed his students to read ‘Abduh’s works, but he did this with the intention that his students would reject ‘Abduh’s ideas (Noer 1973, p. 32). Many of his students were in fact not only reading ‘Abduh’s works but also admiring his thoughts. As such, Khatib functioned as a bridge between tradition and innovation. In such a “liminal”⁶⁷ position he was able to serve as a midwife for both the upcoming generation of the reformist-modernist *ulama* and intellectuals such as Mohd. Tahir b. Djalaluddin, M. Djamil Djambek, Abdullah Ahmad, Abdul Karim Amrullah (Hadji Rasul), M. Thaib Umar, Achmad Dachlan, and Agus Salim as well as conservative-traditionalist ones such as Sjeikh Sulaiman al-Rasuli and Hasjim Asj`ari.⁶⁸

Through reading materials, encounters with pilgrims from Egypt, or perhaps through contact with Indo-Malayan students in Cairo,⁶⁹ the Pan-Islamic and reformist-modernist concepts soon became a new dominant discourse among the Jāwah students in the *haramain*. M.T. Djalaluddin had already left Mecca for Cairo early in 1893 to study astronomy at Al-Azhar. In Cairo he spent four years being deeply exposed to the teachings of ‘Abduh and formed a close relationship with his most enthusiastic disciple, Mohd. Rashīd Ridhā (Roff 1967, p. 60). Other *Jāwah* students subsequently followed in Djalaluddin’s footsteps leading to the gradual exodus of Indo-Malayan students from Mecca to Cairo. This change in the preferred study destination reflected a shift in the religious paradigm that would have a significant impact on the development of Islamic studies and Islamic education in the NEI.

In 1897 M. Thaib Umar had established a reformed *surau* [Islamic school] in Batusangkar (West Sumatra). At this juncture, the “graded classes and classroom teaching”⁷⁰ as well as general modern subjects had not yet been introduced, but all texts used in the school were printed books and the curriculum was adapted to that of Cairo’s Al-Azhar. Slowly but surely the influence of ‘Abduh’s school of thought spread in the archipelago (Junus 1960, pp. 45–53). In later developments, these reformed schools would lead to the formation of what were popularly called *madrasah*.

The Reform of Islamic Schools during the Ethical Era

It was Snouck’s boastful prophecy that “in competition with the attractions of Western education and cultural association, Islam could not but be the loser” (Benda 1958, p. 27). Until this stage, however, there remained much

more to be done if Western civilization was to win the race against Islam in the archipelago.

For a religion that has no effective hierarchical organization, and for the Islamic community in the plural society of the NEI, education had a key role to play in the struggle of Islam. The absence of ecclesiastical structure in Islam left the Islamic school as virtually the sole means of imparting the doctrines of the religion. In the East Indies context, there were at least three additional reasons for the Muslim promotion of Islamic schools. First, given the multiplicity of competing beliefs and value systems in the archipelago, the Islamic school played a key role in establishing a clear and positive identity for East Indies Islam. Second, Islamic education was an essential Muslim ideological apparatus in response to the discrimination and oppression of colonial policies. Last but not least, the lack of opportunities for the admission of *santri* children to government schools combined with the colonial government's lack of interest in promoting Islamic schools forced the *ulama* to develop schools of their own. As Islamic schools were the bastions of Islamic struggle to survive, Islamic leaders made every effort to ensure their survival.

The fact that education was a powerful agent for socializing Islamic ideals and doctrines led the colonial administration to pay more serious attention to Islamic education. Various measures were taken to control the development of Islam and Islamic schools in particular. In 1905 the government for the first time issued the so-called "Guru Ordinance" that obliged Islamic teachers to apply for a teaching permit from the government. As well, the government controlled the movement of *ulama* within the NEI by requiring them to apply for special passes. Furthermore, while in theory the state was supposed to assume as neutral a position as possible in religious matters, the colonial ambition to rein in "wild" Islam led it to empower the institution of *penghulu* [religious judges and leaders of the main mosques] as instruments of government control (Steenbrink 1993, p. 89). Henceforth, alongside the positions of independent *kjai* [religious teachers] and *ulama*, the position of *penghulu (kadi)* was created to provide religious officials of secular rule (Benda 1958, p. 15).

Nevertheless, in spite of the expansion of modern "secular" schools and these various restrictions, traditional Islamic schools survived.⁷¹ The rejection of the colonial ideological apparatus and the pressure of modernization invoked a defensive mechanism on the part of established *ulama* to commit themselves to what they perceived as authentic indigenous religious traditions. So, long-established (traditional) Islamic schools continued to be organized and nurtured by conservative-traditionalist *ulama*.⁷²

Of course the features of the traditional schools were by no means static as they always creatively (and gradually) adjusted themselves to the changing environment. This adjustment, however, was intended to remain in harmony with the established traditions. It took some decades for the body of the conservative-traditionalist *ulama* of the traditional Islamic schools to accept elements of modern schooling. Until the early decades of the twentieth century the adoption of modern subjects and technologies — such as European languages, Roman script, arithmetic, “the graded classes and classroom teaching” and even the use of desks and blackboard — were regarded by the — *pesantren* community as *haram* (forbidden). Even the famous Hasjim Asj’ari-led *Pesantren Tebuireng* (est. 1899), which was regarded as the exemplary centre of the traditionalist Islamic school, took some twenty years to adopt elements of modern schooling (Dhofier 1982, p. 104). In the face of the growing number of modern secular schools as well as the emerging *madrasah* in urban areas, the traditional *pesantren*, *surau* and the like retained their stronghold in the more traditional, less accessible countryside.

In the period when the conservative-traditionalist *ulama* such as Sulaeman al-Rasuli and Hasjim Asj’ari refused to accept the imparted body of Western educational curricula and apparatus, the initiative for cultivating the new breed of Islamic “clerical-intelligentsia” was taken by ‘Abduh-inspired reformist-modernist *ulama*. Faced with the superimposition of Western modernism, the conservative-traditionalist *ulama* expressed their resistance through the fetish of “Islamic indigenization”. On the other hand, the new reformist-modernist *ulama* exhibited a fetish of “Islamic authenticization” combined with the strategy of “appropriation”. The term appropriation refers to the way in which the dominated or colonized subjects imitate aspects of the imperial culture — language, forms of writing, education, technology, modes of thought and argument — that may be of use to them in articulating their own social and cultural identities or in resisting the imperial political and cultural control (Ashcroft, et al. 1998, p. 19).

The early spearhead of the reformist-modernist ideology and *madrasah* in the East Indies came originally from the Arab community. The pioneering efforts of this community were extended by returned native students from the Middle East, especially those who had been exposed to ‘Abduh’s ideas or had been directly in contact with him and/or his disciples in Egypt. In echoing ‘Abduh’s ideas, the main agenda of these reformist-modernist *ulama* of the Arab and native community has been described by Jutta Bluhm-Warn (1997, p. 296) as follows:

Purification of Islam from all accretions (*bida’*) and a return to pristine Islam based on the *Qur’ān* and *sunna*; liberation of Islam from the blind acceptance

of dogmas of former scholars (*taqlīd*); reopening the doors of independent reasoning (*ijtihād*) to enable Islam to respond to the exigencies of modern life; reformation of Islamic education to accommodate secular subjects and methodology and; the revival of Arabic language sciences to facilitate interpretation of the Qurʾān and *sunna*.

The Arab connection with the archipelago was of long standing, going back to the seventh century. With the arrival of economically advantageous conditions in the archipelago in the nineteenth century as well as of better sea communications with the Middle East particularly after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the Arab element in the East Indies population began to increase. By the turn of the century their number was 27,399 (Mobini-Kesheh 1999, p. 21). By far the largest part of this community was from a single area, the Hadramawt. While they lived in the archipelago the Arab community continued to maintain their spiritual and intellectual orientation to the Arab world. This orientation became even stronger in the face of the awakening of Indies proto-nationalism. Natalie Mobini-Kesheh put this succinctly (1999, pp. 14–15):

The adoption of an ethnically defined nationalism among Indonesians from the mid-1910s featured an emphatic rejection of the Hadramis as “foreigners”. This rejection, in turn, sharpened the Hadramis’ sense of separateness from the local population, and was a decisive factor in compelling them to turn to their own homeland, Hadramawt, as the source of their identity.⁷³

Through reading books, periodicals and newspapers from the Middle East or through the pilgrimage to Mecca these Hadramis were able to follow current Islamic thoughts and developments in the centre of the Islamic world. In this way a circle of this Arab community was susceptible to the current ‘Abduh-inspired reformist-modernist ideology.

Under the influence of this new intellectual movement, in 1901 the Arab community in Batavia formed an organization called *Al-Djami’at al-Chairijah* (better known as *Djami’at Chair*), which successfully established a new type of Islamic school in 1905. This school adopted Western curricula and methods of teaching combined with the curriculum of religious schools. It was open to native East Indians, while some of its teachers were imported from the Arab World, including many who had been exposed to ‘Abduh-inspired reformist-modernist ideology.⁷⁴

In further developments, *peranakan* Arabs of the non-*sayyid* (lesser) class, because of internal conflicts with the *sayyid* [higher born] deserted the *Djami’at Chair* and established a new association in 1915 called *Al-Irsyad* (*Al-Djami’at al-Islah wal-Irsjad*, Union for Reformation and Guidance).

Supported by non-*sayyid* traders, the most important figure of this organization was Sjeikh Ahmad Soorkatti, a Sudanese born *ulama* and a follower of 'Abduh's teachings. In promoting education along reformist-modernism line, *Al-Irsyad's madrasah* taught in Malay, Arabic, and Dutch and was open to native East Indians. Its branches spread to other cities mostly in Java (Noer 1980, pp. 68–75).

The native segment of the first generation of the Indies reformist-modernist *ulama* was composed particularly of former students of Achmad Khatib. Upon returning home these new *ulama-intelekt* began to establish reformed schools, periodicals and associations as a means for implanting and disseminating the reformist-modernist ideology and historical projects.

The first important personality of the first generation of reformist-modernist *ulama (ulama-intelekt)* is Mohd. Tahir b. Djalaluddin (b. 1869). After studying in Mecca (twelve years) and Cairo — Al-Azhar (four years) as well as two years of teaching in Mecca, he returned to the archipelago in 1899. Because of his opposition to the matrilineal system of Minangkabau *adat*, he decided to move to Singapore where he and some other reformist-modernist comrades began to publish a new periodical in Malay entitled *Al-Imam (The Leader)*, first published in July 1906). The establishment of *Al-Imam* was inspired by *Al-Manār (The Light)*, 1898–1935), an influential reformist-modernist magazine published in Egypt by 'Abduh and his most enthusiastic disciple, Mohd. Rashīd Ridhā (1865–1935).⁷⁵ In 1908, Djalaluddin helped establish the *Madrasah al-Iqbal al-Islamiyyah* (a reformist-modernist school that combined Western curricula and religious subjects), run by an Egyptian, Othman Effendi Rafat (Roff 1967, pp. 60–66).

With Djalaluddin being domiciled in Singapore, the first *ulama-intelekt* who pioneered the modern Islamic school in West Sumatra was Abdullah Achmad (b. 1878). After attending a Western primary school, he spent some four years in Mecca (1895–99) and then made a short visit to Al-Azhar. Upon his return to West Sumatra in 1899, he began introducing the reformist-modernist ideology to students of his father's *surau* in Padang Panjang. Several years later he moved to Padang and began to give public lectures in mosques and *surau* and make close contact with local students of government schools. Recognizing the outmoded character of the traditional *surau* on the one hand, and the elitist nature of the government schools on the other hand, in 1909 he decided to establish a new religious school [*madrasah*] in his own right, namely the *Adabijah* school.⁷⁶ This school began to introduce “the graded classes and classroom teaching”⁷⁷ as well as offering general

subjects side by side with religious ones (Steenbrink 1994, pp. 37–39). From 1915, the school received a subsidy from the government, changed its name to *Hollandsch Maleishe School Adabijah* (*HIS Adabijah*) and acquired a Dutch headmaster. Although this HIS was the first HIS in Minangkabau that included religious subject to its curricula, Abdullah Ahmad's closeness with Dutch officials resulted in his school losing its status as the spearhead of the Islamic reformist-modernist movement (Noer 1980, p. 52; Junus 1960, p. 54).

The most influential reform school in West Sumatra was the *Thawalib* school under the leadership of Abdul Karim Amrullah (b. 1879), who was known as Hadji Rasul. This school grew out of a traditional *surau*, *Surau Jembatan Besi*, which had been established at the end of the nineteenth century. After more than seven years living in Mecca, Hadji Rasul returned home in 1906, and became an itinerant missionary who travelled across the territories between Maninjau and Padang Panjang. In his lectures he forcefully attacked local customs and the *adat* authorities for their deviation from true Islamic doctrine. After 1912, he devoted himself to reforming *Surau Jembatan Besi* with the support of Abdullah Ahmad. The curriculum of the *surau* was altered to emphasize the teaching of *ilmu alat* [the key of knowledge: Arabic]. Furthermore, beginning in 1916 the “graded classes and classroom teaching” as well as general subjects were introduced and after 1920 this *surau* came to be known as the school of *Sumatra Thawalib*, associated with a confederation of reformed *surau* in West Sumatra with *Surau Jembatan Besi* being its exemplary centre. Hadji Rasul continued his missionary activities by travelling to Malaya (1916) and Java (1917). In Java he established contact with leaders of the *Sarekat Islam* and *Muhammadiyah*. On his return to West Sumatra he became the main propagandist of *Muhammadiyah* (Noer 1980, pp. 44–55).

Still in West Sumatra, similar work was carried out by Djalaluddin Thaib,⁷⁸ Zainuddin Labai al-Junusi⁷⁹ in Padang Panjang; M. Djamil Djambek⁸⁰ and Ibrahim Musa,⁸¹ and Latif Sjakur⁸² in Bukittinggi; M. Thaib Umar and Mahmud Junus⁸³ in Batusangkar. All these reform *surau* created an elaborate network of *madrasah* based on reformist-modernist ideology. A further step in consolidating this network was achieved in 1918 when the union of *madrasah* Islamic teachers, known as *Persatuan Guru-Guru Agama Islam* (PGAI), was established with Zainuddin Labai Al-Junusi as its first chairman. Initially, this association attempted to accommodate conservative-traditional *ulama*. In fact, the latter *ulama* soon responded to the presence of the PGAI by establishing their own association, *Ittihadul*

Ulama (the union of *ulama*), led by Sjeikh Sulaiman al-Rasuli (Junus 1960, pp. 81–82).

In Java, an early native effort to modernize traditional Islamic school began in 1906, when the Central Javanese Prince Susuhunan Pakubuwana established a new model *pesantren* in Surakarta, *Mambaul Ulum*. In this *pesantren*, students were not just offered religious subjects — such as reading and memorizing the Holy *Qur'an* — but also general subjects such as astronomy, arithmetic and logic (Steenbrink 1994, pp. 35–36). This *pesantren* made a very important contribution to the education of *ulama-intelek* and *intelek-ulama*. Future prominent Islamic figures such as Ahmad Baiquni (a famous Indonesian physician) and Munawir Sjadzali (a minister of religion, 1983–93) were educated at this *pesantren*.

The development of reformist-modernist *madrasah* among native people in Java was spearheaded by Achmad Dachlan (1868–1923).⁸⁴ The son of a *khatib*⁸⁵ at the Sultan of Yogyakarta's mosque, Kjai Hadji Abubakar, he first stayed in Mecca from 1890 until 1891 to deepen his religious knowledge particularly under the supervision of Achmad Khatib. After returning home for a while he then returned to Mecca in 1903 to stay for another two years at the very time when 'Abduh's reformist-modernist ideas gained popular acceptance among the international *ulama* networks in the *haramain*.⁸⁶

After his first return, Dachlan ignited an uproar in the local Muslim community over his correction of the *qiblat* [direction of prayer] in the Sultan of Yogyakarta's mosque. The second time he returned he established an experimental *madrasah* in which Arabic was the medium of instruction along with the use of desks and blackboard. He then became a member of several associations, including *Djami'at Chair* and *Budi Utomo*, to which he gave religious lectures. Through his activity in *Budi Utomo* he was asked to give religious lectures to students of the local teacher-training school and of the OSVIA in Magelang. Next in 1911, with the help of students from the teacher-training school, he established an elementary school in the precincts of the Yogyakarta royal palace, introducing a curriculum where general and religious subjects were taught side by side (Nakamura 1976, p. 116; Darban 2000, pp. 32–33). Dachlan's work culminated in the establishment in 1912 of the prominent reformist-modernist association, *Muhammadiyah*, with its elaborate networks of *madrasah*, schools and other modern Islamic institutions.

All these developments represented the early formation of a new form of Islamic school popularly called *madrasah* in the NEI. In many cases, early protagonists of *madrasah* began to conduct their activities in a traditional

school, until they were able to gradually reform this school or establish a new school in its own right. In adopting Western educational methods, curricula and apparatus, the emergence of *madrasah* represented a new Islamic effort to cope with the challenge of modern Western-style schooling. Although access to government schools had become easier following the Ethical Policy, there were insufficient schools to accommodate the numbers of native students wishing to attend. At the same time, many Muslims remained reluctant to enter secular schools. Thus, the *madrasah* offered an alternative education for those who were unable or unwilling to enter the government (secular) schools.

The *madrasah* were located in an intermediate position between the traditional religious and the modern secular schools. The establishment of reformist-modernist associations promoted a network of *madrasah* which taught general subjects (arithmetic, history, literature, geography and so on) and used modern organizational methods (regular class hours, examination, marks, diplomas), employed lay (non-*ulama*) teachers, and even educated girls. In this way, the *madrasah* managed to remain in tune with the *kemadjoean* project but at the same time they managed to be rooted in the Islamic worldview. Clifford Geertz puts this succinctly (1965, pp. 106–07):

A strong and active parochial school system (if I may adapt this Catholic Christian term to Muslim uses) is not, in an Islamic country and certainly not in Indonesia, an enemy but an ally of the secularist modernizing elite. It is an ally not because it promotes the ideals of a militant and totalistic secularism (ideals that only a small minority of these elites themselves hold) but because it allows, and in fact encourages, an established religious tradition with a powerful hold on the minds of the population to come to terms with the modern world, neither simply rejecting nor simply capitulating to it but becoming part of it.

The emergence of *madrasah* represented a new Islamic historical trajectory. The new school was an embodiment of the reformist-modernist plan to recuperate and rejuvenate Islamic society. For its campaign to reform the Muslim society through the return to Islamic orthodoxy, this school represented ideas of Islamic reformism. For its adoption of modern approaches and instruments — such as modern rationalism, Western curricula, and modern apparatus, this school represented ideas of Islamic modernism. For offering both religious and modern scientific knowledge, the *madrasah* functioned as the main breeding ground for the formation of the “clerical-intelligentsia”, popularly referred to by Indonesian Muslims as “*ulama-intelek*”, who would become the main counterpart of the intelligentsia in leading Indies society along the path of *kemadjoean*.

DISCURSIVE PRACTICES AND THE MAKING OF COLLECTIVE IDENTITY

The intelligentsia as a distinct social stratum is much more than just a group of people who shares certain educational and occupational criteria. More importantly, it shares certain intellectual interests, attitudes and identities (Gella 1976, p. 13). But this isomorphism does not just happen. It has to be constructed especially by discursive practices.

“Discourses”, according to Sara Mills (1997, p. 15), “structure both our sense of reality and our notion of our identity”. As Michel Foucault eloquently shows in the *Archaeology of Knowledge* (1972), discourses do not just reflect or represent social entities and relations, they construct or constitute them. A prominent theorist of discourse, Norman Fairclough, had identified three aspects of the constructive capacity of discourse (1999, pp. 64–65): it contributes to the construction of social identities (identity), social relationship (relational), and systems of knowledge and belief (ideational). Because of its constructive effect, ideological struggle is the essence of discourse manifestation. As a site of the constant contestation of meaning, “discourse”, according to Michel Pêcheux, “shows the effects of ideological struggle within the functioning of language, and, conversely, the existence of linguistic materiality within ideology” (quoted in Fairclough 1999, p. 30).

Discursive practices of the first generation of the Indies intelligentsia began as a means of expression for the self-interest and self-actualization of the newly-educated stratum of the Indies society. Modern educational attainment led to an increase in their expectations. Initially, their expectations centred around the issue of *kemadjoean* [progress].

Discursive Practices of the Liberal Era

By the end of the nineteenth century, the impact of Liberal education on the genesis of a new East Indies elite was evident. Graduates from the missionary, European and native public schools, and especially vocational schools produced the prototype of the *homines novi* of civil servants and intelligentsia of the twentieth century. Notwithstanding the fact that graduates of the vocational schools were often not descended from the higher *priyayi* families, their elevation to the status of public servants in the colonial administration granted them the aura of *priyayi* (new *priyayi*) of some standing in the eyes of the East Indies people. For those who were already of *priyayi* status, the acquisition of new qualifications strengthened their position within the *priyayi* group. For a few of them, however, the old-fashioned *priyayi* might have lost their fascination, for as new professionals they became obsessed with

personal and social prestige attached to new roles in the service of the modern colonial bureaucracy (Van Niel 1970, p. 29).

For this embryo intelligentsia, moving from the edge of the colonial as well as the feudal world into the whirl of modern bureaucratic machinery, obtaining these new roles meant changing their life-world. Educational cultivation seemed to have drawn them into the process of “vicarious learning” resulting in a degree of self-reflexive power to measure how far they had stepped forward compared to the achievement of the “others”. What seemed to be the state of the art of human achievements of the time was modern techniques and new industrial enterprises brought into the East Indies as a by-product of the Liberal economy. These were exemplified by the introduction of more elaborate and innovative communication systems such as new shipping technology, railways, telephone, telegraph, post office, printing industry and newspapers. The introduction of modern systems of communication was concomitant with the growth of urban centres and a metropolitan super-culture marked by the expansion of industries, banks, extension services, and warehouses containing imported items from centres of the capitalist world in Europe (Adam 1995, p. 79; Shiraishi 1990, p. 27; Geertz 1963).

In the face of such astonishing modern phenomena, the *homines novi* were simply fascinated and accepted them as symbols of the *kemadjoean* that they had to achieve. In this trajectory of progress, the achievement of the “others” was simply incommensurable. The Europeans as wealthy planters and newly emerging bourgeoisie of the urban centres had of course been well-exposed to modern education, new media, luxurious properties, carriages, and “civilized” social clubs. Even the Chinese, because of their greater wealth gained as middlemen in commercial transactions and their dominant power in retail trade as well as their exposure to missionary schools, moved forward along this trajectory. This was signified by their remarkable achievement in the realms of publishing, education and associations.

Under such historical conditions, the issue of how to catch up with *kemadjoean* [progress] became the dominant discourse of this emerging intelligentsia. For them, *kemadjoean* expressed an ideal loftiness of one’s social status whether as an individual or as an imagined community encompassing many other things: educational improvement, modernization (widely associated with Westernization), respectability, and success in life. As a measure of the obsession with *kemadjoean*, Dutch words, as the icon of the progress itself, were increasingly used in the daily conversation of the *homines novi*. Thus, to use Shiraishi’s description (1990, p. 27), “the words signifying progress — such as *vooruitgang* (advance), *opheffing* (uplifting), *ontwikkeling*

(development), and *opvoeding* (upbringing) — embellished the language of the day together with *bevordering van welvaart* (promotion of welfare).” It is worth noting that the proliferation of this discourse was made possible by the genesis of the embryonic public sphere of the intelligentsia in the form of the foreign-owned vernacular press and the Western-inspired and localized social clubs.

For those who were preoccupied with the idea of *kemadjoean*, the kernel of their aspirations reflected the gap between the rising expectations of the elevation of their self-esteem and the actual constraints they had to face. The major constraint they felt, as reflected in the vernacular press, was the imbalance between the desire for schooling and the real shortage of schools. The fact that until 1882 there were only about 300 schools in Java and no more than 400 in the outer provinces with the total number of students being no more than 40,000 (Furnivall 1940, p. 220), provided the ammunition to demand government action.

Numerous letters from native readers were sent to the press complaining that the government was not providing enough opportunities for native children. In addition, the press also frequently raised issues of the poor conditions of pupils’ food, hygiene and conscientiousness in their schoolwork. The spearhead of this criticism was formed by graduates of the native teacher-training schools. Their disparagement was reflected especially in educational journals published as a response to the growing interest in native education, such as *Soeloeh Pengadjar* [*The Teachers’ Torch*] of Probolinggo (first appeared in 1887) and *Taman Pengadjar* [*Teachers’ Garden*] of Semarang (about 1899–1914). These journals played significant roles in articulating native teachers’ aspirations for the alleviation of discrimination in the provision of education, the improvement of the teaching of the Dutch language in native teacher-training schools and the availability of Dutch to all native children.

In addition to the criticism of government policy, the vernacular press was also reflecting covert tensions and crises in the gestation phase of the constitution of the new intelligentsia. The emerging intelligentsia, nurtured in the Western education system, living in big new cities, using snippets of Dutch in daily conversation and adopting aspects of Western lifestyle, were unlikely to be comfortable in the *habitus* of their elder aristocrats. Meanwhile, in the eyes of the old aristocracy the professionals were nothing but newcomers who were demanding recognition and acceptance by the traditional establishment. In this regard, they were expected to adopt the lifestyle and hierarchical order of the “feudal” *priyayi*, which included showing *hormat* [respect] to the old (higher) aristocrats (Kartodirdjo 1991, pp. 341–42).

Moreover, because the educational qualifications of the new intelligentsia were superior to those of the traditional aristocrats, the European administration often tended to deal directly with them, bypassing the traditional hierarchy and procedures (Van Neil 1970, p. 29).

This all led to a strained relationship between the old aristocrats and the new professionals. *Selompret Melajoe*, no. 143–55 (30 November–28 December 1899), for instance, carried a complaint from the Regent of Demak, Raden Mas Adipati Ario Hadi Ningrat, who begged the government to prioritize the improvement of education for the children of Bupati (Regents) and reminded them that the time was not ripe yet for appointing non-(higher) aristocrats to high bureaucratic posts. On the other hand, *Taman Pengadjar* no. 4 (15 October 1899) ran an article which the embryo intelligentsia criticized what they considered as the humiliating practice of having to show feudal gestures of obeisance towards the upper *priyayi*.⁸⁷

The emerging intelligentsia was also by no means monophonic. Although most of them came from *priyayi* circles, a covert tension existed between those derived from the lesser *priyayi* and those from the higher. Descendants of the lesser *priyayi* who could not achieve high positions in the traditional status hierarchy were in fact still unable to attain appropriate status in the modern sector of the rationalized bureaucratic structure. While most of the children of the higher *priyayi* were favoured for admission to the Chiefs' Schools and thus ensured of a secure career and of having better status and salary, children of the lesser *priyayi* could only choose other vocational schools which were usually looked down on by the former and were less promising in terms of prestige and salary. The lesser *priyayi* were dissatisfied with this dual-system, and publicly criticized it in the press of the time.⁸⁸ This meant that the ongoing discordant relationship between the emerging intelligentsia and the old aristocracy coalesced with the internal frictions within the nucleus of the embryo intelligentsia.

Until the end of the nineteenth century the role of teachers in promoting the discourse of *kemadjoean* was very conspicuous, for at least two reasons. The teaching profession at this juncture was composed of the largest portion of the best educated natives and as educators they were most highly imbued with a sense of *mission sacrée* to enlighten their fellow countrymen. Additionally, the fact that this profession was less respected compared with administrative positions might have stimulated them to be the articulators of the concept of "*kemadjoean*" in order to construct a new gauge for determining social privilege. The conspicuous role of teachers suggests that the "organic intellectual"⁸⁹ of the germinal intelligentsia of the nineteenth century was mainly derived from the circles of teachers.

It is worth noting, however, that until the end of the century this embryonic stratum of the intelligentsia had not yet constituted a distinct collective entity in its own right. Its presence remained hidden under the thick shadow of the old aristocracy. Not only because their number was still limited, but also because they had not yet discovered a special “code” to represent a collective identity that could incorporate the emerging intelligentsia from diverse sectors into a particular community. This factor, along with restricted social mobility and limited numbers and circulation of media, confined the voices and movements of the *kemadjoean* to a narrow and localized sphere of influence. This was, however, only a temporary circumstance liable to be changed in the near future.

Discursive Practices of the Early Ethical Era

The idea of *kemadjoean* that was becoming a new touchstone of social privilege, social relations, and ideational system among the East Indies elite in the late nineteenth century Liberal era continued to be the dominant discourse among the community of the newly formed intelligentsia of the early twentieth century. A synchronic dimension of this discourse lies in its emphasis on the organic institutionalization of the idea.

As the Dutch vocational schools continued to be the major agent providing the native Indies with advanced Westernized education, protagonists of the discourse of *kemadjoean* continued to emerge chiefly from vocational schools. Leading “organic intellectuals” of this period were now predominantly students and former students of the STOVIA. With a nine-year period of study, the STOVIA was the highest level of education available in the NEI until the first two decades of the twentieth century. This generated the cultural capital for students and former students of this school to take over the leadership of the new intelligentsia that had previously been borne by the teachers. Prominent personalities among former *Dokter Djawa*/STOVIA students in the first decade of the twentieth century were Wahidin Sudiro Husodo, Abdul Rivai, Tirta Adhi Surjo, Tjipto Mangunkusumo and Suwardi Surjaningrat.

Imbued with the idea of *kemadjoean*, the expectations of this intelligentsia concerning elevation of their social status began in fact to trap them in a queue and force them to face a bitter reality. Notwithstanding the fact that the number of graduates was still limited there was no guarantee that they would be automatically appointed as bureaucratic officials. Already in the early years of the decade, the dual-administration’s clumsiness in responding to socio-economic developments in the NEI, particularly in absorbing the output

of educational institutions, resulted in a long waiting list of qualified candidates seeking entry into desired posts (Furnivall 1940, p. 252).

The situation was even more disillusioning for the STOVIA graduates. Having attained the highest educational level, the social prestige and economic rewards of the STOVIA graduates were not as high as they had expected. They were the first victims of their own *kemadjoean*, as the meritocratic system could not be applied properly within the context of the colonial discriminative policies.

In the first fourteen years of the twentieth century the STOVIA had produced 135 graduates (Van Niel 1970, p. 52). The figure would have been even greater if it also included graduates from the former *Dokter-Djawa* school. Based on the data from *Jaarlijks Verslag School tot Opleiding Van Inlandse Artsen 1904–1905*, enrolments and graduates of the *Dokter-Djawa* school/STOVIA during the 1875–1904 were respectively 743 and 160 students. To derive more meaning from this figure, let us now take the social background of their parents into account. From the total enrolment of 743, 146 were from the higher *priyayi* and well-to-do,⁹⁰ 278 from the lesser *priyayi* middle income earners, and 319 from the lower class. From the total graduates of 160, 41 were from the higher *priyayi* and well-to-do, 64 from the lesser *priyayi* and middle income earners, and 55 from the lower class (Penders 1977, pp. 218–19). Thus, most of enrolments and graduates of the *Dokter-Djawa*/STOVIA system came from the lesser *priyayi* and lower class. This indicates that, at least until the early years of the twentieth century, the *Dokter Djawa* school/STOVIA could not be categorized as *standenschool* (status school) for the most privileged social group, because the profession of vaccinator or, at best, “Indies Doctor” had never been considered as prestigious.

To make matters worse, in the *Dokter Djawa* school/STOVIA, the awareness of inferiority was maintained by making it compulsory for the non-Christian students to wear traditional dress. Their lower status was reflected also in the way they were addressed by staff. They were not called *leerling* [pupil, used in the lower schools] or *studenten* [student, used at the university level] but instead were referred to by the French word *élève*, which connoted a level in-between pupil and student. In fact, different status and treatment also prevailed among the *élèves*. In school ceremonies, only the senior *élève* was permitted to give a speech in Dutch, while the juniors had to translate it into Malay or other local languages (Toer 1985, p. 21).

After finishing school, the STOVIA graduates — let alone their *Dokter-Djawa* predecessors (before 1900) — could never gain the socio-economic rewards they expected. Until the beginning of the twentieth century, the

position of the government's *Dokter-Djawa* was considered about equal to that of *mantri* [overseer]. Their primary role as vaccinators could not command the same respect as the graduates of OSVIA in the native administrative posts. Moreover, the salary of STOVIA graduates after a period of nine years of study was generally only about one third of that of OSVIA graduates — whose period of study was only five years.

The mood of inter-group resentment was exacerbated by the government policy after 1900 of providing more opportunities for the lesser *priyayi* to enrol in the OSVIA. With this provision the special privilege of the higher *priyayi*'s descendants came under attack. This increase the resentment of the higher born towards the lesser born.

The mainstream intelligentsia of higher *priyayi* origin was inclined to remain on good terms with old aristocracy. Even so, exceptions were possible, especially for those who were not well-accepted by, or could no longer feel at home in, the circles of the gentry. The exceptions or "deviants" together with the lesser born as the victims of discrimination were most likely to become what Indonesia's most prominent historical novelist, Pramoedya Ananta Toer, was later to characterize as a "Minke"-type human being who was trapped in limbo.⁹¹ People of this kind were likely to be positioned in the state of "mimicry" which contains both mockery and a certain menace.⁹² Having observed Western ideas and values through education and the print media, but being frustrated by discriminative colonial practices, some progressive intelligentsia were disposed to dismantle the master's house with the master's tools. Meanwhile, being mortified by the traditional establishment, they were the ones most likely to repudiate the feudal hierarchy.

These feelings of deprivation and humiliation were exacerbated by the global economic crisis of 1903 that had a severe detrimental effect on labour conditions in the NEI. The socio-economic discontent of the intelligentsia found the impetus for historical action in the arrival of the so-called "*Aziatisch Revail*" [The Asian Revival], symbolized by Japan's victory over Russia in 1905, the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 and other emancipation and nationalistic movements in Asia (Blumberger 1931, p. 12).

To better articulate their discontent and ideals, the intelligentsia of the lesser born and of the "deviants" turned their attention to the construction of the new intelligentsia's identity and community. The organic intellectuals of the intelligentsia stratum believed that the idea of progress should be planted on a distinctive social base. This social base was to be constituted from possessors of "cultural capital" such as educational qualifications, technical and language skills.

In this effort, intellectuals of the new intelligentsia were forced to invent an imaginary spatial boundary between themselves and the old aristocracy by constructing special signifiers for members of both groups. The designation for members of the “old” was now “*bangsawan oesoel*” [the nobility by birth] and that for the “new” one was “*bangsawan pikiran*” [the nobility by intellect]. Coined by a graduate of the *Dokter-Djawa* School, Abdul Rivai (son of native teacher), as an editor of the magazine *Bintang Hindia* [*The Star of the Indies*],⁹³ the term “*bangsawan pikiran*” was echoed by other East Indian journalists to become a slogan among the first generation of intelligentsia associated with the movement towards *kemadjoean*.⁹⁴ In the first issue of the magazine in 1902, Rivai wrote an article on “*bangsawan pikiran*” in which, after identifying two kinds of nobility found in European society, namely “*bangsawan oesoel*” and “*bangsawan pikiran*”, he then suggested:

There is little need to prolong our discussion on the “*bangsawan oesoel*” because its rise was predestined [*takdir*]. If our forefathers were born aristocrats we too could be called *bangsawan* even though our knowledge and achievement may just be like the proverbial “*katak dalam tempoeoeng*”, frog under the coconut shell...Now it is achievement and knowledge which will determine one’s standing. It is this kind of situation that gives rise to the emergence of the “*bangsawan pikiran*” (intellectual nobility).⁹⁵

Once the new intelligentsia found a special name, this created a “code”, a template for marking the differences, and a map providing the actor with an orientation and instructions about what to expect and what to do. Although such codes offer only an arbitrary simplification of a situation, social reality and struggle cannot be expressed and perceived without codes. Only through the existence of social referents are process, action, and communication conceivable. As the German sociologist, Bernhard Giesen, points out: “Codes of social classification are the core element in the construction of communality and otherness, of collective identity and differentiation. No boundary would have substance without codes” (Giesen 1998, p. 13).

Based on the invention of the self-defined code “*bangsawan pikiran*”, a further construction was made to incorporate the “*bangsawan pikiran*” into a new imagined-community and collective identity. While members of the “*oesoel*” [hereditary aristocracy] were associated with the community of “*kaoem toea*” or “*kaoem koeno*” [the old community], proponents of the “*pikiran*” [intellect] were incorporated into the community of “*kaoem moeda*” [the new progressive community]. This last term was also introduced by Abdul Rivai in *Bintang Hindia*. In Volume 14 (1905, p. 159) of this magazine, Abdul

Rivai defined “*kaoem moeda*” as “all people of the Indies [young or old] who are no longer willing to follow the obsolete system [*atoeran koeno*] but are, on the contrary, anxious to achieve self-respect through knowledge and the sciences [*ilmoe*].”⁹⁶

The term “*kaoem moeda*” soon became commonplace especially in the coverage of the press and the discourse of the newly-born “*bangsawan pikiran*”. It represented a collective entity of those who shared a common denominator in their ambition to rejuvenate Indies society along *kemadjoean* lines.

In expressing a commonality, proponents of the *kaoem moeda* were by no means homogenous. Coming from diverse social origins and subject positions within the Indies plural society, members of the *kaoem moeda* exhibited internal fragmentation. This resulted from differences in educational background and occupations within the stratum of the intelligentsia as well as from the interaction of this educational and occupational criteria with other categories of status groups, such as religion, ethnicity and heredity. The instigator and perpetuator of this internal fragmentation, however, was the colonial policy of social discrimination and segregation.

Discriminative and segregative situations often placed the intelligentsia in the ambiguous position of being both forward and backward looking and between independence and dependence. In such circumstances, the effort to create a *kemadjoean*-oriented intelligentsia along Western secular values and principles was subjected to its antithetical tendencies once members of the intelligentsia found a way back to their own moorings. Thus, alongside the presence of a “secular-oriented *kaoem moeda*”, there emerged “adat-oriented *kaoem moeda*” and “Islamic-oriented *kaoem moeda*”. They differed from each other in terms of their cultural and economic foundations as the basis for progress. The cultural base of the secular-oriented *kaoem moeda* was Western secular values, while its economic underpinning came from the government bureaucracy and the Western sector of the economy. The cultural base of the *adat*-oriented *kaoem moeda* was local customs and syncretism, while its economic underpinning came from the old aristocracy and the government bureaucracy. The cultural base of the Islamic-oriented *kaoem moeda* was Islamic reformism-modernism, while its economic underpinning came especially from the Muslim petty bourgeoisie. In short, the *kaoem moeda* was a collective expression of “identity in difference” and “difference in identity”. It expressed both commonality and difference.

THE INVENTION OF THE MODERN INDIES PUBLIC SPHERE

The fact that the foregoing discursive practices and symbolic constructions took place in the press and social clubs indicates that the constitution of the

bangsawan pikiran and the construction of collective identity of the *kaoem moeda* were made possible by the existence of a public sphere. The term “public sphere” means a domain of social life “in which such a thing as public opinion can be formed” (Habermas 2000, p. 288).

In the European context of the seventeenth and eighteenth century, this public sphere was centred around a critical discourse on literary works of the audience-oriented bourgeois family in the newly formed social institutions of the public realm: clubs, journals, periodicals, coffee houses, salons and cenacles. This kind of public space was a meeting place for intellectual circles of urbanizing European (mercantile) society in which private individuals assembled “for the free, equal interchange of reasonable discourse, thus welding themselves into a relatively cohesive body whose deliberations might assume the form of powerful political force” (Eagleton 1997, p. 9).

The gestation of the modern Indies public sphere was made possible by the Liberal economy of the later part of the nineteenth century, which had been responsible for the establishment of the vernacular press and the dissemination of Western-style social clubs. Through education and mimicry and from reading the European and then Chinese-established vernacular publications as well as joining associations, the native intelligentsia was finally able to create a public sphere in its own right.

The formation of the native Indies public sphere was somewhat different from that of the European. In the Western European context, the emergence of this public sphere was part of the rising of the (moneyed) bourgeois class, from whom it took the name “bourgeois public sphere”. On the other hand, the Indies public sphere grew out of the activities of the intelligentsia as a new stratum of the Indies society. It is therefore more appropriate to refer to it as the “intelligentsia public sphere”. Moreover, since the East Indies intelligentsia had never been a cohesive social stratum, the Indies’ public sphere tended to be more fragmented.

In analysing the development of social institutions and collectivities of the public sphere it is important to consider the theory of “political process” and social movements. The central focus of the former theory is the relationship between institutional political actors and action, and the importance of the so-called “political opportunity structure” for the emergence of collective actions. Theoreticians of social movements share a concern for at least four characteristic aspects of social movements: first, informal interaction networks, composed of a plurality of individuals and groups; second, shared belief and solidarity; third, the existence of cultural and political conflicts and oppositional relationship between actors; and fourth, the growing process and life-cycle of social movements (Della Porta and Diani 1999, pp. 14–15).⁹⁷

Based on these theoretical perspectives, the development of the Indies “intelligentsia public sphere” can be seen to be inextricably linked with the nature of the political opportunity structure. It was sensitive to interactions between state and society as well as between various groups within society. It also went through a kind of life cycle, from gestation to formation and consolidation.

The Gestation of the Indies Public Sphere in the Late Nineteenth Century

As in the case of the early promotion of Western education, the Liberal economy was a major impetus for the gestation of the modern Indies public sphere. Following the rudimentary printing activities of Christian missionaries and the VOC⁹⁸ as well as the emergence of the first printed newspaper, *Bataviasche Nouvelles* in 1744, down to the inception of liberalism (around 1854),⁹⁹ the Liberal era brought a new impetus in these activities by encouraging the development of vernacular newspapers and periodicals.

The genesis of the vernacular press in the East Indies with most using “low Malay” represented a centrifugal force which differentiated itself from the mainstream centripetal force of colonial policy. The tide of the Liberal economy accompanied by the expansion of the colonial administration, educational institutions, literacy and printing activities was conducive to discursive uniformity and standardization. Because of the very nature of the dualistic approach of Dutch colonial rule, the need for the standardization of language had to be translated into several different lines of action. For the European Civil Service and European school system, the government had to introduce the “true” and “correct” Dutch language. Meanwhile, for the Native Civil Service and for the Dutch officials dealing with this corps as well as for the vernacular school system, the government had to standardize the most widely used vernacular languages, Malay and Javanese. However, from 1860 onwards the main focus was on Malay. During the second half of the nineteenth century the Dutch invented and standardized the “true” and “original” Malay by creating dictionaries for “high” Malay (the language of the Malay heartland of the Riau archipelago, the Malay Peninsula (Malaka, Johor), and the west coast of Kalimantan). This language had been used by great Sumatran mystics of the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, such as Hamzah Pansuri, Sjamsu’l-Din al-Pasail and ‘Abd al-Rauf al-Singkili, in the writing of their manuscripts; it had also been used as the language of the “Malay Bible” during VOC times. It was this language which the Dutch promoted by using it for official communications.

In contrast to this policy, the kind of Malay language that was widely used in cities of the coastal areas — where most modern commercial and governmental activities were run and most of the Europeans were living — was *pasar/bazaar* Malay (“low” Malay).¹⁰⁰ The deepening penetration of capitalism under the Liberal economic forces from around the middle of the nineteenth century encouraged the influx of foreign newcomers. The arrival of these immigrants, notably Chinese and Europeans,¹⁰¹ had a significant impact on the development of the vernacular language. The most salient was the growing popularization of *bazaar* or “low” Malay that slowly became the first-learned tongue of the growing number of inhabitants in the coastal cities of the archipelago (Maier 1993, p. 47). Already in 1858 a well-known Indo-Malayan *literatus*, Radja Ali Hadji, commented critically in the draft of his *Kitab Pengetahuan Bahasa* [Book of Linguistic Knowledge] upon the ways in which Malay life was changing: “values were endangered by outside forces, customs were decaying, and language was becoming debased with the increasing prevalence of *bazaar* usage” (Andaya and Matheson 1979, p. 110; Roff, 1969, p. 47). In his view, this was a dangerous situation, for the neglect of language would lead to the neglect of established tradition, which would inevitably destroy “the arrangement of the world and the kingdom, *kerajaan*” (Matheson 1986, p. 6).

The proliferation of the use of *bazaar* Malay was reinforced by the introduction of print-capitalism. Printing, as noticed by Lucien Febre and Henri-Jean Martin, tended to favour the development of literature written in the vernacular (Febre and Martin 1997, pp. 319–32). When the Liberal economy touched the press sector, the consideration of a potential market and the perception of the simplicity and flexibility of “low” (colloquial) Malay gradually made this language the major medium of journalism.¹⁰²

From 1854 until 1860 there emerged a few vernacular presses owned and edited by the Dutch.¹⁰³ Between 1860 and 1880, in parallel with the expansion of the Liberal economy and the increase in literacy, the number of vernacular newspapers and periodicals increased rapidly.¹⁰⁴ During this period, although the owners of the presses continued to be Dutch and Eurasian, there had already emerged a few Chinese editors (journalists).¹⁰⁵ From 1880 until the end of the century, the Chinese and then native editors (journalists)¹⁰⁶ became more dominant and the full-fledged representation of the Chinese press¹⁰⁷ appeared (Surjomihardjo 1980, pp. 43–44; Adam, 1995, pp. 16–78).

The potential readers of “low” Malay vernacular newspapers and periodicals ranged from European merchants, soldiers and missionaries who had used this kind of language in their contacts with the indigenous population, to the growing number of literate Chinese familiar with so-called

Sino-Malay as well as the emerging newly literate *Boemipoetera* who had long been exposed to Malay.¹⁰⁸ Surprisingly enough, it was through this subaltern “low” code that the discourse of *kemadjoean* and the native political consciousness finally found its medium of articulation.¹⁰⁹

The shift towards the *kemadjoean*-oriented press was initially driven by the logic of capitalism itself. In the proliferation of the vernacular press, the competition to win subscribers became fierce. This especially happened when the *peranakan* Chinese began to establish their own presses to attract Chinese readers away from their former Dutch/Eurasian counterparts. In the face of this new challenge more serious efforts were made by the Dutch/Eurasian-owned presses to attract native subscribers. In this respect, the press was not only responding to commercial interests but also catering to the aspirations of the emerging intelligentsia.¹¹⁰

In concert with the discourse of *kemadjoean*, which was reflected in and ignited by the vernacular press, there sprang up embryonic and localized native-interest clubs as alternative spaces for actions. Spurred by the existing Dutch and Chinese clubs, these clubs also revolved around the issue of *kemadjoean* either as spaces for displaying the new modern-life style or for improving the knowledge and education of their members. These clubs initially emerged within the communities of *priyayi* and teachers. The first club that seems to have been recorded by the vernacular press was called “Mangkusumitro”, formed by teachers in Semarang in 1882 (Adam 1995, p. 97).¹¹¹ Just before the end of the century the most influential teacher’s society was formed, called the club of *Mufakat Guru* [Teachers’ Discussion Group]. Branches of this club appeared in various districts and residencies in Java. The aims of *Mufakat Guru* were basically “to pave the way for teacher unity and encourage discussion of problems of common professional interest such as teaching, matters relating to pupils, and school administration. Issues such as education for girls and ways to encourage parents to send their children to school were also discussed at meetings held by the *Mufakat Guru*” (Adam 1995, p. 89).

Intellectual discourses in these clubs largely dealt with common professional interests, such as language and school improvement, social discriminations and ideals of the *kemadjoean*. It was the existence of these embryonic Indies public sphere and discursive practices that made possible the development of the native intelligentsia public sphere in the early twentieth century.

The Formation of the ‘Intelligentsia Public Sphere’

As early as the first decade of the twentieth century, the embryonic emergence of the nineteenth century public sphere was transformed into the formative

phase of the intelligentsia public sphere. Insofar as the development of the vernacular press is concerned, the first decade of the twentieth century was the most momentous in the history of native engagement in the field. While at the end of the nineteenth century there had emerged a few native editors and journalists who worked for the Dutch/Eurasian and Chinese-owned presses, the native role in the early decade of the new century was much more substantial. Apart from the increasing number of native editors and journalists, members of the native intelligentsia had now started establishing a fully-fledged native owned press.

The most prominent native journalists of the time derived from students or former students of the *Dokter-Djawa* school/STOVIA. Among others, Abdul Rivai (b. 1871) and Tirto Adhi Surjo (1880–1918) deserve to be more celebrated. Coming from a family of teachers, the Sumatran-born Rivai was a graduate of the *Dokter-Djawa* school who had left for the Netherlands at the end of 1899 with the intention of continuing his medical studies. While waiting for permission and taking preliminary examinations to gain entry into University (in Amsterdam) — which was made possible for the STOVIA graduates after 1904 — he engaged in journalistic activities. During this time, he worked as an editor for several Dutch-owned periodicals which espoused the “ethical” ideal and soon became the epitome of the *kemadjoean*-oriented press. He relentlessly criticized outmoded traditional values and stressed the need for a “catch-up” psychology by introducing as well as idealizing the terms “*bangsawan pikiran*” and “*kaoem moeda*”. Moreover, he started to arouse the national consciousness of the people of the East Indies by popularizing the term “*bangsa Hindia*” [Indies nation/people]. In *Bintang Hindia*, no. 1 inaugural issue (1902), for instance, he wrote: “When we compare the ‘*bangsa Hindia*’ (the people of Indies) with the white-skinned race, there may be discerned a variety of differences....” By promoting the term “Indies nation” he suggested the importance of “national pride” as a basic driving force towards *kemadjoean* (Abdullah 1971, p. 12).

Meanwhile, Tirto Adhi Surjo was, to borrow Chairil Anwar’s phrase, a “wild beast” expelled from his own original community and the one who would become the model for the protagonist Minke, in Pramoedya Ananta Toer’s historical novels. Born in Blora (Central Java) in 1880 he came from a family of the higher *priyayi* (holding the office of Regent) that for some reason had a bitter relationship with the Dutch (especially his grandfather and grandmother who brought him up). Graduating from the ELS in 1894 he took a somewhat erratic path by continuing his studies in the *Dokter-Djawa* school (STOVIA) instead of the Chiefs’ School (OSVIA) — and as

such departed from the mainstream of the higher *priyayi*'s descendants of the time. In 1900 he was at the fourth level of the school after studying for six years including two/three years in the preparatory section. During this time, his interest lay more in journalism rather than in study. Added to this was his 'scandalous' behaviour (in the eyes of the authorities), specifically in the context of giving an illegal drug prescription to a very needy Chinese, which led to his expulsion from the school (Toer 1985, pp. 11–21).

After leaving the school he became more enthusiastically engaged in journalism. Based on his experience as a correspondent for the *Hindia Olanda* in 1894, he was appointed an editor of the *Pembrita Betawi* (1901–03) while also becoming an assistant editor of the *Warna Sari* as well as a correspondent for the *Bromartani* and the *Pewartu Priangan*. These activities were a galvanizing moment for his transformation into a resistance journalist. His social criticism, especially as an editor of the *Pembrita Betawi*, connected him to the touchstone of the European intellectual movement of the time. In this newspaper he was particularly responsible for the column "Dreyfusiana" intended to expose abuses of power by the Dutch and native civil servants and which used journalism as a new weapon for the insurrection of the colonized people.

The word "Dreyfusiana" chosen for the column referred to the well-known "Dreyfus Affair" in late nineteenth century France, which gave rise to the so-called "*manifeste des intellectuels*" [the manifesto of the intellectuals] and became a milestone in the history of intellectual movements in Europe (see chapter 1). The fact that the word "Dreyfusiana" was chosen for a column which highlighted the abuse of power in the East Indies indicates the influence of the European intellectual movement in the region — though the word "intellectual" itself had not yet been commonly used in the public discourse of the new "*bangsawan pikiran*".

A major step occurred in 1903 when Tirta Adhi Surjo, with the financial support of the Cianjur Regent, R.A.A. Prawiradiredja, was able to run his own Cianjur-based weekly, *Soenda Berita*. This vernacular weekly became the first indigenous publication owned, edited, and managed by a native. For personal reasons the lifespan of the *Soenda Berita* was only two years, but Surjo's pioneering effort was followed in 1907 by his successful launching of a new colloquial-Malay Batavia-based weekly, the *Medan Prijaji* [*Priyayi's Arena*]. Financial support came from the Chief Jaksa of Cirebon, Raden Mas Temenggung Pandji Arjodinoto and somewhat later from a devout Muslim merchant, Hadji Mohammad Arsjad, with political protection from the Dutch Governor General Van Heutsz. With this backing, the *Medan Prijaji* soon

became the champion of national consciousness of the native East Indies people. Support from the political establishment did not discourage Surjo from inflaming the spirit of emancipation and resistance. In Shiraishi's words (1990, p. 34):

Tirtoadhisoerjo created his own journalistic style in *Medan Prijaji*, militant and sarcastic in tone... Though the title of the newspaper was *Medan Prijaji*, it was no longer the forum for only the *prijaji*, but as its motto says, "the voice for all the (native) rulers, aristocrats, and intellectuals, *priyayi*, native merchants, and officers as well merchants of the subordinated peoples made equal (in status) with *the Sons of the Country*".

The original motto of this press was: "*SOEARA bagai* [sic] *sekalian Radja-radja*, *Bangsawan asali dan pikiran*, *Prijaji dan saudagar Boemipoetra dan officier-officier serta saudagar-saudagar dari bangsa jang terprentah laenja jang dipersamakan dengan Anaknegri*, *di seloeroeh Hindia Olanda*" [emphasis added]. This motto vividly expressed the new native creed that invoked national consciousness and solidarity by converging all of the East Indies people into the same category as "*bangsa jang terprentah*" [the subordinated nation] and the same status as "*Anaknegri di seloeroeh Hindia Olanda*" [fellow citizens of the East Indies]. In responding to the centripetal force of the deepening Dutchification of the East Indies life-world, this native press used the subaltern colloquial Malay as a means of introducing the language of new nationalism and of igniting a new spirit of egalitarianism.

The motto also highlighted the difference between the "*bangsawan oesoell/asali*" and "*bangsawan pikiran*", indicating that both terms had currency in the public sphere. This symbolic construction, which implies the politics of exclusion (either one belongs to the *bangsawan* "*oesoel*" or "*pikiran*"), through discursive practices in the public sphere, introduced the public to a process of subjectification and a fantasy of incorporation. This in turn enabled the new intelligentsia to find their own imagined-community and collective identity.

Thus, the presence of vernacular presses, particularly the native ones, provided symbolic constructions and the expression of a collective identity, a forum for exchanging ideas among the new idealist intelligentsia, and also a torch of inspiration from the outside world that could ignite new desires and actions. With the spread of the vernacular press, definitions of social reality available to the intelligentsia community might now originate increasingly from distant persons, from groups geographically, culturally, and historically distant, and might be contrasted to those provided by local established elite and colonial regimes.

The source of emanation was in fact not only the West as the embodiment of *kemadjoean* but also the East that had been awakening from its sleep. J.S. Furnivall (1940, p. 238) expresses this vividly:

The Chinese and Japanese went to war like Europeans; the Filipinos rose against Spain; the Chinese in the Boxer Rising braved the power of Europe; there was trouble in British India, events in Turkey were shaking the Moslem world, and in 1905 the victory of Japan over Russia started an impulse which was to transform the peoples in Netherlands India, as in other tropical dependencies, from the extreme of acquiescence to the extreme of self-assertion.

These developments motivated the *bangsawan pikiran* to translate the abstract idea of *kemadjoean* into more concrete action. Moving in that direction the idealist intelligentsia transformed the germinal social clubs of the nineteenth century into (further) generative socio-cultural movements. That these movements could come into being was in fact a sign of the pivotal role which the communicative sphere was playing in penetrating spatial boundaries. The new professional intelligentsia, especially those caught up in a small town setting, were socially trapped in a segmented community with little room for either horizontal or vertical integration. The expansion of transportation networks and the growth of the press, in addition to educational and professional links, allowed them to transcend such community boundaries (Kartodirdjo 1991, p. 343). All these channels made possible a communication network that paved the road for the genesis of the formative phase of social movements that opened new spaces for the intellectual struggle and became a prime mover of the integrative process of the new elite.

Led or inspired notably by the “journalist-intelligentsia” who functioned as the organic intellectuals of the time, the major agenda of these movements was how to improve the quality of indigenous life in a more sensible way. It included appealing for better working conditions, opposing educational restrictions (as well as social restrictions inherent in the colonial relationship), promoting a scholarship bureau to support education for a larger community, and empowering the entrepreneurial capacity of native merchants.

Thus, there emerged in 1906 a *kemadjoean*-oriented movement among the so-called “Young Malays” of West Sumatra led by Datuk Sutan Maharadja, a Padang aristocrat and journalist who had graduated from the government primary school. He nicknamed his group the “*kaoem moeda*” and labelled his opponents the “*kaoem koeno*”. This movement represented the voice of the *adat*-oriented *kaoem moeda* as it was intended to revitalize the tradition

of the “*alam*” Minangkabau [the Minangkabau life-world] and to remove the gulf between the rulers (the so-called “first class” human race) and the ruled (the second class). In a more concrete sense, Maharadja and his group espoused the cause of woman’s education by establishing the first vocational school in Padang in 1909 (Abdullah 1971, pp. 12–13).

In the meantime, Tirta Adhi Surjo initiated the establishment of the *Sarekat Prijaji* [the Society of *Priyayi*] in Batavia (Java) in 1906. Triggered by the complaints of some aristocrats concerning the plight of indigenous welfare, the principal aim of the society was to improve the education of *priyayi* descendants. This would be achieved through the formation of a scholarship bureau, providing student accommodation, Dutch courses, library development and financial assistance for the needy, and through publishing (Toer 1985, pp. 109–11).

This trajectory was enhanced further when the society of *Budi Utomo* (BU, Glorious Endeavour) was established in Batavia on 20 May 1908. Originating from the nucleus of the Javanese students in Batavia, the emergence of this society had been inspired by the victory of Japan over Russia (1905) and various forms of discrimination in the colonial situation. The actual motivation for these students, however, was ideas of Wahidin Sudiro Husodo, a retired *Dokter-Djawa* and editor of *Retnodhoemilah*, as an established *bangsawan pikiran* of the time.¹¹² The idea of establishing this association was initially circulated among students of the STOVIA such as Sutomo, Suradji, Mohammad Saleh, Suwarno, and Gunawan Mangunkusumo (a younger brother of Tjipto), and then spread to students of other schools.¹¹³ Representatives of these various schools were brought together to the hall of STOVIA on 20 May 1908 to declare the establishment of this society (Nagazumi 1972, pp. 38–40).

In criticizing the older *priyayi* for failing to look after the interests of the people, the BU originally intended to bypass the traditional establishment and their elders by taking over the leadership of the *priyayi* community (Penders 1977, p. 216). Impressed by the intellectual spirit of the young students, more radical members of the intelligentsia such as Tjipto Mangunkusumo (1885–1943) and Suwardi Surjaningrat (1889–1959) — both were former students of the STOVIA who had shown their public spirit by abandoning a lucrative medical practice for epidemic prevention work for the government — spontaneously supported the society. In fact, the influence of the established *priyayi* remained strong. *Budi Utomo* was soon swamped by conservative *priyayi* who impressed their paternalistic stamp on it and kept it on a tight rein focusing on narrow educational and cultural issues. To keep the society running along conservative lines was actually in accordance with

the mindset of the Ethical colonial interests embodied in the political opportunity structure set up by Governors General Van Heutsz and Idenburg (Shiraishi 1990, p. 35, Toer 1985, p. 118). Thus, for most of its career the BU was very conservative and had no pretensions about establishing a “nation” in a wider sense, only a narrow Javanese nationalism (Van Niel 1970, p. 56; Furnivall 1940, p. 243). The members were mainly drawn from the upper and middle status group of central and east Java whose main concern was to promote “a paternalistic program that emphasized the duty of the aristocracy to lead the masses towards enlightenment” (Sutherland 1979, p. 59).

What seems to have been the innovative feature of this organization was that it was the first native organization run on Western lines, in the sense that it used modern techniques of organization and was supported by the best Western-educated intelligentsia available at the time (Van Niel 1970, pp. 56–57). Realizing that the organization had been appropriated by the conservative *priyayi*, the radical members of the intelligentsia such as Tjipto Mangunkusumo who had joined it as a political shelter within the mantle of the *priyayi* soon withdrew in disillusionment.

In parallel with the establishment of *Budi Utomo*, some privileged East Indies’ tertiary students in the Netherlands founded in the same year the *Indische Vereeniging* [Indies Association]. Before that, Indies students in that country, such as the well-known Abdul Rivai, had been “lone fighters” or had joined the *Vereeniging Oost en West* [The Association of the East and the West]. Encouraged by J. H. Abendanon, the Indies Association was originally oriented to being a social and cultural forum “where the small number of East Indies students could relax together and keep up to date with news from home” (Ingleson 1979, p. 1). In this year, some twenty students became members of this society. The Indies men of higher learning in the Netherlands up to this period were almost exclusively from royal and regent families except for the STOVIA graduates who had been allowed to proceed to universities in the Netherlands after 1904.¹¹⁴

In short, the *bangsawan pikiran* up to this stage had already succeeded to some extent in expanding their network of communication and horizontal integration going beyond the realm of kinship affiliations. Nonetheless, the horizon of the social movements they set up to promote their ideology remained so far unable to transcend the influence of the old aristocracy and ethnic boundaries.

Symbolically, the code “*bangsawan pikiran*”, used to proclaim their historical actions, implied that in part they were still rooted in the noble earth of “*bangsawan*” [aristocrat], while soaring to the adventurous sky of “*pikiran*”

[intellectualism]. Within the cultural cocoon of the aristocracy, the *bangsawan pikiran* made attempts to form societies based on non-ascriptive qualities. Membership of these societies was characterized by a commonality based on the *kemadjoean* orientation, language, education and *habitus*. It was obvious, however, that the sphere of influence of these social movements, and the reproduction of their ideology up to the first decade of the twentieth century, were still confined mostly to the innermost circle of *bangsawan pikiran* and *bangsawan oesoel* or those who had been plunged into the whirl of the modern life-world. So there was not such a clear distinction between the organic intellectuals — as the articulators of a collective identity — and their public, as the public was still confined to the community of intelligentsia that shared a broad common ground. In other words, the public in the wider sense of the masses remained an anonymous, faceless, and an indifferent third party.

Economically, the livelihood of the *bangsawan pikiran* was still disproportionately dependent on the public sector of the colonial administration. In addition to the Dutch as the conglomerate of power, status and wealth, the backbone of the colonial native administration remained strongly under the control of the “old” aristocrats. It took a long time for the new emphasis on official training to have any real impact on the regional civil services. Heather Sutherland cites a good case of this. “In 1907 only ten of 260 native officials in Rembang Residency were OSVIA graduates, while a year later in Kediri 75 per cent had had no formal schooling; in Cirebon it was 92 per cent” (Sutherland 1979, p. 55). As the production relations of the new intelligentsia remained under the control of the old aristocracy, the financial support for the installation of both native publications and social movements were heavily dependent on the blessing of the “elders”. Given the fact that they were typically provincial and conservative in character, the social movements of the time could hardly transcend the boundaries of their respective ethnocentrisms and regionalisms.

Politically, the opportunity structure available to the *bangsawan pikiran* to organize social movements was confined to the framework of the colonial structure. In the colonial worldview, however magnificent the *mission sacrée* of the “ethical” and “association” project, its “hidden transcripts” remained consistent with the goal of maintaining the *status quo*. Within this framework, there had been a meeting of interest between the colonial apparatus and the conservative aristocracy to keep progress running along the lines of the feudalistic social and political order. With the dominant feature of conservatism as the ideology of the ruling class the social movements could hardly pursue a radical course, let alone revolutionary actions.

THE ISLAMIC *KAOEM MOEDA* AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE

The Islamic *kaoem moeda* played an important role in extending the modern public sphere beyond the milieu of the *priyayi*. Organic intellectuals of this community were a combination of the reformist *ulama-intelek* [clerical-intelligentsia] and the modernist *intelek-ulama* [intelligentsia], both by-products of the “association” policy. Being highly exposed to discourses of religious issues, the *ulama-intelek* tended to prioritize the agenda of “Islamic reformism” to reform Indies society by a return to Islamic orthodoxy. Being highly exposed to discourses of secular issues, the *intelek-ulama* of this first generation tended to favour “Islamic modernism” by prioritizing the agenda of modernizing the Islamic community. As such, the modernist *intelek-ulama* tended to be less obsessed with the idea of purifying Islamic belief and practice. Both groups, however, shared some common ground in the importance they gave to rejuvenating the Islamic community through blending Islamic spirit and orthodoxy with modern sciences and rationalism.

Unwilling to desert Islamic faith and culture, yet seeing the advantages of Western civilization, both groups sought to gain the best of both worlds. This peculiar nature of the Islamic *kaoem moeda* placed it on an interstitial space between (Islamic) traditionalism and (Western) modernism. In such a position, this community represented both mimicry and menace to other identities and communities. It was a potential threat to the colonial government and Christian missions, a potent rival to the Westernized secular *kaoem moeda*, a critic of the conservative-traditionalist *ulama* as well as of the conservative aristocracy and *adat*-oriented *kaoem moeda*.

The socio-economic basis of the Islamic *kaoem moeda* was rooted in the milieu of indigenous urban merchants and commercial farmers. In the arbitrary colonial system of social stratification, this group of (old) Muslim petty bourgeoisie belonged to the lower status group. Moreover, with the deepening penetration of European enterprises and the expansion of Chinese trading houses especially from the late nineteenth century onward, the bargaining power of Muslim merchants and commercial farmers tended to become eroded. Richard Robison expresses this succinctly (1978, p. 19):

Throughout the colonial period, Dutch power secured for the Dutch trading houses and, later on, banks, estates, and shipping and mining companies, effective monopolies in international trade and large-scale investment. Chinese merchants were cultivated as intermediaries for the domestic Indonesian market. This structure excluded the *asli* [indigenous] merchant bourgeoisie who, without the protection of the state, remained locked into

small-scale trading and commodity production in rural areas and small towns, and who fought a largely unsuccessful rearguard action against the incursions of Chinese production.

In the face of such a troublesome situation, the idea of Pan-Islamic solidarity and the ideology of Islamic reformism-modernism provided the Muslim petty bourgeoisie with a new ground to underpin its redemptive process.

In the triangular interaction between *ulama-intelek* and *intelek-ulama* (as a new *bangsawan pikiran*) and Muslim merchants/commercial farmers (as an old “moneyed” petty bourgeoisie), there emerged an alternative public sphere outside the milieu of the *priyayi*. This in turn paved the road for the intelligentsia’s encounter with the masses.

It has to be borne in mind that in Muslim society, at least in this period, there is no clear cut distinction between the religious and the political sphere. So that religious discourse and interests of religious communities can penetrate the public sphere, while religious institutions and forums can also function as the public sphere. Besides, in the NEI where more than 90 per cent of the population were Muslims, Islamic institutions and forums were theoretically accessible to a greater part of the population (public). Furthermore, in the NEI where class formation was far less clear-cut or consolidated than in Europe, the public sphere was noisy with the voices of cultural solidarity groupings. If the mode of social incorporation is highly based on cultural solidarity groupings (instead of class solidarity), religious forums and institutions can also function as the public sphere, at least for the *santri* political community.

In contrast to the public sphere of the conservative-traditionalist *ulama*, which remained heavily reliant on oral and face-to-face communication — mediated by the traditional networks of mosques, *pesantrens*, Sufi brotherhoods, and religious festivities — the public sphere of the Islamic *kaoem moeda* was multi-faceted. Apart from using those kinds of traditional networks, it had developed a more structured network of *madrasah* in which the reformist-modernist ideology could be grounded more systematically. Supplementing the network of *madrasah* there emerged supporting institutions in the form of Islamic publications, clubs, foundations and associations, which by the interrelationship among them facilitated the dissemination of new ideas and the consolidation of the movement. To transcend the boundaries of oral communication, the Islamic *kaoem moeda* had begun publishing printed books, brochures, newspapers and periodicals that extended the transmission chain of its ideas across spatial borders. The Islamic *kaoem moeda* was thus able to develop modern systems of

communication and social institutions through social learning from the European-introduced print capitalism, publications and societies.

The Muslim Adoption of Modern Printing Technologies and Social Clubs

Until 1800, the world of Islam rejected the printing press and remained a world of oral and manuscript communication (Messick 1993). With the introduction of the colonial government printing activities and print-capitalism of the Liberal economy around the middle of the nineteenth century, in concert with the adoption of printing presses in other parts of the Muslim world,¹¹⁵ the East Indies Muslims became interested in printing technologies.

At the outset, Muslim printing in the archipelago used the new lithographic printing resembling the successful technique used first in India and then in the Middle East (Proudfoot 1997). In the early stages, the Muslim preference for lithography was based on the consideration that this technique could preserve the graceful (Arabic) script and style of the Muslim manuscript tradition. The first Indo-Malay Muslim book printed with this technique was a beautiful edition of the *Qur'an* published in Palembang in 1848, followed possibly by the publication of the kitab *Sharaf al-Anam* [The Best of Men], the Malay version of a well-loved text in praise of Prophet Muhammad, in Surabaya in 1853. Thenceforward, Muslim publishers enlarged their activities to mass-produce books of religious knowledge [*kitab*] and other literature such as *hikayat* [folktale] and *syair* [verse] published by personally conducted cottage industries. A few other Muslim religious texts were printed in Java from the late 1850s and early 1860s, but the most important development of Muslim printing for the rest of the century took place in Singapore, which since about 1860 had emerged as the centre of the region's Muslim publishing activity and the first centre of Malay-language Muslim printing anywhere in the world.¹¹⁶ Outside the archipelago, beginning in the 1880s, Malay-language Islamic literature was also published in other Muslim lands such as in Bombay, Cairo and Mecca.¹¹⁷ This development had contributed to the considerable reproduction of the old religious manuscripts and the multiplication of new religious works, which with the opening of the Suez Canal in the 1869 enabled a growing influx of religious books into the archipelago.

A shift from manual to mechanical reproduction of the book inescapably entailed a change in what Terry Eagleton called "the literary mode of production" followed by a change in the social position of the *literati* and the social consciousness of society. In the manuscript mode of production,

book copying was costly, labour intensive and scarce. Under these conditions, it was difficult for the author to make a living in the market by selling his book to a larger audience. This meant that manuscript reproduction could only be afforded by a handful of *literati* derived from the (devout) wealthy families, mostly under the patronage of the royal family or feudal lords. Of course, there had been a market for and/or commercialization of the manuscript. Such a market relation, however, remained marginal to the primary relationship between writer and patron. Thus, in the manuscript mode of production the concern for the welfare of poets and writers never went beyond the institution of patronage (Milner 1996, p. 96; Auerbach 1965, p. 242). In the traditional Islamic polity, this explained the symbolic inter-dependence between the sultan and the Islamic *clerisy*. The sultan benefited from the religious legitimacy of the *clerisy*, while the *clerisy* acquired royal patronage for their welfare and works. With the introduction of the printing press (firstly lithography and then typography), book reproductions became easier, cheaper and abundant. Outside the court there now emerged alternative power centres for supporting the reproduction of the book. Apart from the presence of colonial masters as new possible patrons, the most powerful supporting agent was now the owner of a printing press through whom the authors could gain for their works a guarantee of possible commodity exchange between writer and reader. Under the new mode of production the patronage system was replaced by a system of commodity relations that brought about historically unprecedented forms of highly individualized literary production and consumption. This resulted in the gradual disengagement of the Islamic *literati* from the historic ruling class.

The change in the literary mode of production also changed the social position of the *literati*. The traditional *literati* derived much of their authority from the scarcity and uniqueness of the manuscript. This scarcity entailed a social perception of the authenticity of the manuscript that in its association with the divine message of the text gave this traditional literary work a sacred “aura” (Benjamin 1973, p. 225). This aura in turn bestowed a special privilege on a few people who had access to the manuscript, which enabled the old religious *clerisy* to command high social prestige. As Walter Benjamin observed (1973, p. 223), it is this aura that “withers in the age of mechanical reproduction”. This aura possibly was still sustained in the lithographic book production since it was mostly based on the reproduction of the old religious manuscripts. Yet, the multiplicity of books in circulation through the help of lithography had now begun to entail the decentralization of knowledge-possession. This in turn led to the gradual demotion of both the sacredness

of the manuscript and the aura of the traditional *clerisy*, particularly in the eyes of the literate community.

The challenge of mechanical reproduction became even more serious following the Muslim adoption of typographic printing from the 1890s onward, in the wake of earlier uses of the technique by government agencies and private producers of newspapers and periodicals. With the capital costs for typography equipment being higher than for lithography, the economic and managerial pattern of this technique was underpinned by formal business enterprises rather than personally conducted cottage industries. With the new technique and style of management, the scale and speed of book reproduction was simply incommensurable. This in turn changed the nature of literary production. Since the lithographed books were mostly based on the reproduction of old manuscripts, lithographic materials mostly dealt with traditional subjects and histories. By contrast, to optimize the capacity and speed of the machine, typographic printing favoured contemporary works, particularly works related to the recent history of local events (Proudfoot 1993, pp. 46–54). Furthermore, the use of Arabic or *Jawi* [Arabo-Melayu] script in lithography was soon challenged by the dominant use of *rumi* [Romanized] script in typographical production, although for some fifty years more Arabic and Roman script continued to be used side by side.

All these phenomena not only contributed to an explosion in the amount of reading materials but also seriously challenged the status of the traditional subjects and knowledge that had a subversive effect on the previous social prestige of authority of the traditional *clerisy*. After all, the explosion in the amount of printed materials was conducive to both promoting the literacy rate and, more importantly, to increasing the number of equal “citizens” of the “Republic of Letters” [*Respublica litteraria*]. This in turn significantly changed both the social status of the traditional religious *clerisy* and the religious consciousness of society.

Alongside the adoption of new print technologies, in the late nineteenth century there also emerged early Western-style Muslim social clubs. A good example of one such club was an Islamic study club, the *Rusjdijah Club*, which emerged within the milieu of the Bugis sultanate in Riau. Established in the early 1880s, this club was equipped with a library and a printing press to print members’ works and religious texts. It also organized regular social events and sports days (Matheson 1989).

The Muslim adoption of printing technologies and Western-style social clubs embraced a new regime of truth, a new mode of production, a new religious consciousness and new relations of knowledge and power. This threatened the establishment of the traditional *ulama*, while facilitating the

rise of new Islamic reformist-modernist *ulama*. Printing technologies and modern social clubs provided a foundation for the Islamic *kaoem moeda* of the early twentieth century to extend the public sphere, transcending the boundary of the *priyayi* environment.

The Muslim Expansion of the Public Sphere

In the realm of media, the Islamic *kaoem moeda* of West Sumatra took an important step in extending the target audience of the vernacular press beyond the *priyayi* community. From their inception they established some journals which used Malay language written in *Jawi* script which was readable by a larger audience of the Indies people at the time. Inspired by the presence of the first reformist-modernist periodical in Singapore, *Al-Imam* [*The Leader*], since the 1906, Abdullah Achmad with the support of local traders such as Sutan Djamal al-Din Abu Bakar, established *Al-Munir* [*Ar. The Radiant*] in 1911. Its contributors included other local figures of the *ulama-intelek* and intelligentsia such as Hadji Rasul, M. Thaib Umar, Djamil Djambek, Agus Salim's father, Sutan Muhammad Salim, and even Datuk Sutan Maharadja — before the journal showed its blatant support for campaign of the reformist Muslims (Abdullah 1972, pp. 216–29). Promoting the ideas of 'Abduh and Rid., this journal became a mouthpiece for the Islamic *kaoem moeda*. While arguing for the compatibility of Islam with modern sciences and rationality, articles in the journal called the Islamic community to return to Islamic orthodoxy through the eradication of *taqlid*, the promotion of *ijtihad*, and resistance against the practice of *bid'ah*, *khurafat* and the ecstatic *tareqat*.¹¹⁸

The emergence of *Al-Munir* had a snowball effect. There soon emerged other journals of the similar type in this region, such as the Adabiyah-owned *al-Akhbar*, the Sumatra Thawalib-owned *Al-Bayan*, *Al-Imam*, *Al-Basyir*, *Al-Ittigan*, and *Al-Munir el Manar* (Junus 1980, p. 82). In 1916, Abdullah Achmad collaborated with the then *Sarekat Islam* chairman, Tjokroaminoto to establish a *Jawi* periodical, *Al-Islam*, in Surabaya. This journal marked the beginning of Muslim acceptance of the use of the *rumi* script, as the journal began to introduce this script in a minor part of its publications (Laffan 2003, p. 178). This transformation signalled a new development in the Indies public sphere. The *rumi* script and typographic printing provided not only a key to open and disseminate modern (Western) civilizations but also exploited a medium for large scale production and reproduction of publications, which could expand the scope of the public sphere. The Islamic *kaoem moeda* adoption of this script marked the phase of consolidation and also of fierce contestation among the community of *bangsawan pikiran*.

In the realm of social associations, a milestone in the expansion of the public sphere beyond the orbit of the established aristocracy was the formation in 1909 of the Islamic Commercial Association [*Sarekat Dagang Islamiyah*, SDI] in Bogor. Initiated by Tirta Adhi Surjo, this association was led by former students of the STOVIA and other intelligentsia and *ulama*-traders of the *peranakan* Arab and *Boemipoetera*.¹¹⁹

The constituency of the SDI was based on what Tirta called the “*Kaoem Mardika*” [free people] or the “*Vrije Burgers*” [free citizens], people whose livelihood did not derive from service to the colonial government. The principle aim of this association, according to Tirta’s article in *Medan Prijaji* 3 (1909), was to improve the deteriorating conditions of native (Muslim) traders/businessmen in order to catch up at least with the achievements of Chinese traders, if not the Europeans. On the urgency of the establishment of Muslim chamber of commerce, Tirta stated: “In order to uplift the position of our traders of the *bangsa Islam* (Muslim nation) in the East Indies, it is essential to set up a foundation of traders, so that *ilmu sarwat* (political-economics) can be applied properly and the fragile ‘splintered rib’ can no longer be broken since they are now united.” Unfortunately, the sustainability and sphere of influence of this association was circumscribed by the suspiciousness of the colonial apparatus of any movements perceived as embodying the spirit of Pan-Islamism.

The emergence of the SDI was followed by the establishment of similar societies with diverse orientations in other parts of the NEI. During the second decade of the twentieth century, there emerged, among others, the *Djaja Upaja* [Successful Endeavour] in Batavia, *Tsamaratul Ikhwan* [Fruit of Brotherhood] in West Sumatra, the *Baji Minahasa* [Minahasa Welfare] in Makasar, and the *Setia Usaha* [Faithful Endeavour] in Surabaya.¹²⁰ The primary aim of these associations was to promote Muslim/native welfare, education, and solidarity by using Islamic identity as a social glue and promoting correct Islamic teaching and practice as a guidance for life.

The greatest achievements in the formation of associations based on Islamic *kaoem moeda* principles were the emergence in 1912 of *Muhammadiyah* and *Sarekat Islam*. Established in Yogyakarta by Achmad Dachlan with the support of local *ulama*-traders, leaders of the local *Budi Utomo* and also students of the native teacher-training school (Nakamura 1976, pp. 115–16),¹²¹ *Muhammadiyah* was oriented to strengthen the unity and power of Islam in the face of colonialism and missionary activities through the strategy of appropriation. By adopting modern methods and apparatus as well as the tactics of Christian missionary groups, *Muhammadiyah* played important roles in introducing Western-type social institutions to a broader community of the native East Indies.

Embarking on the establishment of an elaborate-network of *madrasah* around Yogyakarta, the *Muhammadiyah*'s scope of activities with the support of Muslim petty bourgeoisie spread to other sectors and to many parts of the NEI over the subsequent decade (Nakamura 1976, p. 116). These other sectors included "*sekolah*" (schools in the Western educational system), publications, orphanages, clinics, hospitals and other humanitarian institutions. For most of its life, this organization has concentrated more on socio-cultural movements — though its individual leaders might join political organizations. In the early decades of its appearance, it stayed on the periphery of nationalist politics — though its branches in Sumatra tended to be more political — in order to remain on good terms with the colonial administration. As a result, the colonial government began in 1915 to subsidize *Muhammadiyah* schools.

While *Muhammadiyah* focused on socio-education activities, *Sarekat Islam* concentrated on economic and political advocacy, as will be discussed in the following section.

POWER GAMES: CONSOLIDATION AND CONTESTATION

Discourse and the public sphere are sites where power struggles are played out and where identities and communities are constructed. The main driving forces for the intelligentsia's power struggles and construction of identity-communities at this time were their improved economic standing along with discriminatory colonial policies which produced different socio-economic impacts for different subject positions of the intelligentsia. Under these conditions, various groups of the intelligentsia attempted to consolidate their collectivities and identities resulting in severe political contestations. Political consolidation and contestation marked the beginning of real (political) power games. These power games took place both along the axis of state and society relations and in the interaction of different subject positions of the intelligentsia within society.

On entering the second decade of the century, the new intelligentsia (*bangsawan pikiran*) gained new momentum to empower their social leverage and their public sphere. The political opportunities for the development of the intelligentsia were primarily conditioned at this time by the age of war. World War I (1914–18) deeply affected the Netherlands and its colonies. The pressure of war forced the British to circumscribe neutral shipping resulting in a tenuous link between the Netherlands and the East Indies. The immediate implication of this communication barrier was the growing independence of the colony from the motherland. Fortunately, the two governors-general of the East Indies during the war namely, A.W.F. Idenburg (1909–16) and his

successor Van Limburg Stirum (1916–21), belonged to the progressive *Ethici* who had great concerns about native progress and were widely accommodating of native interests.

Such concerns co-existed with the need of the government and private bureaucracy for more skilled labourers, resulting in the two governors improving the quality, and extending the recruitment, of educated *Boemipoetera*. This not only led to a gradual expansion of schools with Western standards, but also forced the government to relax the “birth rights” (heredity) requirement in order to draw more students from the somewhat lesser born. The OSVIA, for instance, progressively drew its pupils from the middle and even lower *priyayi*. Whereas at the beginning of the century over half the pupils’ fathers held native civil service positions of assistant *wedana* to regent, by 1915 the proportion of those from lesser ranking families had markedly increased (Sutherland 1979, p. 54).

With the relaxing of the entry requirements, the number of enrolments in various levels and kinds of educational institutions grew considerably. This in turn was responsible for the growing number of educated young people trained for white-collar jobs and able to enjoy the accompanying prestige, regardless of their social origin. The augmentation of the new native professionals’ role in the bureaucracy helped blur the narrow identification between high status and the native civil administrator (Sutherland 1979, p. 54).

The bargaining power of this new native professional group increased as an unintended consequence of discriminative colonial policies. In response to the global economic crisis around the turn of the century, government offices instituted systematic and detailed bookkeeping procedures that necessitated department heads to monitor their expenditures more rigorously. Pressured by budgetary considerations, the department heads had no real alternative but to hire less expensive native professionals in preference to the Indo-Europeans who were paid according to the European salary scale. The same pattern was followed by private enterprise (Van Niel 1970, pp. 64–65). These greater opportunities for the native professionals demonstrated to the commoners that the native administrative corps was no longer the sole track for upward mobility, and that the traditional *priyayi habitus* was not the only exemplary centre of the good life.

Meanwhile, although the greater bulk of the intelligentsia in this decade still worked as government officials, some of them had discovered a new field of livelihood beyond the iron cage of the colonial administration. Thus, a new kind of intelligentsia, one which followed Tjipto Mangunkusumo’s choice of abandoning the lucrative positions in the colonial government bureaucracy

began to flourish. They became known as the “*Kaoem Mardika*” [Free Community]. Heather Sutherland describes them (1979, p. 56) in this way:

They lived on the fringes of indigenous and colonial society, working in the embryonic institutions of middle-class urban native life, as teachers or journalists, moving from place to place and job to job. They joined a heterogeneous mixture of *peranakan* (locally born, acculturated) Chinese and Arabs, Eurasians, uprooted *priyayi* and liberal *santri* who were drawn together by similar attitudes, common experiences, nascent political grievances and often, too, a shared enthusiasm for speculative economic ventures.

With the increased social leverage of the new professional intelligentsia as well as the emergence of the *Kaoem Mardika*, the *bangsawan* designation had lost much of its aura. Benefiting from this situation, the intelligentsia found the momentum to consolidate their own distinct communities separated from the old aristocracy. In this context they began to question their former identification with the code “*bangsawan pikiran*”. As one commentator in the Newspaper *Sinar Djawa* (no. 52, 4 March 1914) noted:

With the change of times a new type of *bangsawan* has risen, namely the *bangsawan pikiran*. But if the *bangsawan pikiran* were merely the offshoot of the *bangsawan oesoel*, then changes would not occur and no associations could be born. But if the *wong cilik* (little people) were to get out of the milieu of their race and refuse to be exploited by their original aristocrats then this would be the beginning of the momentum...¹²²

As the flame of the term “*bangsawan pikiran*” began to flicker, fresh and invigorating new terms emerged. The intelligentsia now preferred to describe themselves through evocative phrases such as “*kaoem terpeladjar*” [educated community], “*pemoeda-peladjar*” [student-youth], “*pemoeda*” [the youth], or the Dutch word “*jong*” [the young]. Coined by latecomer intellectuals of the first generation, such as Satiman Wirjosandjojo (b. 1892, a student of the STOVIA), these terms began to be commonly used as an identity code for the second generation of the intelligentsia, composed of those who were born generally during the period 1900–15. With the invention of these new rubrics or codes, the earlier abstract spirit of *kaoem moeda* was now embodied within the vigorous, educated younger generation.

Having been widely exposed to the Dutch language as a consequence of the deepening process of Dutchification, this intelligentsia, especially the younger generation, was accustomed to reading publications and writing in the Dutch language. During this process, they began to discover and adopt the Dutch term “*intellectueel(en)*” [intellectual(s)]. In a tribute to the late

Wahidin Sudiro Husodo, for instance, Suwardi Surjaningrat wrote an article in the *Nederlandsch Indië Oud & Nieuw I* (1916–17) that contained the following: “There were not many *intellectueelen* who had such knowledge of the *ationale cultuur* (national culture) of the Javanese as Dr. Soedirohoesodo.”

Surjaningrat’s statement indicates, among other things, that the term *intellectueelen* used in this historical period remained associated more with the possession of knowledge than with a historical calling to political liberation. Thus, the historical content of the term *intellectueelen* at this juncture remained related to that of the term *bangsawan pikiran* or *pemoeda-peladjar*, namely designating knowledge [*kemadjoean*] as a new parameter of social status. In addition to the link with knowledge, however, Surjaningrat had also already connected the term *intellectueelen* to the construction of “*de nationale cultuur*” of the Javanese. This indicates that the second decade of the twentieth century was the turning point from the obsessive discourse on *kemadjoean* to the emerging consciousness of proto-nationalism. In other words, it was the transitional phase from cultural to political movements.

The Genesis of the Proto-Nationalist Associations

At this point of transition, the intelligentsia movements were multifarious representing a variety of cultural streams, the archaeology of knowledge and the intensity of political awareness, especially as a reaction to the colonial politics of social segregation. Culturally, the movements might represent diverse ethno-religious national consciousnesses. Cognitively, they might reflect a different degree of exposure to modern education and civilization. Politico-psychologically, they might be the extension of the progressive, the moderate, and the conservative alike. The expression of these various movements in the public sphere had been both enabled and delimited by the existing political opportunity structure, by external influences as well as internal dynamics within the community of the intelligentsia.

The political opportunity structure of the time reflected the idiosyncratic character of the Dutch Governor General Idenburg. On the one hand, he was a staunch supporter of the Christian parties from whom the Christian missions expected much help. On the other hand, he was also a strong devotee of the Ethical policy, which welcomed the emergence of native associations outside the Christian fold.

In the years after Idenburg assumed power, Christian mission groups rapidly expanded their activities in the archipelago. Their operations in the broad realm of education, cultural progress and economic welfare among the

indigenous people were given assistance by the state. The government formulated some policies to advance Christian principles in the daily operation and administration of the East Indies, such as the “Sunday Circular” and the “Market Circular” (Van Niel 1970, pp. 83–84).¹²³ This “green light” from the government helped galvanize the vitality of Christian propagation efforts.

Nevertheless, what made the flame of resentment ignite into a rage was the collision course between the intensification of Christian propagation with the swelling of the Islamic reform movement. Inspired by both Islamic reformist-modernist and Pan-Islamic ideas in the Middle East, the wave of the movement that had already reached the East Indies at the turn of the century had now become the tidal flow that powered the turbine of the Islamic resurgence.

In addition to Christian and Islamic zeal, the intensity of the religious sentiments in the Indies’ public sphere had become overheated by the propagation of new spiritual orders and religious sects such as the Theosophical Society [*Theosofische Vereeniging*]¹²⁴ and the *Ahmadyah* (Noer 1978, p. 242; Saidi 1990, pp. 2–4). During the second decade of the century these kinds of new religious societies actively recruited members from segments of the uprooted urban communities — ranging from Eurasians who were seeking spiritual support for their project of multicultural Indies nationalism, to Javanese aristocrats who found a new medium for articulating their Javanese mysticism, as well as alienated members of the intelligentsia.

Apart from these factors, what caused the atmosphere of the public sphere in this decade to become overheated was the growing strength of the Indies Chinese self-assertion. The rising self-consciousness and social expectations of the Chinese was driven by a combination of the strengthening of their economic bargaining power and their educational improvement.¹²⁵ When the Chinese revolution led by Sun Yat-sen took place on the mainland in 1911, the Indies Chinese saw this event as evidence of the resurgence of the powerful and modernized Chinese state which helped boost their self-confidence. It is said that the Chinese now dared to say to the *Boemipoetere* that the new republic would soon expel the Dutch and that the Chinese would become their rulers and masters. This sort of Chinese swagger ignited native sentiments leading to a growing native national consciousness (Shiraishi 1990, pp. 35–38).

Last but not least, the public sphere in this decade was stirred up by the direct engagement of the Netherlands’ political organizations in the political affairs of the NEI. Most importantly, it was in this decade that the seeds of revolutionary Marxism and communism were systematically planted in the East Indies. Whereas in the first decade of the century there had appeared

several labour unions of government employees led exclusively by Europeans,¹²⁶ in the second decade of the century there had arrived some propagandists of Marxism and communism, especially former activists of the Netherlands Social Democratic Workers' Party (SDAP) and the Netherlands Social Democratic Party (SDP). In 1913 a prominent young Dutch labour leader, Hendricus Josephus Franciscus Marie Sneevliet, arrived in Java and soon joined his fellow socialists such as D.M.G. Koch and Adolf Baars in the project of communicating Marxist messages to the colonized masses.¹²⁷

In the shadow of contested social consciousnesses and interests, varieties of social movements appeared and expressed the heterogeneity of social habitus and social paradigms. This heterogeneity began to create an embryonic fracture in the Indies public sphere that in turn would lead to the fracture of the intelligentsia's collective identity. With the presence of the significant "others", each group now began to activate its own distinct identity as a defence against the discourse and actions of other groups.

The first real East Indies political party with a multicultural base was founded in Semarang on 5 October 1912, namely the *Indische Partij* [IP, Indies Party]. Born out of the *Insulinde*, a Eurasian oriented association founded in 1907, this party was originally motivated by the dislocation of the Eurasian (Indo) community in the social segregation of the colonial structure. Although Indo-Europeans were theoretically equal to Europeans of pure blood, there was in fact a clash of interest between the *blijvers* [permanent residents] and the *trekkers* [temporary residents], and in some matters the *blijvers* stood closer to the *Boemipoetera* than to the *trekkers* (Furnivall 1944, p. 244). What made the Eurasian community become more radical in this decade was the increasingly exclusive European community coinciding with the economic threat from the growing number of educated *Boemipoetera* who could be hired on a lower wage scale, which threatened the Indos' job opportunity in the labour market. Led by an Indo journalist, E.F.E. Douwes Dekker, a great-nephew of Multatuli, the Eurasians sought to overcome these disadvantages by establishing an alliance between Eurasians and educated native Indians to secure rights equal to those of the European population. In this regard they began to promote the so-called "Indies nationalism", which idealized a common identity based on residence in the Indies rather than ethnic or religious criteria. The cultural (religious) counterpart of this project was the Theosophical Society that had a tremendous influence on the circles of alienated East Indians (McVey 1965, p. 18; Van Niel 1970, p. 63).

Prominent figures of the native intelligentsia of the first generation who joined the IP were, among others, Tjipto Mangunkusumo and Suwardi

Surjaningrat. Together with the IP leader, Douwes Dekker, they became known as the “*tiga serangkai*” [triumvirate] who were able to create the party as the most radical and politically well-developed of the non-European organizations, at least in the first part of the second decade. Worried about its potential radicalism and its snowball effect on existing indigenous movements, Governor General Idenburg banned the party and imprisoned the three leaders in 1913, despite support for them from the SDAP leaders who objected to the government’s abrogation of their civil rights. This was also ironic since the party hardly had a gateway to the East Indies masses given the long-standing native Muslims’ distrust of the Eurasian community (McVey 1965, pp. 18–19). After that ill-fated party’s dissolution in 1913, the struggle of the party was continued under the old banner, *Insulinde*, until its name changed to *Nationaal Indische Partij* (NIP) in 1919 (Pringgodigdo 1964, p. 22).

While more progressive associations had been born, an older association inherited from the previous decade, the *Budi Utomo* (BU), represented itself as a moderate association. The radical group headed by Tjipto Mangunkusumo and Suwardi Surjaningrat dropped out of this association in 1909, believing that it had been too conservative. Ironically, what had been too conservative for the radicals had been too radical for the greater bulk of the conservative regents. They too then gradually withdrew from the association and formed the *Regentenbond* [Regents Union] in 1913 aimed at achieving greater local autonomy and greater recognition of their traditional position. After the withdrawal of the two groups, the BU was dominated by the *adat*-oriented *kaoem moeda* such as Radjiman Wediodiningrat (1879–1951) and Mas Ngabei Dwijosewojo (Van Niel 1970, pp. 61–62). Under the leadership of this kind of intelligentsia, the BU strongly favoured a mission of achieving cultural progress within the framework of Javanese nationalism, and retaining Javanese mysticism as its main religious focus. Being a relatively unpopular (elitist) organization, the BU remained the home for the most highly educated intelligentsia of the decade. It was no wonder that when the government-sponsored “Peoples’ Council” [*Volksraad*] appeared in 1918, the native representatives in the council disproportionately came from this organization. In the first period (1918–21), the BU took six seats from the ten of the native elected members of the council plus one representative as an appointed member (Suradi 1997, pp. 15–16).¹²⁸

A major shift in the historical development of the BU was undertaken by Satiman Wirjosandjojo.¹²⁹ Having finished his study at the STOVIA in 1914, this son of a pious Muslim merchant from Surakarta, could not feel comfortable with the narrowness of the BU that had failed to break through

the bounds of Javanese ethnocentrism. This failure made people from different ethnic groups, such as the Sundanese, feel strangers in the association. In 1914 they established their own union, namely *Pagujuban Pasundan* [Sundanese Community], with its headquarters in Bandung and Tasikmalaya (Blumberger 1931, pp. 38–39). Satiman also opposed heredity as the criterion for entry into the leadership group of Indies society and preferred to make educational qualifications the new touchstone. He therefore proposed the establishment of a “*pemoeda-peladjar*” [student-youth] association from which young members of the BU could be recruited. The association was born in 1915 and named initially *Bond van Studeerenden van Java en Madoera* [The Union of the Javanese and Madurese Students], *Tri Koro Dharmo* [Three Noble Goals].¹³⁰ After its first congress in Surakarta in 1918, it was renamed, using the Dutch phrase, *Jong Java* [Javanese Youth], in order to better represent the membership of Sundanese and Madurese students. The basic aim of the association was to unite the native students at secondary schools and vocational institutions; to enlarge the general knowledge of members; and to awaken a sense of fraternity among all languages and cultures of the Indies (Poerbopranoto 1981, pp. 23–26). In fact, such a student union could not avoid various free riders. The association soon became a contested sphere of influence especially between the conservative *priyayi*, the Christian missionaries and the propagators of Islamic reformism-modernism, not to mention the secularizing missionaries of the ethical “association” policy.

The existence of the *Jong Java* made students of the different ethnic and religious origins aware of their own distinct identities. The expression of such awareness was the rise of various student-youth associations along ethnic and religious lines such as *Jong Sumatranen Bond* (1917), *Jong Celebes* (1918), *Jong Minahassa* (1918), *Sekar Rukun* (1919), and some others. The genesis of such student-youth associations added to the multifarious nature of the Indies proto-national consciousness.

In parallel with the rise of the youth associations, the propagandists of Marxism/communism responded to the tension in the public sphere by setting up leftist associations. The spearhead of the genesis of such associations with a radical programme was Sneevliet. Embarking on a campaign of socialism through his journalistic activities and his involvement in a railroad workers’ union (VSTP), Sneevliet moved further by organizing a meeting of sixty social democrats in Surabaya on 9 May 1914. This meeting resulted in the formation of the *Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereeniging* [ISDV, Indies Social Democratic Association] as the embryo of what later became the Indonesian Communist Party. In a further development, the ISDV developed revolutionary tendencies that caused its more moderate elements under their

leader Ch. C. Cramer to split off to form the Indian Social Democratic Party as a branch of the SDAP in the Netherlands (Furnivall 1944, p. 248).

Although members of the ISDV — as well as the ISDP — at least for some years to come were composed almost entirely of Netherlanders, the ideology of Marxism/Leninism had landed in the East Indies, influencing public discourses and inducing the emergence of a group of the native socialist/communist intelligentsia. Subsequently, the first East Indies socialist group, *Sama Rata Hindia Bergerak* [The Indies on the March toward Equality] was founded in Surabaya in 1917 under the initiative of Adolf Baars. The association had only 120 members and after about a year it quietly expired (McVey 1965, pp. 17–18). The collapse of this first Indies socialist group by no means terminated the influence of ISDV-sponsored communism. The most powerful weapon developed by the ISDV at the time was the so-called “bloc within” strategy, whereby the communist cadres entered a particular organization or mass movement and worked to seize control of it from within (McVey 1965, pp. 21–22).

The establishment of leftist associations in the East Indies tempted other political groups in the Netherlands to do the same thing. The appearance of the ISDV was soon matched by the installation of the *Nederlandsch Indische Vrijzinnige Bond* [NIVB, Liberal Union] in late 1916, corresponding to the moderate Liberals of the Netherlands, and aiming to unite moderate progressives of all races. Next, in opposition to the operation of these secular parties in the East Indies, the *Christelijke Ethische Partij* (Christian Ethical Party, CEP) and the *Indische Katholieke Partij* (Indian Roman Catholic Party, IKP) were respectively formed in 1917 and 1918, representing the two main branches of the Dutch Clerical Party. The aim of the CEP and the IKP was to promote a wider autonomy of the East Indies with a strong association with the Netherlands and to make Christianity the ideological basis of the state. In addition to these parties, the *Politiek Economische Bond* [PEB, Political Economy Bond] was formed in 1919 corresponding to the *Vrijheidsbond* in the Netherlands. Having common ground with the CEP and the IKP in terms of promoting the autonomy of the Indies under the association policy, the PEB strongly criticized what they perceived as the over-progressive tendency of the Ethical policy (Pringgodigdo 1964, pp. 25–26; Furnivall 1944, p. 248). All these organizations recruited a mixed membership composed of *blijvers*, *trekkers*, foreign orientals, and members of the East Indies elite alike.¹³¹

However, the most important development in the awakening of the native proto-national consciousness was the rise of *Sarekat Islam* [Islamic Union, SI] in 1912. It was founded by H. Samanhudi (1880–56), a local batik trader with a Second Class Native School background, who had the assistance of

Tirto Adhi Surjo in formulating its statutes. Born out of the *Sarekat Dagang Islam* (SDI) which rose in Surakarta in 1911, this union initially resembled the former Bogor-based SDI, in its aim to defend the interest of local Muslim merchants, especially in facing Chinese competitors in the batik industry of central Java.

The emergence of the SI (SDI) was a watershed in the development of the idea of Islamic nationhood as a form of proto-nationalism. For the first time the word “Islam” was explicitly used as the name of association, which indicates that Islam had now been activated as the basis of a collective identity and as an ideology for the (proto) nationalist movements. Coming from the nucleus of the *Kaoem Mardika* this union represented the expansion of the *kemadjoean* movement away from the milieu of the *priyayi*. Its emergence around the royal capital of Surakarta signified the changing location of Islamic movements from countryside to urban areas. Its leadership in the hand of traders and then intelligentsia reflected the transformation of Islamic political leadership from charismatic *ulama* to non-*ulama* (Kuntowidjojo 2001, p. 9).

The resurrection of this native urban commercial class soon attracted many alienated progressive intelligentsia of the first generation. Thus, prominent radical figures such as Suwardi Surjaningrat,¹³² along with other new progressive activists, like Abdul Muis, H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto, and R.M. Surjopranoto (a younger brother of Suwardi Surjaningrat) soon joined the SI. For some progressive figures of the intelligentsia who were critical of the old aristocracy and were unwilling to work with the colonial government, the genesis of socio-political consciousness within the *Kaoem Mardika* of the Muslim community provided a new social ground for implanting new ideologies and historical actions. As George Rude has argued, insofar as any social movement must have an ideology for collective mobilization, this ideology can only be effectively absorbed if it is planted in ground that has already been well prepared (Rude 1970, pp. 28–30). A bewildering array of native insurrections under the banner of Islam in the previous centuries, followed by the growing socio-political consciousness within new Islamic clubs and associations, provided fertile soil for cultivating a new ideology needed to mobilize proto-nationalist movements. For these reasons, the formation of the SI was so promising for them.

Moreover, the fact that Surakarta with its strong ties to traditional Javanese life was the scene of increased Christian missionary activities, meant that strict Muslims felt drawn towards the union as a medium for an Islamic counteraction. The lesser *priyayi* who tended to oppose the conservatism of the regents and the princely regime in Surakarta also found a medium for self-actualization in the SI. As well, many traditionalists who were

disappointed with the programme of Westernization elaborated by the young intelligentsia of the BU turned to SI as a new vehicle for their aims (Van Niel 1970, p. 91; McVey 1965, pp. 10–11).

In the face of such a rapid development and heterogeneous membership, the SI was soon reorganized and its leadership was gradually transferred from batik traders to the Western-educated intelligentsia. Thus, after 1914, the role of Samanhudi was eclipsed and he was replaced by Tjokroaminoto, supported by several other members of the intelligentsia. In addition to Tjokroaminoto, other intellectuals who became prominent leaders of the SI in its formative phase (1912–16) were R. Gunawan (a graduate of the OSVIA who left a government post to become a journalist), Abdul Muis (a former student of the STOVIA who left a government post to become a journalist), R.M. Surjopranoto (a graduate of the OSVIA and the *Landbouwschool* who left his post at the court of Paku Alam and his position in a private sugar plantation to become a labour activist), R. Hasan Djajadiningrat (a graduate of the HBS who preferred to be a social worker), and Agus Salim (a graduate of the HBS who left his post in the government to become an educator).

Concerning the education and religious background of these SI leaders, Van Neil concluded that among early leaders of the SI (including the aforementioned individuals), “almost none of them belonged to the best educated segment of Indonesian society”, and “none was descended from active *santri*, or religious, families” (Van Niel 1970, p. 113). In fact, the HBS, the OSVIA, the STOVIA and the *Landbouwschool* were the best educational institutions available in the NEI up to the end of the 1910s. It has already been mentioned that Tjokroaminoto and Agus Salim came from *santri* families (see footnote 46 above). In addition, Abdul Muis’ family was in fact closely related to Salim’s and to Achmad Khatib as well (Noer 1980, p. 122). Leaders from *ulama* backgrounds such as M.H Abdulpatah, A. Achmad Sadjeli, Said Hasan bin Semit, K.H. Achmad Dachlan, H. Achmad Hasan Zaeni certainly came from active *santri* families.¹³³ The truth is, only a very limited segment of the best educated Indies people joined the SI, since the greater part of the intelligentsia had been secularized. Members of this segment were mostly from *santri* families.

Under the leadership of the intelligentsia, the early SI emphasis on the empowerment of Muslim merchants was shifted towards a general advocacy for the economic and socio-political rights of the native common people in the framework of a loosely organized social movement. This shift was signalled by Tjokroaminoto’s statement on 26 July 1915 that “*de Islam is de godsdienst van de armen en de verdrukten*” [Islam is the religion of the poor and the oppressed]. Inspired by this statement, the SI began to adopt a populist

ideology leading to a rapid increase of its membership (Koentowidjojo 2001, p. 10). By 1919, SI claimed two million members across the islands,¹³⁴ and had the biggest membership of all associations formed during this period.

The sphere of influence of SI began to embrace a wider public of the masses as a result of the growing social disruptions in the countryside. During the decades of war, rapid social changes, and techno-economical developments, the deepening penetration of the money economy further broke down village life and the sense of security, followed by the failure of the traditional ruling class to offer adequate leadership for the people (McVey 1965, pp. 8–9). In such critical conditions, Islam could fill the gap between the old ways and the new. In Fred R. von der Mehden's words (1963, p. 9): "It presented a recognizable entity which many felt could reunify the fractionalized social order." For most of these deprived people, their new awareness of Islam probably had little to do with schools of Muslim thought or the new Islamic reformist-modernist ideology. The main attraction of Islam for them seemed to come from their collective memory of Islamic insurrections, either in the struggle against the Hindu caste system centuries before or against the colonial caste system more recently (Wertheim 1956, p. 205).

To some extent, however, reformist-modernist values had contributed to the Indies-wide SI membership and its subsequent awakening of proto-national consciousness. The reformist and modernist emphasis on individualism and rationalism in the hierarchical, feudal, parochial, and foreign-dominated society of the East Indies was conducive for creating a new fantasy of social incorporation. As has been well argued by von der Mehden (1963, p. 17): "...the individual identification with national values first necessitates the breakdown of the particularist, feudal, and often hierarchical social order of the village and region." The traditional hierarchical order was further weakened by the reformist-modernist insistence on the equality of man. The fact that the leadership of *Sarekat Islam* was composed primarily of people with modernist learning indicates the compatibility of reformist-modernist values with the spirit of a proto-national consciousness.

With its ability to touch the plurality of human conditions, the SI presence represented a multilingual socio-political aspiration. It soon became the first native association with Indies-wide scope operating under a general nationalist ideology with a religious tinge (Wertheim 1985, p. 85). Tjokroaminoto, in his speech before the SI National Congress in Bandung (17 June 1916), stated: "We love our nation and by the strength of our religion (Islam) we must struggle to unite all or at least the majority of our people" (Tjokroaminoto 1981, p. 14). The word "Islam" in the name of the Union was the signifier of nativeness, as was the case with the Christianity

of the Dutch and Confucianism of the Chinese (Shiraishi 1990, p. 43).¹³⁵ As McVey writes (1965, p. 10): “In the absence of the concept of an Indonesian nation — and this idea was generally lacking among the peoples of the archipelago at the time, Islam appeared to be the most likely source of unity against foreign rule” (McVey 1965, p. 10). It was not only because the majority of the East Indies population were Muslim, but also the fact that Islam in the NEI had long been the rallying cry for native resistances.

Notwithstanding the fact that the SI exhibited its own internal magnetism, the explosive development of the union was made possible by the political opportunity structure of that time. The political backing for the survival of this union came from both traditional and colonial authorities. The SI gained a blessing from the royal palace of Surakarta after Prince Hangabehi was appointed an adviser to the union (Koentowidjojo 2001, p. 9). Meanwhile, unlike the great majority of the European residents in the NEI who perceived the SI phenomenon as a disruptive force, Governor General Idenburg saw it as representing the popular awakening that was a goal of the Ethical Policy. “We”, he said, “must therefore rejoice over it, even if we find this somewhat difficult. We wanted this — at least we said we did — and have encouraged it through our education” (McVey 1965, p. 12). He was convinced that his optimism was justified by the fact that the SI in its early formative stage proclaimed its loyalty unconditionally to the Dutch regime. Tjokroaminoto, in his speech before the SI congress in Surakarta in 1913, stated that the SI “is not political party, and not a party that desires a revolution” (Korver 1985, p. 56).

In the matter of the governor general’s positive response towards the union, a Dutch radical, Mr Fromberg, depicted it as comparable with the behaviour of a well-known figure in Alphonse Daudet’s novel, *Tartarin de Tarascon* (Wertheim 1995, p. 84). He then described it as follows:

Tartarin returned from North Africa to his native village Tarascon in Provence, and his co-villagers gaped at him: behind him a camel was strolling, led by Tartarin with a rein. To anyone who asked: “*Is this camel yours?*”, he replied with pride: “*Yes, it is my camel.*” But when after a while the camel ran wild and started to commit mischief by damaging cornfields, and villagers again asked: “*Tartarin, is this your camel?*”, he threw stones at the animal, and retorted: “*Oh no, not at all!*”

Tartarin’s behaviour in this story resembled Idenburg’s treatment of the SI. He proudly became a patron of the SI in its early days. Nevertheless as soon as the movement began to go out of control, the Dutch officials began to translate SI as “*Salah Idenburg*” [Idenburg’s Mistake].

SI members began to exhibit their radical tendencies during the second half of the decade. They mobilized labour strikes and sporadic attacks against local authorities [*pangreh pradjja*]. After 1916, the SI referred to its annual meeting as a “National Congress”. According to Tjokroaminoto, “this was intended to awaken people’s consciousness to move to the level of ‘*natie*’ (nation), which could be gradually achieved through the struggle for demanding self administration or at least the right to express their voices in political matters” (Noer 1980, p. 126). Yet, it was not until 1924 that the SI moved from the politics of cooperation towards non-cooperation signalled by its withdrawal from the *Volksraad*.

The escalation of SI radicalism was not merely a response to colonial-cum-capitalist exploitation. It was also affected by the growing tension in the public sphere resulting from both internal and external competitive struggles. With its massive influence, the SI became an “island of temptation” for political opportunists. Among others, it was the ISDV leaders who quickly saw it as a potential seedbed for breeding Marxist-Leninist ideology. The SI branches in volatile cities (with rapid urbanization and proletarianization) such as Semarang, Jakarta, Surakarta, and Surabaya were soon infiltrated by the “bloc within” strategy. Young leaders of the SI branches such as Semaun and Darsono (Semarang), Alimin and Muso (Batavia), and H. Misbach (Solo) were soon attracted to the teaching of communism. The Semarang branch was the most highly infiltrated, causing Semaun and Darsono to join the ISDV in 1917. Under the influence of Marxism-communism, young radicals began to criticize the cooperative politics of the SI and called on the leaders to take a more radical line. Their criticism provoked several reactions. First, the SI responded to the critics by developing more radical programs. Second, realizing the intrusion of the “other” into the union, other SI leaders such as Agus Salim and Abdul Muis began to activate Islam as a counter-ideology and a sole identity of the union.

The consolidation of an Islamic identity for SI was reinforced by conflicting relationships with members of other associations. The difference in cultural streams and interests and the competition to recruit new members often led to a battle of discourse in the public sphere. To give a few examples: a leader of the BU, Radjiman Wediodiningrat, writing in *De Indische Gids* (1914, pp. 65–66) doubted the efficacy of religion as the cohesive force for a mass movement. He predicted that the SI “is only a temporary movement of *hadji*, *santri*, and stupid people”. As Islam was identified as the collective identity of the SI, a large segment of SI members reacted to such a negative definition of Islam. Thus, when the Surakarta-based Newspaper *Djawi Hisworo* [*Javanese of the King*] ran articles by Martodharsono and Djodjodikoro

(9 and 11 January 1918) depicting the Prophet Muhammad as a drunkard and opium smoker, the SI quickly reacted by setting up the so-called *Tentara Kanjeng Nabi Muhammad* [Army of the Venerated Prophet Muhammad]. Following this over-reaction, proponents of the newspaper and Javanese ethno-nationalism accused the SI of politicizing religion and soon established the so-called *Comité voor het Javaansche Nationalisme* [Committee for Javanese Nationalism], which published a pamphlet condemning Islamic fanaticism. Muis rejected this label and suggested that the SI remained consistent to its character as a '*nationalistisch Islamistisch*' [nationalist Islamic] organization (Ricklefs 1993, p. 176; Noer 1980, pp. 143–44).

A literary theorist, Diane Macdonell, has argued (1995, p. 43): "Discourses are not at all peaceful; they develop out of clashes with one another." As a defence against discourses of "others", especially when members of a particular group are conscious of being defined in a negative way, a collective identity may find its galvanizing moment through the mobilization of the resources of history and culture. In this way, to borrow Stuart Hall's phrase (1997, p. 4), "Identities are constructed within, not outside, discourse, we need to understand them as produced in specific historical and institutional sites within specific discursive formations and practices by specific enunciative strategies." In other words, the tendency of radicalism or fanaticism as the cognitive structure of a particular social movement seems to be the product of a series of social encounters, within a movement, between movements, and even between a movement and its established opponents. Once such a cognitive structure emerges in the public sphere, this may provide a new model and open up a new space for later social movements in different socio-historical contexts. Thus, the growing radicalism of the SI became a springboard for the succeeding East Indies intellectual movements.

The Genesis of the Proto-Nationalist Press and Literary Works

The growth of such a variety of associations and the increasing expression of a proto-national consciousness in turn changed the character of the press as another domain of the public sphere. The heightening of native awareness had boosted the development of the native-run vernacular press and condemned the non-native press to a difficult situation. While the Chinese press could still survive by relying on the *peranakan* Chinese readership, the Eurasian-edited and Dutch-owned Malay newspapers became gradually alienated from the public, or otherwise had to readjust their reporting policies and style in order to deal better with the changing mood of the public sphere. Yet, this strategy could not last indefinitely. Responding to the new awareness

of their native readers, many vernacular presses run by these agencies had to admit that things were fast changing and were forced to close. Early in the decade (October 1911) the *Selompret Melajoe*, one of the most popular papers of the nineteenth century, stopped publication. Next, more of the smaller Eurasian papers disappeared and by the end of 1913 even the once popular and rather pro-native papers such as *Taman Sari* and the *Pembrita Betawi* were experiencing difficulties because they could not compete with the new native-run newspapers. In the meantime, some Chinese publishers, realizing the change of socio-political mood in the public sphere, began to sell off their presses and printing equipment. As the non-native press was gradually eclipsed, the native-run newspapers and periodicals began to mushroom (Adam 1995, pp. 175–76).

In the midst of the decline of the non-native vernacular presses, the colonial government was able to introduce another kind of government-sponsored publication by establishing a book publishing house, which would have a significant impact on the development of “people of letters” [*literati*] in later East Indies history. In 1908 the government appointed a commission to advise on the provision of reading matter for “native and native schools”. This project, according to Maier, was part of the relentless effort by the colonial state to reinforce “correct” high Malay by separating it from the “*heteroglossia*” of pidgin Malay. In addition, this policy can also be interpreted as the Dutch colonial attempt to lay down state-sponsored literary ethics, aesthetics and politics (Sen and Hill 2000, p. 22). In 1911 the commission submitted its report followed by some initial publications under its auspices including versions of local stories and legends, and translations from European literature such classics as *The Three Musketeers* and *The Count of Monte Cristo* (Johns 1979, p. 32). In 1917 the publishing house under the auspices of this commission was named *Balai Pustaka* [BP, the Hall of Good Reading].

Whatever the hidden agenda of the commission, the existence of the BP was responsible for the provision of inexpensive reading materials for the public throughout the archipelago. Moreover, in the view of the literary critic, A. Teeuw, the coming into being of the modern Indonesian novel, and its popularity, was largely made possible through the existence of *Balai Pustaka*. Even most of the nationalist-oriented writers in the following decade were, surprisingly, former employees, for longer or shorter periods, of the BP, or at least had some of their works published there. The literature of the BP in early years of its establishment remained apolitical in character. This was in the sense that the prominence of contemporary political issues had not yet found expression on a large scale in BP publications, due to the lack of facilities or the strong preventive and repressive measures of the government

(Teeuw 1986, pp. 14–15). The significance of the government-sponsored (book) publishing house at this juncture was in its function as the training ground for members of the intelligentsia to mimic Western literary activism. This process of mimicry paved the road for the incorporation of the East Indies intelligentsia into the universal spirit of the “*Respublica litteraria*” [Republic of Letters].

While BP literature remained predominantly apolitical, a genre of political literature found its medium of expression in vernacular papers and periodicals in the form of serialized literature. Examples of the genre of political novel published in the decade were Mas Marco Kartodikromo’s *Student Hidjo* [*Hidjo, a Student*] and Semaun’s *Hikajat Kadiroen* [*Story of Kadiroen*]. While the former was published in the Semarang-based *Sinar Hindia* in 1918, the latter was published in the same paper in 1920. *Student Hidjo* is basically the story of a native East Indian overseas student in the Netherlands who becomes involved in a love affair with a Dutch girl. Finally, however, he detaches himself in an honourable manner and returns to the East Indies where he marries a native East Indies girl. The *Hikajat Kadiroen* — written during the author’s stay in jail on account of a “*presdelict*” [offence against the press] in 1919 — is about a brilliant young intellectual (Kadiroen) who earns rapid promotion in the native colonial administration. Nevertheless, because of his frustration in realizing the gap between his ideals and the existing discrimination and the misery of the ordinary people [*ra’jat*], he turns to communism. The release of these two serials in the newspaper reflects the predominant role of the vernacular press in championing the language of nationalism.

The changes in the media sphere were not only changes in shifting media ownership and journalistic activities from non-native to native agencies but also changes in the character and content of material published. Differing somewhat from previous decades when the press had been mostly run as a private business, the new native vernacular presses were now mostly run as the mouthpiece or organ of particular associations.¹³⁶

Notwithstanding that the major characteristic of the vernacular press in this decade was as the mouthpiece of particular associations, most of the presses had a common denominator in setting a new discourse and agenda for the public; that is in emphasizing issues affecting the general welfare of the little people and in pioneering the awareness of the need for national unity of the indigenous people under Dutch rule. While the interests of associations in this period were still focused within racial, ethno-religious or ideological boundaries, the press had initiated the construction of what later became a “historical bloc” in Gramsci’s sense.¹³⁷

With the expansion of the public sphere (the proto-nationalist associations and the press) which transcended the spatial boundary of the *priyayi* and even the communities of the intelligentsia, organic intellectuals gained a mediating realm from which to spread their ideas. Following in the footsteps of the clerical-intelligentsia [*ulama-intelektel*], progressive organic intellectuals of the first generation of the intelligentsia began to make contact with the masses. The masses in this case may be described as the collectivity of cultural solidarity groupings in Geertz's sense (1960), the "class" in the Marxist-Leninist's sense (1977) or the "youth" in Ortega y Gasset's terms.¹³⁸

Thus, by the end of the 1910s, intellectuals of the first generation of the intelligentsia had succeeded in communicating with the masses. Meanwhile, the audience of intellectuals of the second generation was still restricted to their fellow students. The political function of the second generation of the intelligentsia at this stage was to be the main political public for the first generation. In other words, the earliest generation of the intelligentsia provided a role (intellectual) model for later generations of the intelligentsia.

CONCLUSION

So many historical lessons can be learned from the drama of East Indies life between the late nineteenth century and the first two decades of the twentieth century. Rewinding the "film" of critical events in this period, we can see the colourful and contradictory character of human beings. The "civilized" colonial masters could not gain ground without civilizing the colonized people; discriminatory policies spawned reactions which returned to haunt them; oppressors could at the same time become protectors; "enemies" might also function as sources of inspiration. Hegemonic power created counter-hegemony. There was no concept of self and individual identity without the presence of significant others; and in the encounter with others identities were subjected to radical changes and transformation.

Viewed in slow motion, it is clear that the main protagonist of this historical drama was the intelligentsia and "clerical-intelligentsia". The form of social learning and symbolic practices in the public sphere served as a social setting in which the intelligentsia and clerical-intelligentsia organized and reorganized the symbolic universe and cognitive structures in their struggle for historicity.

With the improvement of their cultural capital, changing economic relations, and the chances made possible by the political opportunity structure, protagonists of *kemadjoean* were able to create their own collective identities

and communities, and distance themselves from the old aristocracy. In the formative phase they began to deconstruct the “nobility by birth” [*bangsawan oesoel*] by constructing the “nobility by intellect” [*bangsawan pikiran*] along with the effort to create a distinct community for the latter that came to be known as the *kaoem moeda*. In the process of this construction they began to form the public sphere under the patronage of the old aristocrats. Until the first decade of the twentieth century, this public sphere remained confined to circles of the *priyayi* and members of the intelligentsia community. The public, in the wider sense of the masses, remained, in the eyes of the new intelligentsia, an anonymous, faceless, and indifferent third party.

In entering the 1910s, the genesis of an Islamic *kaoem moeda* and the rise of the *kaoem mardika* were responsible for the expansion of the public sphere to reach a wider constituency. About the same time, the emergence of a younger generation of the intelligentsia gave rise to the new intelligentsia’s desire to dissociate itself from the nobility (*bangsawan*) by inventing new codes namely, “educated community” [*kaoem terpeladjar*] or “student-youth community” [*pemoeda-peladjar*] or “*jong*” [youth]. These developments led to the transformation of the public sphere, moving away from the orbit of the old aristocracy.

In their encounter with the wider public of the voiceless, uneducated and alienated masses, the intelligentsia found themselves as a distinct social group which was inspired to serve the “nation” — however they conceived of this term. Such a *mission sacrée* was directed to the improvement of general welfare, to provide a political education, and to set moral standards against the alien established authority. In their interaction with the public, the abstract notion of *kemadjoean* was gradually transformed into a spirit of proto-nationalism. At this juncture, it probably makes sense to delineate the Indies intelligentsia in terms of what Karl Mannheim (following Alfred Weber) called the “*freischwebende intelligentz*” [free-floating intelligentsia]. That is the social groups in every society whose special task is to provide an interpretation of the world for that society (Mannheim 1936, p. 10). Thus, towards the end of the second decade of the twentieth century, organic intellectuals of the first generation of intelligentsia had paved the way for a particular role of the intellectual as public educator.

In fact, though united under a common obsession with *kemadjoean*, members of the *kaoem moeda* varied in terms of their cultural and economic underpinnings for implementing this path of progress. Thus, there emerged secular-oriented *kaoem moeda*, adat-oriented *kaoem moeda*, and Islamic-oriented *kaoem moeda*, which contributed to the polyphony of the Indies

public sphere. Such a polyphony became more noisy as the competitive ideological struggle in the Netherlands was extended to the East Indies public sphere along with the growing Indies Chinese determination for self-assertion, the intensification of religious revivalism and missionary activity, the introduction of new forms of religious spiritualism, and the growing discontent of the Indies Eurasians.

This polyvalence of the public sphere in turn contributed to the growth of proto-national consciousness. At the same time, the intensifying clash of discourses stimulated the formation of distinct collective identities. Thus there emerged the prototype of Indies nationalism, nationalism based on Indies-Netherlands association, ethnic (Javanese) nationalism, and Islamic nationalism, with the last, at this stage, appearing to be the most influential.

Despite the heterogeneity and conflicts, however, there was some common ground and unifying factors. There were at least two factors that can be identified. First was the presence of a common denominator in the public agenda centred on the issue of *kemadjoean*, general welfare and the importance of national unity set up by the discourses of the presses. Second was the existence of multiple affiliations (overlapping memberships) which functioned as bridges between associations.

As most proto-nationalist movements of the time did not begin as structured political parties but rather as loosely organized social movements, it was quite common for individuals to hold membership in two or more associations at once. Thus, individuals like Suwardi Surjaningrat became a member of the BU, and then the SI and the IP. Achmad Dachlan was a member of the BU, *Djami'at Chair*, the SI and *Muhammadiyah*. Agus Salim firstly became a member of both the NIVB and the ISDP and then almost immediately joined also the SI and *Muhammadiyah*. Dwijosewojo was a leader of the BU as well as a strong supporter of the *Muhammadiyah*. Semaun was both a member of the SI and the ISDV.

Through their multiple affiliations, activists of the proto-nationalist movements created bridges between associations, making it easier for information, agendas and resources to circulate. This seems to have facilitated the constitution of strategic alliances such as the so-called "*Radical Concentratie*" [Radical Concentration] in the government-sponsored "Peoples' Council" [*Volksraad*] in 1918. This bloc was composed of the European socialist representatives (ISDP), *Insulinde* (the successor to the IP), SI and BU, and was oriented to achieve further concessions on the road to self-government and a liberalizing of the administrative process of the East Indies. This potential fusion of diverse subject positions of the intelligentsia provided a catalyst for the creation of the "historical bloc" in the next decades.

Notes

1. Quoted from *Hikayat Abdullah*, as translated by A.H. Hill (1970, pp. 63, 162).
2. Quoted in N. Kauppi (1996, p. 99).
3. *Bintang Hindia* no. 1/1902, as quoted by Adam (1995, pp. 102–03).
4. The term “clerisy” is used here to refer to a social group whose members variously thought of themselves as “men of learning” [*docti, eruditi, savants, gelehrten, ulama*] or “men of letters” [*literati, hommes de letters, pujangga*]. For a further explanation of the term, see Gellner (1988, pp. 70–71) and Burke (2000, pp. 19–20).
5. So did the knowledge road to India of the Hindu/Buddhist monks.
6. This push issued in the passing of the Agrarian Law and Sugar Law of 1870, which guaranteed property rights and the operation of private enterprise. This achievement was accelerated by the improvements in communications: telegraphy, opened to the public in 1856; a modern postal service, inaugurated in 1862; railway installation and high seas steamers in 1867; the completion of the Suez Canal in 1869; and the operation of the Royal-Dutch shipping company, *Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij* (KPM) after 1888, both for international and domestic voyages (Furnivall 1944, pp. 174–75; Lombard 1996a, p. 12; À Campo 1994).
7. Private enterprises/planters demanded irrigation for their fields, railways for their produce and transport, medical facilities for their families and their coolies, schools and vocational training for their children, subordinates and staff, and so forth (Furnivall 1944, p. 175).
8. Multatuli is the pseudonym of the famous colonial iconoclast Eduard Douwes Dekker (1820–87). Arriving in Batavia in 1839, his highest achievement in the colonial administrative service was Assistant Resident of Lebak (West Java) around the mid-1850s. In March 1856 he was dismissed from the post after accusing local Javanese regents of corruption. Under the pseudonym “Multatuli” [“I have suffered much”] he then published in Holland a famous autobiographical novel called *Max Havelaar* (1860). This novel contained a vitriolic attack on the injustices of the colonial administration as well as the cruelty and corruption of the co-opted Javanese ruling class that created a sensation and helped to stimulate a movement for reform in the Indies (Anderson 1979, p. 229).
9. The “Romanists” refer to members or adherents of the Church of Rome.
10. The phrase “a debt of honour” [*een eereschuld*] was first introduced by Dr Th. Van Deventer, in the journal *De Gids*, in August 1899. Initially he was a Liberal of the school of Multatuli with socialist tendencies. When socialism had not yet become respectable and the solid majority remained Liberal he joined the Liberal Party with a special concern for the moral and material welfare of the Natives. After spending some time as a lawyer in Semarang (Java), upon his return to Holland in 1897 he joined the Radical Democrat Party and started

campaigning not only in support of the needy colony but also for the separation between metropolitan and colonial finances. This gained him the title of “the father of the ethical movement” (Furnivall 1944, pp. 230–31; Van Niel 1960, pp. 31–34).

11. She proclaimed that “as a Christian power, the Netherlands is obliged in the East Indian archipelago, to better regulate the legal position of native Christians, to lend support, on a firm basis, to Christian missions, and to imbue the whole conduct of government with the consciousness that the Netherlands has a moral duty to fulfill towards the people of these regions” (Adam 1995, p. 91).
12. This trilogy of terms was coined by Van Deventer to describe the ethical policy.
13. This office, which would metamorphose into the *Shūmubu* (the Religious Affairs Office) during the Japanese Occupation, may rightly be viewed as the predecessor and pioneer of the Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs (Steenbrink 1993, p. 88).
14. Examples of these misconceptions, according to Snouck, were the perceived existence of a clerical establishment in Islam, and the threat of the so-called Islamic “priests” and “popes” in the NEI.
15. VOC is an abbreviation of *Vereenigde Oost Indische Compagnie*.
16. On 31 December 1799, the VOC, because of mismanagement and “bankruptcy”, was officially transferred, together with all its possessions, debts (140 million guilders), and property, to the Batavia Republic under the jurisdiction of the home government in the Netherlands (Adam 1985, p. 4; Nieuwenhuys 1999, pp. 1–5).
17. Most of today’s Indonesia was only conquered by the Dutch in the second half of the nineteenth century. Some kingdoms were not even conquered until the first decade of the twentieth century. Control of Aceh was bitterly contested for thirty years (1873–1904), while other kingdoms such as in South Bali and Bone (South Sulawesi) were not conquered until 1906. It is also worth noting that some of the conquered islands were administered directly while other parts were indirectly ruled (Nieuwenhuys 1999, pp. 1–5; Anderson 1991, p. 11; Dick 2002, p. 2).
18. This feeling co-existed with a prevalent European assumption of social evolution: that as modern societies rise, religious faith and observances decline. Under the auspices of this assumption it was envisioned that excessive interference in native (religious) matters could be counter-productive for it might not only evoke native insurrections but also obstruct the process of evolution. On the other hand, there had been much optimism that the successful Christianization of the East Indies would solve the problem of native *cum* Islamic troubles (Lombard 1996a, p. 96; Suminto 1996, pp. 9–14).
19. Inspired by the spirit of enlightenment, which emphasized the separation of education and religion, one European elementary school was established in Weltevreden (now Menteng), Jakarta, in February 1817 followed by some others both in Java and outside Java.

20. The Botanical Garden at Buitenzorg (Bogor) and its associated institutes were established in 1817 followed somewhat later by the establishment of the Association of the Natural Sciences in the Netherlands Indies (*Natuurkundige Vereeniging in Nederlandsch-Indië*, est. 1850). Meanwhile, the most exclusive *Sociëteit*, *Harmonie*, had appeared in Weltevreden in 1815 followed by the Concordia in the same city (est. 1830), *De Vereeniging* in Yogyakarta (est. 1822) and some others in Surabaya and Bandung. The genesis of such institutions together with the emergence of the Dutch press and scientific journals (whether produced in the NEI or imported from Europe) as well as the growth of social clubs' libraries made the European community well-informed and able to disseminate the intellectual and scientific achievements of the Western world (Lombard 1996a, pp. 83–85).
21. During the “Napolenic” War the Dutch colonial officials surrendered their territories to the British “in order to keep them out of the hands of the French” (Ricklefs 1993, p. 112). The British interregnum in Indonesia was run under the leadership of Governor-General Thomas Stamford Raffles (1811–16).
22. The inception of the missionary presence in the archipelago originated in the ambition of the VOC's board of directors to meet the spiritual needs of the company's servants as well as to counter the influence of Catholicism and Islam. It was not until their encounter with a larger congregation that the missionaries started realizing a sort of *mission sacrée* to run educational institutions in the Dutch East Indies. This happened especially in dealing with the problem of teaching Bible and religious catechisms to new converts of native East Indies and Chinese *peranakan* (East Indies born Chinese) or even to children of the European *peranakan* with a poor mastery of Dutch (Maier 1993, pp. 57–59; Adam 1995, pp. 5–7).
23. At this juncture, the independent efforts of foreign missionary societies flourished in Western countries from the beginning of the nineteenth century. In Netherlands, the hallmark of this development was the formation of the *Nederlandsch Zendelingen Genootschaap* (The Netherlands Missionary Society) in 1797, whose efforts in the NEI were begun in the 1820s (Jones 1976, p. 23). Subsequently, some other missionary unions operated in the archipelago with the Dutch Reformed Missionary Union becoming the most important (Steenbrink 1993, p. 98; Coppel 1986, p. 16).
24. Before the coming of the Dutch and the Protestant missions, the Portuguese had been responsible for converting the islanders of the eastern part of the archipelago and instructing them in the Catholic faith. In so doing they had pioneered missionary schools such as a Catholic seminary in Ternate in 1537. With the coming of the Protestant missions to the territories, the Catholic missions had been curtailed until their operation was admitted for the first time by the Governor General Herman William Daendels (1808–11). Their activities were not confined to Europeans but also took place among the East Indies communities of all classes with their stronghold in Flores, Timor, and Ambon

- not to forget their significant appearance in Java (Furnivall 1940, pp. 218–19).
25. Operated initially among the minority peoples of eastern parts of the East Indies (Maluku, Minahasa, and Timor), the mission schools then spread out to Tapanuli and Nias-Mentawai (North Sumatra), parts of Kalimantan, West Papua, Central and South Sulawesi, and parts of Java. The number of these schools increased slowly to reach about 8,400 in 1871, rising to 15,750 in 1892 ((Jones 1976, pp. 23–24; Coppel 1986).
 26. Unlike British India with its tradition of direct administration and disregard, at least in theory, of racial differences, in the Netherlands Indies the practice of administration was characterized by the presence of a dual system combining direct and indirect rule and deliberately maintained racial segregation. Thus, alongside the European Civil Service there was a Native Civil Service (Furnivall 1944, pp. 175, 251).
 27. From the very beginning, the Dutch had been quite aware of the inadequacy of the repressive state apparatus to maintain total control of the vast archipelago given the limited numbers in the colonial army. To compensate for this deficiency, “hegemonic” (symbolic) weapons in Gramsci’s sense were needed to construct the moral authority that positioned the civilized European above the native. Part of this strategy was the preservation of segregation and differences in terms of ethnicity, culture and language. The Dutch tried to cultivate the belief that their colonized subjects were inferior in order to make Dutch-dominated rule somewhat easier. According to H.M.J. Maier (1993, p. 41), the example of the myth of the “white race” that the colonial administration had been energetically preaching since the last part of the nineteenth century was the myth of Dutch *zakelijkheid*. To borrow Benedict Anderson’s words (1966, p. 17), this term can be described as “a mystique of innate racial superiority, near-magical efficiency and the arcana of science”, which “allowed the Dutch to maintain total control of the vast archipelago with a colonial army of less than 40,000 men”.
 28. Based on article 6 of the *Algemeene Bepalingen van Wetgeving voor Nederlandsch Indië* (General Rules of Law Enactment for the Netherlands Indies) of 1848, the people of Dutch East Indies were classified into different categories. Firstly, the Europeans and those who were officially treated as equal to the Europeans — that is all Christians of the indigenous people [*Boemipoetera*]. Secondly, the *Boemipoetera* and those who were officially treated as equal to the *Boemipoetera* — that is Arab, Moor, Chinese, and all Muslim believers and other worshippers (Simbolon 1995, pp. 128–29). In practice, this classification was still more complicated. There were several sub-stratums for each social category. Within the group theoretically assumed as equal to the European, there were levels of hierarchy: the full-blooded Europeans were at the top, the Eurasians [*Indos*] at the middle and the indigenous Christians at the bottom. A similar situation prevailed in the *Boemipoetera* group in respect to the individual’s closeness to symbols of political power and authority. The hierarchy ranged from the gentry

- (higher *priyayi*, aristocrat); servants of leading European and *Boemipoetera* families; lesser *priyayis* or lower level civil servants, and well-to-do families; and finally, peasants, petty traders and other commoners (Van Niel 1970, p. 22).
29. Following several native insurrections notably the Java War (1825–30) and the Padri War (1821–38), the Dutch made an effort to curtail the influence of Islamic zealots within the provincial sphere of power by co-opting and transforming the traditional ruling class, the *priyayi* such as *bupatis* in Java, *penghulus* in Minangkabau and *uleëbalangs* in Aceh), into subordinate functionaries of the Dutch Native Civil Service administration [*Pangreh Pradja*]. The *priyayi* families were allowed to participate in a lower form of the civilization of the colonial master (Lombard 1996a, p. 103).
 30. The school arrangement reflected Governor-General Jan Jacob Rochussen's (1845–51) attitude of continuing the old colonial policy of ensuring *Boemipoetera* maintained their own customs and to keep the languages of the colonial and the colonized people separate and differently categorized (Maier 1993, p. 49).
 31. The length of courses in this school were changed several times. From the beginning until 1863 it was only a two-year (vaccination) course for selected students who were able to speak Malay, using Malay as medium of instruction, and it was then extended to three years in 1864. In 1875 a reform was proposed to extend the course of instruction to five years after some two years preparatory course and to introduce the Dutch language as medium of instruction at a certain level. Subsequently, after 1881 the preparatory period was three years, and then after 1890 the school was only open to ELS graduates (Junge 1973, p. 3; Toer 1985, p. 21; Hadisutjipto 1977, pp. 29–33).
 32. Initially the length of the course was two years with Dutch generally used as the medium of instruction. In 1893, the study was lengthened to five years and some new subjects such as law added to meet new requirements in administrative posts. The pupils of these schools were mostly children of the *Bupati* (regents), as it was assumed that they would succeed their fathers in posts in the Native Civil Service (Sutherland 1979, p. 17; Van Niel 1970, p. 27; Ricklefs 1993, p. 128).
 33. Dutch language and culture became increasingly important following the growth of European private enterprises, the enhancement of the colonial bureaucracy and educational infrastructure, as well as the faster connections between Europe and the colony facilitated by the improvement of shipping technology and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. These developments led to a growing number of people from the colony who spent their furloughs and holidays in Europe as well as an influx of new European migrants who brought with them white women with a mission "*civilisatrice*" to maintain superior European culture. All this contributed to the fading away of Malay language from the formal life of the East Indies and its (partial) replacement after 1900 by Motherland Dutch (Maier 1993, pp. 58–61).
 34. The governor-general, Van Heutsz, perceived the increasing demand for the ELS

- as in danger of imposing unbearable burdens. The enrolment of natives and Chinese in the ELS had reached 17.8 per cent of the total enrolment in 1914–15 (Van der Veur 1969, p. 2).
35. Prior to the establishment of the HIS the government had begun to set up a special primary school for the Chinese Community, the *Hollandsch-Chinese School* (HCS), in 1908 and special primary schools for local royal families throughout the archipelago in 1910.
 36. Theoretically, this category included the children of Regents and other high Indonesian officials down to the rank of “assistant-*wedana*” (Sub-District Officer). The criterion for being well-to-do was a monthly income of about fl. 100 which at the time corresponded to the salary of an assistant-*wedana* (Van der Veur 1969, p. 29).
 37. The HBS were not only limited in number but also had restricted eligibility criteria for natives to enrol even for those who held an ELS certificate. The number of native pupils attending these schools in 1905 was no more than thirty-six (Sutherland 1979, p. 46).
 38. Designed to produce more qualified civil servants, the course was now five years in Dutch and after 1910 some new OSVIAs were opened reflecting a general trend towards recruitment from a lower social stratum (Sutherland 1979, p. 54).
 39. After 1904 graduates from this school could gain entry to a medical school in the Netherlands, from which, after one-and-a-half years attendance, it would be possible to obtain the European Medical Doctorate degree (Van der Veur 1969, p. 5; Van Niel 1970, p. 52).
 40. With the advent of village education and the emergence of new European style schools, this kind of school after 1906 was reorganized and divided into two categories. First was the so-called *Normaalschool* designed to produce teachers for the vernacular schools. Second was the *Kweekschool* entry which required the ELS (or equivalent). It was oriented to meet the demand for teachers for European-style schools at the primary and even the lower secondary level that would emerge in the next decade.
 41. These included the *Middelbare Landbouwschool* (Agricultural Secondary Schools, est. 1903) and the four-year *Nederlandsch Indische Veeartsenijschool* (Veterinary School, est. 1907) in Bogor, the *Rechtsschool* (Law Secondary School, est. 1908) in Batavia, and the five-year technical school, *Koningen Wilhelmina School* (est. 1906), in Batavia (Junge 1973, p. 58).
 42. In Furnivall’s account (1940, p. 251), the number was 23, while in Van Niel’s (1970, p. 50) it was 31.
 43. In 1900, the number of native enrolments in vernacular public and private schools (Second Class Native School and *Volkschool*) that offered instruction in Malay and local languages was 98,173. This figure rose to 303,868 in 1910. At the same time, the number of native enrolments in public and private schools of the European school system that offered instruction in Dutch was as follows.

In the primary schools (ELS, HIS, and *Speciale* School), the number was 2,441 in 1900 and increased to 5,108 in 1910. In the general secondary schools (HBS), the number was 13 in 1900 and rose to 50 in 1910. In the vocational schools, the number was 376 in 1900 and rose to 1,470 in 1910 (Van der Veur 1969, pp. 7, 11–11a). Thus, the total number of “modern-educated” natives (for all types and levels) was approximately 101,003 in 1900 and reached 310,496 in 1910. As a comparison, the total East Indies population in 1900 was 40,150,000 (Elson 1997, pp. 76–77).

44. See next chapter.

45. In Clifford Geertz's *The Religion of Java* (1960), the three *aliran* (socio-cultural “streams”) are defined as follows. The *priyayi* tradition is said to be an ideology of the court and *literati* oriented to Hindu-Buddhist and Javanese mystical worldviews. The *abangan* tradition is a more popular syncretic ideology of peasantry heavily influenced by Javanese animism, while the *santri* tradition is a pious Islamic worldview shared by elements in both Javanese and Outer Island society. As Koentjaraningrat had pointed out (1963), this trichotomy confused a legitimate division between two religious traditions (syncretist *abangan* and Muslim *santri*) by treating *priyayi* as a comparable category, when essentially it refers to a social class. “In actuality, *priyayi* could follow either *abangan* or *santri* religio-cultural traditions.” Despite the Dutch attempt to neutralize the influence of Islam within the milieu of the *priyayi*, many *priyayi*, especially those in the north Java littoral [*pesisir*] and in Priangan (West Java) as well as other provinces of outer Java, continued to be pious Muslims. For a further discussion of this, see Sutherland (1975).

46. Tjipto Mangunkusumo's grandfather was an Islamic teacher [*kjai*] who brought up his children under Islamic tutelage. This Islamic influence remained in the Mangunkusumo family. Notwithstanding the fact that Tjipto's father had been educated in a Western school (most likely a teacher-training school) some of his children were given Arabic names such as Badariah and Samsulmaarif. Moreover, Murtinah (the younger sister of Tjipto) was not allowed to marry her beloved Christian boyfriend. After all, “Islam is the prime guidance of life for this family” (Balfas 1952, pp. 26–27).

Sutomo's genealogy can be traced back to Sunan Giri (Maulana Iskak) of Gresik, one of the so-called “*Wali Sanga*” [The Nine Saints] — prominent Islamic proselytizers who are popularly believed to have converted Java to Islam (Soetomo 1984, pp. 128–29). Concerning his grandfather Sutomo said that: “He was the son of a rich man who used to be headman there. For that reason, if one looks at his time, he received an adequate education. He was sent from *pesantren* to *pesantren*, wherever there were famous teachers” (Soetomo 1984, pp. 113–14; Anderson 1979, p. 228).

Surjo's genealogy can be traced back to Raden Mas Said (Mangkunegara I), former *adipati* (chief of domain) of Surakarta (1757–95). He was well known as *Pangeran Sambernyawa* and led a series of rebellions against the VOC in the

1750s (Toer 1985, pp. 10–11). His Arabic name, Said, indicates that he was a devout Muslim by the Javanese standards of the time. Surjo's father continued this *santri* tradition. His name was Hadji Muhammad Chan Tirtodhipuro (a government tax officer). Thus, he used the name of the prophet Mohammad and had become a *hadji*. In addition, Surjo's elder brother was, again, given an Arabic name, R.M. Said.

The Djajadiningrat brothers were sons of a pious Muslim regent of the former Banten Sultanate who during their childhood studied Islam in *pesantren*. About the religious commitment of his father, Achmad wrote (1936) as follows: "As I seemed to have an aptitude for the study of religion, many people advised my father to let me continue my studies. My father apparently liked the idea, because shortly afterwards he decided to send me after the coming *lebaran* (Iedul Fitri) to the village of Karoendang, where one of my cousins...was running a *pesantren*" (Taken from the English version of Ahmad's memoirs as translated by Penders (1977, p. 252)).

Tjokroaminoto's great grandfather, Kjai Bagus Kasan Besari, was a founder of the well-known *pesantren* Tegalsari (Ponorogo) established during the reign of Pakubuwana II (1726–49). Tjokroaminoto's father, Raden Mas Tjokroamiseno (Wedana of Kleco, Madiun), was a devout Muslim *priyayi* as reflected in the way he gave Arabic names to his children such Umar Jaman, Umar Said, Umar Sabib, Istirah Mohamad Subari and so on. See Amelz (1952a, pp. 48–50).

Finally, Agus Salim's father, Sutan Mohammad Salim, was a devout Muslim from the Minangkabau aristocracy. In fact, the last great East Indies *ulama* in the *haramain* (Mecca and Medina), Sjeikh Achmad Khatib, was a brother of Mohammad Salim's father. As a *hoofdjaksa* (chief native legal official), Mohammad Salim remained strongly committed to Islamic tutelage. He was in fact one of the main contributors to the *Al-Munir* Islamic magazine (Junus 1960, p. 69). He was accustomed to go to the *surau* to read the *Qur'an* and other religious books. He was once impressed by the protagonist of a book he read, namely *Masjudul Haq*. It was this name that was originally given to Agus Salim. Furthermore, as Agus Salim admitted: "To be frank when my father sent me to the Dutch school, there had been an uproar in my village as people repeatedly asked him: 'do you want to make your son become Christian?'" (*Panitia Buku Peringatan* 1996, p. 40).

47. The reverse is also true that the Islamic mindedness of an individual was not necessarily a final condition. Abdullah Achmad (a great propagandist of the reformist-modernist ideology of West Sumatra), for instance, in last years of his life became closer to the Dutch with his support for the Guru Ordinance (Steenbrink 1994, p. 41).
48. Born into a higher Javanese *priyayi* family in 1879, Raden Adjeng Kartini was a model of the *kemadjoean*-oriented woman. She was permitted by her father the unusual privilege of attending a European elementary school until she was

- aged twelve, which was rare for native women at the time. Having a strong desire to continue her education, she was not allowed to do so by her father out of respect for traditional culture. She then compensated for her disillusionment by maintaining and broadening her *kemadjoean* outlook in the form of extensive reading and a voluminous correspondence with press editors and numerous Dutch *Ethici* and feminists including J.H. Abendanon, H.H. Van Kol, Mevrouw Ovink-Soer and Stella Zeehandelaar. She commenced writing letters in 1899 at the age of twenty and continued until the age of twenty-four when she died in childbirth (or by poison?) without accomplishing her long cherished dream to open a small school for Javanese girls (Geertz 1964).
49. Tjokroaminoto finished his study at the Magelang OSVIA in 1902. He then joined the government administration as a secretary of the *Patih* (native chief minister of a regent) of Ngawi. He found he could not stay in this post. He was bothered by the general resentment of old aristocrats towards educated *priyayi* among their subordinates and the requirement for lower government officers of the time to display an obsequious attitude and feudal gestures of obeisance toward their superiors. So, in 1906 he left the government post and joined a private European company, Kooy & Co., in Surabaya. While he worked for this company, he attended the *Burgerlijke Avondschool* [Night School], from 1907 until 1910, and began to write articles for local newspapers. After leaving this school he got a more lucrative job in a sugar factory near Surabaya, and worked there until mid-1912. During this period, to compensate for his expulsion from the feudal *priyayi* life-world, he established contacts with Islamic commercial networks in the city, at the very time when Islamic commercial associations sprang up throughout the archipelago. One of the leading Islamic merchant-activists in the city was Hadji Hasan Ali Surati. He was a *peranakan* Indian Muslim who became the leader of the club of *Taman Manikem*. This club became a meeting place for local merchants and other people in which religious teachings were given and socio-economic problems were discussed. Tjokroaminoto made contact with him and frequently came to this forum. Next, although he himself established his own club, *Panti Harsojo*, he maintained his links with Surati's club. One day, four propagandists of the *Sarekat Islam* (SI) from Surakarta came to this club to promote the newly established association. In the following day, Tjokroaminoto, who had attended the meeting, and Surati were appointed new members of the SI. This event was the turning point in his life that would lead him to be a prominent leader of the early Islamic political movements (Korver 1985, pp. 21–22; Amelz 1952a, pp. 50–51).

Tirto Adhi Surjo began his schooling in the ELS and continued to the *Dokter-Djawa* school/STOVIA. Because of his “scandalous” behaviour (in the eyes of the authorities), specifically in the context of giving an illegal drug prescription to a very needy Chinese, he dropped out from this school in 1900. He then devoted his life to journalism and social movements. To realize his

ambition to establish a fully fledged native press and other activities he needed financial support. He gained the support especially from Muslim traders or the so-called “*Kaoem Mardika*” [Free People]. From this interaction he became sympathetic to the plight and aspirations of Muslim merchants. This provided the impetus for him to promote socio-commercial associations under the banner of Islam. Thus, he played a decisive role in the establishment of the Islamic Commercial Association (SDI) in 1908/09 and in other Islamic commercial networks, including in the early establishment of the Islamic Union (SI) — particularly in dealing with the legal matters of this organization (Toer 1985, pp. 120–27).

50. This will be discussed in the following chapter.
51. In the very beginning Islam was misunderstood by the Dutch who thought that it had an ecclesiastical structure like Christianity, so that Muslim travel to the centre of the Islamic world (Middle East) or even the spatial mobility of the religious teachers within the country should be restricted to prevent vertical and horizontal integration of what they called the “Islamic priests”. Thus, already in 1664 the VOC had restricted the practice of *hadj* (the pilgrimage to Mecca). In 1810 Governor General Herman Willem Daendels (1808–11) issued a decree requiring *kjai* (religious teachers) to have a permit for travel within the NEI (Suminto 1996, p. 8; Dhofier 1982, p. 10). With the emergence of the serial native insurrections led by the returned *hadji* and local religious scholars, the restriction on the practice of *hadj* and religious educational activities found a new rationale.
52. In response to this policy, from the late nineteenth century onward, there was a dual system of education in the NEI in which the Islamic education system was separated from the Dutch education system. This is continued in post-colonial Indonesia, with a secular education system under the Ministry of Education and an Islamic education system under the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Thus, the general education system in Indonesia did not emerge as a result of its adaptation to traditional Islamic education. On the contrary, the Islamic education system as it appears now is the result of a gradual transformation from a traditional system, which has had to respond to the challenge of the general education system (Steenbrink 1994, p. 7).
53. Examples of the native insurrections under the banner of Islam throughout the nineteenth century were the so-called “Cirebon War” (1802–06), the “Java (Diponegoro) War” (1825–30), the “Padri War” in West Sumatra (1821–38), the “Banjarmasin (Antasari) War” (1859–62), the “Jihad in Cilegon” (9–30 July 1888) and the “Aceh War” (1873–1903).
54. This figure, however, may be unreliable since some regions for some years did not report the numbers of teachers and students while some other regions repeatedly reported the same figure for some years. Furthermore, the Dutch reports sometimes described the activities of the Islamic schools as declining and sometimes as increasing. These different conclusions resulted from different

- objectives. The former conclusion was intended to prove that the source of potential Islamic disobedience was successfully under government control, while the latter one was intended to convince the central government about the continuing reality of the Islamic threat (Steenbrink 1984, p. 161).
55. For example, *pesantren* Termas in Pacitan (est. 1823); *pesantren* Jampes and Bendo in Kediri and Pelangitan in Babat (est. 1855); *pesantren* Tegalsari in Semarang (est. 1870); *pesantren* Tebuireng in Jombang (est. 1899); as well as *pesantren* Probolinggo, Bangkalan (Madura), Siwalan Panji (Sidoarjo) and some other *pesantrens* in Jombang such as Ngedang, Keras, Tambak Beras, Den Anyar, Rejoso, Peterongan, Sambong, Sukopuro, Watu Galuh originated in the nineteenth century (Soekadri 1979, p. 19; Dhofier 1982, p. 2).
 56. For a good description of the genealogy of the Jāwah epistemic community (*ecumene*) in the *haramain*, see (Laffan 2003).
 57. At this time, the *Wahhābīya* control over Mecca did not last long. At the request of the Ottoman sultan, the *Wahhābīya* was brutally suppressed and forced out by the forces of the Egyptian viceroy Muhammad 'Alī (r. 1805–48) in 1818 (Laffan 2003, p. 29). However, following the capture of Mecca by 'Abd al-Āziz ibn Sa'ud in 1924, the *Wahhābīya* regained its control over this Holy City.
 58. It is said that elements of *Wahhābīya* teachings might have influenced a segment of the *ulama* of West Sumatra resulting in religious conflicts between the reformist and conservative *ulama*, culminating in the Padri War, 1821–27 (Dobbin 1983). In parallel with the rise of *Wahhābīya* movement in the *haramain*, the wave of Islamic reformism that had long reached the archipelago provided the impetus for religious revival. This was reflected in the shift of the *tareqat* (mystical brotherhood) adherents from the ecstatic *Syattariyah* to the more *shari'a*-friendly *Naqsyabandiyah* and *Qadiriyyah* and in the emergence of religio-political insurrections throughout the nineteenth century. For a further explanation of this issue, see Steenbrink (1984) and Laffan (2003, pp. 29–31).
 59. According to Azra (1994) the network between Muslims in the Middle East and in the archipelago had been initiated as early as the emergence of Islam in the form of religio-economic relations. Through the extensive Islamic propagation in the archipelago from the late twelfth century and the dominant power of the Ottoman Empire and other Islamic kingdoms (such as the Mughal and Safavid) over the Middle East, Red Sea and Indian Ocean since the second half of the fifteenth and throughout the sixteenth century, this network was extended to religio-political relations. Furthermore, at least since the seventeenth century this network began to transform itself into intensive religio-intellectual relations. The important Indo-Malayan figures of the seventeenth century international *ulama* networks were, among others, Nur al-Din al-Raniry (b. 1658), 'Abd Al-Ra'uf al-Sinkili (b. 1615), and Muhammad Jusuf Al-Maqassari (b. 1627). Those of the eighteenth century were Sjihab al-Din b. 'Abd Allah Muhammad, Kemas Fakhr al-Din, 'Abd al Shamad al-Palimbani, Kemas Muhammad b. Ahmad and Muhammad Muhyi al-Din b. Syihab al-Din (from

- Palembang/Sumatra); Muhammad Arsjad al-Bandjari and Muhammad Nafis al-Bandjari (South Kalimantan); 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Bugis (From Sulawesi); and 'Abd al-Rahman al-Mashri al-Batawi (Jakarta).
60. Examples of his works were *Sabil al-Muhtadin and Perukunan Melayu* written around the turn of the eighteenth/nineteenth century.
 61. Born in Banten, the son of a district-*penghulu*, Omar ibn Arabi, he made the pilgrimage (with his other two brothers, Tamim and Ahmad) whilst quite young, after which he stayed about three years in Mecca. When he returned home with strong religious credentials, he soon afterwards decided to return to the Holy City and to stay there permanently. His first teachers in Mecca were the leading *Jâwâh ulama* from the previous generation, notably Khatib Sambas and Abdulghani Bima, and then his real teachers were the Egyptian Yûsuf Sumbulawênî, Nahrâwî and Abd ël-Hamîd Daghestânî (Hurgronje 1931, pp. 268–69).
 62. Examples of these were a Qur'anic commentary, *Tafsir Marah Labid* (published early 1880s), *Syarh Kitab Al-Jurûmiyyah* on Arabic grammar (1881), *Lubâbul al-Bayân* on linguistic style (1884), *Dharî'at al-yaqîn* on doctrine (1886), *Sulûk al-jâdah and Sullam almunâjâh* on Islamic Law (1883 and 1884), and *Syarh Bidâyat al-hidâyah* on Sufism (1881) (Hurgronje 1931, pp. 271–72).
 63. Born in Kota Gedang, West Sumatra, his father (Abdul Latif Khatib) was a descendant of the aristocratic family whose occupation was *Djaksa Kepala* (chief of native legal officials) of Padang, while his mother was a daughter of the well-known reformist *ulama* of the Padri group, Tuanku nan Rentjeh (Steenbrink, 1984, p. 139). As a son of an aristocratic family, the young Achmad Khatib was able to attend the Dutch-sponsored primary school and then the native teacher-training school in Bukittinggi (Noer 1980, p. 38). His stronger interest in Islamic studies, however, brought him to Mecca to study and then teach Islam there. Next, through his marriage with a daughter of an influential and rich Arab merchant, he was appointed a religious leader and held the office of Shafi'i Imam at the *Masjidil Haram* (Abdullah 1971, p. 7; Roff 1967, p. 60).
 64. Examples of his works are *Rauda al Hussab fi 'Ilm al-Hisab* (Cairo 1892) and *Al-Jawahir al-Naqiyyah fi'l Amal al-Jaibiyah* (Cairo 1891) (Steenbrink 1984, p. 145).
 65. Born in Asadabad (Iran) — though he later claimed to be an Afghan in order to ensure a favourable reception among Sunni Muslims — his religio-political career led him to travel across Islamic countries and Europe. Thus he visited Iran, Afghanistan, India, Hijaz, Egypt, Turkey, France, England, Russia before he died in Istanbul in 1897.
 66. The term "Pan-Islam" was actually of non-Muslim origin. The first extensive use of the term was made by Gabriel Charms, a prolific French journalist interested in the Ottoman Empire, who employed the term as a variant of existing terms such as "Pan-Slavism", "Pan-Germanism" or "Pan-Hellenism" (Landau 1994, p. 2). Even so, the idea of (international) Islamic unity itself

had been circulating among a secret society of the Young Ottomans established in 1865 that used the term *Ittihad-i Islam* [Union of Islam] in the late 1860s. This term was then generally rendered as *Wahdat al-Islām* (or *al-Wahda al-Islāmiyya*) in Arabic, and later as *Jāmi'at al-Islām*, which all mean Islamic unity or Islamic union. *Al-'Urwa al-wuthqā* was responsible for the early use of these Arabic terms in one of the articles of the magazine published and edited by al-Afghani and 'Abduh in 1884 at the very time when the term "Pan-Islam" was increasingly employed by Gabriel Charmes and others in France (Landau 1994, pp. 2–4).

67. The term "liminal" derives from the word "limen", meaning threshold or an in-between space. In anthropological studies the term was coined by Arnold van Gennep (1960) to refer to transition rites between the rites of separation from a previous world and the ceremonies of incorporation into the new world (pp. 20–21). In post-colonial studies this term is often used in referring to the trans-cultural space in which there is a continual process of movement and interchange between different states (Ashcroft et al., 1998, p. 130).
68. These students arrived for the first time in Mecca respectively as follows: Djalaluddin in 1881, Thaib in the early 1890s, As'ari in 1892, Hadji Rasul in 1894, Achmad in 1895, Djambek in 1896, Dachlan in 1889, and Salim in 1906. Interestingly enough, three of them before going to Mecca had been exposed to a Western education system. Djambek and Achmad had attended modern primary schools, while Salim was a graduate of the HBS — the only (general) secondary school available in the NEI at the time (from various sources included Noer 1980, pp. 39–54; Roff 1967, p. 60; Steenbrink 1984, p. 146; Junus 1960, p. 45; Syaifullah 1997, p. 28).
69. According to Mona Abaza, based on the historical account written by an Egyptian historian, Mubarak, there had been some eleven Indo-Malayan students at Al-Azhar in the mid-nineteenth century (1999, p. 31).
70. The system of teaching using the graded classes and classrooms was alien to the traditional *pesantren*, at least until early decades of the twenty-first century. The system of teaching applied in the traditional *pesantren* was a combination of the so-called *sorogan* and *weton(an)*. *Sorogan* is a method of individual-centred learning in which a student (*santri*) sits in front of a religious scholar (*kjai*) to read a religious text. *Weton* is a method of teaching in which students sit in a circle in front of the scholar working on various texts. The *kjai* calls on various students to recite and clarify what they are reading. The latter method is also called *bandungan* in West Java and *halaqah* in Sumatra. All of these activities were commonly conducted in the mosque.
71. In 1984/85 the Department of Religious Affairs of Indonesia reported that the total number of *pesantrens* throughout the country at the time was 6,239: some 7 per cent of these were established before 1900, around 25 per cent were founded in between 1900 and 1945, and more than 62 per cent emerged after 1945 (Mastuhu 1994, p. 24).

72. Conservative in this context means a preference to conserve established local traditions of Islam including those that tolerated syncretism. Conservative Muslims tended to find the reformists' project of Islamic purification based on Islamic orthodoxy anathema. While "traditionalist" in this context means a person who tends to be in favour of preserving established religious teachings, methods and instruments.
73. Mobini-Kesheh added that "this pattern was reversed in the 1930s, when a group of young, Indies-born Hadramis elected to proclaim Indonesia as their homeland" (1999, p. 15).
74. Even one of the teachers, Muhammad Noor, had studied directly with 'Abduh in Al-Azhar (Noer 1980, pp. 68–75).
75. Due to its "dangerous" influence on the East Indies *ulama*, *al-Manār* was banned by the Dutch colonial government in the archipelago. However, it was smuggled in and remained in circulation among a limited number of *ulama* and provided a new landmark for them proven by the fact that one of the many names given to the reformist group in the archipelago of the period was *Kaoem al-Manar* (the Al-Manar community). Just before leaving Al-Azhar, Djalaluddin had contributed articles to this magazine and on his return to the archipelago he and colleagues attempted to imitate its spirit and messages by establishing a new magazine in their own right (Roff 1967, p. 59).
76. Before establishing the *Adabijah* School, Achmad visited his colleague, Tahir Djalaluddin in 1906. This visit was intended, among other things, to learn about the planned model of the *Madrasah al-Iqbal al-Islamiyyah* which was about to be established.
77. See footnote 70 above.
78. Djalaluddin Thaib was a disciple of Hadji Rasul who carried out a further reform in *Surau Jembatan Besi* by introducing the use of desks, chairs, and modern curricula as well as extending the spirit of this reform to other *surau* in West Sumatra.
79. Al-Junusi established the so-called *Diniah School* in 1915 for female students. Following the curricula of Al Azhar, the *Diniah* School was welcomed by Minangkabau society proven by the speedy increase in similar schools to become fifteen in 1922.
80. M. Djamil Djambek, after spending some nine years (1896–1903) in Mecca, returned home in 1903. His early religious teaching was given through a series of public speeches, mainly in Bukittinggi, in which he expressed his criticism of the practice of *tareqat* and his advocacy of return to Islamic orthodoxy. To extend his *dakwah* [religious propagation] he established a close relationship with local leaders and students of the local teacher-training school. Finally, in 1918 he founded a reformed *surau* that came to be known as *Surau Injik Djambek* (Noer 1980, pp. 42–44; Junus 1960, p. 69).
81. Ibrahim Musa studied in Mecca first from 1901–09 and then from 1913–15. Upon his first return in 1909 he began to reform a traditional *surau* in Parabek.

- This *surau* had close connections with *Surau Jembatan Besi* and later would join the network of the *Sumatra Thawalib* (Noer 1980, p. 48).
82. After four years of study in Mecca, Latif Sjakur returned home in 1902. Upon his return he began to reform a traditional *surau* in Biaro. Beginning with introducing desks and blackboard to the existing traditional *surau*, in 1912 he finally established his own *madrasah* called *Al-Tarbiyah al-Hasanah*, in which the “graded classes and classroom teaching” were applied.
 83. H.M. Thaib Umar who had pioneered the reform of traditional *surau* in Batusangkar in 1897 continued his reform efforts by establishing in 1910 a *madrasah* called *Madras School* in Sungajang (Batusangkar). Further reforms in this school were continued by Mahmud Junus (Junus 1960, p. 54).
 84. He did not obtain formal training in the Western school system (Nakamura 1976, p. 110). Growing up within the milieu of the Yogyakarta Sultanate, however, he seems to have been exposed to modern systems of knowledge. His association with local leaders of *Budi Utomo* and students of a local native teacher-training school after 1908 seems to have improved his literacy in the Latin Alphabet and modern scientific knowledge.
 85. *Khatib* is the person who gives the sermon during the Friday communal worship.
 86. In his second stay in Mecca, Dachlan was fortunate to meet with Rashīd Ridā and had an opportunity to discuss with him issues concerning Islam and the international Islamic *ummah* (Syaifullah 1997, p. 31).
 87. For most of the quotations from material published at the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, I am indebted to the work of Ahmat B. Adam (1995).
 88. To give an example, *Bintang Timor*, no. 103, 29 December 1880, ran a complaint from a graduate of the *Dokter-Djawa* School stating that a graduate from this school could only become a vaccinator or at best a *Dokter-Djawa* with a maximum rate of pay per month of around fl. 90 (after about twenty years of service). On the other hand, a graduate of the Chiefs’ School had a better prospect of being appointed as a *mantri polisi*, assistant *wedana*, *wedana*, *patih* or *jaksa*, and even the possibility of ultimately becoming a regent.
 89. For the meaning of the term in this context, see chapter 1.
 90. See footnote 36 above.
 91. Minke is a protagonist of the famous *Buru* tetralogy of Pramoedya Ananta Toer. Born the son of a *priyayi*, he had privileged access to Western education and civilization, but had never been able to fully integrate into the Dutch colonial system. At the same time, having been exposed to liberal Western ideas he was also unable to cope with the feudalistic manners of indigenous *priyayi*, his own milieu.
 92. Mimicry is “the process by which the colonized subject is reproduced as almost the same, but not quite” (Bhabha 1994, p. 86). “The Copying of the colonizing culture, behavior, manners and values by the colonized contains both mockery and a certain ‘menace’, so that mimicry is at once resemblance and menace” (Ashcroft et al. 1998, p. 140).

93. Owned by a Dutch romantic-idealist, Henri Constant Claude Clockener Brousson and edited by Rivai, this vernacular magazine was published in Amsterdam and circulated in the East Indies between 1902–07, becoming the mouthpiece of the new intelligentsia.
94. For proof that the term was echoed by other journalists and the younger generation of the time we may turn to a commentator upon contemporary Javanese society in the *Sinar Djawa*, no. 52 (4 March 1914) who said: "With the change of the times a new type of *bangsawan* has risen, namely the *bangsawan pikiran*" (Quoted in Adam 1995, p. 173).
95. Quoted in Adam (1995, p. 103).
96. Ibid., p. 104.
97. Concerning the growing process and life-cycle of social movements, Eyerman and Jamison add the following: "(1) Social movements go through a kind of life cycle, from gestation to formation and consolidation. Social movements seldom emerge spontaneously; instead they require long periods of preparation. (2) No social movement emerges until there is a political opportunity available, a context of social problems as well as a context of communication, opening up the potential for problem articulation and knowledge dissemination. (3) No social movement can emerge until individuals are ready to take part in it, willing to transform private troubles into public problems, as well to enter into the process of collective identity formation" (1991, p. 56).
98. Christian missionaries and the VOC had been operating printing presses since the early seventeenth century. For further discussion, see Adam (1995, pp. 1–15).
99. The chief feature of this period was the advent of the advertisement-oriented and official (government) press, which used the Dutch language, was owned and edited by Dutch people as well as targeting Dutch readers.
100. This colloquial form of Malay is a "simple linguistic structure, almost no redundancy, without a clear standard, but sufficient for communication between people who had a better knowledge of another language" (Maier 1993, pp. 46–47).
101. In the early nineteenth century the number of Chinese in Java was estimated at 100,000. In 1850 there were already some 150,000 in Java, and by 1900 there were 277,000 in Java and 250,000 in the Outer Provinces (Furnivall 1944, pp. 47 and 213). There were only a few thousand Europeans in the early nineteenth century. The figure became 22,000 in 1850 and jumped to 75,700 in 1900 (Furnivall 1944, p. 347; Lombard 1996a, p. 78).
102. This is not to forget the existence of a small number of presses that used Dutch, Javanese and High Malay languages.
103. These were the high Javanese-language weekly *Bromartani* in Surakarta (1855–57) and *Poespitamantjawarna* in Surabaya (1855), the first (low) Malay-language newspaper *Soerat Kabar Bahasa Melajoe* in Surabaya (1856), the first (high) Malay-periodical *Bintang Oetara* printed in Rotterdam but circulated in the East

- Indies (1856–57), and the (low) Malay-language newspaper *Soerat Chabar Betawie* in Jakarta (1858).
104. Examples of these are *Selompret Melajoe* in Semarang (1860–1911), *Bientang Timoor* in Surabaya (1862–87), *Bintang Timor* in Sumatra (1865–65), and *Bintang Barat* in Batavia (1869–99).
 105. It is said that the participation of the *peranakan* Chinese in the vernacular press commenced in 1869 when Lo Tun Tay assumed the post of editor for the bi-weekly newspaper, *Mataharie*, in Batavia. It is also worth noting that the major Chinese contribution to the development of the vernacular press was as subscribers and advertisers.
 106. Examples of Indies natives who had been involved in the press field before the 1900 were Dja Endar Muda as an editor of the Chinese-owned bi-weekly paper, *Pertja Barat* (1894–98), Sutan Baharudin as an editor of daily *Sinar Menangkabau* (1894–97), Tirta Adhi Surjo as a correspondent of the newspaper *Hindia Ollanda* (1894–96), Datuk Sutan Maharadja as an editor of the twice weekly *Warta Berita* (1895–97) and Wahidin Sudiro Husodo as an editor of the Javanese and Malay twice-weekly *Retnodhoemilah* (1895–1906).
 107. The *peranakan* Chinese started running their own vernacular presses in the period following the economic crisis of 1884 which forced some of the Dutch and Eurasian press owners to sell their enterprises. Thus, from December 1886 the ownership of the printing firm and the right to publish the well-known paper of the time, *Bintang Timor*, was in the hands of a *peranakan* Chinese, Baba Tjoa Tjoan Lok. This was followed by other Chinese-owned vernacular presses such as *Pembrita Betawi* (from 1886 up to 1887), *Bintang Soerabaja* (from 1887), and several others (Adam 1995, pp. 58–124).
 108. Before the coming of the Dutch, the use of Malay language had been strongly rooted in the main cities of the coastal area throughout the archipelago, spread by the Islamic trading and *ulama* networks (Lombard 1996b, p. 153).
 109. This in turn enhanced the status of the bazaar Malay as a *lingua franca* of the archipelago.
 110. Words used to name the vernacular press from 1854–1900 seemed to reflect the emergence of the *liminal* space in which the old and the new worlds as well as multi-layers of consciousness and interests interchanged without a common political orientation. Initially, it was commonplace to use terms such as *kabar*, *chabar*, *pewarta*, *berita* [news], *bentara* [herald], *pengbentar* [medium], *selompret* [trumpet], *courant* [newspapers]. This was likely to indicate the liberal economic worldview in which the press was simply regarded as a medium of information produced by private enterprises for the sake of economic interests without any reference to a particular collective identity. Secondly, the local-territorial signifiers such as Betawie, Semarang, Melajoe, Soerabaja, Menangkabau, Sumatra, Prajangan, and Djawi were frequently used perhaps to reflect the dominance of the provincial outlook and orientation of the press. Thirdly, symbolic references to the past such as *Batara-Indra* [Indian legend],

primbon [divining manual] and some other Javanese archaic literary terms were still used seemingly to indicate the continual presence of a pre-colonial cosmology. Finally, the “enlightening” symbols such as *bintang* [star], *matahari* [sun], *tjahaja*, *palita*, *sinar* [lights] and *soeloeh* [torch] together with the professional designation such as *pengadjar* [teacher], *soldadoe* [army] and *pengadilan* [court] were widely used possibly to represent the obsession with the new orientation: *kemadjoean*.

111. Similar clubs also appeared within the milieu of *priyayi* in Semarang, such as *Langen Samitro* (est. 1888) and *Langen Darmodjojo* (est. 1891). From Semarang, the associations spread to other cities such *Medan Perdamian* in Padang, *Perkumpulan Sukamanah* in Batavia, *Abi Projo* in Surakarta, and *Langen Hardjo* in Surabaya.
112. Wahidin had toured Java in 1906 to gain the support of local civil administrators for his attempt to establish a “*Studiefonds*” [scholarship funds] to aid talented Javanese students and to draw attention to the backwardness of the Javanese on the path of *kemadjoean*.
113. Among these other schools were the Agricultural and Veterinary School at Bogor, the OSVIA at Magelang and Probolinggo, the native teacher-training schools at Bandung, Yogyakarta, and Probolinggo, and the *Burgeravondschool* [the citizens’ evening school] at Surabaya (Soewarno 1918).
114. They were, among others, sons of the royal family of Pakualam V (R.M. Ario Kusumo Judo, R.M. Ario Surtio, Surjoputro), sons of the royal family of Notodirodjo (Notokworo, Notodiningrat, Gondowinoto, and Noto Suroto); one son of the royal family of Pangeran Hadiwidjojo VI; two sons of the Kutai Sultanate (Raden Badaruddin and Raden Mahamuddin; sons of regents such as Sosrokartono (elder brother of R.A. Kartini, son of the Jepara Regent), Tjokroadikusumo (son of the Magelang regent), Husein Djajadinigrat (son of the Banten regent), Maharadja Sutan Kasajangan Soripada (son of the Tapanuli regent); along with graduates of the STOVIA such as Bunjamin, Asmaun, Johan E. Tehupeiory, and W.K. Tehupeiory (Simbolon 1995, p. 516).
115. In following the trajectory of British-Indian Muslim printing which had adopted lithography since at least early in the nineteenth century, by mid-century there emerged printing activities using the same technique in Cairo and Istanbul followed by others in Mecca notably after 1883 (Proudfoot 1997, pp. 163–82).
116. Examples of books published in Singapore from 1860–70 were *Sabil al-Muhtadin*, *Bidayat al-Mubtadi*, *Usul al-Din*, Tanbih al-Ikhwan, *Sirat al-Mustakim*, *Kawaid al-Islam*, *Taj al-Muluk*, *Syair Mekkah*, and *Syair Hakikat* (Proudfoot 1993, p. 28).
117. For the publication of Malay-language Islamic literatures outside the Malay world, see Proudfoot (1993, p. 27; 1998, p. 46).
118. The term *taqlid* here refers to a blind adherence to the teaching of the conservative *ulama* and dogmas of the established jurisprudential schools, while

ijtihad refers to the use of independent reasoning to enable Islam to respond to the exigencies of modern life. *Bid'ah* here means illegitimate innovation in religious practice; *khurafat* means superstition; and *tariqat* means mystical brotherhoods.

119. The executive of this association consisted of the President: Sjeikh Achmad bin Abdulrahman Badjenet (an Arab merchant); Vice President: Mohammad Dagrim (a *Dokter-Djawa*); Secretary *cum* Treasurer: Tirto Adhi Surjo (a journalist); Commissioners: Sjeikh Achmad bin Said Badjenet, Sjeikh Galib bin Said bin Tebe, Sjeikh Mohamad bin Said Badjenet (all are Arabic merchants), Mas Railus (native land clerk), Sulaeman (native bookbinder) and Hadji Mohamad Arsjad and Abdullah (native merchants) (Toer 1985, pp. 120–21).
120. Other similar associations in Batavia were the *al Hellal al Ahmar* [Red Crescent Society], the *Itmatul Khairijah* [Perfection of Welfare], the *Derma Ihlas* [Devoted Charity], and the *Sumatra-Batavia al Khairijah* [Sumatra-Batavia Charitable Association]. Another similar association in Makassar was the *Maidjitiil Islam* [Islamic Funeral Welfare Association]. Other associations in West Sumatra were the Abdullah Ahmad-led *Djami'ah Adabiah* [Civilized Community], Ibrahim Musa-led *Muzakaratul Ikhwan* [Discursive Brotherhood], and Hadji Rasul-led *Sumatra Thawalib* (association of Sumatra Islamic students). Other associations in Surabaya were the *Podo Roso* [Mutual Feeling] and the *Taman Manikem* [Garden of Precious Stones]. See Adam (1995, pp. 160–61), Korver (1985, pp. 21–22) and Junus (1960, pp. 54–69).
121. Leaders of the Yogyakarta *Budi Utomo* (BU) were composed largely of teachers of the local teacher-training schools. Among leaders of the BU and teacher of the teacher-training school who supported the establishment of the *Muhammadiyah* were Dwijosewojo, Djojosumarto Budihardjo and Sosrosugondo (Saefullah 1997, pp. 68–76).
122. Quoted in Adam (1995, p. 173).
123. The “Sunday Circular” suggested it was improper to conduct state festivities on Sunday and required all administrators and civil servants to refrain from official or semi-official activities on Sundays. The “Market Circular” recommended the restriction of holding Indonesian markets when these fell on a Sunday (Van Niel 1970, p. 84).
124. Founded in New York in 1875 the Theosophical Society’s teaching was based on the concepts of universal brotherhood, syncretic religion, and the mystic potencies of life. The East Indies branch of this society was established in 1905 as a part of the Netherlands chapter.
125. Following the emergence of the Chinese vernacular press in the late nineteenth century as well as the establishment of the Chinese cultural association, *Tjong Hoa Hwe Koan* [THHK, Chinese Association], in 1900, Chinese awareness of their own distinct identity, hierarchy and expectations increasingly led to the cry for abolition of political barriers that hampered their vertical and horizontal mobility. This growing consciousness coupled with the strengthening of their

economic bargaining power, as well as the signs of political support from the Chinese authority on the mainland, forced the Dutch to respond to their demands. The pass system — which restricted the horizontal mobility of the Chinese — was relaxed in 1904, the *Hollandsch-Chinese School* (HCS) was provided by the government in 1908, and moreover the Chinese gained their freedom for commercial activities and investment in sugar plantations, local industries as well as small shops and commerce.

126. Examples of these early labour unions were *Staats Spoor Bond* in 1905, the *Post Bond* in 1905, the *Cultuur Bond* in 1907, the *Suiker Bond* and *Vereeniging Van Spoor en Tram Personeel* (VSTP) in 1908.
127. For a fragment of the biography of Sneevliet, see McVey (1965, pp. 13–22).
128. In comparison, the *Sarekat Islam* only took one seat as a elected member (Abdul Muis) and one seat as an appointed member (R. Umar Said Tjokroaminoto).
129. Born in 1892 he actually belonged to the first generation of the intelligentsia, but could be rightly said as the forerunner of the second generation reflected in his initiative to form the first East Indies youth organization that came to be known as *Jong Java*.
130. The three were “*sakti*” [inner strength], “*budhi*” [noble character], and “*bakti*” [devotion].
131. The East Indies counterparts of Netherlands associations that promoted Christianity in line with the “association” policy for the Indies polity emerged earlier among indigenous Christian communities. One example was the so-called “Wilhelmina” association for the “*Anak-anak Ambon-Menado*” [the Ambonese and Menadonese]. Established in 1908 (and officially recognized in 1912), this association emerged around the military settlement in Magelang (Central Java) — for many Ambonese and Menadonese were recruited as military personnel — led by J.P. Risakotta. A similar project was continued with the establishment of the “*Ambonsch Studiefonds*” [Scholarship funds for the Ambonese] in 1909 (officially recognized in 1911); the *Ambon's Bond* [The Union of the Ambonese] for Ambonese government employees in Amboina in 1911; the “*Rukun Minahasa*” (est. 1912) and the “*Mena Muria*” (est. 1913) respectively for the Christian-Minahasanese and Ambonese in Semarang (Blumberger 1931, pp. 46–47, Pringgodigdo 1964, p. 21). Associations of this kind were by and large oriented to improving the progress and welfare of the respective communities within the framework of ethno-religious identity with a strong “association” with the Netherlands.
132. Suwardi joined the SI of the Bandung branch in 1912. After 1913, however, he became more active in the *Indische Partij* (Dewantara [a nickname of Suwardi] 1952, p. 31).
133. For a detailed description of the socio-educational background of early leaders of the SI, see Korver (1985, pp. 231–65).
134. Ricklefs disputes the figure claiming it that the true number probably did not exceed half a million (Ricklefs 1993, p. 166).

135. Agus Salim supported this argument by saying that the terms “*inlander*” or “*Boemipoetera*” used in formal language of the time were commonly translated as “*orang Selam*” [Muslim] in the informal daily language of the East Indians. Other groups of the non-Muslim had their own nicknames such as *Inlandse Christenen* (Salim 1952, p. 15).
136. Thus, newspapers and periodicals such as *Boedi Oetomo* (1910–13) and *Djawi Hisworo* (1906–19, it became the mouthpiece of the Budi Utomo in the second decade of the century were the mouthpiece of the Budi Utomo; *al-Munir* (1911–13) and *al-Akhbar* (1913–14) were those of the Islamic reformist-modernists; *Oetoesan Melajoe* (1911–26), *Soeloeh Melajoe* (1913–?) and *Soeara Melajoe* (1913–?) were those of the *adat*-oriented *Kaoem moeda*; *Sarotomo* (1912–15), the *Oetoesan Hinda* (1912–23), the *Kaoem moeda* (1912–42) the *Hindia Sarikat* (1913–14), the *Pantjara Warta* (1907–17), it became the mouthpiece of the SI after 1913), and the *Sinar Djawa* (1913–24) and *al-Islam* (1916–?) were those of the SI; *De Express* (1912–?) and *Tjahaja Timoer* (1908–08) were those of the *Indische Partij* (Indies Party); *Soeara Merdika* (1917–?) and *Soeara Ra’jat* (1918–?) were those of the ISDV and its socialist offshoots.
137. See next chapter.
138. For Ortega, the object of his intellectual message was “youth”, whom he saw as the educated elite among the upper and middle class (Eyerma 1994, pp. 51–52).

3

MAKING INDONESIA, MAKING INTELLECTUAL POLITICAL TRADITIONS

*For us, Indonesia expresses a political objective,
as it signifies hopes for a fatherland in the future,
and to make it come true every Indonesian will struggle
with all their effort and ability.*

Mohammad Hatta (1928)¹

*The result of this treacherous (Dutch) policy has been a kind of thinking
widespread among us,
namely, that in our country there are different groupings.
... Thus we have created mutually exclusive types. You could only be one or the
other,
not be a Muslim and [yet] love your country [etc.] ...
But actually we are all of us nationalists and patriots, and we all of us are also
Muslims!*

Masjumi Circular (1944)²

From the second decade of the twentieth century, the intelligentsia had found the means to communicate with the masses. Recognizing the misery of the masses, the high-sounding ideas of *kemadjoean* inherited from previous decades lost their magnetism. In the face of increasing social dislocation, it became important to translate ideologies into practical programmes of action and to resist colonialism.

The deterioration of the post-war Indies economy and the great economic depression of the 1930s provided a fertile soil for rampant radicalism. In the

growing spirit of political resistance, many former proto-nationalist associations abandoned their socio-cultural aims and became more concerned with the adoption and formulation of political-ideologies. In response to contesting political ideologies, the less-structured proto-nationalist social movements' of the early two decades of the twentieth century began to be transformed into structured "political parties".

As political radicalism spread, the ethical policy became a faltering creed. In the first decade of the twentieth century, members of the *Ethici* such as Snouck Hurgronje publicly vowed: "We cannot rest content with measures which serve to strengthen our rule by preventing discontent and opposition. Our goal is not the quiet, formerly so valued, but progress."³ In the early 1920s, however, mainstream Dutch public opinion regarded progressive Indies intellectuals as disturbers of colonial public order. To curb this potential public disobedience, the regime of *rust en orde* [tranquillity and order] was even more strongly enforced by the colonial administrators. Rather than encouraging the rule of law, *rust en orde* was a euphemism for the deployment of a repressive colonial state apparatus that negated the idea of due legal process.

By the end of the World War I, there had been indications that the social-democratic revolution in Germany would overflow into the Netherlands. With the strong possibility of the Dutch Social Democrats coming to power and forming government in the Netherlands, the so-called "Radical Concentration" in the Indies *Volksraad* [People's Council] demanded that the government reform the fundamental principles and structure of the Council and the Indies administration in order to deal better with the interests of the East Indies people.⁴ In response, Governor-General Van Limburg Stirum (1916–21), who probably knew that the *status quo* in the homeland was safe, promised to set up a Reform Commission to investigate possible reform in those fields within the existing political structure. In fact, because of severe criticism from the European community in the NEI, as well as from politicians in the Netherlands who described the commission as an irresponsible concession to the fear of revolution, the reform investigation failed to be implemented (Ricklefs 1993, pp. 173–74; Van Niel 1970, pp. 184–85).

These so-called broken promises of Van Limburg Stirum seemed to represent the end of support from sympathetic ethical policymakers. This was confirmed in 1918 and 1919 when the colonial government began to repress all local political activism, fearing radical movements were getting out of control.⁵

With the deterioration of the post-war Indies economy, the succeeding two governors-general, Dirk Fock (1921–26) and Simon de Graeff

(1926–31), found a rationale for further strengthening the repressive colonial regime. The 1922 constitutional reforms failed to make any significant changes either in the *Volksraad* or in the structure of administration. In 1925 the states-general rejected the clause allowing a native Indies majority in the *Volksraad* (Ingleson 1979, p. 8). Moreover, Fock made an effort to increase government income through taxes. The communist uprisings of the 1926 and 1927, which were partly driven by the economic and political malaise of the NEI, had provided strong reasons for Simon de Graeff to crackdown on political movements.

As the world economic depression continued through the 1930s with severe effects on the NEI,⁶ the next two governors-general, Bonifacius C. de Jonge (1931–36) and Stachouwer W.L.T. van Starkenborgh (1936–45), maintained the crackdown. On assuming office in September 1931, De Jonge warned political activists: “Political slogans, which are of some benefit in times of prosperity, are now of no use” (Quoted in Ingleson 1979, p. 177). In his view, unrealistic political agitation in a time of economic difficulty could only make economic conditions worse. His successor, Van Starkenborgh, was a rather more flexible man, but brought no significant change (Ricklefs 1993, p. 188). Under the two governors nothing was more important than maintaining more firmly public “peace and quiet”. During this period, the vernacular press was heavily censored, public meetings were tightly controlled by secret agents, and some leading political figures were arrested and exiled. Thus, the fledgling public sphere was soon “imprisoned” by the iron cage of the security regime [*rust en orde*].

The repressive political control continued and even became worse during the Japanese interregnum (1942–45). The Japanese military government forbade any discussion or organization connected with the politics or administration of the country. This severely affected pre-war political organizations which speedily disappeared from the public scene.

These series of historical events altered the political opportunity structure and the public sphere, dramatically changing the opportunities available for the new nationalist movements. On the hand, these changes provided the impetus for the emergence of common ideas which led to the formation of “Indonesia” as a new imagined community and a code of an historical bloc. On the other hand, these changes also affected state-society interactions and sharpened the competition between various political groupings. These tensions led to the formation of various intellectual political traditions.

This chapter covers the timeframe of 1920–45, a period when the notion of Indonesian nationalism and state was discussed among competing groups of the intelligentsia and when intelligentsia of higher learning began to take

a major role in the leadership of the nation. Discussions will show that it was during this period the notion of a “Muslim intelligentsia” was consolidated along with the construction of Muslim intellectual-political tradition and the fragmentation within the Muslim intellectual tradition. The boundary between “Muslim” and “non-Muslim” was constructed through the discursive practices, the formulation of Islamic political ideologies, and the emergence of Islamic parties and associations of Muslim students. The chapter ends up with a discussion of the failure of political Islam at the birth of the independent republic.

Following the previous chapter, focus of attention will be given to the educational field, discursive practices, the public sphere, and power games (consolidation and contestation) of the intelligentsia. With the formation of intellectual-political traditions in this period, special attention will also be given to the formation and inter-generational transmission of Muslim intellectual political traditions. Like the previous chapter, the structure of writing is not purely chronological. It is combined with a thematic approach. Thus, the chronology follows the sub-topics of the chapter. In other words, the chronology within sub-topics is self-contained and discrete.

THE ADVANCEMENT AND DISRUPTION OF THE SECULAR SCHOOLS

The period between the 1920s and the Japanese Occupation in 1942 was the golden age of native access to modern education with a European-standard quality in the twentieth century. Under its influence, Indies students became more cosmopolitan. Their mastery of European languages provided them with passports to enter the Western *Respublica litteraria* [Republic of letters], the main source of modern scientific knowledge and civilization.

The introduction of new European-style public schools for the native East Indies in the 1910s, namely HIS (primary school), MULO (lower secondary school) and AMS (upper secondary school), resulted in increasing numbers of the native intelligentsia (of the lesser born) learning European languages and gaining better educational qualifications. This advancement of East Indies education culminated in the establishment of tertiary institutions (colleges) from the 1920s onwards. Thereafter, the role of STOVIA as the main producer of leading intellectuals of the intelligentsia was taken over by the universities.

These developments were, however, interrupted by the Japanese occupation. The Japanese introduced a distinct education regime which gave more emphasis to military and paramilitary training. This provided a catalyst

for the inculcation of militaristic mentalities and the future formation of a military intelligentsia.

Educational Improvement at the Primary and Secondary Levels

By the 1920s, the ethical and “association” policy in education had begun to produce a clear impact on the native educational profile. In 1920, from around 48,428,711 of the total East Indies population at the time, the total native enrolment in public and private schools of all types was around 829,802 pupils,⁷ an increase of 519,306 from the figures of the 1910. This figure did not include students in the so-called “*wilde scholen*” [wild schools], which began to spring up in the 1920s.⁸ These were schools which were not recognized by any official agency, established usually by idealist members of the intelligentsia who did not wish to work for the colonial government, in response to the demand for Westernized education (Van Niel 1970, pp. 219–20).

TABLE 3.1
Native Enrolments in the Vernacular and
European School Systems, 1910–20

Year	Vernacular Schools	European School System		Vocational Schools	TOTAL
		Primary Schools	Secondary Schools		
1910	303,868	5,108	50	1,470	310,496
1920	781,284	43,411	1,190	3,917	829,802

Source: Modified from Paul W. van der Veur (1969, pp. 7–12).

Compared to the numbers in 1910, there had been a huge increase in the native enrolment in the European school system at all levels. Indies Children in this school system came mostly from fathers who were employed by the government. Only a small portion of these pupils whose fathers were employed by European private companies or came from indigenous economic sphere.⁹

Most of Indies students who sought a Western education continued to be motivated by the desire to gaining positions in the government bureaucracy and the Western sector of the economy. A government survey in 1928–29 of

urban areas showed that over 83 per cent of Western-educated natives worked for wages (only 2.1 per cent of their employers being native East Indians), less than 2 per cent of them were self-employed, while the remainder was unemployed (Kahin 1952, pp. 29–30). On the other hand, the absorptive capacity of the government service and the Western sector of the economy for those with only lower levels of education had been saturated. Affected by the post-war economic situation, both the government and private economic sectors were urged to put a rationalization policy into effect. Consequently, a primary school certificate that would have sufficed for entry into the lower ranks of the civil service in the previous decades would no longer be the case in this decade (Van Niel 1970, pp. 218–19). By the late 1920s, graduates of the primary and even those of the secondary schools had outnumbered the available positions, leading to the development of a sort of “*intelligentsia proletariat*” (Van der Veur 1969, pp. 7–11).

The Promotion of University Education

While the enrolment in primary and secondary schools steadily increased and the absorptive capacity of the job market for the output of these levels had been saturated, the colonial government response in terms of providing university education as a part of the solution was exceedingly slow. It is true that some higher education in the East Indies had been provided by higher schools such as the STOVIA and NIAS. Nevertheless, under the strict Dutch criteria of what constituted university education, these schools were classified as vocational schools (Van der Veur 1969, p. 5).

The earliest demand for higher education came from a small group of *blijvers* (permanent Dutch settlers). To persuade the colonial government to establish a university, in 1901 the group started the *Indische Universiteitsvereniging* [University Association of the Indies]. This effort, however, did not achieve a significant response from the government. The reason given at the time was that the number of secondary school graduates was still too small to justify a university. By the 1910s, however, when there were sufficient numbers, there was still no firm government intention to establish the university. When a university finally did begin to appear, its *raison d'être* was not in response to public demands for higher education, but rather because the colonial government was unable to attract enough recruits from the mother country, especially personnel needed in the technical, medical and administrative fields of the post-war East Indies bureaucracy (Junge 1973, p. 3).

The breakthrough once again reflected the effect of capitalist interests. In 1920, a foundation of Dutch private enterprises took the initiative to

establish the *Technische Hoogeschool* [THS, College of Engineering] in Bandung. The original purpose of the THS was to produce civil engineers for irrigation and road-construction projects as well as young technicians for the plantations, since the supply of trained engineers from Europe had dwindled during and after World War I. In 1924, the government took over the college from the foundation to operate it as a government institution.

The urgent need for lawyers in the East Indies civil service following the shortage of attorneys in the immediate post-war years and the difficulty of attracting lawyers from Europe, even with substantial bonuses, forced the government to establish the *Rechtschool* [RHS, College of Law] in Batavia in 1924. For similar reasons, the increasing demand (especially of the European plantation community) for better medical personnel, which could not be expected to be provided from The Netherlands, prompted the government to upgrade existing medical training. Thus, in 1927 the *Geneeskundige Hoogeschool* [GHS, Medical College] was started in the Batavia. After the opening of the GHS, the STOVIA was gradually absorbed into the college, while the NIAS in Surabaya maintained its original status.

It was a characteristic of these early universities that they did not arise as large establishments, but grew out of a faculty, around which other faculties clustered (Junge 1973, p. 3). Furthermore, considerable evidence suggests that in the beginning these colleges were intended chiefly for the Europeans (including Eurasians) themselves, with a certain share reserved for the Chinese and a few *priyayi*-born Indonesians who had adopted Dutch ways (Thomas 1973, pp. 19–26).

As the introduction of tertiary education was exceedingly slow and did not provide full professional status, many of best young East Indies graduates decided to continue their studies in the Netherlands. This was especially true in the years immediately after World War I. The Netherlands government adviser for students estimated the number of East Indies university students in the Netherlands at the end of 1924 to have been 673 (Ingleson 1979, pp. 1–3).¹⁰ Compared to their predecessors, most of these post-war students derived from lower status groups (Van Niel 1970, pp. 223–24). Many of these students were able to study in the Netherlands because of scholarships provided by the Netherlands government or local communities.¹¹

It is also worth noting that in parallel with the introduction of university education there were a growing number of Dutch-run research institutes in the NEI, many of which had high international reputations.¹² Apart from the government-sponsored institutes, some of these research institutes were funded by the private capitalist community.¹³ Unfortunately, the native

engagement in those various research institutes remained insignificant. Scientific research for most educated Indonesians remained a luxury, and the intellectual core of the leading intelligentsia of the time was generally limited to university study.

A further increase in native enrolments in higher education in the NEI was made possible by the opening of new colleges in the five years before the Japanese occupation. A college for training Indonesian officials for local administration, the *Bestuursacademie* [Administrative Academy], was established by the colonial government in 1938. Next, the College of Letters and Philosophy was opened in Batavia on 1 October 1940¹⁴ followed by the establishment in 1941 of the College of Agriculture in Bogor. Shortly afterwards, as a consequence of the Nazi invasion of the Netherlands in early May 1940, some educational institutions, notably military ones, were relocated to the NEI. Thus in 1940, the Dutch established the Military Cadet School in Bandung on the model of the Royal Military Academy in Breda (Netherlands) followed by the installation of the Marine Academy in Surabaya (Thomas 1973, p. 35; Redaksi SMT 1998, pp. 29–30). In February 1942, the Dutch government issued a decree to unite all the colleges scattered in various cities, excluding the military ones, into a single *Universiteit* [university]. This decree remained only on paper as the Japanese invasion interrupted its implementation (Junge 1973, p. 4).

Thus, despite economic recession and political repression, the sustained demand of the government and private bureaucracy for skilled labour allowed the educational sector to enjoy unprecedented advancement. Just before the installation of the Japanese interregnum, the educational statistics for 1940 showed that the total native enrolment in the public and private school of all types and levels in the NEI was around 2,325,174 (including students of universities, excluding students of wild schools).¹⁵ This number was about 3.3 per cent of the total East Indies population of the time.¹⁶ At the same time, the total enrolment in four higher institutions (the THS, RHS, GHS, and *Bestuursacademie*) was 1,246. Almost half of the enrolments, however, were of Europeans (including Eurasians) and Chinese students, while the total native enrolments were only 673 (Van Der Veur 1969, pp. 5–15; Thomas 1973, pp. 11–12).¹⁷

During this period there had also been some hundreds of native graduates from both domestic and overseas universities. Up until 1940, from domestic higher education system, the total number of native graduates (excluding graduates from what were recognized as the vocational schools such as the STOVIA and NIAS) was only about fifty-five. Although the total number of native graduates during the period remained lower than the combined

number of European and Chinese graduates, the tendency for natives to dominate the domestic university scene started in 1940. In that year the number of graduates for each population group was respectively 39 for the Native, 23 for the Chinese, and 19 for the European. Meanwhile, during the period 1924–40 the total number of native graduates from universities in the Netherlands was estimated at 344. However the Indies Chinese graduates from that country were estimated at 360, which indicates the larger proportion of Chinese graduates compared to native ones (Van Der Veur 1969, pp. 5–15; Kahin 1952, pp. 31–32).

It is clear that the native intelligentsia with higher learning at this juncture was very small. Their small numbers guaranteed that they would have high status and would be called on to play decisive roles in the leadership of the national political movement. To signal the genesis of the higher educated Indies people, the term *intellectueel(en)* (intellectual/s) began to become popular as a new code of the intelligentsia.

Educational Impact on the Second Generation of the Intelligentsia

Those who entered university in the 1920s and 1930s along with other intelligentsia who were born mostly during the first fifteen years of the twentieth century constituted the second generation of the Indies intelligentsia. This generation was possibly the most erudite and productive generation of the entire twentieth century. It was comprised of people with a high standard of Western education, fluency in some European languages, an exposure to modern intellectual culture and discourse, a cosmopolitan mindset and extensive networks and an impressive production of intellectual works of high quality (at least by Indonesian standards).

As a direct product of the association policy, the intelligentsia of this generation was also the most intensely secularized intelligentsia. With the relaxation of the “birth rights” (heredity) requirement for entry to the European school system, however, intelligentsia of the Islamic lesser *priyayi* and Muslim petty bourgeoisie families in this generation began to increase.

Exposed to the reformist-modernist teachings, during their childhood or during their study in the secondary and tertiary education, many children of these Muslim families were able to maintain their religious spirit and identities. Thus, there emerged prominent Muslim personalities such as Raden Sjaamsuridjal (b. 1903), son of a *penghulu* [religious official dealing with Islamic affairs]; Mohammad Natsir (b. 1908), son of a pious *jurutulis controleur* [clerk of a Dutch district senior officer]; Kasman Singodimedjo (b. 1908), son of a *lebai* [village religious functionary]; Mohamad Roem (b. 1908) and Prawoto

Mangkusasmito (b. 1910), sons of pious village heads; Jusuf Wibisono (b. 1909), son of a *mantri ukur* [surveyor].¹⁸

Consequently, the numbers of Muslim intelligentsia of the second generation are much greater than for the first generation. The landmark of the significant presence of Muslim intelligentsia in the second generation was the emergence of the association of (the secondary school) Muslim students, *Jong Islamieten Bond* (JIB) in 1925, and the Islamic study club of Muslim university students, *Studenten Islam Studieclub* (SIS) in 1934.

Secular Education under the Japanese Occupation

The Japanese Occupation, with its focus on military efforts, provided a new political opportunity structure for the development of the intelligentsia. While disrupting the advancement of Western education, it promoted a new kind of educational regime.

The Japanese military government closed down all schools, though some of them were gradually re-opened in line with the interests of the new regime.¹⁹ While the Japanese appeared to be half-heartedly paying attention to the development of conventional schools, they energetically introduced a new kind of education which they considered was urgently needed for the Japanese war effort — military and paramilitary training.²⁰ It was the introduction of this military/paramilitary education which led to the emergence of a new generation of intelligentsia who generally lacked Western erudite knowledge but were highly imbued with the spirit of nationalism and independence.

THE ADVANCEMENT OF ISLAMIC SCHOOLS

Generally speaking, the emergence of *intellectueelen* with university educations widened the gap between the *ulama* and intelligentsia. As Sukiman Wirjosandjojo (b. 1896)²¹ in his memoirs admitted (1984, p. 27):

It was true in the past that *intellectueelen* did not like to study Islam, because the majority of Islamic teachers, *ulama* and *kjais* lacked general scientific knowledge. Hence, the *intellectueelen* were unable to mix with them. Conversely, Islamic teachers and the like were unable to mix with the *intellectueelen*, because their frame of reference was different from that of the latter.

Furthermore, because the Muslim intelligentsia tended to be closer to the reformist-modernist community, the relationship between the Muslim

intellectueelen (who were literate in religious knowledge) and traditionalist *ulama* also deteriorated.

The position of traditionalist *ulama* was under the threat from above and below. From above there was the growing influence of the Muslim intelligentsia as leaders of Muslim politics; while from below there was the deepening cultural penetration of the reformist-modernist activities that began to reach the villages. These threats forced many traditionalist *ulama* to reconsider their position. Some of them responded with positive results. In order to survive, they copied the tactics and methods of their opponents. Thus, they now began to introduce *madrasah* to the *pesantren*, use local languages (mixed with Arabic) in the Friday sermons, teach general subjects, read newspapers using the Latin alphabet, adopt modern educational technology, and so on.

As a result of the introduction of *madrasah* and general subjects in the traditionalist epistemic community, there emerged a nucleus of traditionalist *ulama-intelek*, who would play important roles in the leadership of this community. Alongside this development, the reformist-modernist *schools* experienced a rapid development. In addition to the *madrasah* system, the reformist-modernist community began to establish the *sekolah* system.²² In the long term, the educational efforts of these Muslims would narrow the gap between *ulama* and *intellectueelen*.

Modernization of the Traditionalist Schools

The pioneer of the *madrasah* educational system in the milieu of the traditionalist community was Abdul Wahab Chasbullah (b. 1888). After his return from his study in Mecca (1909–14),²³ he initially collaborated with Mas Mansur (a former student of Al-Azhar who would join the *Muhammadiyah* in 1921) to establish in 1916 a society [*jam'iyah*] of the *Nahdlatul Wathan* [the Rise of the Fatherland] in Surabaya. The aim of the society was to upgrade the quality of education for the Islamic community by establishing the *Nahdlatul Wathan's* modern Islamic schools which had a nationalistic outlook.²⁴

However, the main exemplary centre for the modernization of the traditionalist epistemic community in Java was the *pesantren* Tebuireng at Jombang, East Java. Established in 1899 by Hasjim Asj'ari (1871–1947), a former student of Achmad Khatib, this *pesantren* was soon well known as a centre for the advanced study of Islam especially among the traditionalist community. For almost twenty years after its establishment, this *pesantren* had retained its traditional methods of teaching such as *sorogan* and *weton*. Then

in 1916, Kjai Ma`sum (the first son-in-law of Asj`ari who had studied in Mecca) introduced the *madrasah* system within the milieu of the *pesantren*, which later in 1919 came to be known as *madrasah Salafijah Syafi'ijah*. From its inception, this *madrasah* adopted the graded classes and classroom teaching. However, it was not until 1919 that general subjects were introduced because internal resistance towards everything that smacked of modernity remained strong (Dhofier 1982, p. 104).

A further effort to modernize this *madrasah* was carried out by Mohammad Iljas (b. 1911, a son of the elder sister of Asj`ari's wife). His educational background was unusual in traditional Muslim circles. He studied at the public HIS in Surabaya (1918–25) then after finishing this modern schooling he chose to deepen his religious knowledge at *Pesantren Tebuireng*. In 1929 he was appointed the *lurah* [the functionary in charge] of the *pesantren* and the headmaster of the *madrasah Salafijah Syafi'ijah*. Under his policy, the curriculum of the *madrasah* gave more emphasis to the teaching of *ilmu alat* [Arabic language] and more importantly began to introduce general subjects and to improve the students' general knowledge through the introduction of newspapers, periodicals, and books written in the Latin alphabet (Soekadri 1979, p. 56).

This policy of modernization was continued by a son of Asj`ari, Abdul Wachid Hasjim (1913–53). Beginning his studies in his father's *pesantren* and several others, he then invited private tutors to teach him Dutch and English as well as modern subjects and also to read newspapers and periodicals written both in Arabic and Latin scripts, before spending a year of study in Mecca (1932–33). On his return he established a modern *madrasah* within the milieu of his father's *pesantren* called *madrasah Nidhomiyah*. About seventy per cent of the curriculum of this *madrasah* was devoted to general subjects with a special emphasis on the teaching of foreign languages and literatures such as Dutch and English — as well as Arabic. In addition, he began to establish a library that subscribed to various newspapers and periodicals especially those written in the Latin alphabet. Courses on public speaking in Dutch and English as well as typewriting were introduced to students (Dhofier 1982, p. 106; Soekadri 1979, p. 57).

The modernization taking place in the *pesantren* Tebuireng was contagious and spread to other traditionalist *pesantrens*. By the 1920s, *Pesantren Denanyar* in Jombang and *Pesantren Singosari* in Malang established special *pesantren* for women offering general subjects (Dhofier 1982, pp. 41–42). Henceforward, there emerged two kinds of *pesantren*. First was the so-called "*Pesantren Salafi*" [traditional *pesantren*]. This kind of *pesantren* continues until the present day and maintains the teaching of classical Islamic textbooks

without introducing general subjects, though it also adopts teaching methods of *madrasah*. The second kind was the so-called “*Pesantren Khalafi*” [modern *pesantren*], in which religious and general subjects were taught side by side along with the adoption the graded classes and classroom teaching.

In West Sumatra, the challenge posed by modernist-reformist teachings also stimulated some traditionalist *ulama* to modernize their traditionalist *surau*. As early as 1918, Siradjuddin Abbas of Padang Lawas had begun to introduce modern teaching methods into his *surau*s, while retaining their traditional religious teachings. In 1928 he persuaded other leading traditionalists such as Sulaiman al-Rasuli of Candung and Muhammad Djamil Djaho of Padang Japang to organise networks of local traditionalist schools. As a result, traditionalist scholars founded in 1930 the *Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah* [*Perti*, Union of Islamic Education], a social organization to which the schools were linked (Kahin 1999, p. 84). *Perti* successfully influenced the modernization of the traditionalist *surau* in Jambi, Tapanuli, Bengkulu, Aceh, Kalimantan Barat, and South Sulawesi (Noer 1987, p. 72).

Through modernizing of traditionalist schools, the traditionalist community was able to meet the challenge of secular and reformist-modernist schools. The adoption of the *madrasah* system and the introduction of general subjects made religious studies in *pesantren* more attractive and probably contributed to the significant increase in their student numbers. In the 1920s the average number of students in a big *pesantren* in Java was about 200. In the early 1930s, however, many of *pesantren*, such as Tebuireng, had more than 1500 students. A survey by the *Shūmubu* (Japanese-sponsored Religious Affairs Office) in 1942 revealed that the total number of *pesantren* and *madrasah* in Java alone was 1871, with 139,415 students (Dhofier 1982, p. 40). This survey result indicates a decline in the number of Islamic schools in general compared to that of the Dutch report of the nineteenth century (see chapter 2). These figures, however, seem to reflect the declining popularity of the traditional *pesantren*, as the modernized ones continued to attract a large number of enrolments.

Expansion of the Reformist-Modernist Schools

While the traditionalist community began to adopt the *madrasah* system, the reformist-modernist schools experienced a rapid expansion, offering the native population a major alternative educational system to the (secular) government school system. The *Muhammadiyah* with its strategy of abstaining from direct engagement in political activities achieved the most impressive development. Already in 1925, it operated 55 schools, serving 4,000 students; two major

medical clinics; an orphanage; and a poor house (Federspiel 1970, p. 58). Its schools after 1923 were not only *madrasah*, but also schools in the *sekolah* system. This was especially true after the establishment of the *Muhammadiyah* HIS and the teacher-training schools in Yogyakarta and Jakarta in the mid-1920s (Alfian 1969, pp. 267–68). By 1932 *Muhammadiyah* already had some 207 *sekolahs* in Java and Madura alone, composed of 98 *volksscholen*, 28 *Standardscholen*, 23 *Schakelscholen*, 50 HIS, 4 MULO/*Normaal* HIK, and 4 *Kweekscholen* (Alfian 1989, p. 190). With such an impressive record of accomplishment, the *Muhammadiyah* soon became the most respected association in the reformist-modernist line.

The reformist-modernist effort to develop modern Islamic schools was strengthened by the emergence of other associations with similar aims. Among others, in 1923 a group of merchants in Bandung under the leadership of a Singapore-born Tamil reformist merchant-*ulama*, Ahmad Hassan (b. 1887), established the “*Persatuan Islam*” [*Persis*, Islamic Union]. As reflected by its acronym “*Persis*” (which means “precise” or “punctilious”), this organization was stricter than other reformist groups. It denounced anything that smacked of superstition and “*bid’ah*” [illegal religious innovation] and opposed the idea of secular nationalism on the grounds that it divided Muslims based on politico-territorial boundaries (Federspiel 1977).

Apart from establishing *madrasah*, the main concern of *Persis* was to disseminate its ideas by holding public meetings, conducting sermons and study groups, publishing pamphlets, periodicals, and books (Noer 1973, p. 85). It also promoted public debates and polemics mediated especially by its own publications.²⁵

In Aceh, some leading *ulama* under the leadership of Acehnese patriot, Mohammed Daud Beureu’eh (1899–1987), founded in 1939 the All-Aceh Union of *Ulama* (PUSA). The union was intended to defend Islam as well as to promote the modernization of Islamic schools in opposition to the Dutch-backed *uleēbalang* (aristocrat) administrators (Ricklefs 1993, p. 200). This made it closer ideologically to the reformist-modernist position, at the same time causing internal Islamic disputes between the proponents of modern and traditional Islamic schools [*meunasah*].

Apart from the expansion of modern Islamic schools, the emergence of public universities and the growing influence of the secular intelligentsia with university backgrounds provided the impetus for Muslim intelligentsia and *ulama-intelek* to establish their own Islamic university. *Muhammadiyah* took the lead in championing this idea in the mid-1930s. The idea was brought to the *Muhammadiyah* congress of 1936 and resulted in the recommendation to establish the so-called *Sekolah Tinggi Islam* [Advanced

Islamic School] with the faculty of commerce and industry being the first priority. Rather surprisingly, when this plan began to take on a more definite shape, the Dutch government, probably hoping to contain the rising influence of nationalist (secular) politicians, promised to subsidize the new venture (Benda 1958, p. 96).

In 1938, Sukiman Wirjosandjojo took the initiative of calling a meeting of *ulama* and members of the intelligentsia which resulted in a plan to establish Islamic tertiary education. His elder brother, Satiman (now a prominent figure of the *Muhammadiyah*) followed up this idea by presenting the plan to the existing federation of Islamic organizations, the Supreme Islamic Council of Indonesia (MIAI, est. 1937). This led to the establishment of the so-called *Pesantren Luhur* [Advanced Pesantren] in 1939 with its supporting secondary education, *Islamitische Middelbare School* (Harjono and Hakim 1997, pp. 4–5). Outside Java, the first Islamic college was opened in Padang (West Sumatra) on 9 December 1940 under the guidance of Mahmud Yunus and Muchtar Yahya (graduates of Cairo's al-Azhar). Intended to train *ulama* in a higher level of education, this college comprised two faculties, Theology, and Education and Arabic Studies (Junus 1960, p. 103). Unfortunately, all these early initiatives were interrupted by the Japanese Occupation.

Advanced Islamic Studies in the Middle East

In the absence of an Islamic university in the NEI, Cairo's Al-Azhar university continued to attract those Indies' "clerical-intelligentsia" who could afford higher learning. In the early 1920s, the popularity of Cairo as destination for advanced Islamic studies for Indies *santri* seemed to have overtaken that of the *haramain* (Mecca and Medina).

The reason was as follows. The domestic political afflictions of the NEI had motivated many *santris* to find new ways for expressing their political discontent (Abaza 1999). The ideals of movement for Pan-Islamism and 'Abduh-inspired reformist-modernist ideology in Egypt, centred on Al-Azhar, were attractive to some of the NEI *santri* and led them to Cairo. In addition, while Rector of al-Azhar, 'Abduh succeeded in modernizing Islamic education, by adding general subjects to the curricula of the university. Thus, in Mecca students could only study religion, but in Cairo they could also be exposed to general subjects and politics as well. By 1919 there were about 50 or 60 Indonesian students in Cairo (Roff 1970, p. 74). Most of them came from West Sumatra and Yogyakarta, two regions that had long been affected by reformist zeal.

After the capture of Mecca by `Abd al-`Aziz ibn Sa`ud and his *Wahhābiya* regime in 1924, which tended to be hostile to traditional Islamic teachings, many *santri* from traditionalist *pesantren* backgrounds returned en masse to the NEI but also began to migrate from the *haramain* to Cairo. The *Jāwah* community in the *haramain* was depleted but continued to recruit Indies students. But it was now less attractive than Cairo. All the aforementioned factors, together with the improvement of rubber prices and parental cash incomes towards the middle of the 1920s, led to a sizeable increase in the numbers of East Indies students in Cairo. By 1925, there were at least two hundred Southeast Asian students (mostly from the East Indies) in this city (Roff 1970, p. 74).

Islamic Education under the Japanese Occupation

During their period of occupation, the Japanese used both stick and carrot in their approach to Islamic education. At the outset, the Japanese military administration forbade the teaching of Arabic language in all religious schools and some were forced to close. By the end of 1942, however, the Japanese seemed to realize the impossibility of denying Muslims the right to teach the *Qur'an* in the holy language. Moreover, since all Islamic education on Java was non-governmental, it was very difficult to control. Arabic was then allowed to be used for religious instruction — on the condition that those schools should accept the government standard curriculum in non-religious subjects and the teaching of Japanese in addition to Arabic. This allowed more Islamic schools to re-open (Benda 1958, pp. 127–31).²⁶

The Japanese strategy of controlling Islamic education did not prevent them from wanting also to win the hearts of the Muslim community. Aware of Muslim leaders' long cherished dream of establishing an Islamic university, as early as the first months of the occupation, the *Shūmubu* promised to support the development of a university modelled on Cairo's famous al-Azhar. As part of realizing this promise, a "Centre of Islamic Literature and Culture" was opened in Jakarta in August 1942. Its first head was an Indonesian Muslim, Zain Djambek, but then a Japanese official, N. Noguchi, took over the directorship in April 1943. On 20 November 1944, a special preparatory committee for the establishment of the Islamic university was set up under the aegis of the Japanese-sponsored federation of Islamic organizations (*Masjumi*) with Mohammad Hatta as its chairman.²⁷ Finally, this Islamic University, one of the greatest hopes of the Muslim community over the previous decade, opened its doors on 8 July 1945. This was just a few weeks before the Japanese surrender, providing in Benda's words "the last gesture of

generosity of the last infidel overlords to their Muslim subjects on the island” (Benda 1958, p. 187).

The university was named *Sekolah Tinggi Islam* [STI, Advanced Islamic School]. Its objective was “to provide advanced teaching and education both in religious and general knowledge in order to become a centre of Islamic excellence that would have a significant influence on the development of Islam in Indonesia” (Harjono and Lukman 1997, p. 8). The university was open to graduates of the general secondary schools (AMS, HBS, HIK and SMT) as well as to those graduating from the *madrasah* of the secondary level [*madrasa ‘aliya*]. The leadership and lecturers of the STI comprised the best available *intelek-ulama* and *ulama-intelek* both of the first and second generation, with a conspicuous role given to former activists of JIB/SIS and graduates of al-Azhar.²⁸

With the establishment of the STI, Muslim students of the *madrasah* and *sekolah* system were provided with their own path to become intelligentsia of higher learning. It was this university that would become a breeding ground for leaders of the succeeding generation of the Muslim intelligentsia.

DISCURSIVE PRACTICES AND THE MAKING OF A HISTORICAL BLOC

As the vociferous discourse of *kemadjoean* gradually quietened, the themes of “nationalism” and “independence” replaced it as the dominant discourse in the public sphere. The main protagonists of these new themes were intellectuals of higher learning.

The emergence of native university students both in the colony and in The Netherlands heralded a transformation in the political leadership of Indies society. Imbued with the spirit of the “*pemoeda-peladjar*” associations and familiar with Western (European) intellectual discourses, progressive elements of this “higher” intelligentsia now presented themselves as though they were the *Dreyfusards* [defenders of Dreyfus]²⁹ in an East Indies context, when they started popularizing a new self-generated nickname “*intellectueel(en)*”.

The pioneer of *Jong Java*, Satiman Wirjosandjojo, once again showed his initiative by leading the establishment of the first East Indies union to use the term “*intellectueelen*”, namely the “*Bond van Intellectueelen*” [The Intellectual Union]. It was once again born out of disappointment with the performance of *Budi Utomo*. In his eyes, the hegemonic influence of its administrators and civil servant membership caused the BU to cling to old ways and traditions. The *Bond van Intellectueelen* aimed to offer an alternative space of expression for the expanding group of progressive

intelligentsia; those who were imbued with a sense of mission about “guiding the Indies people on the path of a new life” (Blumberger 1931, p. 34; Van Niel 1970, pp. 214–15). Subsequently, the term “*intellectueel (en)*” with its derivations and various spellings became commonly used in the discourse of the vernacular press.³⁰

In the public discourse of the period, the term *intellectueelen* was generally defined as the “engaged-intelligentsia”, both in the political and the cultural field, for the sake of the national good. In fact, the engaged-intelligentsia in the colonial situation was always a critical minority — for the greater bulk of educated people preferred to secure their careers as functional elites (bureaucrats). For this reason, there was a recurring tendency among the self-conscious intelligentsia to define “intellectual” in terms of its social function and responsibility rather than in terms of educational qualifications.³¹ Nevertheless, because those who engaged in the discourse of the intellectual were almost exclusively derived from the highly educated intelligentsia, and because intellectual leadership of the nation had been dominated by the people of higher learning, the term “intellectual” in the perception of the general public was commonly associated with educational criteria.

The popularity of the term *intellectueelen* in public discourse coincided with the rising tide of resistance ideologies of nationalism. The accelerator of this strengthening national consciousness was, among others, the socio-economic deprivation of the intelligentsia. This was largely due to the mismatch between the supply and demand sides of the educational sector, which resulted in the “proletarianization” of the intelligentsia. This situation provided the impetus for the proliferation of more progressive and radical political movements.

The rising tide of radical intelligentsia and political movements increased tension in the public sphere, involving clashes between intellectual-led civil societies versus the (colonial) state as well as clashes of ideologies within the multifarious civil societies. When they realized they were enduring common difficulties because of the economic malaise and political repression, intelligentsia with diverse ideological inclinations and social networks began to unite in a single historical calling: the struggle for political independence.

The will to independence necessitated the construction of a new imagined community. This in turn required the invention of a new code as a guide for the orientation of the national struggle and for the convergence of multiple-subject positions into what Gramsci called a “historical bloc”.

This notion of “historical bloc” originated from Gramsci’s understanding that the political moment in the making of collective will can be broken

down into three stages. The first and most primitive moment called “the economic-corporative” stage, is a moment when members of the same category express a certain solidarity toward each other but not with other categories of the same class. A second moment is that in which solidarity of interests is shared by all members (categories) of a social class — but still purely in the economic field. The third moment, which Gramsci calls “the most purely political phase”, marks the transcendence of the “corporate limits of the purely economic class”, and the inauguration of a broader coalition that reaches out to “the interests of other subordinated groups too”. This moment also marks “the decisive passage from the structure to the sphere of the complex superstructure” (Radhakrishnan 1990, p. 92; Adamson 1980, pp. 160–61). Gramsci used the term “historical bloc” to describe the union of structure and superstructure in which an ensemble of ideas and values is shared by a number of social sectors.

In Laclau and Mouffe’s view (1985), Gramsci’s notion of a historical bloc transcends the Leninist notion of political leadership within class alliance. In their view, Gramsci believed: “Political subjects are not...strictly speaking classes, but complex ‘collective wills’ and where the ‘collective will’ is a result of the politico-ideological articulation of dispersed and fragmented historical forces” (1985, p. 67). The organic ensemble of ideas, beliefs, values and practices, ideology, they add, provides the means by which the new historical bloc can be cemented, its intellectual-moral leadership articulated in the field of political contestation and its hegemony exerted over the rest of society. This accordingly removed the problem of attaining unity among diverse subordinate groups from the field of class structure and supplanted the principle of representation with the principle of articulation (1985, pp. 67–77).

By adding their concept of “subject positions” to Gramsci’s theory, Laclau and Mouffe move further by taking the idea of the historical bloc beyond the class concept. The concept of subject position assumes the existence of other points of antagonism and social contestation, as well as recognizing the multiformity and non-unitary character of the subject. Here, the subject is recognized as a multifaceted, detotalized, and de-centred agent, constituted at the point of intersection of a multiplicity of subject positions, between which there exists no *a priori* or necessary relation and whose articulation is the result of hegemonic practices. Thus, the bloc in this context looks for multiple positionings, multiple determinations and multiple alliances rather than for single unifying principle or essence, for example, “class” in the context of orthodox Marxism.³² Thus, we can argue that in the NEI between the 1920s and 1940s, intellectuals of diverse ideological inclinations and spatial

positions shared a common ground in order to create a “historical bloc” in their own right.

From *Perhimpunan Indonesia* to the Construction of a Historical Bloc

Early efforts in this historical self-invention were carried out by a nucleus of Indies students in The Netherlands. In the later part of the 1910s, the existing East Indies cultural association, *Indische Vereeniging* [IV, Indies Association, est. 1908],³³ began to pay attention to political matters. The arrival of the triumvirate of IP leaders, Douwes Dekker, Suwardi Surjaningrat and Tjipto Mangunkusumo, as political prisoners in 1913, had provided political inspiration for some of the IV activists. Already in 1916, this association published a journal, *Hindia Poetra* [*Indies Sons*], as a medium for debating the political issues of the NEI.

The nationalistic fervour of Indies students in The Netherlands also flared following the arrival of new students from lower social backgrounds (in comparison to their predecessors) who were more aware politically because of their exposure to the early awakening movements in the homeland. The forerunner of these new politically aware students was a young revolutionary, Tan Malaka, who would become a legendary communist-nationalist figure.

Born in 1896–97, Tan Malaka was actually a man from a transitional generation between the first and second generation of the East Indies intelligentsia but closer in terms of age and political experience to the second one. A graduate of the *Kweekschool* in Bukittinggi, this son of a local Minangkabau *adat* chief arrived in Holland in 1913 to upgrade teaching qualifications in a Dutch teacher’s college, *Rijkskweekschool*, in Haarlem. During his six miserable years of study (often ill and lonely) in Holland (1913–19), he was impressed by the self-reliance of a working class family with whom he lodged and particularly attracted by the success of the Russian Revolution of the 1918 which stimulated him to begin his deep study of Marxist literature. Because of his anti-feudalistic beliefs (Alfian 1978, p. 149), he was reluctant to get involved in the IV activities, probably because this organization was still dominated by sons of the royal/regent families. Just before he left Holland in late 1919, however, he was appointed to represent the IV at congress of East Indies youth and students of *Indology* at Deventer to report on the nationalist movement in the homeland (Malaka 1991, pp. 19–32; Anderson 1972, pp. 270–72).³⁴

The presence of Tan Malaka heralded the emergence of the new generation of Indies students in the Netherlands, in the immediate post-war

years,³⁵ who were more or less influenced by Marxism. Most of these students had been well-known as leaders of social movements and student youth organizations in the homeland and were largely from lower social status groups (Van Niel 1970, pp. 223–24).³⁶ Excellent examples of students from this milieu were the two Mangunkusumos, Gunawan and Darmawan (younger brothers of Tjipto, sons of a Javanese school teacher) as well as Mohammad Hatta and Sukiman Wirjosandjojo (sons of merchant families).

The highly educated people from this social milieu generally felt more insecure in their battle for upward mobility within the discriminative environment of colonial society. This feeling of insecurity engendered a kind of crisis of identity. For some, uprooted from their village or small town and plunged into the metropolitan super-culture of Batavia or Bandung and then into the vortex of the cosmopolitan super-culture of Europe, there were problems of “self-perception” (Ingleson 1979, pp. 2–3). Attempts to cope with the combination of political repression and identity crisis became possible in the free European bourgeoisie public sphere of the Netherlands. In this public sphere they could interact with European political activists and became familiar with contemporary humanist thought. Moreover, these activists from diverse ethno-religious backgrounds for the first time were able to interact intensely with each other resulting in a mutual understanding of common interests and leading to the search for a new collective identity.

Aware of the discrepancies between the superiority of the colonial state and the inferiority of the colonized people and recognizing the powerlessness of the national movements in the NEI due to lack of cohesiveness, these students tried to find a new icon for the construction of the national bloc. In this spirit, they felt strongly that the term (East) “Indies” was inappropriate. It was not only an ambiguous term — because it might be confused with the well-known British — “India” — but also a colonial construction. For this reason, they began to promote a fresh term, “Indonesia”.

The word was actually a neologism which was already used in ethnology and anthropological studies. Based on the term “*indu-nesians*”, which was coined by a British scholar, George Windsor Earl, in Singapore in 1850 and popularized by his compatriot, James Richardson Logan, the word had initially been used to identify a particular geo-culture characterized geographically by the archipelago (*nusa* in Malay or *nesos* in Greece) and culturally by the term “*Indic*” (Jones 1973, pp. 93–118).³⁷ In the hands of the Indies students in the Netherlands and the progressive intelligentsia in the homeland, however, the term was reformulated specifically to refer to the particular politico-spatial context of the NEI and to provide a new political orientation for the nationalist movements. In Hatta’s words (1928; 1998, p. 15): “For us,

Indonesia expresses a political objective, as it signifies hopes for a fatherland in the future, and to make it come true every Indonesian will struggle with all their effort and ability.”

The reinvention of the term highlighted a departure from its original sense, which reflected the struggle for self-construction.³⁸ For the students it represented the basis for the making of a collective identity and the beginning of creating one nation. In this respect, the genesis of an Indonesian nation was somewhat different from the experience of most Western European and Central/Eastern European societies. In Western Europe, the development of national consciousness ran largely parallel to the constitution of the nation-state, while in Central/Eastern Europe the constitution of the nation-state was generally a reaction to an already existing ethno-cultural national consciousness (Giesen 1998, pp. 2–3). In the Indonesian context, however, the state (colonial state) came earlier, and the national consciousness as well as the constitution of the one-nationness was a reaction to the existing alien (colonial) state. Thus, from the very beginning the constitution of Indonesia was not a constitution of the nation-state, but rather the state-nation. In this embodiment, the state-bred intelligentsia turned to nationalism in their struggle for independence from the repressive (colonial) state. As such, the state in the Indonesian context was likely to be the main rationale for both the construction and destruction of nationhood.

To highlight this shift in consciousness, the *Indische Vereeniging* [Indies Association] changed its name to *Indonesische Vereeniging* [Indonesian Association] in 1922.³⁹ The development of a new national consciousness and the need to create a boundary between the colonizer and the colonized world necessitated a change in the symbolic universe. This was reflected in this statement by Sunarjo’s (a Leiden law student): “I am disgusted with what the Dutch have done and I intend as soon as I return to the Fatherland to find a teacher who will try to remodel my very neglected Malay and Javanese, for they are in a very regrettable condition” (Ingleson 1979, pp. 8–9).

The Indies students believed that to use Dutch words for the name of the association was now out of tune with the new Indonesian identity. To express the spirit of nationalism, in 1924 the *Indonesische Vereeniging* (IV) was again renamed, using Indonesian (Malay) words, *Perhimpunan Indonesia* [PI, Indonesian Association], and its journal, *Hindia Poetra*, became *Indonesia Merdeka* [Free Indonesia].

The IV’s membership represented only a tiny minority of Indies students in The Netherlands. To give an example, in 1926 at the peak of its political activities, the PI’s total membership was only 38 out of more than 673 Indonesian students at the time (Ingleson 1979, p. 2). In addition, the

political outlook of its members was by no means homogenous. For students such as R.M. Noto Suroto (son of Notodirodjo from the royal family of Pakualam), maintaining the *status quo* of the East Indies under the Dutch colonial empire was the preferred option. For Maharadja Sutan Kasajangan Soripada (son of the Tapanuli Regent), the union of the East Indies with The Netherlands was preferred (Simbolon 1995, pp. 319–21). But for the true believers in an Independent Indonesia, a radical departure from the colonial ties was the only way ahead. It was the true believers in Indonesian independence who finally played dominant roles in transforming the PI into a sort of seedbed for conceptualizing “Indonesia” as, to use Anderson’s words, a new “imagined-community”.

The dominant personality among these protagonists of an Independent Indonesia was Mohammad Hatta (1902–80).⁴⁰ Imbued with the idea of independence and a national bloc, he and his comrades carefully watched the nationalist movements in the homeland and were dismayed by their fragility. Not only had they failed to create a strong mass based organization to challenge the Dutch but they were also trapped in a spiral of rivalries among themselves.

The disputes between the Islamic and communist intelligentsia both inside and outside the SI were unbridgeable (see below), and neither of two streams impressed most of the PI members either ideologically or strategically. For the more advanced students with considerable exposure to a secular education system, the SI tendency to stress increasingly its Islamic base was obviously dissonant with their habitus and life-world. On the other hand, despite the fact that most of them were ideologically socialists — attracted to a Marxist interpretation of colonialism as the child of capitalism — the Indonesian communists’ ideals and methods of class struggle and the use of violence were not shared by most PI members. For the students who mostly came from the historic ruling class and wealthy families, and for those with higher education who aspired to new elitist roles and status, the struggle for the new Indonesian imagined-community in class terms was *ipso facto* discordant with their ideals. Moreover, these PI intellectuals believed that the PKI tendency to use violence and popular uprisings prematurely would only result in a futile loss of Indonesian lives (Ingleson 1979, pp. 10–13).

Having rejected the ideology of Islam and communism as well as ethno-nationalism as the basis for an independent Indonesia, the PI came up with a new ideological conception that emphasized the primacy of the political goal of independence. This conception did not mean that the PI approach down-graded socio-economic questions. The majority of PI members also realized the multicultural nature of Indonesia and envisaged the future

adoption of a federal state system in order to rescue the national *heteroglossia* from the iron cage of the centralized colonial state.⁴¹ For them, however, independence had to come first, and only a united Indonesia which put aside particularistic differences could break the power of the colonizers.

According to the PI's conception, the political goal of independence should be based on four principles: national unity, solidarity, non-cooperation, and self-help. National unity meant the necessity of setting aside particularistic and regional differences to form a united battlefield against the Dutch. Solidarity meant eliminating differences between Indonesians while essentializing conflicts of interests between the colonizers and the colonized people — this conflict could be symbolized in racial terms (the brown *versus* the white). Non-cooperation meant the necessity of seizing independence through Indonesia's own effort — as the Dutch would never grant it voluntarily. This necessitated ignoring offers of cooperation with the Dutch, for example, through participation in the Peoples' Council (*Volksraad*). Self-help meant the necessity of developing an alternative national, political, social, economic and legal structure, deeply rooted in indigenous society, parallel to that of the colonial administration (Ingleson 1979, p. 5).

The PI's enunciation of the ideological principles which were the basis of the independent Indonesia was the beginning of a "historical bloc". The PI's conception of "national bloc" as a historical bloc tended to emphasize the ensemble of multiple "subject positions" which might include both class alliances and cultural (solidarity) alliances. In this conception, the project of an independent Indonesia needed to transform the commonality of Indies people from economic to moral-intellectual alliances, since the concept of class alliances was considered inappropriate to the situation in Indonesia where class formation had never been the main basis of social incorporation.

The will to construct a national bloc could not in fact be built from scratch, but rather necessitated the incorporation of the previous ideologies of major political movements (parties). Thus, in spite of their disagreement with the aims of previous/existing political movements (parties), the PI ideological principle was by and large a further synthesis derived from its predecessors. National unity was the major theme of the *Indische Partij*, non-cooperation was that of the communist political platform, and self-help was that of the *Sarekat Islam*. Solidarity was the only thread which linked these major themes.

To implement the PI's ideals in Indonesian society, its members recognized the importance of building a new united nationalist party as a national body, which the radical nationalists of all political persuasions could join. The intellectual leadership of this national bloc was expected to be in

the hands of the new generation of politically-conscious Western-educated intelligentsia. Because of their superior training, awareness of the nature of colonial oppression, and ability to free themselves from “colonial hypnosis”, the young intelligentsia were expected to take the initiative in awakening popular power and providing a theoretical basis for collective actions (Legge 1988, pp. 23–24).

As a national body of this kind did not yet exist, the task of the PI members was to socialize the PI's ideas among Indonesian youth organizations and political organizations as well as to promote student circles similar to the PI to provide cadres for the leadership of new nationalist movements. To create a network between the nationalist's brains-trust in the Netherlands and the political activists in the fatherland, former PI members who had returned to the homeland were expected to play a role as catalysts in parallel with the distribution of the PI's publications as mediums for exchanging ideas.

What enabled the PI's ideals to find fertile ground was the emergence of a fresh generation of university students both in other overseas countries and in the homeland. Following the PI appearance, Indies student associations in some other countries outside the Netherlands, such as in Egypt, India, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Japan, and even in the United States began to rename their associations incorporating the term “Indonesia” (*Biro Pemoeda* 1965, p. 46). Similar decisions were taken in the homeland.

From *Djama'ah al-Chairiah* to the Construction of a Historical Bloc

The experiences of Indonesian students in Egypt deserves attention in order to understand the incorporation of Muslim intellectuals into the Indonesian historical bloc. In 1922, Indo-Malayan students in Cairo began to establish the Welfare Association of the Indo-Malayan students [*Djama'ah al-Chairiah al-Talabiyyah al-Azhariah al-Djawah*, popularly called *Djama'ah al-Chairiah*]. The leading figures of this association, among others, were Djanan Thaib, Muchtar Lutfi, Iljas Ja'kub and Mahmud Junus (of West Sumatra), Raden Fathurrahman Kafrawi (of East Java), Abdul Kahar Muzakkir (of Yogyakarta) and Othman Abdullah (of Malaya). Started as an agency to further the social welfare of university students, by 1925 this association had distinguished itself by adopting increasingly radical views, critical of both Dutch and British colonialism. These radical views were affected by both the political developments in Indonesia and the increasing nationalist fervour in the Middle East. Early in the 1920s Egypt itself was pounded by a wave of anti-

colonial sentiment and constitutional change that gave rise to continual political ferment (Roff 1970a, p. 74). The growth of radical views among the Indo-Malayan students found their medium for articulation in the emergence of the association's most influential monthly journal, *Seroean Azhar* [*Call of Azhar*]. Produced from October 1925 until May 1928, the first director of this journal was Fathurrahman Kafrawi who would become a prominent Muslim leader with NU affiliations.

The views of the *Seroean Azhar* were perceived as threatening the colonial establishment, so that the colonial government soon banned its circulation in the NEI. Even so, it continued to be widely read in Malaya. The major themes of this journal centred around three main concepts: Pan-Islamism, Pan-Malayanism (union between Indonesian and Malaya), and anti-colonialism (Roff 1967, pp. 88–89). In an introductory editorial, Mahmud Junus as one of its editors wrote: "All our people...whether in Java, or in Sumatra, or in Borneo, or the Malay Peninsula, must unite and share a common purpose and agreement to strive for advancement, seek the best ways of doing this, and on no account allow ourselves to split into separate parties" (Roff 1970a, p. 77). Meanwhile, Fathurrahman Kafrawi, as president of the association and director of the journal in 1925–26, wrote in *Seroean Azhar*, II, 13 (October 1926): "The first steps of the indigenous movement of Indonesia and the Peninsula have been taken....Young Indonesians and Malays have given thought to action both within and without by mingling with other peoples. In short we can say that we have joined hands with the rest of Islamic world..." (Roff 1970a, p. 79).

Activists of this association also maintained contact with intellectual movements elsewhere, including with the Netherlands-based *Perhimpunan Indonesia*. Under the influence of these discourses and networks the association began to be obsessed with the idea of creating an historical bloc. Initially, it even imagined the unity of Indonesia and Malaya. To express this, it changed its name in 1927 to *Perkumpulan Pemuda Indonesia Malaja* [*Perpindom*, Association of Indonesian-Malay Youth].

The *Perpindom*, however, did not last long. Indonesian students became more engaged in domestic political issues in the Indies. This was especially so following the failure of the Caliphate conferences in Cairo and Mecca and following the communist uprising on the West Coast of Sumatra (January 1927), in which so many Muslim students of the Sumatra Thawalib were involved. A controversy arose concerning the extent to which the journal should engage directly with radical nationalist movements. This controversy provided the impetus for a split within the association notably between the Indonesian and Malay students.

In September 1927 Iljas Ja'kub ceased to be editor of *Seroean Azhar*, and in the following month he established *Pilihan Timoer* [Choice of the East]. Both journals, however, only survived until 1928. Following this event, the Malayan students left the association, while the Indonesian students came out with a new association, *Persatuan Kemerdekaan Indonesia* [The Union for Indonesian Independence] (Thomas 1973, pp. 32–34; Abaza 1999, p. 49). This choice of name made the Indies (Muslim) students an integral part of the creation of the historical bloc.

From Domestic Student Movements to the Construction of a Historical Bloc

Following the establishment of three colleges in the 1920s (THS, RHS and GHS), some clubs for university students began to appear in the Indies. Most of the student clubs in the early 1920s were oriented towards recreational activities dominated by Dutch students. A good example of this was the *Corpus Studiosorum Bandungense* [CBS, the Bandung Student Body] that had appeared in 1920. Outside the mainstream recreational clubs, however, there emerged some study clubs among a nucleus of politically conscious students especially in Bandung and Jakarta that had the potential to become counterparts of overseas student associations in the creation of a historical bloc. A prominent personality among these politically conscious students was Sukarno who entered the THS in 1921.⁴²

Former activists of the IV/PI played important roles in the early formation of study clubs in Indonesia. The first study club in this context was the *Indonesische Studieclub* [ISC, Indonesian Study Club] with its magazine *Soeloeh (Ra'jat) Indonesia* [Torch of the Indonesian People]. Established in Surabaya in July 1924, the founder and driving force of this study club was the well-known Sutomo, who had returned from The Netherlands in 1923. Aimed to promote the consciousness of Indonesia as a nation and a sense of socio-political responsibility among Western-educated Javanese, this club emphasized the practical value of the knowledge in seeking solutions for the nation's problems.⁴³

The formation of the study club in Surabaya was contagious. The movement spread to other cities such as Surakarta, Yogyakarta, Batavia, Semarang and Bogor. The best known of the clubs, however, was the *Algemene Studieclub* [ASC, General Study Club], that came into existence in Bandung in November 1926. An early figure in this Club seemed to be Iskaq Tjokroadisurjo, a former PI activist who had returned home in 1925. The

most active promoters of the club, however, were the Bandung tertiary students, notably two engineering and architecture students from the THS, Sukarno and Anwari. Besides the involvement of former PI members and radical students in Bandung, this club had also been supported by the presence of the grand old nationalist mentor, Tjipto Mangunkusumo. In its formative stages Iskaq became the inaugural chairman of the club. Later, however, Sukarno became the dominant personality of the club.

Like overseas student activists who had been obsessed with the idea of the national bloc, Sukarno and his fellow domestic activists also shared the same ideal. In 1926 he wrote an essay in the journal of the ASC, *Indonesia Moeda* [Young Indonesia], entitled “*Nasionalisme, Islamisme dan Marxisme*” [Nationalism, Islamism and Marxism], idealizing the synthesis of those major ideologies for the sake of building the national bloc. This reflected the thinking of many members of the ASC.

A further step in the promotion of the national bloc was the creation of *Perhimpunan Peladjar-Peladjar Indonesia* [Association of the Indonesian Students, PPPI] in 1926. Drawing on the circle of politically conscious tertiary students of Jakarta, mainly activists of the RHS, which had appeared in 1924, the PPPI membership was extended to recruit a large number of tertiary students in Jakarta and Bandung. The significance of this association was its role in bringing together various (lower level) student youth associations in which the PPPI members were regarded as respected senior comrades (Pringgogidgo 1964, p. 99). At the same time, the attempt to create a national bloc was taken by the ISC when it sent its secretary, R.P. Singgih (a former PI activist), to promote the establishment and unity of study clubs on his extensive tour of Java around the mid 1920s. This campaign was echoed in Bandung when various study clubs and student youth organizations, as well as social and political organizations (the BU, SI, *Muhammadiyah*, *Pasundan*), formed the *Komite Persatuan Indonesia* [Indonesian Unity Committee] in 1926.⁴⁴

To counter the growing influence of the politically oriented study clubs and student associations, Dutch conservative professors (especially in Batavia) reacted by sponsoring the establishment of purely academic and recreational student associations. Examples of the latter type were the *Unitas Studiosorum Indonesia* [Association of the Indonesian Students, USI, est. 1932], the *Indonesische Vrouwelijke Studenten Vereeniging* [Association of Indonesian Women Students, est. 1933], and even the more conservative Dutch-dominated *Studenten Corps* [Union of Students], which also emerged in the decade (Pringgogidgo 1964, p. 168; Mrázek 1994, p. 226).

Although these Dutch-sponsored student associations successfully recruited a large membership, this did not deter progressive students from their struggle for historical-self invention. The emergence of the Indonesian Unity Committee inspired activists of various student-youth associations to hold the First All-Indonesian Youth Congress (30 April–2 May 1926) in Jakarta. Despite the shortcomings of the congress — its committee represented individual voices rather than official representatives of the student-youth associations and also the Dutch language continued to be used in its meetings (Purbopranoto 1987, p. 314) — it paved the way for the strengthening of alliances among student-youth associations and for further acceptance of the concept of a national bloc. In a similar spirit, students in Bandung under the patronage of the ASC, who felt no longer at home within the constraints of ethno-religious groupings, established in early 1927 a student youth organization named *Jong Indonesie* [Young Indonesia]. The organization had its branches in several big cities and published a journal *Jong Indonesie*. By the end of the year, the name of the organization and its journal were renamed *Pemoeda Indonesia* [Indonesian Youth] together with the creation of its sister organization, *Putri Indonesia* (for women), to reflect the growing enthusiasm for spreading Indonesian.

A giant step in the creation of a historical bloc was the establishment of two political associations. The first was *Perserikatan Nasional Indonesia* [PNI, Indonesian Nationalist Association] in July 1927 with its aim to achieve Indonesian independence.⁴⁵ This was followed by the formation of *Permufakatan Perhimpunan-Perhimpunan Politik Kebangsaan Indonesia* [Federation of Political Organizations of the Indonesian People, PPPKI] in December 1927.⁴⁶ Attempting to create an all-Indonesian nationalism, this federation gave a new conviction to the nationalist leaders that a united Indonesian nation was possible, though the federation itself did not last long.⁴⁷

The emergence of the PNI and PPPKI stimulated activists of student youth organizations to hold the Second All-Indonesian Youth Congress. Under the leadership of the PPPI, the Congress was held on 26–28 October 1928 and resulted in a monumental cornerstone in the formation of the historical bloc. This was the declaration of the so-called “*Soempah Pemoeda*” [Youth Pledge], which contained three ideals: one fatherland, Indonesia; one nation, Indonesia; and one language, *Bahasa Indonesia*.⁴⁸ Thus, despite the ongoing polarization between the secular and Islamic intelligentsia as well as fragmentation both within the secular and Islamic intellectual community, there was a collective will to create a common historical bloc in the cause of achieving Indonesian independence.

From Literary Activism to the Construction of a Historical Bloc

The road to the formation of this historical bloc was in fact not only a political trajectory but also a cultural one. The 1920s–1930s saw the development of national and cultural self-awareness in the literary field.⁴⁹ The most important expression of this was the emergence of a literary magazine called *Poedjangga Baroe* [PB, *the New Poet*] in 1933. The main protagonists of this magazine were Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana (b. 1908) and Armijn Pane (b. 1908); the former was a graduate of the RHS who had worked with the *Balai Pustaka* (BP), the latter was a former student of the STOVIA and NIAS who had also worked as an editor of the BP. Although it was called a literary magazine, the *PB* was concerned with general cultural issues which were often interwoven with current political ones. Alterations of its sub-title throughout its lifespan indicated the metamorphosis of its concern from literary towards general cultural issues and then to the constitution of the national bloc.⁵⁰

For about eight years of its publication — until the time of the Japanese occupation — the *PB* became a prominent discursive arena in which intellectuals could exchange ideas concerning new cultural and intellectual foundations for the construction of a new and fecund pan-Indonesian imagined community. The most monumental achievement of this magazine was its major role in triggering the unfolding “*polemik kebudayaan*” [cultural polemic] in several newspapers and periodicals on the so-called pan-Indonesian culture of the 1930s.⁵¹

St. Takdir Alisjahbana and Sutomo proved the most important personalities of the polemic for each represented an extreme of contradictory views. Instead of idolizing the glorious past as an inspiration for the future Indonesia, Takdir perceived the pre-Indonesian era as the period of “*jahiliyah*” (ignorance), which had been “*mati semati-matinya*” [as dead as dead can be]. As the past could not provide a good foundation for the building of a new Indonesian nation, he saw the key to the future Indonesia in the spirit of dynamism that to him was the source of Western progress. As the key to this Western progress was the spirit of “*intellectualisme*”, “*individualisme*” and “*materialisme*”, the Indonesian young intelligentsia should not be afraid to follow this way.⁵² On the other hand, Sutomo perceived that Western culture and education had poisoned Indonesian society, which had produced the uprooted intelligentsia whose members were destitute of any cultural aspirations and interested only in safe jobs as clerks. Furthermore, he viewed Western education as only offering instruction, instead of providing education in the proper sense of the word, that is, moral training, character development, and a sense of mutual responsibility. Thus in contrast to Takdir’s preference

for Western education Sutomo was in favour of the traditional religious school system, the *pesantren* (Kartamihardja 1954; Johns 1979, pp. 23–25; Teeuw 1986, p. 37).⁵³

The polemic was a showcase for the ambivalent relationship between the colonized intelligentsia and the Western colonial masters. In dealing with aspects of the imperial culture — language, modes of thought, knowledge infrastructure, etc., there had been two main contradictory strategies for achieving Indonesian independence. In the terminology of post-colonial studies, this contradiction can be described as the opposition of the proponents of “authenticity” *versus* that of “appropriation”.⁵⁴ Whatever their strategies, however, both shared a common spirit in understanding the importance of cultural foundations for the construction of the historical bloc.

Thus, on the eve of the Japanese Occupation, “Indonesia” as an imagined community had been invented, the idea of historical bloc had been grounded, and the language of nationalism had been proclaimed. The political opportunity structure of Japanese administration would provide a decisive moment for the consolidation of these historical projects in their journey to national independence.

THE FRACTURED PUBLIC SPHERE AND THE MAKING OF INTELLECTUAL POLITICAL TRADITIONS

All historical actions in the making of the historical bloc were reflected and affected by the public sphere of the period. In this period, the public sphere became a contested space between commonalities and differences. There was indeed a common concern to form a historical bloc. However, there were also ideological rivalries and conflicts of interest between groups and organizations. In this respect, the public sphere was no longer the domain of critical discourse between private individuals, rather it had become a force field of competing collective expressions of identity politics.

The Commonalities in the Public Sphere

Despite experiencing acute political cleavages, all political parties supported the idea of the national bloc as a historical bloc. Proto-nationalist associations of the previous decade gradually changed their names reflecting their acceptance of the idea of Indonesia-ness. By the 1930s, all political parties added the word “Indonesia” to their names.

During this period, the tendency of the press to be an extension of social and political organizations remained. What appears to be a new feature in

the public sphere of the 1920s–1930s was the press disposition, regardless of political affiliations, to take up and amplify the catchwords and discourse of the national bloc. Examples are the frequent use of words like “*bergerak*” [to move], “*merdeka*” [free], “*ra’jat*” [people], and “Indonesia” as titles of publications. From the titles of publications, we can trace the construction of the national bloc as a gradual metamorphosis from the word *bergerak* to *merdeka* to *ra’jat* and finally, to Indonesia.

The term *bergerak* began to be used in the title of publications around mid-1910s when the paper *Doenia Bergerak* appeared in Surakarta (1914–15) as the organ of the IJB [League of Native Journalism] but then became the mouthpiece of the SI and the IP. This was followed by the SI’s mouthpiece *Islam Bergerak* (est. 1917), the Padang-based newspaper *Soematra Begerak* (est. 1922), the Red SI’s *Ra’jat Bergerak* (replacing its predecessor *Doenia Baroe* in 1923), and so forth. This term reflected the desire of the Indies people to move away from the colonial situation.

The term *merdeka* first appeared in the title of *Benih Merdeka*, published in Medan in late 1916, as a mouthpiece of the SI. It was followed by a communist oriented *Soeara Merdika* in 1917. Thereafter, it featured in the titles of *Sinar Merdeka* in North Sumatra in 1919, *Sora Merdika* in Bandung in 1920, *Sora Ra’jat Merdika* in Garut in 1931 and some others.

The term *ra’jat* seems to have been first used by the communist oriented *Soeara Ra’jat* that was established in 1918 followed by the Red SI’s *Ra’jat Bergerak* in 1923. Next in 1930s there appeared the PSI oriented *Sora Ra’jat Merdika* (est. in Garut in 1931), the Partindo’s *Fikiran Ra’jat* (est. in Bandung in 1931), and the PNI Baroe’s *Daulat Ra’jat* and *Kedaulatan Ra’jat* (est. in Jakarta respectively in 1931 and 1932) and several others.

Finally, the incorporation of the term “Indonesia” in the title of publications seems to have been pioneered by the PI when its journal changed from *Hindia Poetra* to *Indonesia Merdeka* in 1924. Operating in the Netherlands under full protection of Dutch law, this journal experienced much more freedom of expression than its counterparts in Indonesia and played an important role in the dissemination of the idea of the national bloc. The word “Indonesia” was used by the ISC’s paper, *Soeloeh (Ra’jat) Indonesia* (est. 1924), the ASC’s journal, *Indonesia Moeda* (est. 1926), the Jong Indonesie’s/Pemoeda Indonesia’s journal, *Jong Indonesia/Pemoeda Indonesia* (est. 1927), the Medan-based *Matahari Indonesia* (led by a former PI member, Iwa Kusuma Sumantri, est. 1929), the PSI’s newspaper *Oetoesan Indonesia* (replacing its predecessor *Oetoesan Hindia* in 1932), and some others.

The appearance of these “code” words signified the changing of intellectual discourse as well as the transformation of the nationalist movement from static or localized to dynamic [*bergerak*], which stimulated the intelligentsia to move from a mindset of repression to one of freedom [*merdeka*]. In so doing, the intelligentsia took the nationalist movements from the elitist periphery to the heart of the ordinary people [*ra'jat*] followed by the attempt to draw all proto-national bonds into the new “Indonesian” imagined community as a common historical bloc.

Disputes in the Public Sphere

This process of making Indonesia a new imagined community and historical bloc, however, was conterminous with the ongoing political disputes among the intelligentsia of different ideologies and/or intellectual networks. The clash of ideologies occurred as a result of the growing radicalization of politicized intelligentsia and as social movements of the previous decades transformed themselves into political parties.

At first, the ideological discovery was needed not only to give a solid theoretical foundation to resist the repressive colonial state, but also to give a cognitive structure and collective identity to particular collective actions. Nevertheless, once that ideology was taken up by a structured political party — that entailed specific rules, a code of conduct, chains of command and party discipline — a mental, linguistic, and spatial boundary had been automatically created to define the border between us and them, in-group and out-group (collective) identities. Different ideologies would in turn lead to different intellectual political traditions.

The presence of “tradition”, according to Eric Hobsbawn and Terence Ranger (1983), is invented. The construction of Indonesian intellectual political traditions was propelled by the growing economic and political frustrations of the intelligentsia. This frustration was a result of the Indonesian economic malaise from the time of the end of World War I up till the great economic depression of the 1930s and the colonial state's deployment of a *rust en orde* regime. During this period of politico-economic oppression, intellectuals (of the intelligentsia and clerical-intelligentsia) as the “creators and carriers of tradition” (Eisenstadt 1973) began to translate their ideological formulations into various intellectual-political traditions.

Birth of the Communist and Modernist Muslim Intellectual Political Traditions

First of all, the growing economic and political frustrations made radical ideologies very attractive. In the early 1920s, the seeds of radical socialism

which had been gathered by the ISDV and then planted in the fertile soil of the SI (through the “bloc within” strategy) in the previous period, began to bloom. For the deprived intelligentsia, the phenomenon of its growing “proletarianization” can be identified as one of the factors that drew it to communism. For the frustrated masses, the perseverance of the leftist intelligentsia in supporting the working class and peasant interests through labour unions, strikes and rallies magnified the attractiveness of “communism” — whatever their understanding of this term — as a sort of apocalyptic hope.

The educational background of native communist leaders, such as Semaun and Darsono, provides a typical example of the formal educational qualifications of many members of the communist intelligentsia. While Semaun (b. 1899) had only studied at the *Tweede Klasse* [Second Class Native primary school] with an additional course in Dutch language, Darsono (b. 1897) was a drop-out of the native primary school. However, he was able to transfer to the vocational school of agriculture in Sukabumi. Similar educational patterns appear among many of the internees of the communist uprisings of the 1920s. As Van Niel’s observed: “None of the internees could be classed as belonging to the highest Indonesian intellectual level.... The degree of failure among them to complete secondary school training is unusually high even when compared with the general average of failures” (Van Niel 1970, pp. 234–25).

For many of the intelligentsia of this kind who were barred from entry into adequate bureaucratic, professional and business positions, working as professional revolutionaries was a feasible choice. Alienated from the government bureaucracy, Western sector of the economy, the old aristocracy as well as the Muslim petty bourgeoisie, they began to identify themselves with the urban working class and rural poor peasants. In this context, some aspects of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of communism appear to have satisfied their desire for an historical self-invention.

Few of those intellectuals who called themselves Marxists had actually studied Marx.⁵⁵ Besides, only a part of communist theories of revolution was workable in the Indonesian context.⁵⁶ Nevertheless, the Marxist-Leninist perspective of colonialism as the child of capitalism and the understanding of Dutch colonialism as a historical phase in the development of Western European “sinful” capitalism was intellectually and emotionally satisfying to these radical intellectuals (Mintz 1959, p. 5; 1965, p. 8).

Under these conditions, the ISDV was able to expand its native constituencies. From late 1917 (after the second national congress of the SI) the ISDV-influenced Semarang branch of the SI had gradually drawn the CSI to take a radical socialist direction. Encouraged by such a promising result, in May 1918 the ISDV decided to transform itself into a native movement

in its own right without too much regard for whether the natives understood or even approved of the movement's communist goals. On the eve of the 1920s, the ISDV began to attract a huge number of native followers from both inside and outside the SI.

Based on the deepening influence of the leftist revolutionary section within the SI and the growing power of the ISDV, a strategic alliance was made between communist cadres inside "the bloc within" (the SI) and the outside (the ISDV) designed to create a common front. As a result, in May 1920 proponents of the leftwing SI-Semarang together with members of the ISDV began to establish a new communist organization, *Perserikatan Kommunist di India* [PKI, the Communist Association in the Indies] — the first such organization established in Asia outside of the former Russian empire — with Semaun as president, Darsono as vice president, Bergsma as secretary, and H. W. Dekker as treasurer (McVey 1965, pp. 34–46; Kahin 1952, p. 74). With the establishment of the new Indies communist association, however, the communist cadres in the bloc within remained as members of the SI, creating a problem for the Islamic-oriented intelligentsia of the organization.

In response to the ideological attraction of communism both outside and inside the association, the Islamic-oriented intellectuals of the SI came out with a counter-ideology. The battle in the field of discursive practices between proponents of communism and Islamic modernism had its own constructive results. This in turn led to differences in "social identities", "social relations", and systems of knowledge and belief among members of the SI. The bitter personal elite rivalries that had earlier caused cleavages within the association had now achieved ideological definition. Islamic identity that had been activated in the previous decade began to enter the phase of "politicized identity". This term denotes a situation where an identity provides a more firm base for action and where individuals constantly think of themselves in terms of an identity (Bradley 1997, p. 26). In this phase, Islamic identity became not only the basis for political thinking and mobilization; it was the sole basis for politics.

The making of an Islamic identity as the sole basis of politics was constructed by a system of signification based on the invention of a new form of Islamic ideology.⁵⁷ The construct of Islamic ideology in this historical period was in fact produced within specific socio-historical contexts and discursive formations as a response to the presence of significant others either as a defensive or affirmative mechanism. Although Al-Afghani's ideology of Pan-Islamism and 'Abduh-inspired Islamic reformism-modernism became the main inspirations for formulating Islamic ideology in the Indonesian context, the

influence of the leftist intellectuals and the relevance of socialist doctrines for colonized people stimulated the Islamic-oriented intellectuals to combine a progressive view of Qur'anic doctrines with certain socialist ideals. This combination became known as "Islamic socialism".⁵⁸ The new ideology was spearheaded by the Islamic modernist group including Tjokroaminoto, Agus Salim, Abdul Muis and Surjopranoto, with Salim acting as the prime formulator of the ideology because his erudition in both Islamic and Western socialist literature was the most advanced in the SI.

Inspired by the new politicized Islamic identity and ideology, Islamic intellectuals under the influence of Salim began to accuse communist cadres in the SI of having dual loyalties, which created problems for the maintenance of a common platform and collective identity. This in turn led to the idea of party discipline,⁵⁹ and a policy to remove communists from the organization. The furore this caused was only calmed by the efforts of peace-maker, Tjokroaminoto. However, when he was taken into custody in August 1921 — accused of perjury in the secret Section B trials — Salim and Muis successfully took control of the organization. As a result, at the Sixth National Congress of the SI in Surabaya (6–11 October 1921), the party discipline proposal was accepted by the Congress. As a consequence, the communist cadres had to leave the SI.

Tan Malaka, in his capacity as a communist leader from late 1921, had tried to resolve tensions between communist and Islamist leaders before his arrest in March 1922. Then, from exile, he continued to struggle to reconcile the relationship between communism and Islamism through the Fourth Comintern Congress in November 1922. On this occasion, he outspokenly denounced the Comintern's hostility to Pan-Islamism as an untrustworthy, bourgeois force. He also stressed "the revolutionary potential of Islam in the colonized territories and the need for communist parties to cooperate with radical Islamic groups" (Anderson 1972, p. 272; Malaka 1991, pp. 92–93). This, however, was not well-received by his communist comrades, and the conflicts between the PKI and SI continued.

The removal of the communist cadre from the SI resulted in the formation of two intellectual political traditions in Indonesia: the reformist-modernist (Islamic) tradition and the communist (secular) tradition. The cultural base of the former was Islamic reformism-modernism, while its main socio-economic base was the (urbanized) Muslim petty bourgeoisie. The cultural base of the communists was a mixture of secular and syncretic *abangan* values, while its socio-economic base was the urban working class and rural peasantry. These differences were reflected in their views of nationalism. While the basis of nationalism

of the reformist-modernist tradition was Islamic solidarity, that of the communist tradition was class solidarity.

Each tradition contained within it the ideological touchstones for future generations of what were popularly called “Muslim” and “communist” intelligentsia movements. Henceforth, the word “Muslim” in Indonesian political discourse was no longer a “culture code” referring to anyone embracing Islamic religion, but rather a “political code” signifying the adherents of Muslim politics (political Islam).

During the 1920s, the SI gradually transformed itself into a political action group for reformist-modernist Islamic ideas. In February 1923 it changed its name to *Partai Sarekat Islam* [PSI, the Islamic Union Party] and then became *Partai Sjarikat Islam India-Timur* [PSII, East-Indies Islam Union Party] in 1927 and finally was renamed *Partai Sjarikat Islam Indonesia* [PSII, Indonesian Islam Union Party] in 1929 (Amelz 1952*b*, p. 15).

Meanwhile, the Marxist revolutionary intelligentsia became more integrated into the communist international community. In 1924, members of the *Perserikatan Komunis di India* supported by the splinter group of the SI (the so-called *SI Merah* [Red SI] or later *Sarekat Rakjat* [Peoples’ Union]) transformed the communist association of the Indies into the *Partai Komunis Indonesia* [the Indonesian Communist Party, PKI] (Ricklefs 1993, p. 174).

While the SI was gradually being transformed itself into a reformist-modernist political party, reformist-modernist non-political organizations such as *Muhammadiyah* and *Al-Irsyad* began to expand from local to national levels. The tide of reformist-modernist zeal provided a self-defining moment for the conservative-traditionalist *ulama* to express their own collective identity.

Birth of the Traditionalist Muslim Intellectual Political Tradition

Until the early 1920s, despite the growing influence of the reformist-modernist movements in the public sphere, the relationship of the traditionalist *ulama* with their reformist-modernist counterparts in Java remained on relatively good terms. This is evident, for example, in the multiple affiliations of Abdul Wahab Chasbullah, who was a pioneer of the traditionalist (politico-cultural) movement. While he was studying in Mecca, he took the initiative to set up a local branch of the SI. Next, as we have seen, he collaborated with Mas Mansur (a reformist-modernist *ulama*, and a former student of Al-Azhar) to establish the *Nahdlatul Wathan* in 1916.

The deepening penetration of reformist-modernist propagation in the 1920s, however, brought a real threat for the traditionalist *ulama*. In 1921,

Mas Mansur left the *Nahdlatul Wathan* and his former traditionalist comrades to join the *Muhammadiyah*. Thereafter, conflicts between the two Islamic streams became more severe, exacerbated by personal disputes between those who used to be close friends. This development pushed conservative-inclined *ulama* like Wahab to further identify themselves with traditional Islamic identity and traditional Islamic networks.

The deepening conflict within the Islamic community in the face of the growing pressure of the communist and other political groups, stimulated the Muslim intelligentsia of the SI to try to unify Islamic groups. To this end the First All Islam Congress was held in Cirebon (31 October–2 November 1922) with the dual aim of minimizing internal disputes on matters of “*furu*” [trivialities] and “*khilafiah*” [matters of difference], and emphasizing the unity of the entire Islamic community [*ummah*] under the leadership of the caliphate. In fact, the Western educated intelligentsia of the SI and leading figures of the urban-based reformist-modernist organizations dominated the leadership of the congress leaving the rural-based traditional *ulama* in a marginal position. This became even more marked when the second congress was held in Garut (May 1924), for only the reformist-modernist elements attended the congress (Van Niel 1970, p. 209).

The disenchantment of the traditionalist *ulama* became stronger in the aftermath of the abolition of the caliphate in Turkey by Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk 1881–1938) in February 1924. Shocked by this abolition, Al-Azhar *ulama* planned a so-called international “Caliphate Congress” organized by Rashīd Ridā scheduled originally for May 1925 (Landau 1994, pp. 236–38). In response to this planned conference, the third “All-Islam Congress” was held in Surabaya (24–26 December 1924) to select the Indonesian delegates for the Cairo congress. Those chosen were predominantly reformist-modernist leaders.⁶⁰

Because of internal difficulties, the Cairo congress itself was delayed until May 1926, and by this time there was no Indonesian “official” (that is, All Islam Congress) delegation to the congress. Nevertheless, the resentment of traditionalist *ulama* continued to grow, exacerbated by events following the capture of Mecca by ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud (1880–1953) in October 1924. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz brought with him puritanical Wahhabi ideas of reform and the ambition to become a new caliph. In countering the Cairo congress plan, which smacked of the Egypt’s King Fu‘ād’s (reign 1923–36) ambition to become caliph, Ibn Sa‘ud also planned an international conference in Mecca on the issue of the caliphate scheduled in June–July 1926.

The Indonesian problem of choosing between the Cairo and Mecca congresses and of deciding an appropriate response to the new Sa‘udi regime,

led to the Fourth and Fifth All Islam Congress respectively in Yogyakarta (21–27 August 1925) and Bandung (6 February 1926). In these congresses, *Muhammadiyah*, which was from the very beginning closer to the Egyptian Islamic reformism-modernism rather than to the radical puritan Wahhabism, favoured the Egypt congress. Meanwhile, Tjokroaminoto of the PSI and traditionalist *ulama* preferred the Mecca congress. In the eyes of Tjokroaminoto, King Fu'ad's role in the Egypt congress represented a British plan to control the entire Islamic world. For the traditionalist *ulama*, the Hijaz position was perceived as much more important than that of the caliphate, for it was the home of traditional Islamic teachings. In their eyes attending the Mecca congress was important in order to ask for a guarantee from the Wahhabi regime that traditional Islamic practices would be respected. In fact, although the "All Islam congresses" decided to choose the Mecca congress, none of the traditionalist *ulama* were appointed as Indonesian representatives to the congress⁶¹ (Van Bruinessen 1994, pp. 29–33).

All these events marked the growing dominance of the Western educated intelligentsia and the reformist-modernist groups in the leadership of contemporary Islamic movements in the archipelago. With the development of a cohesive relationship between the Muslim intelligentsia and reformist-modernist *ulama*, the position of the traditional *ulama* came under threat both culturally and politically in the homeland. The capture of Mecca by the Wahhabi regime threatened their position in the heartland of Islam. With the non-representation of the traditionalist *ulama* in the All Islam delegations to the Mecca congress, Wahab Chasbullah (a spokesman for traditionalist *ulama* in the All Islam congresses) urged traditionalist *ulama* to send their own delegates. They responded the so-called *Komite Hijaz* (The Hijaz Committee) on 31 December 1926. To add credibility to these traditionalist delegates, this committee then transformed itself into an organization that came to be known as *Nahdlatul Ulama* (the Rise of the Islamic Scholars, NU).⁶² Henceforth, the NU, with Hasjim Asj'ari (the founding father of *Pesantren Tebuireng*) as its venerable leader and Chasbullah as its main organizer, became the representative par excellence of Islamic traditionalism with its stronghold in East and Central Java.

The emergence of the NU reflects the existence of another intellectual political tradition in Indonesia, namely the traditionalist (Islamic) tradition. The cultural base of this political tradition was "Islamic traditionalism",⁶³ while its main socio-economic base was the rural peasantry (land owning). For the next two decades, the leadership of this tradition relied heavily on the *ulama* and the traditionalist *ulama-intelekt*, as the traditionalist intelligentsia remained in the gestation stage.

While the leadership of the reformist-modernist political tradition was predominantly Muslim intelligentsia (*intelek-ulama*) with the support of the reformist *ulama-intelek*, the leadership of the traditionalist tradition was predominantly *ulama*. Thus, conflicts between the two traditions reflected not only the contestation of ideologies but also the contestation of social prestige between the old and the new Islamic *clerisy*. There had been recurring attempts to close the gap between the two traditions especially in response to the external ideological pressures. However, the cleavage between the two streams remained.

Birth of the 'Nationalist' and 'Socialist' Intellectual Political Traditions

In the midst of such growing tensions in the public sphere, abortive communist uprisings took place in West Java (November 1926) and on the West Coast of Sumatra (January 1927). The colonial government's crackdown of the uprisings was disastrous not only for the PKI but also for the rest of the nationalist movements. The PKI was banned, and thousands of its leaders and supporters were jailed or transported to the malarial upper reaches of the Digul River in New Guinea. The event was a prelude to a more general roundup of Indonesian nationalist leaders.

As the colonial state became more and more repressive, the radical intelligentsia concluded that Indonesians could not expect any meaningful assistance from the colonial master towards achieving their independence. Therefore, all cooperation with the colonial government should be terminated. In the eyes of PI members, "Cooperation is only possible between two groups with equal rights and duties and with a common interest". Otherwise, cooperation means merely "the stronger riding roughshod over the weaker and the use of one as an instrument by the other for its own interest" (Ingleson 1979, p. 9). Thus, in following the PKI, which from the very beginning refused to take part in the *Volksraad*, in late 1924 the PSI turned its political course towards the called "*hidjrah*" [migration] politics, which meant shifting from cooperative to non-cooperative politics. This stance was followed by other nationalist political movements and parties.

The exile of many suspected leaders and supporters of the PKI insurrections followed by the removal of the party from the political scene, encouraged young nationalist intellectuals to take over political leadership by implementing their conception of a new united nationalist party. Hatta and his PI connections proposed the establishment of the *Sarekat Rakjat National Indonesia* [SRNI, Indonesian National people's Association]. After

the announcement of the intended formation of the SRNI in early 1927, however, the PI lost the initiative to implement the plan to a group of nationalists in the Bandung-based *Algemene Studieclub* (ASC). Leaders of the ASC, notably Sukarno, argued that they had a better understanding of the Indonesian situation than the PI executive in The Netherlands. Abandoning the PI's proposed programme, the Bandung group then took its own initiatives. On 4 July 1927 they publicly launched a new nationalist association called the *Perserikatan Nasional Indonesia* [PNI, Indonesian Nationalist Association] with a journal *Persatoen Indonesia* [*Indonesian Unity*]. A year later, it metamorphosed into the first nationalist party led by intellectuals of higher learning, the *Partai Nasional Indonesia* [PNI, Indonesian Nationalist Party] in which Sukarno assumed the position of chairman (Ingleson 1979, pp. 29–33).

The emergence of the PNI heralded the formation of another intellectual political tradition in Indonesia namely, the secular “nationalist” tradition. In fact, there was a crucial disagreement between the PI's ideals for the new party and the actual political direction taken by the PNI. In Hatta's view, despite the need for the new party to be radical in nature, its first task was an educational one, and it could therefore proceed only slowly to prepare its members for independence. In Sukarno's view, however, Hatta's plans were too moderate and the proposed party's educational role was tactically inappropriate for it would not lead soon enough to an independent Indonesia. In contrast to Hatta's ideal, the PNI preferred to be a radical mass party. Beyond the controversy surrounding the new party's character, however, this seemed to prove that even in this historical phase the relationship between the university student activists was not always harmonious. There had been some disguised competition among students of different networks resulting from their respective cultural origins and political inclinations.

Hatta's opportunity to implement his idealized party came after the arrest of Sukarno and three of his colleagues, and their subsequent trial and imprisonment in December 1929. After the imprisonment of Sukarno, Sartono, who took over the leadership, decided to dissolve the PNI and to form an ostensibly new organization in April 1931 named *Partij Indonesia* [*Partindo*, the Indonesian Party]. *Partindo* maintained the PNI journal, *Persatoean Indonesia*, and published a new party newspaper *Fikiran Ra'jat* [*People's Ideas*]. Not all former-supporters of the PNI joined the *Partindo*. In many places those who disagreed with Sartono's action set up rival organizations in the form of study clubs and called themselves *Golongan Merdeka* [Independent Groups]. About the same time, the PI itself split when Moscow-oriented communists gained control over the organization, resulting

in the expulsion of Hatta and his younger comrade Sutan Sjahrir (b. 1909) who had arrived in Holland in 1929. It was through the emergence of the “independent group” movements that Hatta and Sjahrir found a way of implementing their political ideals.

To the leading figures of this movement, such as Sujadi and Johan Sjahruzah, both Hatta and Sjahrir stressed the importance of publishing a journal and providing political education for the masses. Late in August 1931, the independent groups from several cities met and acting on Hatta’s and Sjahrir’s advice established a new political movement with its own journal. For the name of the movement they chose neither “*partai*” [party] nor “*perserikatan*” [association], but “*pendidikan*” [education], that is the *Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia* [PNI, Indonesian National Education].⁶⁴ The name of its journal was *Daulat Ra’jat* [the People’s Sovereignty, est. 1931], which was followed a year later with its own newspaper, *Kedaulatan Ra’jat* (Mrázek 1994, pp. 78–87). After Sjahrir and Hatta returned from the Netherlands respectively in 1931 and 1932, they assumed leadership of the *Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia*, which was popularly called the *PNI Baru* [the New PNI].

The release of Sukarno from Sukamiskin prison did not succeed in reuniting the (secular) nationalist movements. He decided to throw in his lot with *Partindo* and thus perpetuated the cleavage between that party and *PNI Baru*. Both groups shared a common secular-nationalistic outlook, but both had different constituencies. Followers of both group differed in the degree of their exposure to (Western) liberal-secular values and socialist thinking. The main recruits of the *Partindo* were followers of *adat*-oriented *kaum muda* especially from Central and East Java, who worked for the government bureaucracy and remained respectful to traditional aristocratic values. In contrast, *PNI Baru* tended to be critical of any “intellectual aristocratic spirit”.⁶⁵ Its main constituency was the secular-oriented *kaum muda* who worked for the government bureaucracy and Western sector of the economy, typically people of higher learning who had been highly exposed to (Western) liberal-secular values.⁶⁶ Compared to members of the *Partindo* in general, members of the *PNI Baru* were also stronger in their appreciation of Marxist-socialist thinking.

Henceforth, the secular nationalist intelligentsia was split into two camps: the secular-traditionalist nationalist political tradition (commonly called “nationalist” by Indonesians) and the secular-modernist nationalist political tradition (commonly called by Indonesians as “socialist”). The cultural base of the former was a mixture of secular values, local customs and syncretism, while its main socio-economic base was a combination of the government

bureaucracy and land owners. The cultural base of the latter was Western secular values, while its main socio-economic base was a combination of the government bureaucracy and Western sector of the economy.

Birth of Christian Intellectual Political Traditions

Developments in the public sphere in turn encouraged the Indonesian Christian (Catholic and Protestant) community to develop its own political action groups. Already in 1923 Javanese Catholics had successfully established their own political association, namely *Parkempalan Politik Djawi* [the Association of Javanese Politics, PPKD] led by F.S. Harjadi and then I.J. Kasimo.⁶⁷ In response to growing political tensions, the PPKD then transformed itself in July 1938 from a socio-cultural movement into a political one under the banner *Persatuan Politik Katolik Indonesia* [the political unity of Indonesian Catholics, PPKI]. An attempt to set up an Indonesian Protestant political party was made in December 1930 when the *Partai Kaum Masehi Indonesia* [PKMI, Indonesian Christian Party] emerged in Jakarta.⁶⁸ The party called for the autonomy of Indonesia and the need for the autonomous government to be based on Christian Principles. Due to internal rivalries, however, this party lasted for only a short time. A more serious effort was made in 1939 when the so-called *Federasi Perkumpulan Kristen Indonesia* [Federation of the Indonesian Christian Associations] was established in Yogyakarta,⁶⁹ as a prelude to the establishment of a Christian political party (Pringgogidgo 1964, pp. 126–28).⁷⁰

Being relatively small in membership the significance of the Christian (Catholic and Protestant) political parties, in Ricklefs' view, came from "the substantial over-representation of Christians in higher levels of the civil service and the military because of their superior educational qualifications" (Ricklefs 1993, p. 240). The emergence of Christian political action groups represented the formation of yet another intellectual political tradition, that is the Christian (both Protestant and Catholic) tradition. The cultural base of this tradition was Christian values, while its socio-economic base was the government bureaucracy and the Western sector of the economy. In the discourse of nationalism and Indonesian state and nationalism in the future, the position of this tradition tended to follow the secular nationalist position/tradition.

Fragmentation within Intellectual Political Traditions

Further consolidation of these political parties and traditions was still constrained by the increasingly repressive colonial state apparatus during the

world economic depression of the 1930s. With the Dutch government's concern to maintain more firmly public peace and quiet, there was no scope for effective political activity on the part of non-cooperating parties. The choice of political parties was either cooperative politics (with the risk of internal conflicts between the realist and idealist members) or accepting a shadowy existence (with the risk of losing contact with a larger audience).

In these circumstances, fragmentation within particular political traditions began to emerge. In May 1930, radical elements of the SI-West Sumatra branch and *Sumatra Thawalib* groups converted the *Sumatra Thawalib* into a political association, *Persatuan Muslimin Indonesia* [PMI, Indonesian Muslims' Union]. In 1932 it became a political party and its name was abbreviated to *Permi* (Noer 1973, p. 50). Among prominent personalities of this party were former activists of the Cairo-based *Djama'ah al-Chairiah*, Ilias Ja'kub and Muchtar Lutfi. Disappointed with the value of Pan-Islamic ideas following the failure of the caliphate conferences in Cairo and Mecca, Ja'kub and Lutfi returned home respectively in 1929 and 1931. On their return they took charge of this newly established party to make it attractive to many younger Minangkabau. Using the slogan of *Islam dan Kebangsaan* [Islam and (Indonesian) nationalism] the *Permi* established links with *Partindo* (Ricklefs 1993, p. 190) and distanced itself from the PSI ideological position. After the Dutch arrested Lutfi and Ja'kub in 1933, however, this party soon disappeared from the public scene, though it continued to be active educationally and culturally (Roff 1970a, p. 87). About the same time, internal disputes within the PSII, between proponents of the cooperation and those of the non-cooperation, caused this party suffered a severe internal fragmentation.

In 1935, Sutomo's *Indonesische Studieclub*, which had changed its name to *Persatuan Bangsa Indonesia* [PBI, Union of the Indonesian Nation] in 1931, merged with the BU to form *Partai Indonesia Raya* [*Parindra*, Greater Indonesia Party]. This party tended to be close to the *Partindo* in its ideological position, but for the sake of its survival it remained on good terms with the colonial government (Van der Veur 1984, p. 26). Meanwhile, after the arrest and exile of leading nationalist leaders such as Sukarno, Hatta and Sjahrir in 1933, *Partindo* was dissolved in November 1936. A year later, some of its former activists led by members of the radical intelligentsia such as Mohammad Yamin and the leftist Batak Christian Amir Sjarifuddin, established *Gerakan Rakjat Indonesia* [*Gerindo*, Indonesian People's Movement]. With similar objectives to the *Partindo*, the *Gerindo* accepted cooperation with the Dutch to appose the threat of fascism, especially Japanese fascism (Ricklefs 1993, p. 192; Pringgodigdo 1964, p. 108).⁷¹

In short, on the eve of the Japanese Occupation, there had already emerged six major intellectual political traditions in Indonesia: modernist-reformist (Islamic) tradition, traditionalist (Islamic) tradition, communist (secular) tradition, nationalist (secular) tradition, socialist (secular) tradition, and Christian (secular) tradition. One more political tradition would emerge after the Japanese interregnum, namely, the military (secular) tradition. Each tradition had its own culture and socio-economic base as well as political orientation, as depicted in Table 3.2. Features of each tradition in this diagram are only an ideal type and valid during the early formation of intellectual political traditions (1920s–1940s). Over the course of time, the cultural and socio-economic base as well as the political orientation of each tradition could change.

FORMATION AND TRANSMISSION OF THE ISLAMIC 'INTELLECTUAL' POLITICAL TRADITION

Until the 1950s, the traditionalist community did not produce a significant number of *intellectueelen* — in the full sense of the term discussed above. The presence of *madrasah* within this community was an important step in producing traditionalist clerical-intelligentsia [*ulama-intelek*] represented by figures like Wachid Hasjim, Mohammad Iljas and Fathurrahman Kafrawi, forerunners of the future traditionalist intelligentsia. Yet, the participation of the traditionalist students in the modern *sekolah* system at this juncture remained an anomalous phenomenon. Thus, the intelligentsia of the NU before the 1950s were basically outsiders [*orang luar*] who were recruited to join and help manage the organization (Van Bruinessen 1994, p. 39).

Thus, Muslim intellectual movements before 1950s were basically grounded in the reformist-modernist constituency. The reason was that once the Muslim intelligentsia had planted the flag of Islamic political ideology, it had to be placed in ground that had been well prepared to accept a new ideology. Insofar as political ideology in its systematic formulation is a modern phenomenon, “Islamic political ideology” can only be effectively absorbed if it is planted in a community that has been exposed to modernity. In this regard, as Shepard has argued (1987, p. 308), “traditionalist positions could not be said to involve ideology in the strictest sense.” As the traditionalist position before the 1950s was not yet fertile soil for planting the seed of Islamic political ideology, it was sensible for the Muslim intelligentsia to focus their attention on the reformist-modernist community. When the SI became a reformist-modernist political action group, the formation of the modernist-political tradition began.

TABLE 3.2
Intellectual Political Traditions, their Cultural and Economic Bases and Political Orientations

Tradition	Culture Base	Socio-Economic Base	Political Orientation
Modernist Muslim	Islamic Reformism-Modernism	Perty Bourgeoisie (Indigenous Economy)	Islamic-Modernism
Traditionalist Muslim	Islamic Traditionalism	Peasantry/Land Owning	Islamic-Traditionalism
Nationalist	Secular Values + Local Custom + Syncretism	Bureaucracy and Land Owning	Secular-Traditionalism
Socialist	Western Secular Values	Bureaucracy & Western Sector of the Economy	Secular-Modernism
Christian	Christian Values	Bureaucracy & Western Sector of the Economy	Secular-Modernism
Communist	Secular Values + Syncretism	Working Class and Poor Peasantry	Secular-Modernism
Military*	Secular-Nationalistic Values	Bureaucracy and Public Sector of the Economy	Secular-Modernism

*The military political tradition began to emerge in the second half of the 1940s.

This formation grew out of public intellectual debates. From the 1920s until the 1940s there had been a series of public debates in the press and at public meetings between organic intellectuals of the Muslim and secular intelligentsia, especially concerning political ideology and the very foundation of nationalism and Indonesian independence. Through these polemics in the public sphere, the notion of Islamic ideology emerged. The decline of the political influence of the first generation of Muslim intelligentsia did not bring to end the Muslim intellectual-tradition and its ideology. This tradition and ideology was transmitted to and reformulated by the following generations of the Muslim intelligentsia. This transmission was made possible by inter-generational intellectual networks, while the reformulation was needed because each generation had to face different critical issues and socio-historical challenges.

The Making of a Muslim Collective Identity and Ideology

Muslim political identity and ideology was not ready-made but developed out of clashes and discourses. At the outset, the clash of discourses between Muslim intellectuals of the first generation with the communist cadres (such as Semaun and Darsono) in the SI resulted in the overt proclamation of Islam as the SI principle. With Tjokroaminoto (until 1921) working to maintain party unity rather than develop party principles, it was Agus Salim who began to move along the path of the party principle. Although the idea of Islam as the basis of the party had been formulated by Tjokroaminoto in 1917, Agus Salim asserted it more clearly and firmly so that it became the sole basis and identity of the SI in 1921. Writing in *Neratja* on 18 October 1921, Salim publicly stated: "There is no need to look for other 'isms' to cure the organizational disease. The medicine is in the principle of the party itself, the principle that is longstanding and eternal, which cannot be eliminated by mankind, though the entire world may be hostile to it. This principle is Islam."

The effort to mobilize support for the Islamic cause in a disputatious public environment necessitated the creation of a new framework of collective solidarity and ideology. At an international level, this led to efforts to draw the SI into the sphere of the "Pan Islamic" movement. The SI and its related Islamic organizations became engaged in international Islamic affairs at least until the abolition of the caliphate in 1924 and the failure of international congresses to address this problem. In the media-sphere this tendency was reflected by the emergence of the newspapers *Doenia Islam* [*The Islamic World*] published in Jakarta (1922–23) and edited by Agus Salim. Domestically, since

the ideological attack chiefly came from the proponents of Marxist-socialism, the formulation of Islamic principles and ideology in this early period tended to emphasize the socialistic dimension of Islam. Henceforward, the modernist Muslim intelligentsia of the SI began to promote the so-called “*Socialisme-Islam*” [Islamic Socialism].

After the removal of the communist cadres from the SI, Tjokroaminoto joined Salim to champion the ideology of “Islamic socialism”. Beginning in 1922, special courses on Islamic Socialism were given to the SI young members in Yogyakarta with Tjokroaminoto teaching the doctrine of socialism, Surjopranoto teaching sociology in general and H. Fakhruddin (of the *Muhammadiyah*) teaching the Islamic theology of socialism. Among those who enthusiastically attended these courses was Hadji Abdul Malik Karim Amrullah (Hamka, b. 1908), a son of Hadji Rasul of West Sumatra, who was to become one of Indonesia’s most prominent *ulama-intelekt* (Hamka 1952, pp. 34–40). About the same time, articles such as “*Apakah Socialisme itu?*” [What is Socialism?] or “*Socialisme berdasar Islam*” [Socialism based on Islam], written by Tjokroaminoto and Agus Salim, frequently appeared in the SI-affiliated newspapers. Furthermore, at the First All Islam Congress in Cirebon (31 October–2 November 1922), Islamic socialism became one of the main issues discussed by the congress (Amelz 1952a, pp. 137–38). All these contributed to the publication of Tjokroaminoto’s influential book, *Islam dan Socialisme* [*Islam and Socialism*], in November 1924. The symbolic representation of this ideology was the establishment of an Islamic periodical, *Bandera Islam* [*The Islamic Flag*, 1924–27],⁷² which became the main mouthpiece of Islamic socialism.

Having agreed with a large portion of Marxist doctrine, Tjokroaminoto in his book and articles criticized the Marxist-socialist theory of historical materialism for allowing no place for God and for its deification of the material object. He concluded: “Our socialism is not that kind of socialism, but Islamic Socialism which seeks human salvation in this world and in the hereafter” (Tjokroaminoto 1925; 1952, p. 141). Although they claimed the primacy of Islamic social principles, Tjokroaminoto and his modernist comrades — as modern educated people who had been exposed to contemporary Western political thought — also believed that democracy and democratic principles should provide the groundwork for Islamic struggles. “If we, Muslims, truly understood and seriously performed Islamic injunctions”, he said, “we must be true democrats and socialists as well” (Tjokroaminoto 1952, p. 155). It was also said in the explication of the party’s principles, *Tafsir Program-Asas Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia* (formulated in 1931): “In the independent nation of Indonesia, that the PSII is obliged to

struggle for, its government must be democratic in nature, as asserted in the *Qur'an* (*Asj-Sjurá*, XLII, p. 38).” It is rather ironic that in their efforts to find Islamic scriptural underpinning for their arguments, because most of these Western-educated intellectuals had a poor command of Arabic language and Islamic theology, the supportive literature they quoted was taken from Dutch and English translations (or commentaries) on the sources of Islam (Amelz 1952*b*, p. 9).

The making of a Muslim intellectual collective identity and ideology found its galvanizing moment because of growing tensions between the modernist Muslim intelligentsia and secular nationalist leaders, such as Tjipto Mangunkusumo, Sutomo and Sukarno. Until late 1920s the relationship between the Muslim intelligentsia of the SI and nationalist leaders remained on good terms. Sukarno, for instance, was regarded initially as the SI’s own flesh and blood.⁷³ Not only because of his personal relationship to Tjokroaminoto as his *bapak asuh* (foster father), political mentor, and father-in-law (for a couple of years in the early 1920s), but also because Sukarno was actively engaged in SI’s activities. It was Sukarno, together with Agus Salim and Tjokroaminoto, who edited *Bandera Islam*. Even after the establishment of his own political party (PNI) in 1927, Sukarno continued to attend SI national meetings. In the SI (now PSII) meeting in Pekalongan in 1927, Sukarno proposed the idea of converging all political organizations and leaders into a federation of political parties, which was supported by Tjokroaminoto and Agus Salim. This idea materialized on 17 December 1927 with the establishment of the Federation of Political Organizations (PPPKI), including the PSII, PNI, ASC, BU, *Pasundan*, *Sarikat Sumatra*, and ISC.

Nevertheless it was the conflict of interests within this federation that created a series of disputes between the Muslim intelligentsia and the secular nationalist leaders. A competitive struggle between Muslim and nationalist leaders, to win the leadership of political movements in general and the federation in particular, resulted in unbridgeable internal conflicts. In March 1928 Tjipto Mangunkusumo sent a letter to Sukarno warning him of the dangers of (the infectious residue of) Pan-Islamism and of probable attempts by Tjokroaminoto and Salim to gain control of the PPPKI. Tjipto blamed such alleged attempts on the “traitorous game” of Tjokroaminoto and the PSII (Ingleson 1979, p. 131).⁷⁴

The unwillingness of the secular nationalist intelligentsia to be led by their Muslim counterparts coincided with the growing resentment of the PSII leaders in the face of the rising popularity of new nationalist leaders in the public sphere. The major cause of this resentment was the steadily increasing internal fragmentation and decline of the party’s development.⁷⁵ The fact that

this internal paralysis coincided with the growing influence of new nationalist leaders made the SI leaders sensitive to the perceived external threats. Thus, they could not accept the federation's ruling of equal representation among political parties ("one party one vote") — regardless of the size of the party's constituency. They perceived this ruling as weakening the PSII position as the biggest political party and the only Muslim representative in the federation (Noer 1980, p. 272).

This internal conflict of interest within the PPPKI was worsened by public disagreements. At the outset, a series of hostile debates occurred between the SI leaders, particularly Salim, with Sutomo. These debates had their origin in Sutomo's interview with the *Indische Courant* (18 December 1926) in which he requested the government to give more official positions to Indonesian-educated people. This strategy was opposed by some SI leaders afraid it might give the impression that the main motive of the Indonesian political movement was to gain official positions. This led to a public debate between Sutomo and SI leaders (Wondosudirdjo, Sangadji and Salim) in January 1927. It resulted in a bitter conflict, as Sutomo accused the PSI of inflaming dissension among the various elements of the nationalist movement and argued that Salim was a foreigner (non-Javanese) who was fond of creating dissension wherever there was unity. In response to this accusation, in January 1927 the PSI ordered its members to withdraw from Sutomo's club. This in turn stimulated counter-reactions from Sutomo and proponents of secular nationalism.⁷⁶ Sutomo in his writing, published by *Balai Pustaka* in 1928, condemned leaders of the PSI as being tightly tied to Islam rather than to nationalism, ignoring the fact that even in Turkey the sentiment of Pan Islamism had been replaced by nationalism.

In the midst of growing conflicts between Islamic and nationalist leaders, Sukarno made an effort to restore national unity. In his appeal for national unity, Sukarno drew on pre-Islamic elements from the archipelago's past, such as the strong figure of Gadjah Mada from the fifteenth century of Madjapahit kingdom, to claim a common united position for all Indonesians. He also called upon the Indonesian people to sacrifice their lives for the sake of the nation. Unexpectedly, this provided fuel for the PSII leaders to criticise the secular nationalist conception of nationalism. Debates between Salim and Sukarno then followed in *Fadjar Asia* contesting the very definition of nationalism. Salim criticized Sukarno's speeches by warning that excessive emphasis on nationality could endanger both the Indies people and those of foreign countries. He called Sukarno's conception of nationalism a form of idolatry. "Our loving devotion to the country", he said, "must go beyond a devotion to the material and territorial entity; it must be a devotion to

almighty God" (*Fadjar Asia*, 26 July 1928). Sukarno countered such a criticism by saying that the nationalism he struggled for was not identical with that developed in Western society. "It is not a jingoistic nationalism or chauvinism, and not a copy or imitation of Western nationalism. Our nationalism is a wide nationalism which gives a space for loving other nations, as basic as oxygen that gives life to every living thing" (*Fadjar Asia*, 18 and 20 August 1928).

The polemics continued without compromise for each argument had its own political basis. Salim then came to the conclusion that despite the similarity of the PSI and the PNI in their objective for achieving Indonesian independence, they differed from each other in basic principles. Even so, he said, the PSI respected Sukarno's own outlook and political stand, but at the same time would choose its own political trajectory (Noer 1980, p. 277). The Muslim intellectuals of the PSII came to the conclusion that in future seeking cooperation with other Islamic organizations, even if they were in some ways contrary to the PSII, was far preferable to working with the anti-Islam secular nationalists (Ingleson 1979, p. 131).

All these heated discursive clashes in the public sphere compelled adherents of each position to engage in the debate. Fired by the secular nationalist's negative definition of Islam, Ahmad Hassan of *Persis*, a man who had involved himself more in religious teaching rather than in political affairs, began to side with the PSII leaders in resisting the ideology of secular nationalism. In 1929 he established a monthly journal, *Pembela Islam* [The Defender of Islam, 1929–35], with the mission to defend Islam from the secular ideological onslaught. In the sixth edition of the journal, for instance (March 1930), he linked the spirit of nationalism to "*ashabiyah*" [tribalism] which was forbidden in Islam. This journal soon became the bastion of Muslim ideological defence, where Muslim intellectuals launched their counter-ideological positions. Its role in defending Islam became more conspicuous in the events following Sutomo's controversial statement in a public meeting in May 1930 and the appearance of a series of articles (June–July 1930) in Sutomo's *Soeara Oemoem* (June–July 1930) written by Homo Sum (pseudonym).⁷⁷ Fired by the negative perception of Islam by its opponents, *Pembela Islam* ran many articles calling for Islamic solidarity.⁷⁸

Ironically, while the public debates of the 1930s were becoming hostile and the Muslim intelligentsia more obsessed with their proclaimed role as the defenders of Islam, the PSII itself had reached its nadir. At the very time new parties of the higher intelligentsia began to bloom, the PSII split into factions. The leadership competition between Tjokroaminoto (a leader of the younger generation) and Sukiman Wirjosandjojo (a leader of the new

generation) combined with criticism of Tjokroaminoto's financial mismanagement led to the suspension of Sukiman and Surjopranoto from party membership in 1933. Some branches of the party protested against this decision by establishing a special committee that came to be known as *Persatuan Islam Indonesia* [Union of Indonesian Islam]. The committee merged with another splinter group of the Yogyakarta chapter, the PSII *Merdeka* [the Independent PSII], to establish *Partai Islam Indonesia* [Indonesian Islamic Party, PII] in late 1933. This became the first Islamic party to be led by a Western university graduate, Sukiman. However, it was inactive until it was revived under the same name in 1938 with strong support from leaders of the *Muhammadiyah* (Noer 1980, p. 175; Alamsjah 1952, pp. 68–69). Meanwhile, Agus Salim who had considered the *hidjrah* policy of non-cooperation as unrealistic under the repressive regime of *rust en orde*, in November 1934 established a cooperative faction called *Barisan Penjadar PSII* [Awareness Front of the PSII]. In 1937, the PSII expelled any of its members who gave support to the *Barisan Penjadar*.

The decline of the PSII and the growing internal disputes between activist Muslims proved that action was urgently needed to promote a sense of unity. Under the initiative of NU, *Muhammadiyah* and PSII leaders, an All Islam Congress was conducted in Surabaya on 18–21 September 1937. It resulted in the establishment of the *Madjlis Islam A'laa Indonesia* [MAI, Supreme Islam Council of Indonesia], a federation which continued to exist until the first two years of the Japanese Occupation.

The paralysis of the PSII did not lead to the death of its ideals. Vehicles for the transmission of Islamic collective memory and ideology from the first to the second generation of Muslim intelligentsia were now available, especially in the form of Muslim student associations.

The Transmission of Muslim Intellectual Political Traditions

The most important catalyst for the transmission of Muslim intellectual political traditions from the first to the second generation of Muslim intelligentsia was the establishment in January 1925 of *Jong Islamieten Bond* [JIB, Young Muslims' League] in Jakarta.

Born out of disappointment with *Jong Java* [Young Java], the establishment of this league reflected a severe competitive struggle in the public sphere and the marginality of Islamic-oriented intelligentsia. It is said that a Christian missionary, Hendrik Kraemer (1888–1965), gave a series of lectures on Christianity (as well as on theosophy and Catholicism) for the *Jong Java* members and successfully put himself forth as an adviser to this

student association (Steenbrink 1993, p. 111). The more orthodox Muslim students in the association believed that Islam could provide a common denominator for fragmented youth leagues and that *Jong Java* members as prospective leaders of the nation, regardless of their religious beliefs, were supposed to know about Islam, the religion of the majority of the people because of its important role as the main social worldview.

In response to the Christian lectures in *Jong Java*, the more orthodox Muslim students also requested a series of lectures on Islam as well. Among supporters of this proposal was Raden Samruridjal, the sixth chairman of *Jong Java*. He put forward the proposal at the society's seventh annual meeting held in Yogyakarta towards the end of 1924. The fact that the proposal was not supported by the majority vote,⁷⁹ forced him and his supporters to find their own way. Agus Salim, who attended the meeting and had long realized the importance of forming cadres of the Islamic oriented intelligentsia, suggested that they establish a new student organization which came to be known as *Jong Islamieten Bond*, or JIB (Noer 1978, pp. 242–43).

JIB's historical project was to "Islamize educated people" [*mengislamkan kaum terpelajar*]. The major concern of this league was how to bring Western-educated Indonesians closer to the Islamic community or at least to persuade some of them not to become full-fledged members of secular oriented organizations. The aims of the league were stated in its statutes:

The study and promotion of the practice of Islam; the cultivation and promotion of sympathy for Islam and its followers, while giving positive tolerance to those who think otherwise; the cultivation and promotion of contacts among the *intellectueelen* and with the people through Islam; and the promotion of physical and spiritual development of its members through self-training (education) and self-activity.⁸⁰

Thus, the understanding of Islam was now different from that of *Jong Java*. While the idea of providing Islamic teaching within the *Jong Java* context was based on pragmatic reasons (for the sake of unity and leadership of the nation), the same idea was now situated within a particular collective identity and with a particular ideology. Islamic solidarity was now regarded as the only solution to social problems. As the statute stated: "No one can work wholeheartedly to improve general social welfare without having respect and sympathy for this religion of the majority people."⁸¹ Moreover, following its first congress in Yogyakarta in late 1925, the league obliged its members to learn and observe Islamic tenets. Islam was now perceived as providing more than a language of social solidarity; it was to provide the groundwork for socio-political action. In their exposure to the clash of discourses between

Muslim and secular intellectuals of the older generation, these students found a model for the formulation of their own ideology.

It has to be borne in mind, however, that the notion of Islamic solidarity for JIB members did not contradict the idea of national solidarity and did not lessen their attachment to the aim of a national (historical) bloc. "In becoming a Muslim", argued Mohamad Roem (one of its leading activists), "one has to love the fatherland, as this is an essential part of the Islamic faith" (Roem 1989, p. 131). This was reflected in name it chose for its scout group established in 1926, namely *National Indonesische Padvinderij* [The Indonesian National Scouting Movement], the first-ever organization in Indonesia referred to the "Indonesian nation". It is also reflected in its active involvement in the Second All-Indonesian Youth Congress (October 1928). Thus, Islamic solidarity in this context was invoked as a way of supporting the idea of collective identity in the face of the competing ideo-political struggles of diverse intellectual streams.

JIB's emphasis on the importance of Islamic collective solidarity was reinforced by arguments to defend Islam from external misrepresentation. Early editions of JIB's journal, *Het Licht* [*The Light*], were overwhelmed by complaints about the false-depiction of Islam in Western schools, textbooks, libraries, and the view of the *Ethici* and missionaries who had successfully downgraded the high standing of Islam. Agus Salim in his article in the first edition of the journal published in March 1925, emphasized that the Western world should thank Islam for its great contribution to modern civilization. In fact, he said, many Western scholars and Christian missionaries had relentlessly produced a negative image of Islam. "Sadly, the Muslim community of this day, because of the lack of intellectualism and lack of understanding of Islam, tends to take for granted such a negative definition of Islam."

To attract educated people to Islam in this historical context required the modernization of Islamic expression. The prime test of modernity among students at that time was the use of Dutch language and the application of modern approaches and rationalism in teaching. Thus, the JIB journal was named in Dutch, *Het Licht*,⁸² and most of its articles were written in Dutch. In its first five years, many of its articles argued for the compatibility of Islam with modern science and rationalism, described the glory of medieval Islam, the relevance of Islam to modern social problems, and the importance of religious teaching to the younger generation, with the quotation of views of Western scholars being frequently used to support the arguments. In the view of Mohamad Roem, this information helped to rescue Muslim students from the prison of an inferiority complex and endangered a sense of pride in being Muslim (Roem 1989, p. 132).

To make Islamic teaching attractive for students of secular schools, most Islamic mentors of JIB were drawn from the reformist *ulama-intelekt* and the modernist *intelekt-ulama*. In contrast to the traditionalist method of teaching that tended to be dogmatic with little opportunity for questions, these *intelekt-ulama* and *ulama-intelekt* were more open for discussion and more able to connect Islamic themes with contemporary realities. This together with the fact that JIB mainly operated in big cities⁸³ made this league closer to reformist-modernist intellectual tradition rather than the traditionalist one. In addition to Agus Salim, Tjokroaminoto (of the PSI) Ahmad Hassan (of the Persis), Achmad Dachlan and H. Fakhruddin were among the prominent Islamic mentors of this league.

By and large, JIB members were students or former students of secondary schools, although graduates of the primary school could join the league and some of its members, especially in the 1930s, were university students. The fact that there was no university-based Islamic student association in the country up to the 1920s indicates the backwardness of the Muslim intellectual community compared to secular, Chinese and Christian counterparts.⁸⁴ Moreover, JIB could only attract a small percentage of the secondary school students. From about 5,692 Indonesians with Western secondary education in 1927 (Kahin 1970, p. 31), it was claimed that the total membership of JIB was 1,700 — not all of them from secondary schools (Alfian 1989, p. 124).

Among senior members of JIB in the 1920s who would become the future leaders of Muslim political movements, were Samsuridjal (the first president, 1925–26, a graduate of the *Rechtsschool*), Wiwoho Purbohadidjojo (the second president, 1926–30, a graduate of the HBS), Kasman Singodimedjo (the third president, 1930–35, a student of the STOVIA-preparation section), Mohamad Roem (a student of the STOVIA-preparation section), Mohammad Natsir, Jusuf Wibisono, and Prawoto Mangkusasmito (all were students of the AMS). It is worth noting, however, that the level of Islamic mindedness of JIB members even among these prominent figures was by no means homogenous.⁸⁵ Despite their heterogeneity, however, the shared experience of being incorporated into the same network of Islamic intelligentsia provided JIB's members with a sense of affinity and attachment to an Islamic political tradition.

From 1927 JIB's concern about strengthening Islamic knowledge and practice among its members led to the establishment of the so-called *Kern Lichaam* [Core Body]. This was a sort of brains-trust, comprised of those who had a good understanding of Islam. Internally, it was oriented to the promotion and improvement of religious teaching within the league.

Externally, it functioned as a connecting chain between JIB and other Islamic organizations. Members of this body were typically those who had multiple organizational affiliations. The most prominent was Muhammad Natsir who was also a rising star of the *Persis*. Having a *madrasah* background (*Diniah School*, Solok-West Sumatra) combined with the HIS at the primary level, Natsir had been well exposed to the reformist-modernist ideology. His encounter with *Persis* founder A. Hassan during his study in the Bandung AMS reconnected his link to the reformist intellectual networks and quenched his ambition to take a degree from the college of law. Similar to Natsir was Kasman Singodimedjo who had been exposed to the reformist *dakwah* [Islamic outreach] in his childhood and then had a strong connection to *Djami'at Chair* and *Muhammadiyah* during his study in Jakarta. Through this kind of cadre, JIB connected itself to a wider web of Islamic socio-political movements, and became integrated into Islamic ideological formation in the public sphere. It would become a vehicle for the transmission of Islamic ideology from the old to the new generation of Islamic intelligentsia.

At the beginning of the 1930s some leading activists of JIB had become university students. Realizing that JIB was no longer a suitable place for the intellectual development of the university students, Jusuf Wibisono and Mohamad Roem (both were now students of the RHS) proposed the founding of an Islamic society for university students — as the continuation of JIB in a tertiary milieu. This was achieved in December 1934 with the establishment of the *Studenten Islam Studieclub* [SIS, Muslim Students' Study Club] in Jakarta.

The emergence of this Islamic club actually lagged behind that of the secular (university) student activists, for the latter by this time had already transformed their student clubs of the 1920s into political parties. It was exactly because of this backwardness that SIS initiators were motivated to continue JIB's historical project, namely the Islamization of the intelligentsia. Jusuf Wibisono's remarks at the opening ceremony of this society capture the mood surrounding of its establishment:

The intelligentsia (*intellectueelen*) of our society mostly have a poor understanding of Islam...Notwithstanding the fact that they lack an understanding of Islam and although they may realize the meaningfulness of Islam for the majority of people, they have no interest in Islamic study...They often associate Islam with the negative image of its followers...Sadly, the literature on Islam accessible to these educated people is mostly written by non-Muslim scholars who are not free from negative intentions.

After describing the Islamic deprivation of the intelligentsia, Wibisono came to the conclusion: "Our objective is to stimulate interest in Islamic studies among the intelligentsia (*intellectueelen*) in particular and Islamic society in general" (Wibisono 1980, pp. 394–95). This objective was again emphasized by A. Karim's remark (former chairman of SIS, 1937–38) in his speech on 8 October 1938: "Our great desire is to convert the intelligentsia (*intellectueelen*), especially those increasingly alienated from their own religion" (Karim 1990, p. 89).

To attract student interest in Islamic ideas, SIS adopted a scientific approach to articulate Islam. For this purpose, in March 1935 SIS established its own journal, *Orgaan van de Studenten Islam Studieclub* [*The Mouthpiece of SIS*], which after the fifth edition of the second year was renamed *Moslimse Reveil* (The Muslim Revival). Most articles were written in Dutch and, more importantly, a scientific analysis was applied to the interpretation of Islam. An article like "*Dante en Islam*" [Dante and Islam] appeared in this journal. To give a rational interpretation of the scriptures, this journal often used the Qur'anic commentary of the *Ahmadiyah*, which was well known for its rational scientific reasoning.

In actual fact university students with strong Islamic backgrounds and commitment to Islam were limited. To deal with this problem SIS relaxed its recruitment criteria to accommodate a wider constituency. In Article 5 of its statutes it is said that "all university students, regardless of their national and ideological orientation, can be accepted as members of the association". In reality, the membership of this association was limited in number. From about 1,246 students of the university in 1940 (Thomas 1973, p. 12), the number of students engaged in various SIS activities, based on Prawoto Mangkusasmito's estimates, was no more than 100 people (Saidi 1990, p. 39). Moreover, to encourage the involvement of nominal Muslim students in this association, the early leadership of SIS was given to those who had no background in Islamic activism.⁸⁶

Thus, the majority of SIS members were unlikely to be committed to Islamic political ideology. Nevertheless, whatever their level of commitment to Islamic political ideology, their engagement in Islamic intellectual networks linked them into the Islamic community. With its pioneering effort to create a nucleus of Islam-friendly intelligentsia among university students, the foundation of the SIS was a watershed for the future development of a university-based Muslim intelligentsia.

The formation of JIB and SIS represents a central theme in the development of Muslim intellectual movements throughout the twentieth century, namely the Islamization of the intelligentsia. During the Japanese Occupation in 1942

both organizations disappeared from the public scene. Their ideology and networks, however, were sustained in the memory of their former members and maintained through commemorative ceremonies and informal contacts among former activists or were transposed to new forms of collective actions.

The main overseas counterpart of the JIB and SIS was the Cairo-based *Djami'ah al-Chairiah* (*Persatuan Kemerdekaan Indonesia*). The most important contribution of this Cairo organization to the intellectual and political development of the Indonesian Muslim community was its function as a catalyst in linking the religious and political thought of the Indonesian Muslim intellectuals to that developed in centres of Islamic learning and movements in the Middle East. Al-Azhar graduates played a decisive role in the translation and interpretation of Arabic literature into Indonesian. In so doing they contributed to the provision of Islamic arguments used in the clash of discourse in the public sphere and to the formulation of Islamic ideology in response to the ongoing debates on nationalism and the foundation of the independent state (Boland 1971, pp. 161–64, 212).

Leadership of the Second Generation of Muslim Intelligentsia

(Former) leaders of JIB, SIS and *Djama'ah al-Chairiah* became leading intellectuals of the second generation of Muslim intelligentsia and clerical-intelligentsia. Leaders of this generation began to play a significant role in the political and intellectual leadership of the Muslim community in the 1930s. One of the most influential intellectuals of the second generation was Muhammad Natsir. His identification with the reformist-modernist ideology was a consequence of his deepening incorporation into the reformist-modernist intellectual networks (*Persis and JIB*). His erudition in both secular and religious knowledge made him an organic intellectual of the Muslim community which was recognized when he was made co-editor (with A. Hassan) of *Pembela Islam* in 1929.

At the time when Natsir began to co-edit this publication, the public sphere was dominated by discourses on nationalism. He began to take part in the polemic on Islam and nationalism in 1931. His article, “*Indonesisch Nationalisme*” [Indonesian Nationalism] in *Pembela Islam* no. 36 (October 1931), introduced the term “*Kebangsaan Muslimin*” [Muslim nationalism] as an alternative to secular nationalism and outlined the pioneering efforts of Muslim intellectuals in the national awakening movements, as well as stressing the primacy of Islamic principles and solidarity over secular-territorial identities.⁸⁷ Furthermore, his commitment to defending Islamic ideals was articulated through the establishment of an Islamic educational institute,

Pendidikan Islam [Islamic Education], of which he was director from 1932 to 1942. About the same time, he became an editor of a Medan-based Islamic magazine, *Pandji Islam* [*The Islamic Banner*, 1934–41], a magazine that reflected a Westernized approach to the study of Islam. As well, he translated some Arabic religious books into Dutch as well as writing pocket books in Dutch to communicate Islam to the educated community and also to promote Islam as the foundation of Indonesian independence.⁸⁸

Natsir's engagement in political activity began in 1940 when he became a chairman of the Bandung Chapter of the Sukiman-led Islamic Party (PII). This time was also a decisive moment for his inauguration as the leading ideologist of the second generation of the Muslim intelligentsia. He gained a reputation as a leading spokesmen for modernist-reformist Islam through his widely circulated exchange with Sukarno (then interned by the Dutch in Bencoolen) in April–June 1940 (Kahin 1993, p. 161). This exchange was expanded to debates on the Islamic versus the secular state which were published in *Pandji Islam* from May 1940 until July 1941. In this polemic, Sukarno highlighted Turkey's experience of detaching Islam from the state as the possible solution to the challenge of the modern world. In contrast, Natsir denied that the Ottoman Sultanate, commonly perceived as the exemplary centre of Islamic polity, was truly Islamic because of its departures from Islamic tenets. In that case, he said, Islam had never united with the state. For the polity to be really Islamic, he argued, "it has to apply the whole of Islamic principles, whether in relation to individual behaviour or social life" (*Pandji Islam*, no. 28, 15 July 1940). Natsir rejected the idea that a Western secular polity was the only model to be followed. He argued that according to Islam "the state is not an end in itself, but it has to realise Islamic injunctions."

In a much more thorough fashion than had been argued by Salim's generation, Natsir's arguments brought a new benchmark for the future formulation of Islamic ideology. The main political challenge of Salim's generation was the pressure of Marxism-communism. The formulation of Islamic ideology by Salim's generation was presented under the rubric of "Islamic socialism". The main political challenge of the Natsir's generation was the pressure of secular nationalism and the formulation of Islamic ideology by Natsir's generation was represented under the rubric of "Islamic nationalism and state".

The rise of Natsir as a new champion of Islamic ideology was followed by the elevation of the intellectual and political roles of former activists of JIB and SIS, such as Mohammad Roem, Wiwoho Purbohadidjojo and Kasman Singodimedjo⁸⁹ and also that of former activists of the *Djami'ah al-Chairiah*. In addition to Iljas Ja'kub and Muchtar Lutfi whose important role

in the leadership of the *Permi* has been discussed, it is worth including some other figures. Mahmud Junus, on his return in 1930 was made principal of the Normal School, founded by the PGAI in Padang in 1931. He himself soon ran the *Djami'ah Islamiyah School* in Sungajang, and later in the early 1940s, in collaboration with Muchtar Jahja, established an Islamic university. In the same period, Fathurrahman Kafrawi and Abdul Kahar Muzakkir after their return to Java became prominent leaders of the NU and *Muhammadiyah* respectively. Thus, by the time of the Japanese Occupation, these Muslim intellectuals of the second generation of Muslim intelligentsia had become the new leaders of the Islamic community.

POWER GAMES: CONSOLIDATION AND CONTESTATION

By the early 1940s intellectuals of the first generation of the intelligentsia, such as Agus Salim, were referred to as “the grand old men” and their political influence had begun to decline. At the same time, the second generation of the intelligentsia were considered as the “*kaoem dewasa*” [mature generation]. Intellectuals of this generation, most of whom had university educations, had successfully created new parties in their own right and detached themselves from the older parties of the first generation. The main political public of these new parties, beyond fellow intelligentsia of the same generation, were junior student-youths who were born generally in the late 1910s and 1920s. On entering the public sphere of the second generation of the intelligentsia, the activists among these junior students had been brought up in the discourse of nationalism and Indonesian independence. By the time of the Japanese Occupation (1942–45) and the revolution for independence (1945–49), these student youths found a common “language” and experience leading to the formation of the third generation of the Indonesian intelligentsia.

The Japanese Occupation which began on January 1942 provided a galvanizing moment for the strengthening of Indonesian nationalism. An easy victory for Japan over the Dutch made a tremendous impression on the Indonesians. The Dutch lost prestige in the eyes of many Indonesians and there was a belief that if given arms, they could have done as well as the Japanese. Coming to the land below the winds with the image of the Asian elder brother, the Japanese initially raised popular feelings that they came as liberators and as such they were generally received enthusiastically. This was reinforced when the Japanese immediately allowed the display of the red and white Indonesian national flag and the singing of *Indonesia Raya*, the national anthem, both of which had been forbidden by the Dutch. They also elevated

the status of *Bahasa Indonesia* [Indonesian language] so that it replaced Dutch in all its functions (Kahin 1952, pp. 101–02).

The Japanese soon interned in concentration camps practically the whole Dutch population of the Indies plus a substantial proportion of the Eurasians, as well as a number of Christian Indonesians whom they suspected of harbouring pro-Dutch sympathies. To fulfil the middle and upper-bracket administrative and technical positions left empty by the Dutch and Eurasians, the Japanese relied heavily on the Indonesian functional intelligentsia. Suddenly almost all such Indonesian personnel were given promotions, advanced to at least one and frequently two or three ranks in the hierarchy in which they had been employed. As a result, the Indonesian functional elite experienced a tremendous upward rise in socio-economic status (Kahin 1952, pp. 102–03).⁹⁰

This shocking “*Umwertung aller Werte*” [radical change] of events in 1942 was a prelude to a great break in the history of modern Indonesia. In this regard, there is every reason to consider 1942 rather than 1945 as the starting point of Indonesian Revolution. As A. Teeuw argued (1986, p. 106): “...the events of 1945 were a logical and also irrevocable consequence of the events of preceding years; politically as well as spiritually there is continuity rather than a break in 1945.”

From Japanese-Sponsored Associations to Popular Nationalism

For the politicized intelligentsia, the transfer of power from the old to the new colonial master might be summed up by an Indonesian saying as an “exit from the mouth of the crocodile, to enter into the mouth of the tiger”. Even so, the Japanese war effort provided an unintended catalyst for the consolidation of Indonesian nationalism as an historical bloc.

At the very beginning, the Japanese administration attempted to impress the Indonesian political community by releasing all former political prisoners imprisoned by the Dutch. Shortly afterwards, however, all Indonesian political activities were prohibited by a decree of the first Japanese Commander-in-Chief on Java, Lt.-General Imamura, which forbade “any discussion or organization...concerned with the political administration of the country”. This did not have the automatic effect of abolishing the existing political parties, but it condemned them to a process of gradually “withering away” because any political activity in the public sphere was tightly controlled by the military police, *Kempeitai* (Benda 1958, p. 111).

On the basis of the initial welcome they received from the population in general and the functional intelligentsia in particular, the Japanese

Gunseikan (head of the military administration) initially felt their ambition to exploit Indonesian resources could be achieved without having to make concessions to Indonesian nationalism. Thus, the *Gunseikan* side-stepped pre-invasion political associations and on 29 April 1942 launched a new all-embracing political umbrella called *Pergerakan Tiga A* [Triple-A Movement], without involving the first rank nationalist leaders of the time such as Sukarno and Hatta.⁹¹

Wanting to attract all major anti-Dutch forces to their cause, the Japanese, as depicted by Harry J. Benda, “appeared to have felt that to ensure Muslim goodwill was a matter of greater urgency than to satisfy the demands of the nationalist elite”. In the eyes of the new colonial masters, neither the corps of *priyayi* nor other functional elite “could, by comparison, easily escape the stigma of their previous loyalty to the colonial government”. In contrast to the nationalist leaders — whose political influence remained confined to the few major urban centres — the political advantage of the Muslim leaders from the point of view of the Japanese was simply incommensurable, as the latter “counted hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of adherents”. In addition, “the Japanese might have singled out Muslim leaders as perhaps the most reliable and Eastern-oriented element” of the Indonesian political communities (Benda 1958, pp. 108–10).

Some preliminary efforts to establish a good relationship with Indonesian Muslims had been taken even before the Japanese troops landed in the archipelago. On October 1939, the Japanese invited the MIAI to attend the Japanese-sponsored first Islamic World Congress in Tokyo. Also, just before the arrival of Japanese troops to the area, the PUSA’s *ulama* of Aceh had contacted the Japanese and laid plans to conduct sabotage against the Dutch and to remove the *uleëbalang* (feudal aristocracy) from their administrative posts. This led to a general revolt in Aceh in March 1942 (Benda 1958, pp. 103–04; Ricklefs, 1993, p. 200). In Java, the Japanese effort to mobilize Muslim supporters began soon after the surrender of the Dutch with the establishment of the Religious Affairs Office [*Shûmubu* in Japanese, *Kantor Urusan Agama* in Indonesian] at the end of March 1942. The Office was headed by a Japanese officer, Colonel Chôsô Horie, but from October 1943 Dr Husein Djajadiningrat (the first result of Snouck’s “association” policy) was elevated to be the first Indonesian head of the office.

It must be borne in mind, however, that when Muslim politics became an issue, the Japanese adopted a carrot and stick policy. In a similar pattern to Snouck’s blue print of divorcing Islam from politics, the Japanese made it clear that they would not tolerate the marriage of Islam and politics. Thus, of all political groups, Islamic political parties were singled out for explicit

prohibition. On May 1942 the PSII announced the closing of its Jakarta head-office and ordered all branches to follow suit immediately. About the same time, the new modernist *Partai Islam Indonesia* (PII) also published a similar announcement. On the other hand, the new rulers not only tended to provide greater representation for Muslim leaders in the new government-sponsored quasi-political organs, but also attempted to forge a close link between the Islamic elite and its rural following (Benda 1958, pp. 111–13).

In this context, the Japanese sponsored the creation of an all-embracing Muslim body that was to become part of the Triple-A Movement. The motive for this policy appeared to be to supplant the pre-invasion Islamic federation, MIAI — for its overtly anti-colonial record — with a new more cooperative one. Thus, the Japanese soon created the Preparatory [committee] for the Unification of the Islamic Community, headed by PSII chairman Abikusno Tjokrosujoso (Tjokroaminoto's younger brother), and called a three-day meeting of all Muslim leaders to be held in Jakarta between 21–23 August 1942. Although the conference resulted in a certain degree of cooperation with the Japanese, it was surprising that no new organization came into existence. Instead of creating a monolithic *persatuan* [union], the conference decided to retain the MIAI federation headed by a Western-educated leader of the PSII, Wondoamiseno. By the end of 1942, when the new version of the MIAI had been set up, the authorities had abandoned the Triple-A Movement. This meant that the MIAI continued to be an “independent” organization.

In a further development, however, as the MIAI leadership sought to build an independent network of Islamic cells through the islands, to unite the people in the name of *Allah*, rather than that of *Tenno Heika*, the Japanese could no longer tolerate the existence of the federation. In an attempt to alienate the leadership of the MIAI from its major constituency, the Japanese granted legal status to *Muhammadiyah* and *NU* with all their branches. In the face of this challenge, chairman Wondoamiseno could do nothing but to close down the MIAI in October 1943. After the disappearance of the MIAI, the government sponsored the creation of a new federation in November 1943, the *Majlis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia* [*Masjumi*, Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims]. This federation was initially based on legal associations⁹² and headed nominally by the venerable traditionalist leader, Hasjim Asj'ari. It would play a critical role in championing the aspiration of political Islam in the lead up to the proclamation of Indonesian independence (Benda 1958, pp. 114–51).

The creation of *Masjumi* represented a victory for Japanese Islamic policy. At the same time, it provided a catalyst for a powerful alliance of the two

most important Muslim associations, *NU* and *Muhammadiyah*. This elevated the political bargaining power for the Muslim group at the expense initially of the secular nationalist camp. Thus, under the Japanese policy of wooing the Islamic community, the Muslim intelligentsia and clerical intelligentsia made more conspicuous gains than they had during the pre-war period. More importantly, traditional Islamic leaders with their unique influence at the grass-root level gained a higher political advantage than other groups and during previous periods. The main beneficiaries of this situation were the traditionalist *ulama-intelekt*. Because the Japanese government forbade formal communication except in the Latin and Japanese script, the *ulama-intelekt* who were literate in Latin alphabet had a symbolic capital which strengthened their public role. This was signalled by the appointment of Wachid Hasjim as the vice (and acting) president of the *Masjumi*.

Nevertheless, the occupation was too short in duration to affect in any vital way the body of Indonesian political and functional elite. As the Japanese began to lose the Pacific War and the economic condition of Java deteriorated, the Japanese became more aware of the importance of curtailing radical nationalist movements by giving more concessions to the secular nationalist leaders. Thus, the political scene during the last months of the occupation was increasingly dominated by the rise to ultimate pre-eminence of the Indonesian nationalist elite (Benda 1958, pp. 172–74).

The Japanese came to realize the importance of involving influential nationalist leaders following the failure of the Triple-A movement to gain expected support from the secular nationalist politicians. With the promise that self-government would be granted in the near future, a new all-inclusive nationalist organization was set up on 9 March 1943, called the *Pusat Tenaga Rakjat* [*Putera*, Centre of People's Power]. This movement brought together all of the former Indonesian political and non-political nationalist associations domiciled in Java and Madura, led by a board of four. Sukarno was chairman, Hatta vice chairman, with Suwardi Surjaningrat (Ki Hadjar Dewantara) and a prominent Muslim reformist-modernist leader, Mas Mansur, as the other members.⁹³

Under the aegis of *Putera*, the Japanese set up a number of military organizations. The most important was the *Sukarela Tentara Pembela Tanah Air* [*Peta*, Volunteer Army of Defenders of the Fatherland].⁹⁴ Established in September 1943, *Peta* was as a decentralized auxiliary guerrilla force,⁹⁵ in which those chosen for training as battalion commanders [*daidancho*]⁹⁶ were mostly older men believed by the Japanese to have influence among the youth. They were recruited often from among local schoolteachers, officials, Islamic notables and intellectuals who had some Western

education.⁹⁷ On 29 April 1943 the military government also initiated paramilitary training for youth, intended to provide youth forces for the more immediate goals of internal security and political mobilization. These included *Seinendan* [Youth Corps],⁹⁸ the *Keibodan* [Vigilance Corps],⁹⁹ the *Gakutotai* [Student Paramilitary Corps].

For the Japanese, these organizations were primarily a means of rallying Indonesian support behind their war effort. To the nationalist leaders, however, they provided a vehicle for extending their contact to the masses which the repressive apparatus of the Dutch regime had so severely limited (Kahin 1952, p. 108).¹⁰⁰ Japanese lack of political commitment up till 1943 provided the opportunity for the nationalist political leaders to exploit these organizations for their nationalist interests. This factor along with internal leadership rivalries doomed the *Putera* project to failure.¹⁰¹

As the economic condition of Java and popular morale deteriorated, the *Gunseken* felt it urgent to create a new organization that they could control effectively. Established on 1 March 1944 the name of this organization was the *Perhimpunan Kebaktian Rakjat* [People's Loyalty Organization] generally was known by its Japanese name, *Djawa Hôkôkai* [Java Service Association]. Designed for the purposes of massive mobilization, the *Hôkôkai* was directly under the authority of the *Gunseikan*. Sukarno was only a nominal chairman of this organization (Kahin 1952, p. 110).¹⁰²

Under the aegis of the *Hôkôkai*, in September 1944 the Japanese set up a youth vanguard organization, *Suishintai* or *Barisan Pelopor* (Pioneer Corps).¹⁰³ This corps was originally designed as a political organization whose principal aim was to be the driving activist vanguard of the *Hôkôkai*. For this purpose, members were given paramilitary drilling with *bambu runcing* [sharpened bamboo spears] and taught the techniques of mass mobilization, such as bringing the people to hear the speeches of the nationalist leaders. The *Hôkôkai* recruited young people from all social strata but primarily those from nominal Muslim backgrounds (*abangan*). The corps drew its strength especially from the increasingly politicized youth of the larger urban centres (Anderson 1972, pp. 29–30).

Shortly after the appearance of the *Barisan Pelopor*, the Japanese concern about the increased strength of the nationalists prompted the *Gunseikan* to grant a long neglected Muslim request for a similar corps on 8 December 1944. A few weeks later this Muslims youth corps was named *Hizbu'llah* [The Army of God], followed in January 1945 by the first field training of five hundred Muslim fighters somewhere in West Java.¹⁰⁴ This corps was incorporated into *Masjumi* and was intended as a reserve corps for the *Peta*.

Its chairman was Zainul Arifin (one of the NU delegates in the *Masjumi* executive), with Mohammad Roem (modernist Muslim intelligentsia) as vice-chairman plus ten other members.¹⁰⁵

Through the structure of vanguard corps such as *Barisan Pelopor* and *Hizbu'llah*, the links between the educated people of the central offices and the non-educated people of the city slums, shantytowns and countryside were created. In this process the rigid educational stratification and the boundaries between the elite and others created by long-term colonial policies began to break down. The Japanese-sponsored propaganda of nationalism by nationalist leaders might have contributed to the crumbling of the social boundaries. But the main reason was the encounter of the educated and uneducated youth as fellow members of particular vanguard corps, which enabled the nationalist ideology to attain its concrete meaning. This experience, in the view of Anderson "generated that sense of mass power, of fraternal solidarity, of immense possibilities, that lies at the heart of popular nationalism" (Anderson 1972, p. 30).¹⁰⁶

From Underground Movements to Popular Nationalism

The growing tide of popular nationalism was also swelled by underground movements. Soon after the arrival of the Japanese troops, some of the politicized intelligentsia who did not want to collaborate with the new colonial masters went underground. Thus, there emerged underground groups in the large urban centres, notably Jakarta. These developed informal communication networks in which a few senior (political) mentors recruited followers from the nucleus of student youths.

At the outset, the so-called "Sjarifuddin's *Pemoeda*" acted this way under the sponsorship of P.J.A. Idenburg.¹⁰⁷ Amir Sjarifuddin, chairman of the Gerindo, the most left-wing of the legal parties of the late thirties, recruited to his underground networks former members of *Gerindo* and members of the so-called Illegal PKI, which had been clandestinely reconstituted by Muso in 1935 (Anderson 1972, pp. 37–38).¹⁰⁸ After the collapse of Sjafruddin's underground networks in early 1943, "Sutan Sjahri's *Pemoeda*" came into existence and became the most important. Drawing its principal support from amongst educated youth, Sjahri's *Pemoeda* also established a wide network with rural youth through peasant cooperatives.¹⁰⁹ In addition, there also emerged "Tan Malaka's *Pemoeda*" (followers of the legendary communist leader, Tan Malaka), as well as an Islamic circle of "Mohammad Natsir's *Pemoeda*". Each of these groups developed a particular student-youth wing, comprised of radical students of the tertiary and secondary schools whose

number increased unprecedentedly as a result of changes in educational regime and school conditions.

For the Western-educated minority, the initial effect of the occupation was extremely shocking. The military government closed down all schools, and when the schools were gradually re-opened, Dutch was no longer permitted as the language of instruction in any type of school. As Dutch was outlawed and Japanese took some time to learn, Indonesian became the language of instruction.

For Indonesian students, the promotion of Indonesian language and the teachers provided a perplexing new experience. On the one hand, there were difficulties as the “alien” Indonesian language had to be mastered and textbooks provided in Indonesian and Japanese. On the other hand, the exposure to Indonesian language and the encounter with Indonesian teachers, the fusion of various types of schools (particularly at the secondary level) into a single united system, the introduction of school uniforms, morning rituals, marching and other paramilitary practices brought about a new collective solidarity [*esprit de corps*] which empowered Indonesian nationalism (*Redaksi SMT* 1998, pp. 15–32).

As well as re-organizing public schools, the Japanese kept close control over the whole field of Islamic education. In their eyes, Islamic education deserved special attention for its significant impact on grass-roots political behaviour. For this reason, Arabic teaching was initially forbidden. Nevertheless, when active Islamic support for the defence of Java was felt to be more urgent, Arabic teaching was allowed and Islamic schools were gradually re-opened. Yet, Islamic students and teachers suffered a serious humiliation. The Japanese insistence on the practice of *Saikeirei*, bowing towards Tokyo (rather than Mecca) which resembles the prayer bow performed by Muslims, clashed head-on with the Islamic faith. This gave rise to anti-Japanese overtones and increased the desire for independence (Benda 1958, pp. 122–23).

The most detrimental effect of this new educational regime occurred at the higher level of education. Students of the higher schools who were the most Westernized segment of society and for whom Dutch was the language of conversation had to face the reality that the Dutch was outlawed and that Japanese, or at best Indonesian, was the general medium of instruction. Since virtually all upper-level textbooks were in Dutch, students were suddenly alienated from the existing academic literature. Beyond the language problem, the students were also humiliated by Japanese lecturers who could slap the students’ faces and order them to have their heads shaved in the Japanese fashion (Mrázek 1994, p. 229).

Lacking exposure to Western scientific knowledge, all students of this generation were exposed to military and paramilitary trainings in which they were encouraged to absorb a spiritual strength *à la Bushidō*. The residual effect of the student-youth engagement in this paramilitary education was a the cultivation of violent mentalities.¹¹⁰ At the same time, this kind of education helped strengthen the spirit of egalitarian nationalism and student-youths of diverse backgrounds came to unite in a common historical calling: to serve the nation.

Being deprived of or frustrated by the school conditions, many students went in various directions with radical students tending to be drawn slowly into the underground movement.¹¹¹ Some student youths began to set up underground groups centred in some student dormitories (*asrama*) in Jakarta. These included the group of *Persatuan Mahasiswa* [Student Union] centred in the *asrama* of the *Ika Daigaku* [medical college] at Prapatan 10,¹¹² the “Sendenbu group” centred in the *Asrama Angkatan Baru Indonesia* [Ashram of the New Generation of Indonesia] at Menteng 31,¹¹³ the “*Kaigun* group” centred in the *Asrama Indonesia Merdeka* [Free Indonesian Ashram] at Kebon Sirih 80,¹¹⁴ and the group of *Sekolah Tinggi Islam* [Advanced Islamic School] centred around *Balai Muslimin Indonesia* [House of the Indonesian Muslims] at Kramat 31.¹¹⁵

These groups were not “underground” in the sense of being secret agents who orchestrated secret violent resistance. In fact, not only were many of the *asrama* activists closely related by family or other ties to the most prominent collaborators but it was also the case that the military government knew what was going on in *pemoeda* circles. The term “underground” in this case, to borrow Anderson’s view, could best be seen as a frame of mind: “a growing willingness on the part of metropolitan *pemuda* to think of themselves as ‘thinking dangerous thoughts’ ” (Anderson 1972, p. 49). Even so, this was sufficient to stimulate a political climate conducive to mobilizing popular patriotism.

From Literary Activism and the Media-Sphere to Popular Nationalism

In the literary field, the immediate impact of the Japanese Occupation was the voluntary cessation of the publication of *Pudjangga Baroe* (PB) by its editors. In the face of the new colonial environment, the PB journal and the *literati* of the PB generation found themselves unfit to cope creatively with the new *zeitgeist*. Politically, although the PB journal was a manifestation of pre-war nationalism that opposed colonialism, its tendency to favour some

Western values such as modern rationalism and individualism had a certain degree of affinity with the symbolic universe of the Dutch colonial masters. This affinity may well have worked to gain Dutch support for its survival. But now, under the fascistic Japanese occupation, the mental frame of reference of the PB *literati* underwent a sudden breakdown. Spiritually, the approach of the PB was essentially romantic, sentimental and provincial. In an age of war and revolution that demanded deeds rather than dreams, PB literature became totally inadequate. Under the heightening spirit of popular nationalism and revolution, a new generation of *literati* emerged from 1942–43 up to the end of the Indonesian revolution in 1949 (Teeuw 1986, pp. 105–18).

The literature of this generation reflected the spirit of revolution both in content and form. In content, the literature tended to be dominated by nationalistic political propaganda. In form, there was a radical departure from rigid traditional literary structure, especially in the poetry. By adopting Western literary styles the works of the “rebel” poet Chairil Anwar became the representative par excellence of such a revolutionary change. In prose, most writings produced in this period were short stories reflecting the revolutionary mood, time and space with Idrus’ works being the best example of this genre. At this juncture, “there was still little specifically Islamic writing, except for Bahrum Rangkuti (1919–77), who was much inspired by the Pakistani writer Muhammad Iqbal” (Ricklefs 1993, p. 215).

Apart from literature, a specific characteristic of the public sphere of the time also contributed to the growing vibrancy of popular patriotism. Under the Japanese all types of publication without legal permit from the military government were forbidden. All Dutch and Chinese-owned media were forbidden. All pre-invasion native presses were closed down, although shortly afterwards a few of those reappeared under a new structure with new names given or agreed to by the Japanese.¹¹⁶ Increased opportunities to spread the seeds of popular nationalism occurred when the Japanese installed a considerable radio network throughout the archipelago. They also made sure that the villagers and city dwellers had receiver sets.¹¹⁷

Since most of the Indonesian population of the time were illiterate, the introduction of the radio was a breakthrough in overcoming the communication barriers between the politicized intelligentsia and the masses. To borrow the words of Marshall McLuhan in his seminal work, *Understanding Media* (1964, p. 299), the advantage of this new media can be described thus:

Radio affects most people intimately, person-to-person, offering a world of unspoken communications between writer-speaker and the listener. That is the immediate aspect of radio. A private experience. The subliminal depths

of radio are charged with the resonating echoes of tribal horns and antique drums. This is inherent in the very nature of this medium, with its power to turn the psyche and society into a single echo chamber.

In contrast to the limited and elitist circulation of the press, the radio provided the first massive simultaneous experience of exposure to the “alien” political world of the intelligentsia in an intimate way. In this, the radio mediated the construction of common ideas and solidarity leading to the empowerment of popular nationalism.

Towards the Proclamation of Indonesian Independence

The encounter of *pemoeda* from all social strata through various military and vanguard organizations, the existence of underground movements and the powerful effect of radio in breaking socio-spatial boundaries brought about an unprecedented collective experience of horizontal comradeship. This in turn helped empower the spirit of Indonesian nationalism as a common historical bloc. In the growing spirit of egalitarian nationalism, the third generation of intelligentsia was born without a specific signifier in its own right. The only powerful signifier of the time was “*pemoeda*”, which included both the educated and uneducated people.

The egalitarian nationalism of the revolutionary *pemoeda* was channelled into the push for independence following the so-called Koiso Declaration. As the Japanese military situation worsened, the Japanese prime minister Kuniaki Koiso made his historic promise on 7 September 1944 that Indonesia would definitely be given its independence “in the future”. This declaration stimulated civil disobedience among the educated youths. Underground groups changed their character, “and moved out of the shadowy limbo between legality and illegality”, as “the Japanese authorities were no longer in a position openly to oppose *pemuda* objectives” (Anderson 1972, p. 49). Above ground, this promise led to the formation of several Japanese-sponsored institutions in line with the preparation of Indonesian independence.

Towards the realization of this promise, on 1 March 1945 the Japanese commander-in-chief announced the establishment of the Study Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence [*Badan Untuk Menyelidiki Usaha-Usaha Kemerdekaan*]¹¹⁸ chaired by Radjiman Wediodiningrat. The composition of the Study Committee was made public on 29 April. Of the sixty-two members of this committee at its first series of meetings (29 May–1 June), there were only ten representatives of the Islamic community.¹¹⁹ The dominance of secular politicians in the committee reflected the Japanese preference for transferring state power to Indonesians capable of administering

a modern state. In this context, as Benda argued, the secular nationalist elite was to benefit from its superiority in Western education and political schooling that "it could rightfully claim as a monopoly among its competitors" (Benda 1958, pp. 173–74).

In this first session of the Study Committee, the mood of the meetings, which were dominated by secular figures, had tended to reject the idea of an Islamic state. On the closing day (1 June) Sukarno as a prominent nationalist leader gave an address in which he outlined for the first time his ideas on the five principles of the independent Indonesian state, ideas that came to be known as *Pancasila* (Five Principles).¹²⁰ When the address described the third principle, that of democracy, he rejected the idea that Islam should become the basis of the Indonesian state. He confronted the Islamic leaders with the fact that although about eighty to ninety per cent of the total Indonesian population were Muslims, a considerable proportion was fairly lax in practising Islamic injunctions and was in favour of a secular over an Islamic state (Dijk 1981, pp. 45–46).

Sukarno's exposition on this fundamental issue with subsequent debates on its ramifications gave rise to a conflict between proponents of a secular and those of an Islamic state. These debates provided a new basis for mobilizing Islamic collective solidarity and identity. After their experience of unity under the all-inclusive Islamic federation, MIAI/Masjumi, and in confronting a common enemy, both traditionalist and reformist-modernist Muslim leaders now had a common language with which to articulate the interests of the Islamic political community. This can be seen in their cohesiveness in defending Islamic ideals in the following session of the Study Committee.

Following the first session, Sukarno took the initiative to gather some thirty-eight members of the committee in the headquarters of *Djawa Hôkôkai* on 22 June to discuss the issues to be settled at the committee's next session. At this meeting, a special sub-committee of nine chaired by Sukarno was appointed to study the position of Islam. The other eight were Mohammad Hatta, Muhammad Yamin, Subardjo, and Maramis (as representatives of the secular camp), Agus Salim, Abdul Kahar Muzakir, Wachid Hasjim, and Abikusno Tjokrosujoso (as representatives of the Islamic camp). This sub-committee reached a compromise that later came to be known as the formula of the "*Piagam Jakarta*" [The Jakarta Charter], which was intended to be included in the preamble of the constitution. In this compromise formula, Islam was not regarded as the sole basis of the state, but with a modification of the *Pancasila* principles outlined by Sukarno early in June would have a proper place in the independence state. In the first place, the order of five

principles was changed. The principle of the “belief in one God”, put at the end in the earlier Sukarno’s formulation, became the first principle. Next, under pressure from the Islamic camp for a special provision for the Muslim community, the phrase “belief in God” was expanded with the following clause “with the obligation for the adherents of Islam to practise Islamic law”. This clause came to be known as “the seven words” (Dijk 1981, pp. 47–48; Boland 1971, p. 27).

During the second series of the Study Committee meetings (10–17 July), the formula of the Jakarta Charter was discussed in the constitution sub-committee headed by Sukarno. The formula came immediately under attack from J. Latuharhary (representing the Christian community of the Moluccas), Wongsonegoro (a Javanese aristocrat) and several other representatives of non-Muslim and secular groups. Basically, they raised objections to “the seven words” for “the consequences the clause might have for adherents of other religions, and because of difficulties it might give rise to in the relation between Islam and customary law”. The attacks gave rise to severe and extensive debates that could only be reined in by the charismatic appeals of influential personalities such as Sukarno. Sukarno relentlessly reminded members of the sub-committee that the Jakarta Charter was the optimal compromise in which both proponents of the secular and Islamic State could gain a common denominator. Thus, at the end of the second session, the status of the Jakarta Charter remained in the draft of the constitution (Dijk 1981, pp. 48–58).

By the beginning of August 1945, the Japanese position in the Pacific War was desperate. When Hiroshima was devastated by the atomic bomb on 6 August, Indonesian political developments accelerated. On 7 August the Japanese High command in Saigon announced the creation of the *Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia* [PPKI, Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence], as the successor to the Study Committee. The new committee was intended “to hasten all efforts in relation to final preparations for forming a government of an independent Indonesia” (Anderson 1972, p. 62). While the membership of the Study Committee had been composed along the lines of ideological diversity, the major criterion for the composition of the PPKI members was the regional diversity of Indonesia. Consequently, some key former members persons of the Study Committee such as Agus Salim, Abdul Kahar Muzakkir, Masjkur, Ahmad Sanusi, Abikusno Tjokrosujoso as well as Wongsonegoro and Mohammad Yamin disappeared from the list of PPKI membership (Dijk 1981, p. 60).

The disappearance of leading Muslim figures from the PPKI was a bad omen for the struggle of Muslim politics. The political history of the nation

afterwards continued to reflect the inferiority of political Islam. Originally, the PPKI was composed of twenty-one members chaired by Sukarno with Mohammad Hatta and Radjiman Wediodiningrat as vice chairmen.¹²¹ Of the twenty-one members twelve can be classified as older generation, non-Islamic nationalist leaders. The other nine contained two representatives of the "*pangreh praja*" [indigenous administrative corps], three from the principalities of Yogyakarta and Surakarta, two from Islamic organizations, one as Peta representative, and one from the Chinese minority (Anderson 1972, p. 64). The new committee was once again dominated by secular politicians with the Islamic camp represented only by Ki Bagus Hadikusumo of the *Muhammadiyah* and Wachid Hasjim of the NU.

After discussions between the chairman of the PPKI with Japanese authorities it was agreed that the committee's first meeting would be held on 18 August. When the time came, the Indonesian political mood and situation had changed dramatically.

When the Japanese surrendered to the Allied forces in August 1945 there was an opportunity for the political intelligentsia to declare the independence of Indonesia. In this moment, a combination of the growing culture of violence and the spirit of egalitarian nationalism among the youth played a very decisive role. Hearing rumours about a possible Japanese surrender as early as 10 August 1945, radical *pemoeda* urged nationalist leaders, Sukarno and Hatta, to declare immediately the proclamation of independence outside the framework of the Japanese-sponsored PPKI.¹²² Sukarno and some other *pemoeda* kidnapped Sukarno and Hatta at 4 a.m. on 16 August and brought them to the *Peta* garrison at Rengasdengklok (West Java). Although the act itself failed to move both leaders, that experience was a strong case for them to convince the Japanese military government that the Proclamation of Independence was a condition *sine qua non* to avoid a state of anarchy. This dramatic moment finally led to the proclamation of Indonesian independence by Sukarno on 17 August 1945.

In the jubilation of Indonesian independence, certain adjustments were made to the composition of the PPKI. On an informal basis some individuals, included Kasman Singedimedjo (*Peta* commander in Jakarta), were asked to attend.¹²³ Thus, with the addition of Kasman, there were only three people who could be expected to represent Islamic voices in the committee. With this minority representation, the Islamic camp had to confront a vital "battle" in deciding the constitution of the Indonesian republic. On 18 August the PPKI elected Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta respectively President and Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia. At the same time, the committee approved the draft constitution drawn up

earlier by the Study Committee. The “seven words” of the Jakarta Charter — the provision that had frequently been described by Sukarno as an optimum compromise and that had aroused the greatest controversy in the last session of the Study Committee — were omitted.¹²⁴

The impotence of the Islamic camp in the PPKI was also proven by the early rejection of the idea of creating a Ministry of Religion. At first, Latuharhary opposed the idea on the ground that it would become a bone of contention between the Islamic and Christian communities. He won the support of the nineteen members of the Committee (Anderson 1972, pp. 87–90) with the result that from Sukarno’s first presidential cabinet (31 August–14 November 1945) until Sjahrir’s first parliamentary cabinet (14 November 1945–12 March 1946) this department did not exist.¹²⁵ The disappointment of Muslim leaders grew when they were under-represented both on the newly established legislative body *Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat* (KNIP, Central Indonesian National Committee)¹²⁶ and on the Indonesia’s first republican cabinet.¹²⁷

Thus, although they were freed from the iron cage of the colonial occupation and moving towards the free public sphere of the independent nation, political Islam remained in gloom. The political marginalization of Muslims was sustained, in part, by persisting colonial hierarchies of knowledge and values which reinforced what Edward Said calls the “dreadful secondariness” of some segments of society and cultures. Colonization, as Said argued, is a “fate with lasting, indeed grotesquely unfair results” (Said 1989, p. 207).

CONCLUSION

With the proclamation of Indonesian independence, a radical departure in the history of the nation began. The cry of “*merdeka*” now became the *rite de passage* of people in the street. It was in the fantasy of popular hope that Indonesian independence became a reality, while in fact post-colonial nightmares entered the political arena through the back door of the new republic. For the political actors of the new republic there was no time to rest. New “enemies” had arisen and the Allied forces were about to land on the islands. At least, there was a brief moment to share jubilation with the millenarian hope of the ordinary people through the recognition of the heroic Indonesian struggle of the late colonial period.

The period of the 1920s–1940s had seen the culmination of a whole series of both hegemonic and counter-hegemonic projects in the relationship between the superior-colonizers and the inferior-colonized people in the East

Indies. In the end, “*Dewi Fortuna*” (the Goddess of Fortune) sided with the oppressed.

It seems to be true that the historical trajectory of humans is not a straight path that can be easily manipulated by the superiority of knowledge and power. Both the myth of Dutch *zakelijkheid* and Nippon’s inner strength failed to control Indonesian history. Despite the colonial practice of domination, there remained some resources of counter-hegemonic power. No matter what domination was applied it failed to quell the resistance.

The dominant power was always equipped with its own mask. The Dutch “Ethical” and “association” policies were intended to cover colonial interests with the image of benevolence. The cost of maintaining the mask was indeed expensive. In a time of social-economic malaise when economic resources were scarce, the rising expectations of the privileged segment of the dominated society were too expensive to be satisfied by the presentation of so-called benign policies. Faced with this, the dominant power preferred to remove its mask. Thus, in the deterioration of the Indies economy after World War I, and especially during the great depression of the 1930s, the ethical spirit became an outworn creed, to be replaced by the regime of *rust en orde*.

The deployment of the repressive state apparatus at a time of newly emerging national consciousness brought about a radical change in Indies political development. Politicized intelligentsia began to turn away from the politics of cooperation with the apparatus of the colonial state. In their eyes, cooperation under repression meant merely “the stronger riding roughshod over the weaker and the use of one as an instrument by the other for its own interest”. The point of departure was the invention of “Indonesia” as a counter-construction to the Dutch construction of the “Netherlands East Indies”. The invention of Indonesia signalled the invention of Indonesian politics. A new “imagined community” emerged that could unite the plurality of subject positions into a common historical bloc.

The struggle to achieve this historical project found its decisive moment during the Japanese interregnum. Through the structure of the Japanese-sponsored military and paramilitary organizations the links between the educated and the non-educated people were forged. In this process the rigid educational stratification and the boundary between the elite and the masses, created by long-term colonial policies, began to break down. This situation generated a sense of mass power and of fraternal solidarity leading to the growth of popular nationalism.

The making of Indonesia as a new imagined community and historical bloc was in fact coterminous with the ongoing political disputes among the intelligentsia of different collectivities and identities. The clash of

ideologies which began as social movements in the previous decades transformed themselves into political parties. In the very beginning, ideological discovery was needed not only to give a solid theoretical foundation for responding to the repressive colonial state, but also to give plausibility and a sense of collective identity to particular collective actions. Nevertheless, in grounding the ideology in the body of a the structured political party — requiring specific rules, code of conducts, chains of command and party discipline — mental, linguistic and spatial boundaries had been automatically created which separated us and them, in-group and out-group (collective) identities. In this stage, collective identities that had been created in the awaking of the proto-national movements in the 1910s began to be converted into politicized identities.

There soon emerged diverse political traditions centred around nuclei of the intelligentsia and clerical intelligentsia. The basic principle for the constitution of these traditions was a coming together of differences in intellectual networks, the degree of exposure to modern (Western) civilization, cultural and socio-economic base, and political orientation. In broad terms, six political traditions had emerged in the pre-war period: the reformist-modernist (Islamic) tradition, the traditionalist (Islamic) tradition, the communist (secular) tradition, the nationalist (secular) tradition, the socialist (secular) tradition, and the Christian — Protestant and Catholic — (secular) tradition. One more tradition would emerge in the second half of the 1940s, namely the military (secular) tradition.

Here, both the Marxian premise of polarization between two major camps of society and the Weberian theory of social fragmentation within each social camp are of relevance. As the socio-political groupings were mainly defined on the basis of “*aliran*” [cultural stream] solidarity rather than “class” solidarity, political polarization mostly emerged between the Muslim and secular camp. At the same time, there had been a fragmentation within both the Muslim and the secular camps. Each tradition had its own sectoral solidarity and identity. In certain moments, however, the logic of competitive political struggle, especially in facing external threats to the perceived common cultural identity, forced smaller sectors of each cultural stream to unite in a broader coalition of the *aliran* entity.

Thus, the making of Indonesia as a new political community expressed not only a tension in the state-society interaction but also in the interaction of diverse political traditions within society. Under the “alien” colonial administration, the conflict within society was neutralized by conflict in the state-society interaction. As the colonial state disappeared, conflicts within the society made it difficult to arrive at a common cause.

In the competition between the secular and Muslim intelligentsia over the political leadership of the new state, the secular intelligentsia became the winner. The Dutch association policy with its disguised ambition to detach the new elite from Islam now began to bear fruit in the emergence of the (moderate) secular intelligentsia. The handicap of the Muslim intelligentsia in terms of modern educational qualifications and political schooling was made worse by the Dutch and Japanese policy of marginalizing political Islam. As a result the Islamic camp was defeated in a series of competitive political struggles.

The Muslim intelligentsia began to realize their minority position within the intellectual community in the 1920s. To deal with this problem they developed the historical project of Islamizing the intelligentsia that would become the main theme of Muslim intellectual movements for the rest of the twentieth century. This was embedded in the formation of, among others, JIB, SIS, and the Islamic University. These projects successfully contributed to the emergence of a new breed of the Muslim intelligentsia. By the time of the proclamation of independence, however, their competitive advantage remained far less than that of their secular counterparts. This resulted in under-representation of political Islam in the political community of the new republic.

With the impotence of the Islamic camp in the polity of the new republic, the faith continued to be an outsider on the Indonesian political scene. This gave rise to the emergence of what W. F. Wertheim called (1980) "the majority with minority mentality" syndrome. It was this kind of collective memory and mentality that would shape the construction of Muslims' politics of meaning in the following decades. Under the shadow of this cognitive structure, a new generation of the Muslim intelligentsia was born with the burden of a painful remembering.

Notes

1. Quoted from Hatta (1998, p. 15).
2. Quoted from H. Benda (1958, p. 176). Reference to the "treacherous (Dutch) policy" seems aimed at the "association" policy. For discussion of the "association" policy, see chapter 2.
3. Quoted in Furnivall (1958, p. 465).
4. In fact, this socialist political manoeuvre in the Netherlands failed and the *status quo* was maintained.
5. Fearing the communist orientation of the ISDV with its ability to gather at least 3,000 soldiers and sailors into Soviets, mainly in Surabaya, the government crushed these Soviets, exiled Sneevliet, and exiled or arrested other leaders of this union. Next, after the alleged involvement of communists in early 1919

rural troubles in Surakarta, the government arrested Hadji Misbach ("red *hadji*" of the SI) and Douwes Dekker as well as banishing Tjipto Mangunkusumo from all Javanese-speaking areas. Furthermore, following the murder of a Dutch *Controleur* at Tolitoli (North Sulawesi) in May 1919, just after Abdul Muis of the *Central Sarekat Islam* (CSI) had made a speaking tour in the region, Muis was arrested. Soon afterward, a shooting incident at Garut (West Java) led to the discovery of the so-called secret Section B of the SI and resulted in the arrest of Sosrokardono of the CSI together with some members of the ISDV (Ricklefs 1993, p. 174).

6. As Ingleson observed (1979, p. 176): "The depression affected Indonesia later than most other countries, largely because it was the secondary agricultural commodity crisis rather than the initial financial crisis that had the major impact on it. But its effects lingered longer and had a profound influence on the social and economic structure of the country."
7. The number of native enrolments in the vernacular public and private schools of all types (*Standaardschool*, *Volkschool*, and *Vervolgschool*) in 1920 was 781,284, while in the European school system (public and private) they were as follows: in the primary schools (ELS, HIS, Speciale School), the native enrolment was 43,411; in the secondary schools (HBS 3, HBS 5, Lyceum, MULO and AMS) it was 1,190; and in the vocational schools it was 3,917 (Van der Veur 1969, pp. 7–12).
8. The post-war economy and the great economic depression of the 1930s resulted in a reduction in government spending on education that forced East Indians to turn their desire for education to independent and unsubsidized schools, termed "wild schools" (Ingleson 1979, p. 205). The number of wild schools in the late 1930s was estimated at 2,200 with an enrolment of 142,000. The most famous of the independent schools were those belonging to the *Taman Siswa* [Garden of Pupils] system founded by a famous radical intellectual, Suwardi Surjaningrat (also known as Ki Hadjar Dewantara). The Taman Siswa schools made a conscious attempt to adapt their teaching to local values (Van der Veur 1969, p. 8).
9. Even though the pupils at different types of primary schools exhibited different characteristics of parental occupations. Based on the Report of the Educational Commission of the 1929, Van der Veur (1969, p. 25) concluded: "The parents of pupils attending the ELS, like the Europeans, are almost exclusively wage earners (453 of 484), predominantly in government service. The *Schakelschool*, on the other hand, draws the greater part of its pupils (715 of 1,173) from quite a different social environment, i.e., from the indigenous economic sphere. The HIS with 10,747 wage-earning parents out of 11,909 is somewhat in between these two types although closer to the ELS as far as the nature of the social position of the parents is concerned."
10. This seems to include the East Indies Chinese students. For further insights we may turn to the statistics of Indonesian students at Leiden University compiled by Harry A. Poeze (1990, p. 57). In 1920–24, the number of native

Indonesian students in this university was 60, while the Chinese was 28. Based on this account, we may assume that the total number of native university students in the Netherlands at the end of 1924 did not reach that number (673 students).

11. Mohammad Hatta, for instance, was able to study in the Netherlands because of the financial support of the local Minangkabau community.
12. These research institutes were established as parts the university or as independent bodies. The most notable research institute in this period was the Eijkmann (Medical Research) Institute in Jakarta, named after Dr C. Eijkmann (1858–1930) who won the Nobel Prize in 1929 for his discovery of vitamins, because his experiments were carried out in military hospitals in Jakarta. The quantity and quality of the East Indies research institutes was globally recognized especially following the influx of European scientists (mostly Dutch) to the NEI during the great economic depression of the 1930s and after the German occupation of the Netherlands in 1940. By the early 1940s, there were twenty-six research institutes in the country, some of which produced outstanding journals (Masser 1994).
13. Examples of research institutes founded by owners of private plantations were the Bosscha Observatory in Bandung (funded by a tea planter), the Central Rubber Research Institute, and the Research Institute of the Sumatra Planters' Associations.
14. A strong case to establish a faculty for Indonesian languages and literature had been put by the Director of Education, J. Hardeman, in 1927, but it did not materialize until 1940 (Van der Veur 1969, p. 5).
15. The number of native enrolments in the vernacular public and private schools of all types (*Standaardschool*, *Volkschool*, *Vervolgschool*, *Schakelschool* [est. 1921] and Vernacular MULO [est. 1937]) was 2,220,513, while that in the 'European school system (public and private) was as follows: in the primary schools (ELS, HIS, Speciale School), the native enrolment was 88,023; in the secondary schools (HBS 3, HBS 5, Lyceum, MULO and AMS), it was 9,975; in the vocational schools it was 5,990 (Van der Veur 1969, pp. 7–12); and in the university, it was 673 (Thomas 1973, pp. 11–12).
16. According to Ricklefs (1993, p. 161), the total population of the East Indies in 1939 was about seventy million.
17. Of the professors, 91 were Europeans, 19 Indonesians, and 15 other Asians (Thomas 1973, p. 12).
18. For further information, see Soebagijo (1980), Ghazali et al. (1988), *Panitia Peringatan 75 Tahun Kasman* (1982), *Panitia Peringatan Mohammad Natsir/ Mohamad Roem 70 Tahun* (1978).
19. Under the Japanese administration the school was reorganized and renamed in Indonesian and Japanese. The former lower secondary school (MULO) was renamed *Sekolah Menengah Rendah* (in Indonesian) or *Chugakko* (in Japanese). Almost all types of the general and vocation upper-secondary school were fused

into and renamed the *Sekolah menengah Tinggi* (SMT, in Indonesian) or *Kotto Chu Gakko* (in Japanese). The former NIVAS (secondary veterinary school) in Bogor survived in its own right but changed its name to *Bogor Zui Gakku*. The teachers were now called *Engku* and came mostly from the graduates of the higher teachers' training school. Otherwise, since professional teachers were limited, they also were recruited from former students of the THS and GHS. At the university level, the Japanese only reopened the GHS (in 1943) and THS (in 1944). The GHS was renamed *Ika Daigaku*, while the THS became *Kogyo Daigaku*. For the *Ika Daigaku*, a department of pharmacology was added to its original GHS, and students of the NIAS in Surabaya were transferred to Jakarta. Meanwhile, the former STOVIT (dental secondary school) was upgraded to a three-year college course and given a Japanese title *Ika Daigaku Shika Igakubu*. Next, to replace the former *Bestuursacademie* [Administrative Academy], the Japanese set up a new advanced institute for training public officials in 1944 called *Kenkoku Gakuin* and about the same time also launched the Advanced Teachers' Training School [*Sekolah Guru Tinggi* in Indonesian or *Kootoo Shihan Gakko* in Japanese]. The plan to open an Islamic university which had emerged in early 1942 to win Muslim support for Japanese interests came into existence on 8 July 1945. The university was named *Sekolah Tinggi Islam* [Advanced Islamic School] and was governed by a board of well-known Muslims with Mohammad Hatta as the chairman (*Redaksi SMT* 1998, pp. 33–37; Benda 1958, p. 187; Thomas 1973, pp. 38–39; Junge 1973, p. 66, Harjono 1997, pp. 12–13).

20. The range of the Japanese military and paramilitary training will be discussed later in this chapter.
21. Sukiman was a younger brother of Satiman (the pioneer of *Jong Java*). Both were sons of Muslim merchants and both were graduates from the STOVIA. After leaving the STOVIA, Sukiman was able to proceed to a university in the Netherlands in early 1920s. Upon his return he immediately joined the SI/PSI, and henceforward was well-known as a leader of Muslim politics.
22. *Sekolah* refers to schooling incorporating Western educational methods and emphasizing the teaching of secular subjects.
23. During his study in Mecca, Wahab played a major role in establishing the local branch of the *Sarekat Islam*.
24. Islamic Schools of the *Nahdhatul Wathan's* networks appeared with different names in Surabaya Wonokromo, Jagalan, Pacarkeling, Gresik, and other places in East Java. Apart from this school network, from 1919 Wahab also organized a discussion group on Islamic matters among traditionalist *ulama* in Surabaya that came to be known as *Tasjwirul Afkar* [the exchange of ideas]. Moreover, in the early 1920s Wahab also set up within the traditionalist community a youth organization, *Syubbanul Wathan* [the Youth of the Fatherland] and a merchant cooperative, *Nahdhatul Tujjar* [The Rise of the Merchant]. Beyond the traditionalist community, he made an effort to socialize with nationalist

- intellectual networks through his involvement in Sutomo's *Indonesische Studieclub* (Soekadri 1979, pp. 64–66; Van Bruinessen 1994, pp. 34–36).
25. The most important periodicals of *Persis* were *Pembela Islam* [*Defender of Islam*, 1929–33], *Al-Fatwa* [*The Fatwa*, 1931–?], and *Al-Lisaan* [*The Tongue*, 1935–41].
 26. The general pattern of Japanese control over the Islamic educational sector is well described by Benda who wrote (1958, p. 131): “The pattern which gradually emerged made it clear that, while the Japanese would be content indirectly to control religious schools at the lower levels, they would reserve all secondary education, teacher training, and higher institutes of learning to their own direct management. Thus it is significant that in May 1943, the authorities forbade non-obligatory religious instruction in governmental secondary schools. In the same month, all Islamic teachers were organized in a new central body, the *Pergaboengan Goeroe Islam Indonesia* [Federation of Indonesian Islamic Teachers], and gradually more and more Islamic — and Arab — schools reopened their doors.”
 27. Members of the committee were, among others, Wachid Hasjim (a young leader of the NU and The chairman in charge of the Masjumi), Satiman Wirjosandjojo and Sukiman Wirjosandjojo (who had pioneered the same project in late 1930s), Mohammad Natsir (a former JIB activist), Fathurrahman Kafrawi and Abdul Kahar Muzakkir (former *Djami'ah Chairiah* activists), Mas Mansur, Farid Ma'ruf and Kartosudarmo (of the *Muhammadiyah*), Suwandi and S. Mangunsarkoro (of the government educational office).
 28. The university's board of governors comprised Drs Muhammad Hatta as the chairman, Mohammad Natsir as the secretary plus some other famous names such as Prof Husein Djajadingrat and Sukiman Wirjosandjojo as the members. The rector of the university was Abdul Kahar Muzakkir (a former activist of the Cairo-based Indo-Malayan student association, *Djama'ah al-Chairiah* and later a senior officer of the *Shimubu*). The senate of the university comprised the rector as the chairman, assisted by Mohammad Natsir and Prawoto Mangkusasmito (the last president of SIS) respectively as secretary and vice-secretary along with some other members including Kasman Singodimedjo and Abdul Karim (the former fifth president of SIS), Prof Pourbotjaroko, Prof Slamet Iman Santoso, Mohammad Yamin and some others. Among lecturers of the university were a famous name from the first generation of Muslim intelligentsia, Agus Salim (Harjono and Hakiem 1997, pp. 8–9).
 29. For discussion of the *Dreyfussards* (in the European context), see chapter 1.
 30. To give examples, the communist-oriented press *Pandoe Merah* in its first edition of 1924 carried an article entitled “*Sarekat Orang-Orang Intellectuel di Indonesia*” [Association of Intellectuals in Indonesia], which associated the term “*intellectuel*” with highly educated people. In December 1929, Sukarno wrote an article in the PNI's journal *Persatoean Indonesia*, “*Kewadajiban Kaoem Intellectuel*” [The Responsibility of the Intellectual]. In this article, he defined

intellectual as those whose mind-capacity (*akal-fikiran*) is higher than that of the ordinary people, and criticized people with this higher intellectual capacity for being apolitical and lacking of nationalism, while idealizing the union of the intellectual and the people. Later on, Sutan Sjahrir (1909–66) — who later became the first prime minister of Independent Indonesia — wrote a similar article in the Newspaper *Daulat Rajat* (10 November 1931), “*Kaoem Intellectueel dalam Doenia Politik Indonesia*” [The Intellectual in the Indonesian Polity], which again connected the intellectual to the political leadership of the people. Thereafter, terms “*intellectueelen*”, “*intellectualisme*” and “*intellectualistisch*” were widely used in the literary and cultural writings of the so-called *Poedjangga Baroe* [the New Poets] especially in their “*Polemik Kebudayaan*” [polemics on Indonesian culture] of the 1930s. The terms featured prominently in the work of Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana and his polemicist counterpart, Sutomo. Takdir associated the terms with the capacity and function of the man of ideas to interpret the world analytically and objectively to discover a new intellectual foundation for the newly imagined pan-Indonesian nation (Kartamihardja 1954).

31. See, for instance, Sukarno (1929) and Sjahrir (1931).
32. For commentaries on Laclau and Mouffe’s view of the historical bloc, see Radhakrisnan (1990, pp. 93–94) and Yanarella (1993, pp. 87–88).
33. The *Indische Vereeniging* was not the only student association which was concerned about developments in the East Indies. There were also the Indies Chinese student association, *Chung Hwa Hui*, and the group of Dutch students who studied and were concerned about the East Indies, *Groeven van Indologische studenten*. In 1917, under the sponsorship of the Dutch *Ethici*, there had been an initiative to set up a federation of the three associations called *Indonesisch Verbond van Studeerenden* [The Federation of Indonesian students]. This federation, however, only survived for five years due to unbridgeable differences in political orientation and interest (Blumberger 1931, pp. 183–84).
34. Upon his return to the Indies in November 1919, Tan Malaka took up a position teaching coolies contracted to the *Senembah* Corporation. Anderson describes his intellectual venture as follows: “In June 1921 he moved to Java, where he was at once taken up by the growing radical movement. He was brought to Semarang by Semaun, the chairman of the PKI, and asked to start a school there. His success in developing the school...was a major factor in his elevation to the chairmanship of the PKI at the party’s eighth congress in December that year. Although he was 25 years old, he led the party vigorously enough to draw rapid repressive action from the colonial government. In March 1922 he was exiled from the Indies. It was to be twenty years before he again set foot on his native soil” (Anderson 1972, p. 271). During his exile and imprisonment he wrote some books, the most important being his political autobiography, *Dari Penjara ke Penjara* [From Jail to Jail], and his political philosophy, *Madilog* (*Materialisme, Dialektika, and Logika*) [Materialism, Dialectics and Logic].

35. In 1919 Gunawan Mangunkusumo and Sutomo (former founders of the *Budi Utomo*) arrived in Netherlands and soon became mentors for their fellow junior students. At the same time, Nazir Pamontjak (a former activist of *Jong-Sumatranen Bond*), Achmad Subardjo Djojoadisurjo (a former activist of *Jong-Java*), and Alex Andries Maramis (a former activist of *Jong-Minahassa*) also arrived. In following years, many more former student activists continued their study in the Netherlands such as Hermen Kartowisastro, Iwa Kusuma Sumantri, Mohammad Hatta, Sukiman Wirjosandjojo, Gatot Mangkupradja, Darmawan Mangunkusumo, Sunarjo, Abdul Madjid Djojoadiningrat, Sartono, Ali Sastroamidjojo, Setiadjit, and Sutan Sjahrir (Simbolon 1995, pp. 321–29). Most of these students would play decisive roles both during the Independence movement and in the early decades of post-colonial Indonesia.
36. It has to be borne in mind that social stratification in the colonial situation was not based on material ownership (land or wealth) but on the individual's proximity to symbols of power and authority. Thus, indigenous merchant families belonged to the lower status group, though financially they might be wealthy.
37. This included the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, Straits Settlements (Malaka, Singapore, Penang and the surroundings), British Borneo (Sarawak, Brunei, British North Borneo Company) and Madagascar.
38. A well-known Dutch scholar, Van Vollenhoven, criticized the use of the term "Indonesia" as a synonym for the Dutch East Indies. According to him, even though the largest number (about 49 million) of the "Indonesian" (in former anthropological sense) people at that time lived in the Dutch East Indies, there were at least 15 million living outside this territory. Responding to this criticism, Hatta (1928) drew an analogy with the case of the United States of America. Although the geographical notion of the term "America" is a signifier for a new continent stretching in between two poles to include some states and nations, in fact there is only one state occupying only a quarter of the entire continent which derives its name from the name of the continent. Its name is not only "America", but even the United States of America, which may refer to the federation of all states in the continent. According to Hatta, the naming of America to refer to an individual state is acceptable, not only due to the usage of the USA people but also as other states in the continent have their own specific names (Hatta 1928).
39. This followed the earlier use the term "*Indonesische*" by the Ethici's-sponsored *Indonesische Verbond van Studereenden* [the Federation of Indonesian Students, est. 1917] and by the (triumvirate) IP leaders-sponsored *Indonesische Persbureau* [*Indonesian News Agency*, est. 1918]. See footnote no. 33.
40. Born in Bukittinggi (West Sumatra) in 1902, Hatta's original name was Mohammad Ibn 'Atta'. This name was inspired by Mohammad 'Atta'-i 'l-Lah al-Sakandari, the author of *Al-Hikam* [*the Wisdom*], a book on Islamic mysticism that was well known among communities linked with the traditional Islamic

schools (Madjid 2002). He came from a strong religious and wealthy family. His grandfather, Syekh Abdurrahman (b. 1777), was the grand founder of the famous *surau Batuhampar* (Payakumbuh), which was well known as a teaching centre of the *Naqsyabandiyah* mystical order. His father, Hadji Muhammad Djamil (Sjeikh Batuhampar), was a prominent local *ulama*-merchant, while his mother was a descendant of the richest family in town (Noer 1990, pp. 15–16; Alamsjah 1952, p. 32). With his well-to-do background, Hatta was able to enrol in the ELS and MULO in Padang, and then continued his study to the *Prins Hendrik Handels School* [Secondary Commercial School] in Jakarta. During his childhood and schooldays in West Sumatra, he had been exposed to both Islamic mysticism taught in his father's *surau* and the reformist-modernist Islamic teaching given especially by Djamil Djambek in Bukittinggi and Abdullah Achmad in Padang. Apart from this religious exposure, however, from the second year of his study in MULO (1918) he became interested in a student youth organization, *Jong Sumatranen Bond*. This interest became more serious during his schooldays in Jakarta until he left for The Netherlands in 1922 to continue his study at the *Handels-Hoogeschool* (College of Economics) in Rotterdam (Noer, 1990, pp. 21–22). Having a strong religious upbringing but long exposed to a secular education and environment, Hatta became a religious man personally but “liberal” (embracing inclusive values) politically.

41. At the PI meetings on 7 and 28 March 1926, Sunarjo raised the issue of the form of a free Indonesian state. Hatta and the majority of students in Amsterdam preferred a federal state system because of the diversity of NEI cultures (Ingleson 1979, p. 12).
42. The son of a schoolteacher of lesser *priyayi* lineage — who gained access to the European education system (ELS) with the help of a Dutch private teacher, Sukarno had long been fluent in the language of nationalism. His early exposure to the youth organization, *Tri Koro Dharmo* (*Jong Java*), might have fuelled his concern for national problems, but the early training in the language of nationalism was his encounter with the SI grand leader, Tjokroaminoto, when he was a student of the HBS in Surabaya. Tjokro was not only well known for his tendency to “agree with all men” — and political activists from diverse ideologies were welcomed to his house — but also the fact that he had been a landlord for students of a diverse political inclination. Not only Sukarno lived in his house, but also Muso and Alimin, who later became leaders of the PKI, Kartosuwirjo, who later became a leader of Islamic militant [DI/TII], and Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, who later became a leader of the PSII (Amelz 1952, p. 55). It was probably his early interactions with political activists of diverse backgrounds as well as through his reading about the contemporary fracture among the major political parties that made Sukarno aware of the weakness of the proto-nationalist movements.
43. Instead of restricting itself to theoretical discussions and advice, the ISC emphasized the practical value of knowledge in seeking the solution to the nation

problems. In so doing, it promoted the establishment of schools, banks, health clinics, foundling homes, and so forth. The activists of this club came from returnees of former PI members, Western educated Javanese — many of whom had been members of the BU but who, like Sutomo, found that the Javanese-orientation of this organization was no longer in line with the new national spirit — and tertiary education graduates in Bandung and Batavia.

44. The executives of this committee were predominantly ASC members (Sartono as chairman, Suprodjo as vice-chairman, Sukarno as first secretary, Sjahbudin Latif as second secretary, and Mas Usman as treasurer). Besides being ASC members, Sartono, Suprodjo and Sjahbudin Latif were also former PI members (Ingleson 1979, p. 22; Pringgodigdo 1964, p. 60; *Biro Pemoeda* 1965, pp. 46–47).
45. A year later this association changed its name to *Partai Nasional Indonesia* [PNI, Indonesian Nationalist Party], the first political party led by intellectuals with higher education.
46. This federation was composed of the PNI (represented by Sukarno and Iskaq), ASC (Sartono, Budiarto, Samsi), PSI (Sukiman and Sjahbudin Latif), BU (Kusumo Utojo and Sutopo Wonobojo), *Pasundan* (Oto Subrata, Bakri Surjaatmaja and S. Sendjaja), *Sarikat Sumatra* (Parada Harahap and Dachlan Abdullah), *Kaum Betawi* (M. Husni Thamrin), and ISC (Sujono, Gondokusumo and Sunjoto). The majority of the representatives in this federation were now obviously those with tertiary education.
47. A competitive power struggle between Muslim and nationalist leaders to win the leadership of the political movement in general and the PPPKI in particular led to the breakdown of the federation.
48. The committees of the congress were composed of representatives of the PPPI (Sugondo Joyopuspito), *Jong Java* (Joko Marsaid), *Jong Sumatra* (Muhammad Yamin), *Jong Batak* (Amir Sjarifuddin), *Jong Islamieten Bond* (Johan Muhamad Tjaja), *Pemoeda Indonesia* (Korjosungkono), *Jong Celebes* (Senduk), *Jong Ambon* (J. Leimena), and *Pemoeda Kaum Betawi* (Rohjani).
49. In the face of a whole series of social and political developments and the need to renew the fabric of Indonesian social life and identity, significant changes took place both in the form and content of literary works. In 1920–22, Muhammad Yamin began to abandon the traditional *pantun* and *syair* [verse] forms when he published the first truly Western influenced modern poems followed by the publication of early modern Indonesian novels such as Merari Siregar's *Azab dan Sengsara Anak Gadis* [*The Trial and Tribulations of a Young Girl*] and Marah Rusli's *Sitti Noerbaja* [*Miss Nurbaja*] both published by the *Balai Pustaka* (BP) respectively in 1920 and 1922. The production of such modern literary works was made possible by the government-sponsored BP. It was probably too much to expect critical (political) works to be supported by this publishing house since the colonial government was suspicious of anything connected with the nationalist movement. Yet, the BP had unintentionally

- served as the springboard for the development of nationalistically oriented literary works. The major theme of the BP's literary works in the 1920s–1930s was the crisis of personal identity experienced by members of the intelligentsia who were trapped between the modern and the traditional world. Beyond this major theme, despite government restrictions on anything associating itself with the name Indonesia, some books that were of importance within the framework of nationalism were unexpectedly published. In Abdul Muis' novel *Salah Asoehan* [*A Wrong Upbringing*] (1928), Sanusi Pane's collection of poems *Madah Kelana* [*Wonderer's Song*] (1931), and in Habib St. Maharaja's novel *Nasib* [*Fate*] (1932) the term Indonesia was freely used (Teeuw 1986, pp. 23–24). Outside the BP literature, the serial publications in the vernacular press continued to provide a major alternative for publishing more critical (political) literary works. The representative par excellence of serials publication was again Mas Marco Kartodikromo's novels' *Rasa Merdeka* [*the Feeling of Freedom*] and *Kromo Bergerak* [*the Masses on the Move*] published in *Sinar Hindia* respectively in 1924 and 1931.
50. In the first year of the magazine, its sub-title was "*Madjalah kesoesteraan dan bahasa serta keboedajaan omoem*" [Magazine for literature and language together with general culture]. From the third year and for a few years to come its sub-title was "*Pembawa semangat baroe dalam kesoesteraan, seni, keboedajaan dan soal masjarakat oemoem*" [Bearer of a new spirit in literature, art, culture and general social issues]. Later it went so far as to become "*Pembimbing semangat baroe jang dinamis oentoek membentoeke kebudajaan baroe, keboedajaan persatoen Indonesia*" [Conveyer of a new, dynamic spirit for the formation of a new culture, a culture of Indonesian unity] (Teeuw 1986, pp. 29–30).
 51. The polemics began with a provocative article of St. Takdir Alisjahbana, "*Menoejoe Masjarakat dan Keboedajaan Baroe*" [Towards a New Society and Culture] published in the *PB* in August 1935. This soon invited other polemicists — such as Sanusi Pane, Sutomo, Suwardi Surjaningrat, Purbatjaraka, Cindarbumi, and M. Amir — to engage in the polemic and involved some other presses such as *Soeara Omoem*, *Pewarta Deli*, and *Wasita* (Kartamihardja 1954).
 52. By the term "*intellectualisme*" he meant the capacity to look at the world objectively and analytically; the term "*individualism*" means the primacy of the individual rights as over against the corporate group; and the term "*materialisme*" means a healthy acquisitive attitude to material comforts.
 53. The fact that Sutomo, a product of overseas study (in Europe), was in favour of the pre-colonial traditions and Takdir, a product of the domestic one, valued the Western traditions indicates that exposure to the master's house was not a guarantee of individual submission. The individual response to the imperial culture seemed to depend on the specific personal experience in the encounter with the master's house as well as on the social origin and social networks of the particular individual.
 54. For the proponents of "authenticity", the demand for a rejection of all things

to do with colonialism through programmes of decolonization invoked the idea that some forms and practices of imperial culture were perceived as “inauthentic” and so harmful. In this view the return to the perceived “authenticity” in the form of the recuperation of authentic pre-colonial traditions and cultures was preferred. The problem with this view was that its supporters often became entangled in an essentialist cultural position in which fixed practices became iconized as authentically indigenous and others were excluded as hybridized or contaminated, ignoring the possibility that cultures might develop and change as their conditions changed. To counter the view that the use of the colonialist’s culture inescapably imprisoned the colonized within the colonizer’s conceptual paradigm, a second strategy emerged, that of dismantling the master’s house with the master’s tools. According to this view, colonized subjects could use the imperial culture through “appropriation” to articulate their own social and cultural identities. The master’s house was always adaptable and the same tools might offer a means of conceptual transformation and liberation. In addition, through “abrogation” the dominated or colonized culture could use the tools of the dominant discourse to resist its political or cultural control (Ashcroft 1998, pp. 5–22).

55. According to Mintz many of the ideas that the Indonesian Marxists frequently attribute to Marx are essentially those of Leninist doctrines (Mintz 1959, p. 171; 1965, p. 7).
56. In practice, there had been a tendency for the Indonesian communist party to depart from communist class theory and secular values and to accommodate other forms of social cleavages (cultural stream) and syncretic (religious) values of the poor peasantry (Mortimer 1969, pp. 1–2).
57. As Louis Althusser holds, consciousness is constructed by ideologies; these are systems of meanings that construct the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence (1971, pp. 152–55).
58. For further discussion of the roots and formulations of Islamic socialism in Indonesian context, see J. S. Mintz (1965).
59. Salim and Muis argued that party discipline had in fact been applied by the BO, NIP and even the PKI itself. Nevertheless, the SI had been excepted. As the most powerful organization in this period, the SI tended to be viewed as a recruiting ground for other organizations notably the PKI (Pringgodigdo 1964, p. 42).
60. The nominated delegates were Tjokroaminoto and Surjopranoto (PSI), Ahmad Soorkattie (*Al-Irsyad*), Fakhruddin (*Muhammadiyah*), and Abdul Wahab Chasbullah (a representative of traditionalist *ulama*).
61. The official representatives to the Mecca congress were Tjokroaminoto (of the PSI) and Mas Mansur (of the *Muhammadiyah*). Outside the All Islam delegations, there were four non-official delegates to the Mecca congress, namely Muhammad al-Bagir (a traditional *ulama* of Yogyakarta), Djanan Thaib (a graduate of Al-Azhar who established an Indonesian school in Mecca, *Madrasa Indonesia al-Makkiah* in 1926), Umar Nadji and Muhammad bin Thalib (both

- of *Al-Irsyad*). Meanwhile, the reformist-modernist community of West Sumatra sent its own delegates to the Cairo congress, namely Hadji Rasul and Abdullah Achmad (Van Bruinessen 1994, p. 33).
62. This name seemed to follow the practice of earlier organizations set up by Chasbullah from 1916 up to early 1920s that had used the word “*nahdlat*”, such as *Nahdlatul Wathan* and *Nahdhatul Tujjar*.
 63. Islamic traditionalism prefers to conserve “indigenous Islamic values” [*Islam pribumi*].
 64. In J.D. Legge’s view (1988, p. 21): “The name was probably chosen in order to preserve the initials, PNI, but it expressed also Hatta’s view that the principal task of the nationalist movement at this stage was not agitation or mobilization of mass action to challenge the colonial power, but the less spectacular task of educating the members of the movement and preparing for a long term struggle against the more powerful imperial enemy.”
 65. As Mrázek observed (1994, p. 91): “The Pendidikan carefully registered all of the *ningrat*, ‘aristocratic’ characteristics of its opponent. ‘Noble bearers of degrees’ was a favorite term.”
 66. Having said that the *PNI Baru*’s main supporters were people of higher learning is by no means to say that the educational qualifications of its leaders were superior to that of *Partindo*. Conversely, the educational background of *Partindo* leaders was in fact superior to that of the former, since most of them derived from the higher *priyayi* families who had earlier access to the higher education. For further observations, see Ingleson, 1979, pp. 193–95).
 67. For two years to come, however, PPKD remained affiliated to the Dutch-sponsored *Indische Katholieke Partij* (IPK). In 1925 it began to assume an independent status separated from the IKP, and after 1930 its membership was extended to non-Javanese Catholics.
 68. Until 1930, the Indonesian protestant political community was affiliated to the Dutch-sponsored *Christelijke Ethische Partij* (which was renamed the *Christelijke Staatkundige Partij* in late 1930).
 69. This federation consisted of the *Perkumpulan Kaum Kristen* [Association of the Christian Community], *Persatuan Guru Kristen* [Association of the Christian Teachers], *Persatuan Verpleger dan Verpleegster* [Associations of the Christian Nurses], and *Persatuan Pemoeda Kristen* [Associations of the Christian Youth].
 70. Proponents of this federation such as Amir Sjarifuddin, at a Christian missionary conference in Karangpandan (near Surakarta) in 1941, raised the issue of the Church’s calling in the political field and the plan for establishing the Christian political party. This plan could not be implemented until 1945 because of the interruption of the Japanese Occupation.
 71. In the meantime, after the disastrous uprisings of 1926–27, the PKI was clandestinely reconstituted by Muso in 1935 and popularly called the Illegal PKI (Anderson 1972, p. 38). Meanwhile, after the arrest of Hatta and Sjahrir, the *PNI Baru* managed to preserve its shadowy existence until the arrival of the Japanese (Legge 1988, p. 21).

72. Published by prominent members of the SI and *Muhammadiyah* in Yogyakarta.
73. The SI also supported the establishment of the *Indonesische Studieclub* by Sutomo anticipating that this club would empower the non-cooperative movement. This was indicated by the involvement of some SI members in this club (Noer 1980, pp. 269–70).
74. This letter was publicly uncovered when at Sukarno's trial in August 1930 the prosecution produced a letter from Tjipto to Sukarno, which was soon published in several newspapers including Sutomo's *Soeara Oemoem* and PSII's *Pembela Islam* (Ingleson 1979, p. 131; Noer 1980, p. 279).
75. In 1923 one of the SI's prominent leaders, Abdul Muis, withdrew from the party because of the lack of moral support from the party's leaders, particularly Tjokroaminoto, for his activities as the vice president of the party. This was followed by the departure of all *Muhammadiyah* members from the party in 1927 in response to the persistent criticism by *Muhammadiyah* leaders of the personal laxity of the SI's leaders.
76. In February and March 1927, *Timboel* (a magazine edited by Wediodiningrat of the BU and Singgih of Sutomo's club) ran articles accusing the PSI as having fallen under the influence of opportunist leaders such as Agus Salim who had transformed the party into a party of the clergy and inflamed dissension among nationalist leaders (Noer 1980, p. 270).
77. Among other things, Sutomo's statement and these articles criticized the practice of the *hadj*. He argued that the money spent on the *hadj* could better be used for the interest of the nation. He also suggested political prisoners from Digul deserved more respect than *hadjis* (Van der Veur 1984, p. 28).
78. Sukiman Wirjosandjojo of the PSII, for instance, wrote an article in this journal (no. 13, October 1930), "*Tentangan Terhadap Kepada* [sic] *Agama Islam*" [The Challenge to Islamic Religion], in which he concluded that such views represented anti-Islamic voices.
79. For a further explanation of this vote taking, see *Panitia Peringatan 75 Tahun Kasman* (1982, p. 27).
80. See *Het Licht*, no. 1 (1925): 7.
81. See *Het Licht*, no. 10 (1925): 3–10.
82. Although it also had an Arabic name, *An-Noer*, its Dutch name was more popular and widely cited in the works of its followers.
83. In addition to big cities in Java such as Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Bandung and Surabaya, JIB branches were found in Sumatra (Kota Raja/Aceh, Medan, Padang, Bukittinggi and Palembang), Sulawesi (Makassar, Gorontalo and Manado), and even in Maluku (Ambon).
84. By this decade a secular intelligentsia with university backgrounds, as we have seen, had established socio-political clubs in their own right. Early in the 1920s an association of Chinese university students was formed, *Ta Hsion*. Christian university students began to establish the *Christelijke Studenten Vereeniging* [Association of the Christian University Students] in 1926 (officially proclaimed

- in 1932), while Catholic university students established the *Katholieke Studenten Vereeniging St. Bellarminus* [Association of the Catholic University students, St Bellarminus] in 1928.
85. Titi Marsuti in her article in *Het Licht* (Vol. VII, 1931) identified some categories of JIB membership including those of true believers of Islam, those who had gained both secular and religious education and then joined the league to satisfy their religious spirit, those who had been widely influenced by Western thoughts but who were interested in knowing Islamic teachings, and those who were interested in political Islam. JIB activities ranged from Islamic study courses, publishing, establishing libraries and schools, scouting, excursions, and sports.
 86. The SIS's chairmen were respectively: Sudiman Kartohadiprodjo (December 1934–35), Suwahjo Sumodilogo (Des. 1934–December 1936), Mohammad Roem (December 1936–March 1937), Abdullah Sidik (March 1937–October 1938), Abdul Karim (October 1938–July 1939), Widagdo (July 1939–December 1940), Prawoto Mangkusasmito (December 1940–March 1942). The first two chairmen as indicated by their names were descendants of higher *priyayi* families who had never before been involved in Islamic activism.
 87. In developing his own appreciation of Islam, Natsir admitted he was influenced by two non-Indonesian Islamic thinkers whose writings he studied in the 1920s and 1930s, namely Mohammad 'Abduh and his disciple Rashīd Ridā (Kahin 1993, p. 160).
 88. Among the books written in this period were *Het Islamitische Ideaal* [Islamic Ideals] and *De Islamitische Vrouw en haar recht* [Women's Rights in Islam] published by *Persatuan Islam* in 1934 followed by *Cultuur Islam* [Islamic Culture] in 1936 and *Dengan Islam ke Indonesia Moelia* [With Islam towards the glory of Indonesia] in 1939, which reflected his deepening inclination towards the idealization of Islam as the foundation of Indonesian independence.
 89. When the Salim-led *Barisan Penyadar PSII* [Awareness Front of the PSII] became an Independent political group after 1937, Mohamad Roem joined this party, becoming the chairman of the executive committee [*Lajnah Tanfidziyah*]. Next, Wiwoho Purbohadidjojo (former president of JIB) collaborated with Sukiman Wirjosandjojo to activate the PII in 1938. Meanwhile, Kasman Singodimedjo (a former president of JIB) began to emerge as a young leader of the *Muhammadiyah*. In 1936 he became a teacher in some *Muhammadiyah* schools (*Mu'alimien*, *Mu'alimmat*, MULO, HIK, and AMS). His first promotion as a new leader of this association began in the aftermath of his arrest in 1940 just after giving a public speech to the *Muhammadiyah* conference of the West Java chapter in which he called for Indonesian independence. His first major role in Muslim leadership was as one of the chairmen of the MIAI during the Japanese period (*Panitia Peringatan 75 Tahun Kasman* 1982, pp. 41–46). In addition, Raden Syamsurizal (a founder of JIB) would become a *Masjumi* figure.
 90. From the vantage point of the Dutch, the shifting loyalty of this native

functional elite to the new colonial masters seems to be ironic. As a former professor of the RHS in Batavia, W. F. Wertheim, noted: "Remarkable was the conduct of many ['native'] civil servants, always loyal to the Government, the pillars of Dutch rule. How easily, now, they bowed to the new masters. They had been yes-men before — they were yes-men now, these antique *prijajis* [aristocratic civil servants], the jewels of feudal society. Their tradition of obedience carried them over towards a new authority" (Mrázek 1994, p. 221). The Japanese relied heavily for their administrative tasks on the traditional administrative corps, *Pangreh Praja*, who largely continued as they had under the Dutch colonial bureaucratic state [*beambtenstaat*] — except in the symbolic field that the Indonesian language now became the official language of administration.

91. The three A's stood for the well-known Japanese propagandas slogan: "Japan the Leader of Asia, Japan the Protector of Asia, and Japan the Light of Asia". By appealing for Asian solidarity, the movement manipulated Indonesian support for the Japan's war effort and the so-called Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. This movement was headed by Raden Samsudin, a member of the governing board of the *Parindra* (Kahin 1952, p. 103).
92. At the time of *Masjumi's* establishment, legal status had been granted only to *Muhammadiyah* and *NU* and the new federation derived its main membership from both associations. In further developments, however, individual *kjai* [religious teacher] and *ulama* could likewise become members of the *Masjumi* with the approval of the *Shûmubu*, which assumed control over the new federation (Benda 1958, p. 151).
93. Because it was widely believed that *Putera* was a genuinely nationalist organization oriented toward self-government, this organization initially gained wide support, even from many students and underground activists (Kahin 1952, p. 106).
94. Prior to *Peta*, the Japanese military administration had set up the *Heihô* (Auxiliary Forces), a unit of conscripted Indonesian labourers, *romushas*, incorporated into the Japanese army as labour battalions.
95. *Peta* was set up as local defence for the administrative district of the islands, *kabupaten*, and organized only up to the battalion [*daidan*] level. In the case of very large *kabupaten*, like Jakarta and Bandung, there might be two or even three battalions.
96. The *daidanchos* were not given intensive military training and were not confined to barracks. Their essential function was to conduct moral leadership and exercise political supervision over their subordinates. Schooling and effective military training was only given to junior officers who assumed the rank of company commanders [*chudancho*] and platoon commanders [*shodancho*] (Anderson 1972, pp. 20–22).
97. To give an insight of the *Daidanchos'* background, several examples are given. Kasman Singodimedjo, a *daidancho* of Jakarta, was a graduate of the RHS as

- well as former leader of the JIB and MIAI. Mas Arudji Kartawinata, a *daidanco* of Cimahi, was a graduate of the MULO as well as the former PSII executive in charge of youth. Mustopo, a *daidanco* of Surabaya, was a former student of the STOVIA and a graduate of the STOVIT as well as a dentist by profession. Sudirman, a *dandanco* of Kroja, was a graduate of the Muhammadiyah's Teachers' Training School as well as a Muhammadiyah schoolteacher. Mohammed Saleh, a *daidanco* of Yogyakarta, was a graduate of the Higher Teacher-Training School as well as teacher of the *Muhammadiyah* MULO. Although there also appeared exceptions such as K. H. Sjam'un, a *daidanco* of Banten, who had a conservative rural *kjai* background (Anderson 1972, p. 21).
98. *Seinendan* was designed as a sort of militant, politicized scout organization primarily for the urban population to carry out various tasks such as transmitting government propaganda to the young.
 99. *Keibodan* was an auxiliary police force designed to help maintain order and security and to detect spies and saboteurs.
 100. As Kahin noted (1952, p. 108): "...the most important long-term result of the activities of the *Putera* was the tremendous increase in political consciousness of the Indonesian masses, and in particular their will to independence. For the *Putera* not only allowed but even encouraged the contact between nationalist leaders and the masses which the repressive apparatus of the Dutch regime had so severely limited."
 101. In Benedict Anderson's view, the reason for *Putera's* failure was in part because of covert obstruction by the traditional civil service after finding that the leadership of the movement was in the hands of their old adversaries, the pre-war nationalist politicians, "and in part because of internal divisions among the politicians themselves". "Essentially, however, the movement failed because in 1942 and 1943 the war was not yet going badly enough for the Japanese to feel any urgent commitment to political development." This lack of political commitment provided a space for nationalist political manoeuvres to exploit the *Putera* for their own interests. As a result, those who engaged in *Putera* activities, especially the educated youth, appeared to be more anti-Japanese than anti allies (Anderson 1972, pp. 27–28).
 102. This made Sukarno in the eyes of many Indonesians nothing but a captive of the Japanese. In contrast to the *Putera* that confined its constituency to indigenous people, the *Hôkôkai* reached out to incorporate the Eurasian, Chinese, and Arab minorities (Anderson 1972, p. 28; Kahin 1952, p. 110).
 103. Nominally, this corps was under the leadership of Sukarno, but operationally directed by the radical nationalist, Dr Muwardi.
 104. In addition, to contain the influence of the *Barisan Pelopor* in the countryside, on 28–30 January 1945 the *Masjumi* decided to set up local Islamic work brigades (*Barisan Pekerdja*) directed to obtain a secure Islamic foothold in the village neighbourhood association, *Tonari Gumi* (Benda 1958, pp. 178–80).
 105. The ten people were S. Surowijono, Sudjono, Anwar Tjokroaminoto, K.H.

- Zarkasji, Masjhuri, Mrs Sunarjo Mangunpuspito, Jusuf Wibisono, Muhammad and R.H.O. Djunaedi, and Prawoto Mangkusasmita who mostly had a Western educated background (Benda 1958, p. 280).
106. The growing tide of this popular nationalism eventually rebounded on the colonial masters when its enthusiasm was converted into political insurrection. Greeted as liberators from the Dutch oppression when they first arrived in the archipelago, Japanese popularity in the eyes of Indonesian populace was not long-lived. In the short term, this "Asian elder brother" had proved himself to be a most oppressive and devastating colonial regime. In the face of a bloody repressive apparatus, racial ignorance, the *rōmusha* programme, and crop failures, native resentment turned into the despair and hatred that finally led (a century-old tradition of hopeless agrarian protest) to sporadic instances of open resistance. On 25 February 1944, the first instance of a popular uprising occurred in Singaparna (West Java) led by an elderly traditionalist *kjai*, K.H. Zainal Mustafa, with the full support from the members of his *pesantren* and the surrounding populace. This was followed by sporadic mutinies within rural *Peta* units in early 1945. The first and the most serious was the mutiny in Blitar on 14–15 February 1945 led by Suprijadi (Anderson 1972, pp. 35–36).
 107. Shortly before the collapse of the Dutch colonial government, PJA Idenburg had contacted Amir Sjarifuddin asking him whether he would be willing to organize an underground intelligence network in the event of a Japanese Occupation. Amir accepted the proposal, realizing that for the committed leftwing Asian nationalists at the time, cooperating with bourgeois-democratic colonial states was preferable to collaborating with the rising powers of fascism and militarism, as confirmed by the alliance of those states with the Soviet Union after June 1941. After accepting the offer Sjarifuddin received sum of 25,000 guilders to finance the projected underground networks (Anderson 1972, pp. 37–38).
 108. Early in 1943 Sjarifuddin and several other leaders of this underground organization were arrested and sentenced to death on 29 February 1944. Sukarno's intervention was able to change the sentence of Sjarifuddin to be life imprisonment, but four of the other arrested leaders were executed (Kahin 1952, p. 112).
 109. For a good description of the Sjahrir's group, see J.D. Legge (1988) and Mrázek (1994).
 110. "During the Japanese occupation", said General T.B. Simatupang, "military skills were widely acquired by the population, and a radical change took place in our minds, especially among the militant *pemoeda* [youth]. Subsequently, there emerged a tendency among us to reach our goals by employing force, against the enemy as well as against ourselves" (Quoted in Said 1991, p. 5).
 111. As Anderson observed (1972, p. 19): "Some [students], indeed, returned to their homes. Others went to work in various capacities for the military government, most notably in the *Sendenbu* (Department of Propaganda), where they were

- given significant roles to play. Still others, thanks to their financial means, were able to withdraw into private life, meeting with friends, holding informal discussions, reading intensively on all manner of subjects that seemed relevant to their condition, some of these youths were drawn slowly into the underground groups that grew up on the base of such intimate daily interactions.”
112. The *Persatuan Mahasiswa* [Student Union] had a close relationship with Sjahrir. It was made up of university students in Jakarta, principally those from the medical college (*Ika Daigaku*), and was formed following the student demonstration in the middle of 1942 to protest against the Japanese order that all students had to crop their hair (Kahin 1952, p. 112).
 113. The so-called “*Sendenbu group*” associated with the *Asrama Angkatan Baru Indonesia* [Ashram of the New Generation of Indonesia], which was set up early in the occupation under the auspices of the army’s Department of Propaganda [*Sendenbu*]. This was intended to give political training to the recruited student youths in order to be potential cadres in the provinces. The lectures given in this *asrama* were strongly nationalist in content given by such prominent older nationalist politicians as Sukarno, Hatta, Yamin, Sunarjo, and Amir Sjarifuddin (until his arrest). Older *Pemoeda* of this group such as B. M. Diah, Adam Malik and the Tjokroaminoto brothers (Anwar and Harsono) worked for the *Dômei* (Japanese news agency) or the Japanese-sponsored newspaper *Asia Raja*. This group was headed by Sukarni and included among its leaders Adam Malik, Chaerul Saleh, Pandu Wiguna, and Maruto Nitimihardjo. Most leading members of this group were former students of the RHS (the Law College) and had been involved with the pre-invasion anti-Dutch nationalist activists. Some of them were also identified as Tan Malaka’s *Pemoeda* (Mrázek 1994, p. 242; Anderson 1972, pp. 42–43).
 114. The so-called “*Kaigun group*” associated with the *Asrama Indonesia Merdeka* [Free Indonesian Ashram]. This *asrama* was set up as a political school for semi-educated youths between eighteen to twenty under the sponsorship of Rear Adm. Tadashi Maeda. Its purpose remained a matter of controversy. It was sometimes charged that the *asrama* was set up to materialize the *Kaigun* (Japanese navy) ambition to train infiltrators to penetrate the communist or near-communist underground. On other occasions it was said that *asrama* was set up by Maeda and his aides in anticipation of a Japanese defeat which would finally lead to the Japanese alliance with the communist axis (Soviet Union) in opposition to the Anglo-Saxon powers. It was also believed that the *asrama* was set up as reflection of the sincerity of Maeda and his assistants with regards to Indonesian Independence, consistent with the Koiso Declaration (Anderson 1972, p. 45). The Indonesian chosen to head the school was Wikana, a man who had a close connection with the “Illegal PKI” but then became fairly closer to Sjahrir. And the Indonesian behind-the-scenes organizer of this project was Achmad Subardjo (former PI’s member), an older-generation politician who had close connections with Tan Malaka. The lecturers of this school were

- virtually identical with those at the army's sponsored *Asrama Angkatan Baru Indonesia* (minus Sjarifuddin) with Sjahrir as an addition (Kahin 1952, p. 115; Anderson 1972, p. 46).
115. The *Sekolah Tinggi Islam* (Advanced Islamic School) group came late and had close connections with Masjumi leaders. The existence of this group has been almost unrecognized by Indonesian historical accounts possibly due to the late emergence of the school (est. on 8 July 1945). In fact, the school played a significant role particularly as an alternative for students whose colleges were close down or suspended by the Japanese or for those who had been expelled from other schools due to their political resistance. Moreover, in the early revolution after the proclamation of Indonesian independence, the ashram of *Balai Muslimin Indonesia* was also important as an alternative sanctuary when the *Asrama Angkatan Baru Indonesia* (Ashram of the New Generation of Indonesia) at Menteng 31 was captured by the Japanese (on 19 September 1945), and the *asrama of Ika Daigaku* at Prapatan 10 was under the strict surveillance of the NICA (Netherlands Indies Civil Administration) — the postwar Dutch administrative system in occupied territories. The leading figures of this asrama were Subianto Djojohadikusumo, Suroto Kunto, Bagja Nitidwirja (all were former students of the *Ika Daigaku*), Bahrum Rangkuti (former student of the College of Literature), M. Sjarwani (former student of the THS), Siti Rahmah Djajadiningrat, Anwar Harjono, Karim Halim, Djanamar Ajam and some others (Harjono and Hakiem 1997, pp. 3–59).
 116. The secular nationalist organizations had been deprived of any publication of their own since early in the occupation. Neither the Triple-A movement nor the *Putera* were allowed to print their own periodicals. Despite repeated requests, the nationalist's cry to have their own press was only granted some three months before the collapse of Japanese rule (Benda 1958, p. 118). By contrast, the Japanese priority of winning of Muslim supports gave the opportunity for Islamic socio-political organizations to run their own press. This is especially true when the MIAI was allowed to publish its journal, *Soeara MIAI* (the *Voice of MIAI*), which would metamorphose into the Masjumi's journal *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia* (Benda 1958, pp. 118, 262). Few other publications appeared during the Japanese Occupation run as individual enterprises — a contrast to the situation before the pre-Japanese invasion. Examples of this publication were the Jakarta based *Asia Raja* [Greater Asia], *Tjaja Timoer* [Light of the East], *Kung Yung Pao-Indoenesia*, *Kana-Monji Shimibun*, *Pandji Poestaka* [Banner of the Good Reading], and *Djawa Baroe* [New Djawa], and *Pemandangan* [The View] or its substitute *Pembangoen* [The Developer]; the Bandung based *Tjahaja* [The Light]; the Yogyakarta-based *Sinar Matahari* [Sun Light]; the Semarang-based *Sinar Baroe* [New Light]; the Surabaya-based *Soeara Asia* [The Voice of Asia]; the Medan-based *Kita Soematra Shimibun* and *Semangat Islam* [The Islamic Spirit]; the Padang-based *Padang Nippo* and *Soematra Shimibun*; the Palembang-based *Palembang Shimibun* and *Sinar Matahari* [Sun Light]; the Tanjung Karang-based *Lampoeng Shimibun*; the Banjarmasin-based

Soeara Kalimantan (or what later became Borneo Shimbun); the Makassar-based *Selebes Shimbun*; and the Ambon-based *Sinar Matahari*; and probably some others (Said 1987, pp. 52–55; Benda 1958, p. 238). The names of publications in this period overwhelmingly used the word “*shimbun*”, “*sinar*” or “*tjaja*”/“*tjahaja*” [light], Asia, and the like, reflecting the radiance of the Triple-A’s credo and the spirit of the so-called Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. Under this regime there was no such thing as an independent press, as the military government strictly controlled all existing publications.

117. The significance of these radio networks is depicted by Kahin (1952, p. 108) as follow: “Large public address systems linked to the radio network, ‘singing towers,’ were set up at important points throughout the cities. At prescribed hours the population was required to listen to their official broadcasts, including the frequent speeches of Soekarno. In these, according to his instruction from the Japanese, he attacked the Allies, extolled the Japanese and called upon the population to support their war effort. An examination of these speeches, however, will support Soekarno’s contention that ‘75 per cent of their content was pure nationalism.’ Moreover, they were full of subtleties and double talk which generally passed over the heads of Japanese monitors but were meaningful to the population, especially those of Javanese culture. Such talk made it easy for the peasant to equate ‘anti-imperialism’ with anti-Japanese.”
118. In Japanese it was called *Dokuritsu Zyunbi Tyoosaka*.
119. These were Agus Salim, Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, Sukiman Wirjosandjojo, Mas Mansur, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, Abdul Halim, Abdul Kahar Muzakkir, Ahmad Sanusi, Wachid Hasjim and Masjkur (Yamin 1959–60, p. 60).
120. The five principles (*Pancasila*) based on Sukarno’s speech were nationalism, internationalism, democracy, social justice, and belief in God.
121. The original members of the PPKI were Sukarno, Mohammad Hatta, Radjiman Wediodiningrat, Oto Iskandardinata, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, Wachid Hasjim, B.K.P.A. Surjohamidjojo, B.P.H. Puruboyo, M. Sutarjo Kartohadikusumo, R.P. Suroso, R. Supomo, and R. Abdul Kadir for Java; Mohammad Amir, Teuku Mohammad Hassan, and Abdul Abas for Sumatra; G.S.S.J. Ratulangi and Andi Pangeran for Celebes; A.A. Hamidhan for Borneo; I. Gusti Ketut Pudja for the Lesser Sunda Islands; J. Latuharhary for the Moluccas; and Yap Tjwan Bing representing the Chinese community (Kahin 1952, p. 127; Yamin 1959–60, p. 399).
122. Sukarno and Hatta, hoping to avoid bloodshed, preferred to wait for an official statement from the *Gunseikan*. This was perceived by the radical *pemoeda* as wasting time and they decided to intervene.
123. Other names were R. A. A. Wiranatakusumah, Iwa Kusumasumantri, Ki Hadjar Dewantara, and Sajuti Melik (Yamin 1959–60, p. 399).
124. Sukarno and Hatta approached Teuku Mohammad Hassan (the Acehnese representative) and Wachid Hasjim to persuade to the strongest supporter of the Islamic position on the committee, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo. Although from an aristocratic family, Hassan’s association with the Acehnese community, which

was well known as a strong defender of Islam, was expected to effectively persuade Hadikusumo. In fact, both Hasjim and Hassan could not convince him. The last effort was made by Kasman Singodimedjo who presented the argument that in the very critical situation when Indonesian unity was so important for saving the Indonesian independence threatened by the arrival of Allied forces, the Islamic stand should be sacrificed. More importantly, Kasman convinced him that based on an article of the draft of constitution it was said that in six months time a special session could be conducted to set up a more comprehensive constitution. Believing that the Islamic position could be reintroduced by that time, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo finally accepted the elimination of "the seven words". The special session never occurred cancelled by the great tremor of the revolution (*Panitia Peringatan 75 Tahun Kasman* 1982, pp. 128–30).

125. In both cabinets religious affairs were managed under the Minister of State without Portfolio. Later, however, the Department of Religious Affairs appeared in Sjahrir's second parliamentary cabinet (2 October 1946–27 June 1947) and has continued to exist up to the present (Djamil 1986).
126. On 22 August the PPKI disappeared into the newly established *Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat* [KNIP, Central Indonesian National Committee] which acted as an advisory body of the new government that, in a later development, would become the legislative body for the new Republic. Sukarno as Indonesian president was given the authority to select the membership of the KNIP. He was assisted by Hatta, appointing 137 members including those from the PPKI (Kahin 1952, p. 140). Although Kasman Singodimedjo was appointed the chairman of the KNIP (perhaps because of his strategic position as *Peta* commander in Jakarta), the Islamic representation on this Committee was once again very small. As Anderson observed (1972, p. 91): "A great majority of the 137 members (at least 85) were *abangan* Javanese. At the highest estimate, Islamic leaders numbered less than twenty. The *pemuda* fared little better, with no more than twenty or twenty-five positions. An even larger majority consisted of nationalist politicians, of *pangreh pradja*, and of professional men who had been appointed to the various top-level pseudo-legislative and pseudo-party organizations of the Japanese period."
127. Indonesia's first republican cabinet was formed on 31 August under President Sukarno's leadership. The greater part of the ministers were selected from the PNI [State Party] and the *Jawa Hökōkai* or from those men of *priyayi* origin who had occupied the top posts of the departmental hierarchies as *bucho* [chiefs] or *sanyo* [advisers] in the Japanese administration. Of the fourteen ministerial level posts of this cabinet, the Islamic camp received only two positions: Abikusno Tjokrosujoso as the Minister of Communications, and Wachid Hasjim as the Minister of State without Portfolio, namely as an adviser for religious affairs (Anderson 1972, pp. 110–13; Kahin 1952, p. 139).

4

INTELLIGENTSIA AS THE POLITICAL ELITE OF THE NEW NATION

The postcolonial dream of discontinuity is ultimately vulnerable to the infectious residue of its own unconsidered and unresolved past.

Leela Gandhi (1998)¹

Although the intellectuals of the underdeveloped countries have created the idea of nation within their own countries, they have not been able to create a nation. They are themselves the victims of that condition, since nationalism does not necessarily become citizenship.

Edward Shils (1972)²

The Indonesian intelligentsia (inteligensia) has the intellectual responsibility to defend the ideas and moral values of the nation...

Those who give up this responsibility to political passion betray their function and the nation.

Mohammad Hatta (1957)³

For more than four years after the proclamation of Independence, Indonesians had to defend their self-proclaimed freedom through revolutionary struggle as the Dutch attempted to reassume the control over the territory. In this critical historical phase, the national euphoria of independence provided the impetus for all political traditions to strive to actualize their own political dream.

This resulted in internal power struggles and clashes of ideologies which were reflected in the short lifespans of the early cabinets. From 19 August 1945 until 20 December 1949, the new nation experienced the rise and fall

of nine cabinets each of which lasted less than two years.⁴ Despite this internal fragmentation, however, an historical bloc survived temporarily based on a common will to resist the aggression from the outside.

Through revolutionary warfare and negotiations, Indonesia at last achieved its formal and legal sovereignty. The Round Table Conference held at The Hague from 23 August to 2 November 1949 resulted in an agreement to the unconditional and complete transfer of sovereignty by the Netherlands no later than 30 December 1949, of the entire territory of the former Netherlands East Indies, except for West New Guinea, to the republic of the United States of Indonesia (RUSI).

The RUSI was to have the sovereign of the Netherlands as a symbolic head, Sukarno as president, Mohammad Hatta as vice-president and also prime minister (1949–50). It consisted of the original Republic of Indonesia and fifteen Dutch-created political units (states).⁵ Dutch investments were to be protected, and the new government was to be responsible for the billion-dollar Netherlands Indies government debt.⁶

This federal state of Indonesia, however, did not last long. Although the idea of federalism had long been idealized by a large segment of the politicized intelligentsia, the fact that the formation of RUSI was perceived as Dutch-imposed and a relic of colonialism gave rise to a climate of opinion that favoured a unitary state. In all the fifteen states there soon emerged popular demands for the liquidation of these states and their merger with the republic. On 3 April 1950 Mohammad Natsir, the chairman of the *Masjumi* fraction in the RUSI House of Representatives, proposed the so-called “*Mosi Integral Natsir*” (Natsir’s “Integral” motion) to the house, calling on all the states to unite and to establish together a unitary state. The motion gained positive responses. On the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the declaration of independence, on 17 August 1950, the RUSI was replaced by a new Republic of Indonesia with a unitary (but provisional) constitution.

Natsir was mandated by President Sukarno to form a new cabinet, which was announced on 6 September and symbolized the beginning of the new “unitarian” government. The long cherished dream of political independence had been achieved but the dream had to be transformed into actuality. The “enemies” were now no longer foreign imperialists but domestic problems of poverty, educational backwardness, social inequality, corruption, political disputes and the challenge of territorial disintegration.

In the polity of the independent state, the Indonesian intelligentsia and clerical-intelligentsia who served as the instigators, leaders and executors of national politics constituted the dominant ruling elite. Harry J. Benda has

tended to exaggerate the situation by describing the structural position of this intelligentsia in terms of forming a class in its own right. In his view, this group of intelligentsia wielded political power in their own right, as intelligentsia, rather than as spokesmen for entrenched social forces. "In other words, these intelligentsias are a ruling *class*, or rather the ruling *class* par excellence" (Benda 1962, p. 237, emphasis added). This is an exaggeration since the economic conditions for the transformation of the intelligentsia into a class were absent in Indonesia.

As G. Konrád and I. Szelényi argue (1979), the intelligentsia in a market economy and state capitalism system do not constitute a class in the way they did in the (former) socialist societies of the Eastern Europe. In the latter countries, the intelligentsia with its monopolistic authority to control both the state ideology and the redistribution of the products of economic surplus had been the focal point for a merging of economic and political power. In this way it could emerge as a class. In a system of market economy and state capitalism, however, economic redistribution is subordinated to the logic of the market and cannot be controlled in the same way.

The Indonesian situation was also different from that of Eastern Europe. Members of the Indonesian intelligentsia who led cabinets in the early years of the new republic, while formally advocating ideologies of a socialist and nationalist character,⁷ had no intention of immediately nationalizing the economy and of controlling the redistribution of economic surplus products. They believed that "any rapid move from a colonial to a national economy would create disruption on a scale that they could not manage and thus were unwilling to confront" (Robison 1978, p. 19; 1981, p. 20). This situation was reinforced by the Financial-Economic Agreement of the Round Table Conference in 1949. Based on this agreement, "Dutch firms could enjoy business as usual, including the remittance of profit". The Indonesian government was obliged to consult with the Netherlands on any monetary and financial measures likely to have an impact on Dutch interests, which was a definite limitation of Indonesian sovereignty' (Dick 2002, pp. 170–71).

The ruling intelligentsia's attempt to control economic distribution in the early 1950s through the so-called *Benteng* [bastion] programme was doomed to failure as it was never their serious objective.⁸ When the nationalization of Dutch corporate holdings took place in 1957–58, what appeared afterwards was state capitalism (Robison 1978, pp. 23–24). In this system of the economy, the intelligentsia could not fully control the redistribution of the economic surplus products, as economic redistribution in this system was still subordinated to the logic of the market.

Nor can the Indonesian intelligentsia's road to power be described in terms of the rise of the "new class" in Gouldnerian terms. Alvin Gouldner argues that the possessor of cultural capital could emerge as a class in its own right for it has "considerable *de facto* control over the mode of production and hence considerable leverage with which to pursue its interests" (Gouldner 1979, p. 12). In fact, the political dominance of the Indonesian intelligentsia did not originate from their (powerful) control over the mode of production. Rather, members of the intelligentsia were predominantly government employees and socio-humanities intellectuals who had no strong connections with the productive sector of the economy.

Under these conditions, the Indonesian intelligentsia could only constitute a social stratum, which typically occupied an intermediate position between capitalists and workers.⁹ As a social stratum, the intelligentsia underwent a noticeable structural differentiation. The great bulk of them belonged to the middle income level. Some few others emerged with their wealth substantially enhanced, in many respects coming to share economic power with the owners of capital, while the rest were distinctly proletarianized. These factors along with the diversity of their cultural and political affiliations meant that the Indonesian intelligentsia could not emerge as a distinct established class.

Despite the diversity of their structural positions and political affiliations, intelligentsia and *ulama-intelekt* played a dominant role in all political groups. As a corollary of this they played a dominant role in the leadership of the state. There were some explanations for the elevation of intelligentsia and *ulama-intelekt* to the dominant ruling elite. By the time of Indonesian independence, the princely dynasties were in decay. Their powers and their capacities had declined even before the consolidation of the colonial state: they "organized no political movements and they espoused no ideology" (Shils 1972, p. 387). The historic *clerisy*, such as the (old) scholastic *ulama* and other custodians of the sacred texts, usually — with a few great exceptions — lacked the capacity to deal with the administration of the modern state. During the same period, merchants and industrialists (the "moneyed" bourgeoisie) had no significant influence on politics. The passing of colonialism did not change the economic structure and capital formation of the nation. As Robison argues, capital control continued to be dominated by Dutch (or other foreign) bourgeoisie and their Chinese counterparts, who were unable to constitute themselves as a ruling class in the full sense of the term because both were excluded from formal participation in public political activity. Although the "*pengusaha pribumi*" [indigenous bourgeoisie] were included in political participation, their social and economic base was too

weak to enable them either to capture the state apparatus or to exert a decisive influence on the formation of state policy (Robison 1981, pp. 19–20). It was the restricted translation of economic force into a political power that gave politics a substantial degree of autonomy.

In the vacuum of power following the end of World War II and the relative incapacity of other agencies to administer the country, the (politicized) indigenous intelligentsia of diverse political streams eventually achieved a position of political dominance. This was a position achieved not simply through the possession of cultural capital, but more importantly through their special affinity with anti-colonial movements as well as with the leadership of political organizations. Thus, to borrow G. Konrád and I. Szelényi's argument (1979, p. 28), the essence of the intelligentsia's political dominance did not lie in the fact that their cultural capital guaranteed power and reward in certain positions; rather, the intelligentsia sought to obtain power and reward for themselves by exploiting their relative monopoly of cultural capital as a means of achieving those goals. The heart of the matter, then, was not to be found in a knowledge that was functionally necessary, but rather in the desire to legitimize aspirations to power, which based its justification on the intelligentsia's leadership position in the struggle for independence.

Under the leadership of intellectuals of the second generation, from September 1950 to March 1957 Indonesia experimented with the development of parliamentary (constitutional) democracy.¹⁰ The experiment did not run smoothly. Along with the deterioration of the post-revolutionary economy, Cabinets continued to change, with none lasting more than two years. This was a serious predicament for both the implementation of the state's programmes and for the consolidation of democracy. To make matters worse, with political parties tending to be preoccupied with their own short-term interests, the abuse of power in the form of corruption and cronyism was a common feature. Overall, all cabinets failed to meet the high expectations of the general population.

The fragility of parliamentary democracy provided a rationale for President Sukarno to play a more active role in political life by shifting the country's political system towards authoritarian lines. Thus, from March 1957 until the collapse of the Sukarno regime in 1966, the democratic experiment was destroyed, leading to severe political unrest, which provided the momentum for the construction of new collective identities of Indonesian intelligentsia as well as for a regime change.

This chapter describes the political role of the intelligentsia and *ulama-intelek* as the political elite of the newly born Indonesian Republic, stretching from the early months of Indonesian independence in 1945 until the fall of

the Sukarno regime in 1965. During this period, contestations between various intellectual traditions were translated into contestations between various political parties in the struggle for control of the state leadership. The chapter will then discuss the obstacles to the democratic experiment and the failure of civilian intelligentsia in exercising parliamentary democracy in the 1950s. At the same time, it will also pay attention to the acceleration in educational development that gave rise to the quantitative explosion of the Indonesian intelligentsia. A more elaborate discussion will focus on the rise and fall of Muslim intelligentsia as political leaders of the nation and the rising tide of a new generation of Muslim intelligentsia.

EQUAL ACCESS TO (SECULAR) PUBLIC EDUCATION

Indonesian independence was celebrated in a spirit of liberty, equality, and fraternity. With the passing of colonialism there had been a vibrant popular hope that the colonial-imposed social boundaries and discriminations would crumble. The Indonesian word "*merdeka*" [independence], which became a popular cry everywhere in the public sphere, implied a call for the elevation of social status. Deriving from a Sanskrit word "*maharddhika*" (meaning "sacred", "wise" or "pundit"), the word in the old Javanese language (*Kawi*) was often used to refer to a "pundit" or "Buddhist monk"; that is, a person who had a privileged social status (Steenbrink 1984, p. 169).¹¹ Thus, with independence, people from different classes and status groups shared the dream of being treated as first-class citizens. This spirit was reinforced by the popular use, from the time of the revolution, of the word "*bung*" before the name of particular persons, such as *Bung Karno* (Sukarno) or *Bung Hatta*. The word is best translated as "brother" resembling the use of the term "citizen" of the French Revolution or that of "comrade" of the Russian.

The popular desire for greater social recognition for all brought new opportunities for the expansion of the intelligentsia. Realizing that educational qualifications were a powerful means for the elevation of social status in the colonial period, there was a strong political consciousness among people of different status groups to break down restrictive regulations and enlarge people's choices in the educational field. The political commitment to fulfil such a desire was enshrined in clause 31 of the 1945 Constitution: "Every citizen is entitled to education."

The realization of this educational ideal, however, was temporarily interrupted by the revolutionary struggle. In mid-September 1945, the first British troops (on behalf of the Allied forces) began to land in Jakarta, their mission being to establish and maintain law and order in Indonesia until the

Netherlands administration could be re-established. They were soon followed by the landing, under British cover, of Dutch troops who intended to overthrow the republic and return Indonesia to colonial status (Kahin 1952, pp. 141–43).

Under these circumstances little could be done in educational development as priority was given to more urgent military and political tasks. On 29 September 1945, the first education minister, Ki Hadjar Dewantara, issued an interim educational guideline intended more to galvanize the spirit of nationalism than to launch educational programmes. “Schools were urged to instil the spirit of nationalism especially through daily singing of the national anthem and raising of the Republican flag” (Lee 1995, p. 32). The Nationalization Decree and the Higher Education Decree of 1946 mandated that instruction be delivered in Indonesian with English and German being included at the secondary and tertiary levels.

Thus, the educational opportunities for the third generation of intelligentsia continued to be overtaken by history. As Lee Kam Hing stated (1995, pp. 32–33): “Large numbers of students had already dropped out of school during the Japanese occupation. When the revolution broke out, many more young men left school to join the fighting. Young university and high school students formed student army organizations referred to as *tentara pelajar* or sometimes *pelajar pejuang*.”

Even so, efforts to maintain educational life continued. Two days after the proclamation of independence, Indonesian nationalists established in Jakarta an educational association, the Republic of Indonesia Higher Education Centre [*Balai Perguruan Tinggi Republik Indonesia*]. “It drew most its staff and students from Indonesians of the Jakarta medical school during the Japanese times and of the Dutch law and literature colleges from before the war” (Thomas 1973, p. 43).

Following the first Dutch “police” (military) action in July 1947, the Dutch forces controlled most of the islands, while the Indonesian republican government could only hold a densely populated portion of Java around Yogyakarta, the city that became the capital for the revolutionary government. With some existing colleges inherited from the past decades located in the Dutch occupied territories, the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (NICA) regained the momentum to realize the unfinished business of the early 1940s of amalgamating all pre-war colleges plus several new faculties into a single university. This university was called *Universiteit van Indonesie* [the University of Indonesia] with its branches being scattered in some cities.

Many nationalist lecturers and students who did not want to stay in the Dutch occupied territories fled together with the revolutionary government

to Yogyakarta. In the city and its surrounding areas (Klaten, Surakarta, etc.) they established faculties (colleges) of medicine, dentistry, pharmacy, veterinary medicine, agriculture, law, and (limited) the arts. On 19 December 1949, these faculties were officially combined to form the *Universiteit Negeri Gadjah Mada* [UGM, Gadjah Mada State University].

When Indonesia finally achieved its legal sovereignty in December 1949, the long cherished dream of equal rights to education began to find strong ground. The Education Law no. 4 of 1950, which was ratified as Law no. 12 of 1954 when the federal system was replaced by the unitary state, stated unequivocally that “education was the right of every citizen”. Henceforth, despite the nation’s serious economic and political problems, the educational sector enjoyed unprecedented growth.

The greatest expansion in the number of schools and pupils took place initially in the areas of elementary and secondary education. Between 1950 and 1958, the number of (secular) elementary schools increased from 24,775 to 33,845, while the total number of their pupils grew from 4,977,304 to 7,317,307. In the same period, the number of (secular) lower and upper secondary schools increased from about 954 to 4,608, while the total number of their students jumped from about 138,668 to 754,089 (Ministry of Education 1956, 1958). This dramatic expansion at elementary and secondary levels soon flowed through to higher education. A great number of upper secondary school graduates were ready in the later 1950s and early 1960s for admission to universities.

In the first half the 1950s government efforts at the tertiary level were concentrated on improving the two existing public universities: Gadjah Mada University (UGM) and the (former Dutch) University of Indonesia (UI).¹² With large numbers of upper secondary school graduates in the late 1950s, Indonesia began to experience its most rapid expansion in higher education. As Thomas noted (1973, p. 87): “The four universities of 1950 had increased to well over 135 higher-education institutions by 1960, 53 of them public and more than 80 private. The total enrolment grew from about 6,000 in 1950 to 60,000 or 70,000 in 1960.”

This quantitative explosion, however, was not matched by qualitative improvement, especially at the higher education level. By precipitating an exodus of Dutch academics and the removal of Dutch as the language of instruction,¹³ Indonesia experienced a degree of intellectual impoverishment. As Professor I. Broersma, a former Dutch scientist in the Bandung Branch of the University of Indonesia, said: “The greatest loss Indonesia sustained after independence was not wealth but brains...The intellectual capital of the country, represented by a generation of Dutch scientists with research

experience in Indonesia, was lost” (Messer 1994, pp. 57–58). Furthermore, after Indonesian plus English were mandated as replacements for Dutch as languages of instruction, there were a number of practical problems. Because of the scarcity of technical literature in Indonesian, lecturers were forced to provide notes as a replacement for books. Very few students understood sufficient English to use English texts. Thus, nationalism, which was signalled by the removal of Dutch from the academic world, made a massive scientific literature suddenly unavailable, and Indonesia became largely cut off from current scientific developments because of a language barrier.¹⁴

Thanks to the Cold War and growing tensions in international relations, some Indonesian scholars were able to improve their academic qualifications through foreign aid (and) scholarships. During the 1950s and 1960s, a substantial amount of aid to Indonesian higher education came from both communist and capitalist countries.¹⁵ By far, however, the greatest amount of help was given by the United States Agency for International Development (US-AID) and by the Ford Foundation (Thomas 1973, pp. 213–14). While the communist and nationalist scholars tended to be critical of the capitalist countries, those who benefited most from scholarships from these capitalist institutions were “socialist” and Christian scholars, and to a lesser degree also Muslim scholars. Among those who pursued overseas studies through these scholarships were several economists from the University of Indonesia such as Widjojo Nitisastro and Ali Wardhana, who would play an important role in the rise of the New Order. About the same time, with scholarships from the Canadian government, several Muslim intellectuals of the Islamic institutional background such as Mukti Ali, Anton Timur Djaelani and Harun Nasution began to enter a Western centre of Islamic Studies at McGill University. These Muslim scholars would have a significant impact on the future development of Muslim intellectuals and of the religious administration of the country.

In addition to the general qualitative degradation, the rapid educational expansion was not matched by the economic performance of the country. In the late 1950s, a Dutch economist, A. van den Ende, had already predicted that the result of this discrepancy would lead to an inevitable disillusionment. For an agrarian economy, he believed that too much education is dangerous. Education was not in keeping with the needs of people and it was producing extremists. He appraised the situation and predicted violent upheavals as a result of too much education in Indonesia (Mauldin 1981, pp. 361–65). It was against this backdrop that the formation of the fourth generation of intelligentsia took place. This generation was made up largely of those who were born in the 1930s and 1940s.

In the rapid expansion of an educated population, the term “*inteligensia*” [intelligentsia], which was often used interchangeably with the term “*intelektuil*” [intellectual], became relatively popular for the first time. Entering the Indonesian public sphere perhaps through a detour *via* Western European intellectual influence, rather than being imported directly from Russia or Poland,¹⁶ the term intelligentsia began to appear in Indonesian intellectual writings as early as the late 1930s.¹⁷ During the Japanese Occupation and revolution of the 1940s, however, the term was overshadowed by the popularity of the term “*pemoeda*” [youth] as the latter better represented a sense of mass power and of fraternal solidarity. By the end of the revolution, the rise of new (university) student organizations, provided the momentum for the term “*inteligensia*” to be reintroduced to the public sphere signalling the growing expectations of the educated community.¹⁸

Until the end of revolution in 1949, the community of those with higher education continued to be dominated by secular-oriented students. Only a small number of Muslim students was able to enrol at the new republican colleges.¹⁹ Due to their involvement in the revolutionary struggle, however, these Muslim students of the third generation could not finish their tertiary education or postponed completion until after the revolution.

During the 1950s, taking advantage of better access to education and rapid expansion of higher education, however, children from *santri* families gradually entered state (secular) universities. As a result, by the emergence of the fourth generation of intelligentsia around the 1960s, Muslim students began to play a major role in the Indonesian student movement.

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND THE EXPANSION OF ISLAMIC UNIVERSITIES

Disappointed by the omission of the “seven words” of the Jakarta Charter from the preamble of the 1945 Constitution, Muslim leaders attempted to seek compensation in the realm of religious education. They started their strategy during discussions on the Educational Bill in the Working Committee of the KNIP in October 1949.²⁰ In these discussions, Muslim leaders, included Prawoto Mangkusasmita, Muhammad Daud Beureu’eh, Zaenal Abidin Achmad, and Kjai Zarakasji, raised three contentious issues: the future of religious schools, co-education (between males and females) and the position of religious instruction in secular schools.

Regarding the first issue, Muslim members of the KNIP accepted that religious schools should be administered separately from the state secular schools, but on condition that the government treat Islamic schools as equal

to secular schools. This was agreed and it was decided that there would be two major educational streams in the country: a secular system under the Education Ministry, and a religious one under the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The latter ministry was established in the second Sjahrir cabinet (March 1946–October 1946) with M. Rasjidi (b. 1915, a graduate of Cairo University) being its first minister. Intended initially to assuage Muslims' political disappointments and to win their political support in the age of revolution, this ministry offered a middle way between a secular state and Islamic state.

Concerning the second issue, Muslim members of the KNIP were unhappy with the concept of co-education. Placing boys and girls together in the same schools was regarded as improper and even offensive. This provision, however, seemed to be tolerated, and the government proposal was passed without serious objection.

The third issue was the most contentious. Almost all political groups in the KNIP agreed that religious education was an important foundation in shaping Indonesian education to distinguish post-colonial schools from those of the Dutch period. However, there was no consensus about whether religious instruction ought to be a compulsory subject or not, and whether compulsory religious education obliged attendance only or that examination marks from religious classes should determine promotion. As expected, Muslim leaders insisted on the implementation of compulsory religious education with all its ramifications. This proposal was totally rejected by secular and Christian leaders. When this matter of disagreement was covered in Clause 20 of the bill, the details of the text went even farther than Muslims' expectations. The clause stated: "In all state schools, religious instruction will be provided. Parents are to decide whether their children should attend those classes."

The bill was finally passed by the KNIP. Acknowledging Muslims' dissatisfaction, President Sukarno decided not to sign it as a law. The bill was signed finally by Assaat as president of the Yogyakarta-based Republic of Indonesia, which was a member of the RUSI, and became Law 4 of 1950. When the federal system was replaced by the unitary state, it was ratified, during the prime ministership of Ali Sastroamidjojo of the PNI, as Law 12 of 1954.²¹

Despite Muslims' dissatisfaction with some aspects of the law, the fact that two early cabinets of the new "unitarian" government were *Masjumi* cabinets (Natsir's and Sukiman's cabinets) secured Muslims' interests. At the time when Law 4 of 1950 had not yet been ratified, the minister of education and the minister of religious affairs in the Natsir cabinet, respectively Bahder Johan (a devout Muslim from West Sumatra) and Wachid Hasjim (of the

NU) took early initiatives to pass a regulation that made religious instruction compulsory for secular schools and conversely the teaching of secular subjects was made compulsory for religious schools.²² With Hasjim being re-appointed the minister of religion in the Sukiman cabinet, this arrangement was then fixed in the Education Regulation of 16 July 1951. When Law 4 of 1950 was ratified in 1954, the Education Regulation of 1951 had been widely implemented and was not easy to remove (see Table 4.1). This scheme bridged the gap between the Muslim intelligentsia who were erudite in secular subjects but generally lacking in religious ones, and the *ulama* who were erudite in religious subjects but generally lacking in secular ones.

TABLE 4.1
Religious Education in State (Secular) Schools 1955–56

	Primary	Lower Secondary (SMP)	Upper Secondary (SMA)
Total number of school	27,910	1,299	494
Schools where religious Education was given	15,584	881	93

Source: Lee Kam Hing (1995, p. 121).

Legislation aside, Islamic educational institutions continued to catch up with the development of secular schools. At the tertiary level, the backbone of the Indonesian Islamic university was the Japanese-sponsored *Sekolah Tinggi Islam* [STI, Advanced Islamic School] with its governing board and lecturers representing the best available Muslim intellectuals of the first and second generation. Established in the last few weeks of the Japanese Occupation, educational activities of this university were soon interrupted by the demands of the revolutionary struggle. When most of the republican intelligentsia fled with the revolutionary government to Yogyakarta, the STI was also relocated to this city. On 10 April 1946, its re-opening took place in Yogyakarta, in the presence of President Sukarno, with a speech by Hatta as president of the board of governors. Later on 10 March 1948, this institution began to transform itself into *Universiteit Islam Indonesia* and then *Universitas Islam Indonesia* [UII, Islamic University of Indonesia] offering degree programmes in its four constituent faculties — those of religion, law, economics, and education.

The emergence of the STI/UII was very important. It not only represented the first Indonesian private university offering both religious and secular faculties but it was also an ancestor for a widespread network of state Islamic institutes and a diversity of private Muslim universities and colleges that would evolve in later years. More importantly, it was an early breeding ground for the upcoming leaders of the Muslim intelligentsia. Some of its early students such as Lafran Pane (b. 1922), M. Jusdi Ghazali (b. 1923), Anwar Harjono (b. 1923), and Mukti Ali (b. 1923) would play decisive roles in creating new Islamic epistemic communities and intellectual networks as new vehicles for Islamic ideals.

The Ministry of Religious Affairs was keen to raise the educational levels of its staff, a desire which was in accord with the government policy of providing more public higher education. The ministry therefore took over the faculty of religion at the UII. In order to train Islamic judges, teachers of religion, and directors of district religious offices, the faculty of religion was transformed in 1951 into the so-called *Perguruan Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri* [PTAIN, The State College of Religion].

Meanwhile, a new type of Islamic college was created in 1957 in Jakarta, known as *Akademi Dinas Ilmu Agama* [ADIA, Government Academy of Religious Studies]. It was designed to be a training college for officials of religion in government service and for teachers of religious instruction at state schools. Subsequently, the PTAIN and ADIA were united in 1960 to form an *Institut Agama Islam Negeri* [IAIN, State Islamic Institute], set up initially in Yogyakarta (IAIN Sunan Kalidjaga) with other IAIN being established later in some other cities.²³ In this educational institution religious and general subjects were taught side by side, a policy that would have a significant impact on the future development of Islamic intelligentsia. It was graduates of these Islamic universities who would become a strategic counterpart of Muslim students of secular universities in the struggle for intellectual hegemony in the 1960s.

DISCURSIVE PRACTICES AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE OF THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT NATION

Besides leading to a sharp rise in the number of the intelligentsia, the egalitarian spirit of the new independent nation also had a significant impact on intellectual discourses and on the construction of the Indonesian political system in the early years of the post-colonial republic. Alongside the theme of revolution, issues of “democracy” became a dominant discourse in the public sphere. Already in Sukarno’s historic speech on the birth of *Pancasila*

(1 June 1945), democracy had been idealized as one of the future national principles. In the constitution and platforms of the fourteen parties included in the book *Kepartaian di Indonesia* [The Party System of Indonesia], which was published by the Information Ministry in 1950, the word was used frequently and almost always with unqualified approval (Feith 1962, p. 38). At the level of discursive consciousness — which was not necessarily manifest in practical consciousness — a general agreement prevailed for the need for democracy in the social, economic and political fields including support for the equality of all citizens, denunciations of dictatorship, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly and demonstration, and freedom to strike.

Intelligentsia of higher learning and *ulama-intelekt* continued to become organic intellectuals of various political streams and it was they who articulated political ideals of particular groups. Their public role had now been extended from being the champions of civil society (as they were during the colonial period) to becoming champions of political society in the newly independent nation.

As the political elite, the intelligentsia and *ulama-intelekt* had a critical role in shaping the future of the nation. The euphoria of political freedom in the early birth of the new Republic encouraged each group of the intelligentsia to lead the nation along a particular ideological line. The immediate consequence of this attempt was the failure of the monolithic state-party arrangement. In an effort to maintain an historical bloc for the sake of the unfinished revolution, the PPKI which metamorphosed into the KNIP on 22 August 1945, on the very same day established a single state party, *PNI Staats-Partij*, with the strong support of President Sukarno. This single state party was oriented to unite all groups and to become the “motor of the people’s struggle in every sphere and every field” (Anderson 1972, p. 91). Ten days later, however, this monolithic state party was dissolved as a result of pressure especially from radical *pemoeda* under the influence of Sjahrir.²⁴ With the dissolution of the monolithic state party arrangement, the era of the multi-party system began bringing with it the return of the Indonesian public sphere with its diverse nature.

The Formation of Post-Colonial Political Parties

Just a few months after the proclamation of independence, diverse political traditions were reconstructed according to the socio-political networks which had been set up both before and during the Japanese occupation. As a result, the public sphere soon became a contested space of a diverse

intellectual political traditions. The Communist Party (PKI) was reconstituted in October 1945 representing the communist intellectual political tradition, and soon after came under the control of orthodox internationally oriented leaders. Many of these leaders were former activists from the 1920s who had been released from detention, such as Alimin and Sardjono (Ricklefs 1993, p. 221).²⁵

In November 1945, the *Masjumi* was founded as the main representative of the Muslim intellectual political tradition. Unlike the earlier Japanese-sponsored *Masjumi*, it now brought together both non-political Islamic organizations subsumed under the *Masjumi* of the Japanese period, including the *Muhammadiyah* and NU, and pre-war Islamic political organizations such as the PSII.

In December 1945, Amir Sjarifuddin's followers merged with those of Sjahrir to form a political party along socialist lines called *Partai Sosialis* [Socialist Party]. In early 1947 they split again. In February 1948 Sjahrir's followers established the *Partai Sosialis Indonesia* [PSI, Indonesian Socialist Party], while Sjarifuddin's group made an alliance with the PKI to form the so-called *Front Demokrasi Rakyat* [People's Democratic Alliance]. The PSI's main constituency was still found among the "Westernized" segment of Indonesian society and it was particularly influential among higher civil servants and the central army command. During the last months of 1945 there also emerged the *Partai Kristen Indonesia* [*Parkindo*, Indonesian Christian/Protestant], the *Partai Katholik* [Catholic Party] and some other small parties. Both parties represented the Christian intellectual tradition.

In January 1946, the *Partai Nasional Indonesia* (PNI, Indonesian Nationalist Party) was revived outside the framework of the aborted PNI state party. Although Sukarno was not made its chairman, because as president he was theoretically above politics, this party was led by Sukarno's followers, especially those former activists of the pre-war PNI and *Partindo*. Its main supporters came from the *adat*-oriented bureaucrats, especially those from Central and East Java (Kahin 1952, pp. 155–59).

These parties, with many others that would emerge in the following days, vigorously recruited mass support especially amongst young men whose militancy could prove to be an enormous asset. Along with the political parties there emerged their paramilitary offspring. So the *Hizbullah* became the offshoot of the *Masjumi*; the *Pesindo* (*Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia*, Indonesian Socialist Youth, est. 1945), became that of the socialist group; the Japanese-sponsored *Barisan Pelopor* metamorphosed into the so-called *Barisan Banteng* [Buffalo Corps] and became the vanguard of the PNI, but slowly drifted into the camp of radical nationalists; and the *Laskar Rakjat*

[People's Militias] and *Laskar Merah* [Red Militias] were affiliated to the PKI (Sundhaussen 1982, p. 4).

The emergence of this plethora of political parties and the resulting political conflicts coincided with Dutch attempts to reoccupy the country. The worst consequence of these conflicts was the rise of political insurrections against the civilian authority of the Indonesian Republic. Among these were the *Darul Islam* (Ar. the House of Islam) rebellion by a West Java-based militant Islamic guerrilla unit in May 1948 and the "Madiun Affair", the PKI rebellion in September–October 1948. The challenge of maintaining the new civilian government's authority and of struggling for independence provided the impetus for the formation of an Indonesian military force.²⁶

The Formation of the Indonesian Military Political Tradition

The early backbone of the National Army was drawn from the former *Peta* corps. With the need to improve its military organization, some former KNIL (Royal Netherlands Indies Army) officers became involved. Because there was civilian political interest in the military force, some *laskar* (militia) forces and segments of youth paramilitary groups were also integrated into the Republic army.

The formation of the Indonesian National Army was accompanied by a series of internal and external conflicts. Internally, conflicts occurred because of differences in the background of military training and affiliation (ex-KNIL *versus* ex-*Peta*, and ex-*Peta* *versus* ex-*laskar/pemoeda* elements in the army), in religious affiliation (Muslim *versus* non-Muslim and *santri* *versus* *abangan*), in ethnic origin (Java [Central and East Java] *versus* non-Java), and in age group (senior *versus* junior military officers). Externally, the military field became an extension of the competitive civilian political struggle with the socialist politicians (Amir Sjarifuddin and Sutan Sjahrir) being the most interventionist civilians in the formative phase of the National Army.

At the very beginning, the conspicuous role of Muslim officers was evident in the appointment of Sudirman (former *dandancho* of Kroja, and a local *Muhammadiyah* school teacher) as the first Indonesian military commander-in-chief.²⁷ As most Muslim officers were ex-*Peta* officers, however, their role gradually declined following the urgent need to create standards of military efficiency. In an effort to create a professional military corps, former KNIL officers became more influential in carrying out staff duties.²⁸ Although only a very small group of about thirty, these ex-KNIL officers were far superior to the ex-*Peta* officers.²⁹

The standing of Muslims in the new army became even worse following the involvement of particular Islamic irregular guerrilla units in rebellions against the Indonesian Republic government.³⁰ This caused difficulties for the integration of the Islamic military/paramilitary corps into the National Army (TNI). Given this fact, it was hardly surprising that the military tradition of independent Indonesia gradually lost its original close links with Muslim political communities.

In the meantime, the growing civilian-military conflict in the face of Dutch military actions and the impotence of the civilian politics of diplomacy provided the grounds for the military officers to consolidate their own corps and to increase their political leverage over civilians. The determining moment in the construction of the army collective identity was the so-called second Dutch "police action", an attack on the temporary capital of the Indonesian Republic, Yogyakarta, around 19 December 1948. The top civilian government leaders decided to stay in the capital, as if intending to surrender authority to the Dutch, but the Army mobilized a guerrilla war that finally forced the Netherlands into negotiation with the Indonesian leaders. The sudden willingness of the Netherlands to grant independence to Indonesia in 1949 was regarded by the army not as the result of either diplomacy or international support, but of their military achievements which must have convinced the Dutch that the application of force to prevent Indonesian independence would no longer work. This perception boosted *esprit de corps* and created internal solidarity and a sense of collective identity in the army.³¹

The emergence of the TNI's sense of common identity and political ideology brought about the formation of another intellectual political tradition, namely that of the military leaders. It makes sense to depict the Indonesian military officers as an intelligentsia in their own right. They shared common characteristics with the civilian intelligentsia in terms of higher social origin and exposure to modern education. From the very inception of military training for the Indies, the recruitment patterns for officers had restricted the opportunity of people of lower social origins to become KNIL officers. The Military Academy was prestigious, with fluency in Dutch language being a prerequisite for admission, and this alone was an entry barrier for people of lower social origin (Sundhaussen 1982, p. 17). A strict recruitment pattern was also applied to the Peta officers. As Sundhaussen noted (1982, pp. 17–18):

Battalion commanders were recruited among well-known politicians, outstanding religious leaders, or influential opinion leaders. The rank of company commanders was filled in many cases with school-teachers who

commanded a comparatively high social prestige in a largely illiterate society. Platoon commanders were recruited from students, or sons of the lower *pamong praja*, or young officials. All these groups had some sort of secondary education. They included a large percentage of youths with noble backgrounds; but by and large the Japanese did not deliberately promote an aristocracy which they had reason to believe to be rather Dutch-oriented, especially the older generation.

Moreover, with their modern educational background and experience of study in a relatively cosmopolitan atmosphere, these military officers had been in close contact with the civilian intelligentsia (Anderson 1972, p. 235).

The systematic effort to create the military political tradition was institutionalized as early as February 1946 when Amir Sjarifuddin established the so-called *Pendidikan Politik Tentara* [PEPOLIT, Army Political Education]. Two years later, Hatta's first cabinet (29 January 1948–4 August 1949) launched the policy of rationalization and reconstruction of the National Army, so that the military intelligentsia wielded a more decisive role in the leadership of the army. A more serious effort to prepare military intelligentsia for the leadership of the nation began in 1957, when the Indonesian military academy was reopened in Magelang. This academy provided the Indonesian army with professional and politically conscious officers.³²

Thus, by the end of the revolution, the euphoria of independence had not only led to the establishment of multifarious political parties but also the highly politicized Indonesian armed forces. This explosive political participation gained momentum following the achievement of Indonesian legal sovereignty and the installation of the unitary Indonesian state.

POWER GAMES: CONSOLIDATION AND CONTESTATION

The Indonesian attempt to translate their democratic ideals into political practice was manifested in the adoption of Western-type parliamentary democracy. Indonesia's commitment to this Western democratic institution reflected both a genuine belief in democracy and a pragmatic interest. For some of the politicized intelligentsia who had been deeply exposed to the traditions of European liberalism and socialism or similar values of modernist Islam, the adoption of parliamentary institutions was believed to be a necessary condition to safeguard the country against a possible development of authoritarianism. Such a genuine commitment to constitutional democracy was allied with a pragmatic interest to gain wider international acceptance for the new republic and to show the Dutch that Indonesians were able to govern themselves democratically (Feith 1962, pp. 43–45).

Impediments to the Democratic Experiment

In the open public sphere of a newly sovereign Indonesia, the euphoria of parliamentary democracy among the plurality of Indonesian political traditions encouraged proliferation of parties and increased the trend to a wide range of parties which had been an early characteristic of Indonesian politics. In the lead up to the first Indonesian general election in 1955, there had been some 172 parties and quasi-political groups reflecting the ongoing external polarization and internal fragmentation of Indonesian political traditions. Along with this development, freedom of the press became an issue. After experiencing survival difficulties during the revolution, the number of Indonesian daily newspapers jumped quickly from 67 in 1950 to 120 in 1957. Daily circulation tripled from just 338,300 in 1950 to 1,049,500 in 1957. In the period when professional (non-partisan) media remained in an embryonic stage, newspapers that gained a large circulation were those affiliated to political parties. These were, among others, *Harian Rakjat* of the PKI (55,000/day), *Pedoman* of the PSI (48,000/day), *Soeloeh Indonesia* of the PNI (40,000/day), and *Abadi* of the *Masjumi* with 34,000/day (Said 1987, pp. 95–96).

During the 1950s, only a few political parties had significant influence in terms of followers or political representation. Among these were the *Masjumi*, the NU, the PNI, the PKI, the PSI, the Christian parties (*Parkindo* and the *Partai Katholik*). The PSI and Christian parties were small parties in terms of followers but influential parties in terms political representation. Their powerful political representation derived from their influence among higher civil servants and the central army command (because of their superior educational qualifications).

Throughout the 1950–57 period these major parties, excluding the PKI, were the principal stakeholders in governmental affairs, with the PNI and *Masjumi* being the prime movers. The failure to sustain cabinets for more than a year or two, a characteristic of the revolutionary period, continued into the 1950s. From September 1950 until the 1955 elections, Indonesia experienced the rise and fall of five different governments based on a fragile series of coalitions between several parties. The five cabinets were respectively the Mohammad Natsir cabinet of the *Masjumi* (September 1950–April 1951),³³ the Sukiman Wirjosandjojo cabinet of the *Masjumi* (April 1951–February 1952),³⁴ the Wilopo cabinet of the PNI (April 1952–June 1953),³⁵ the first cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjojo of the PNI (July 1953–July 1955),³⁶ and the Burhanuddin Harahap cabinet of the *Masjumi* (August 1955–March 1956).³⁷ Such fragility was hardly surprising for there were few foundations

upon which constitutional democracy could be consolidated. In a country still typified by a high rate of illiteracy, a lower level of education, poor economic conditions, huge social discrepancies and authoritarian mentalities, the political terrain remained the property of a tiny layer of elite politicians (Ricklefs 1993, p. 237).

The political behaviour of these elites has been identified by Feith as the main problem leading to the failure of the democratic experiment in this period. In his eyes, the most crucial factor that caused the breakdown of Indonesian constitutional democracy was an enduring tension between what he called the "solidarity makers" (such as Sukarno) and the "administrators" (such as Hatta); that is between leaders with integrative skills and skills in symbolic manipulation as well as mass mobilization and leaders with administrative, legal, technical, and foreign language skills. The tensions were never effectively resolved. Both groups were little concerned about middle-range goals. Virtually none of the leaders were attempting to link long-term ends with short-term administrative programmes, ideological appeals with the solution of practical problems (Feith 1962, p. 34).

In contrast to Feith's view, H.J. Benda attributed the failure to the alien nature of democracy in the Indonesian historical context. In his eyes, Indonesian political history from pre-colonial times until the end of colonialism had not experienced styles of governing other than patrimonialism and authoritarianism. Thus, the democratic experiment was doomed to failure "once Indonesian (especially Javanese) history found a way back to its own moorings" (Benda 1964, pp. 453–54). Beyond the surface of both perspectives, however, the cause lay much deeper in the complexities of Indonesian politics as a reflection of the diversity of the Indonesian political elite, the plurality of Indonesian society, and the polyvalence of Indonesian collective memories and cultural conditionings.

The Indonesian intelligentsia and clerical-intelligentsia as the dominant ruling elite underwent structural and cultural differentiation. Economically, they were not a unitary class that could form a unitary technocracy. Culturally, they were affiliated with diverse cultural solidarity groupings. By the end of revolution, a common historical bloc, which created a common will during the colonial period, suddenly became an anachronism and lost its efficacy to maintain national unity in facing new domestic problems of the new republic. With the breakdown of the historical bloc, Indonesia found its way back to its original nature: a plural society.

J.S. Furnivall (1980) characterized a plural society as comprising two or more elements or social orders which live side by side, yet without mingling in one political unit. In such a society, he said, "there is no common will

except, possibly, in matters of supreme importance, such as resistance to aggression from outside.” This lack of common will makes nation-building in such societies an uphill task.³⁸

The uphill task of grounding democracy in a plural society does not necessarily mean that this kind of society is inimical to democracy. Arend Lijphart argued (1977) that it is possible to maintain a stable democratic government in a plural society as long as the elites are willing to cooperate. That such cooperation will occur, however, cannot be taken for granted. This requires a new common solidarity framework that relies, *inter alia*, on the presence of civic nationalism. In fact, this kind of nationalism which bases its appeal on inclusive citizenship and the virtue of civility (Snyder 2000, p. 24) had not yet become the major feature of the Indonesian political community.

This lack of civility might reflect the lack of a common will amongst Indonesians as a plural society, but more importantly this was rooted in the post-colonial traumatic remembrance. Post-colonial Indonesia was sensitive to the imprint of traumatic experiences and the persistence of the source of hatred inherited from the clash of identities in the colonial period. One of the most crucial problems in creating national integration in the Indonesian polity was the problem of collective memory. To borrow Homi Bhabha’s depiction (1994): the past in the collective memory of most Indonesians was not just a reservoir of a raw material of political practice and experience that could be theorized distantly, but rather the root of historical self-invention, the main source for discovering group identities. Remembering, as such, is a necessary bridge but also a dangerous one between past experience and the question of cultural identities.

What seemed to weigh on many Indonesian minds, especially among the marginalized groups, was the colonial policy of social segregation and favouritism. This collective recollection did not die with the coming of new generations. In the absence of a genuine civil society in Indonesia, the medium for collective social learning and the production of political symbols was predominantly supplied by communal groups. It was through the commemorative rituals of these communal groups that recollections were sustained. Thus, traumatic remembrance was sustained by the failure of collective social learning.³⁹ Generally speaking, Indonesia at this juncture was still a communal, not an associational, society. Associations as a catalyst for transforming people from the spirit of communalism towards the spirit of citizenship did not exist to any great extent.

The politicized intelligentsia, who were expected to lead the political communities into the virtue of political civility, had in fact fostered the

attractions of communalism. Having no strong economic foundation, groups of the politicized intelligentsia competed with each other to control the state bureaucracy and economy. The will to control resources needed social justification. In this context, communal interests became a powerful reason. Cultural and communal solidarity became politicized in conflict situations where the real issues were frequently the political and economic interests of the political elite.

The first general election of 1955 was expected to become a springboard for elite settlements, political stability, and the pursuit of national goals. In fact, the dream did not come true. The results of the election established the pre-eminence of four parties but none of them obtained a majority. The four parties were PNI, *Masjumi*, NU, and PKI that each gained 22.3, 20.9, 18.4, and 16.4 per cent respectively of the total valid votes (Feith 1957, pp. 58–59).⁴⁰ While none of the parties could win a majority vote in the parliament and most of the parties wanted to be included in the cabinet, the government was once again formed through a broad coalition. The cabinet that emerged following the election was formed through a coalition of the PNI with two major partners, *Masjumi* and NU, plus other small parties (*Parkindo*, *Partai Katholik*, PSII, IPKI and *Perti*) and even a non-party representative (H. Djuanda). This so-called second cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjojo was led by Ali Sastroamidjojo of the PNI as prime minister, assisted by Mohamad Roem of the *Masjumi* and Idham Chalid of the NU respectively as the first and second deputy prime ministers. This broad government coalition without a solid democratic foundation was once again destined to fail.

In December 1955, the Election for the Constituent Assembly, a special body responsible for drafting and approving the definitive constitution for the Republic of Indonesia, produced similar overall results. This brought no victory to any political party or even to any one of the mainstreams in Indonesian society. The two parties considered to represent the Islamic stream and those representing the secular one could not win the two-thirds vote required as a legal basis for deciding the drafting and approval of the new constitution. This created a fragile base for the assembly sessions, which in turn would undermine the whole parliamentary system.

Beginning its sessions on 10 November 1956 in Bandung, the assembly could reach agreement on many fundamental principles including issues concerning human rights, the unitary form of the state, governmental bodies (legislative, executive, and judicative), the power of the head of the state, and so on (Nasution 1995).⁴¹ One question, however, developed into the most crucial issue that polarized opinions of assembly members into two blocs that could not arrive at any compromise. This was the formula concerning the

basis of the state, more precisely the label of the state, which led to a verbal battle between the proponents of a so-called *Pancasila* state and those seeking some form of Islamic state. All parties considered to represent the secular stream were united in support of the former, while all parties representing the Islamic stream were united in support of the latter. As none of the streams controlled two-thirds of the total vote, no one became the winner nor could they reach any compromise.⁴²

In a situation of enduring political disputes, the economy of the country continued to deteriorate. The end of the revolution created great damage to economic infrastructure: transportation and communications, irrigation and power supplies. The macroeconomic environment was also unstable. Because of budget deficits, governments borrowed money from the Bank of Indonesia. The over-supply of money fuelled inflation which in turn weakened the balance of payments. At the same time, foreign investment was discouraged, domestic savings remained low, and public expenditures were weighted heavily towards current consumption. Furthermore, there were no economic foundations on which national integration could be grounded. Apart from the continuous presence of dualistic economic tendencies (between the modern and traditional sector), the economies of the Outer Islands were oriented more to the outside world rather than to Java (Dick 2002, pp. 170–82). This immense economic problem was exacerbated by an arrogant aloofness in the ranks of the elite, immoral exhibitionism among the new rich, and corruption among state officials and government servants (Feith 1962, p. 463).

All these factors, together with efforts of the central government to extend its power, especially through the taxation of the trade of the Outer Islands, provided the grounds for regional disappointment and rebellion. At first, the provincial spokesmen criticized the central government for not giving them enough autonomy. Then, as Jakarta did not respond to their demands satisfactorily, regional disappointments in some provinces metamorphosed into rebellions led by regional army commanders and political leaders.⁴³ Between 1956 and 1960 the country was plagued by increasing tensions and regional rebellions.

Repression and Resistance

The failure of parliamentary governments to overcome the political and economic turmoil of the country provided a rationale for three latent political forces to play a decisive role in politics: Sukarno, the TNI (particularly the army)⁴⁴ and the PKI. Throughout the 1950–57 period, these three forces had

been excluded from playing active roles inside the government.⁴⁵ The three forces were now united by a common will to power.

Both the army and PKI found in Sukarno great political prestige that could be used to achieve their political interests. Conversely, political turmoil and regional rebellions gave Sukarno no choice but to cooperate with the army. At the same time he also needed the PKI as a powerful source of popular support to counterbalance the power of the army. Thus, the army and PKI became the most enthusiastic partners of Sukarno. At the same time, they also competed with each other and would face one another in a struggle for political power.

In the latter half of 1956 Sukarno began explicitly to criticize the detrimental effect of Western-style parliamentary democracy on the revolutionary struggle of the nation which was perceived as far from complete. In a rousing speech on 28 October 1956, he described political parties as a “disease” and called for them to be “buried”. His ambition to bury parliamentary democracy became more uncontrollable following Hatta’s resignation from the vice-presidency in December 1956.⁴⁶ Thus, in Sukarno’s next speech on 21 February 1957 he attacked “liberal democracy” and advocated, for the first time, what he called “Guided Democracy”, that is democracy with “leadership”.⁴⁷ After a series of speeches attacking the incompatibility of Western-style democracy with Indonesian conditions, he came out with the so-called “*konsepsi*” [conception] speech, on 21 February 1957, in which he revealed his alternative proposals. The president called for the establishment of a new form of government based upon a “mutual cooperation” [*gotong royong*] cabinet, which would accommodate all major parties, including the PKI. He also proposed the formation of an entirely new *Dewan Nasional* [National Council] as an advisory body for the government, which would represent functional groups (workers, peasants, youth, women, religions, regions, etc.) rather than political parties.

Sukarno’s chance to introduce his long-awaited *konsepsi* was provided by the proclamation of military-supported martial law, following explosive regional rebellions in Sulawesi and Sumatra.⁴⁸ These rebellions provided the grounds for the army chief of staff, Major-General Nasution, to end parliamentary democracy by asking Sukarno to proclaim martial law over the entire nation. Racked by internal dissension and the spreading of regional resistance Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo dissolved his cabinet on 14 March 1957. On the same day, Sukarno declared martial law, which paved the road for both Sukarno and the army’s active involvement in politics and civilian affairs.

With the announcement of martial law the experiment with constitutional democracy began to crumble. Major-General Nasution was soon appointed

as Central War Administrator signalling military involvement in non-military affairs.⁴⁹ Sukarno, appointing himself *formateur*⁵⁰ as “citizen Sukarno”, established a new cabinet which marked the early implementation of his conception of “guided democracy”. This cabinet was called the “Working Cabinet” [*Kabinet Karya*] with H. Djuanda, a respected engineer who was not aligned with any political party, becoming the prime minister.

As the Djuanda cabinet evolved, the PKI and the army took steps to strengthen their position. By now PKI members had begun infiltrating the armed forces through contacts with intelligence officers who were themselves seeking to infiltrate the PKI. In the meantime, the army chief of staff, Major-General Nasution, began to formulate the so-called “Middle Way” concept, as a basis for what would become known as the military’s dual function [*dwi-fungsi*], the legitimization of the military’s role in non-military’s affairs. Speaking before the National Military Academy on 11 November 1958, Nasution insisted that the army would neither seek to take over the government by imitating the Latin American military junta nor remain politically inactive as a dead tool of the government. Instead, the army leadership would share political power with civilians in the cabinet, parliament, and other state organs (Crouch 1988, pp. 24–25). In line with this concept, the army began to establish army-civilian cooperation bodies (BKS).⁵¹ The establishment of these cooperative bodies, which would metamorphose into the so-called *Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya* [*Sekber-Golkar*, Joint Secretariat of the Functional Group] in 1964, was intended to empower the army as a functional group in order to ensure its position both in the cabinet and in the National Council.

The army’s path to power was facilitated by the strengthening of its economic base and its decisive role in cracking down on regional movements. The military control over economic resources began through the expropriation of Dutch enterprises in 1957–58. In December 1957 Nasution ordered all Dutch property to be placed under military supervision and most Dutch citizens to be repatriated to Holland (Robison 1986, pp. 72–73). In the meantime, the role of the armed forces in maintaining political stability became more obvious as regional rebellions reached their climax in the face of the establishment on 15 February 1958 of the so-called *Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia* [PRRI, Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia] in Padang (West Sumatra), which involved prominent figures of the *Masjumi* and the PSI.⁵²

This political crisis was exacerbated by the deadlock of the Constituent Assembly session. After two years, the assembly sessions could not arrive at any compromise concerning the basis of the state. This provided the excuse for Sukarno to move against the assembly. On 22 April 1959, he gave a speech before the assembly proposing the idea of a return to the 1945

Constitution which he believed could revive the spirit of revolution. Based on the president's proposal, the assembly discussed the idea and decided to take a vote on 30 May 1959. The majority agreed with the idea but could not win two-thirds of the total votes. The taking of a vote was repeated on 1–2 June but the result was the same. On the following day (3 June), Nasution as the central war administrator, took a decision to forbid political activities. On 5 July 1959 Sukarno, with the full backing of the armed forces, issued a Presidential Decree dissolving the Constituent Assembly and restoring the 1945 Constitution.

The proclamation of this decree signalled a complete breakdown of the whole structure of constitutional democracy and a full implementation of the totalitarian "Guided Democracy". Institutionally, from 9 July onwards Sukarno appointed himself as prime minister of a succession of guided democracy cabinets that lasted until 1966. In these cabinets military and communist intellectuals would assume a dominant position supported by intellectuals of the PNI, NU and other parties, excluding those of the *Masjumi* and PSI. In June 1960 Sukarno dissolved the elected parliament and appointed the so-called *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Gotong Royong* [DPR-GR, the Mutual Cooperation People's Representative Council] along with the so-called *Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara* [MPRS, Provisional People's Consultative Assembly]. In both new institutions the armed forces and the PKI were again well-represented, while the *Masjumi* and PSI were excluded.

The implementation of Guided Democracy brought a new political structure into being. Ideologically, on 17 August 1959 Sukarno began to set out a political manifesto called *Manipol-USDEK*.⁵³ Politically, in order to unite all political powers for the sake of the "unfinished revolution", he proposed the re-establishment of a sort of national bloc. The option was either to revive the idea of a monolithic state party or simply to weaken the parties and then link them in a broad coalition faithful to Guided Democracy. In 1960 he decided in favour of the latter option. This led to the establishment of "*Nasakom*" (from *Nasionalisme* [nationalism], *Agama* [religion], and *Komunis* [communism]).⁵⁴

The doctrine of *Manipol-USDEK* and *Nasakom* became the official definition of the state's ideological orthodoxy. It soon became the hegemonic discourse in the public sphere. It was indoctrinated at all levels of education and government, and was even adopted as a scientific paradigm that influenced the theoretical thinking and textbook writing of academic intellectuals. The press became the state's ideological apparatus and was obliged to support it. Mass media that refused to do so, such as the pro-*Masjumi* and pro-PSI newspapers and periodicals, were banned. As a result,

during the years 1959–61, newspaper circulation was cut by about one-third, from 1,039,000 copies for ninety dailies to 710,000 copies for sixty-five dailies (Ricklefs 1993, p. 267).

With the introduction of *Nasakom*, parties were severely restricted in their activities and subjected to a great variety of army-implemented controls. There were only ten parties included in the new political system: PNI, PKI, *Murba*, NU, PSII, *Perti*, *Parkindo*, *Partai Katholik*, IPKI, and *Partindo*. The last had split from the PNI in 1958. These ten parties would form the core of a National Front. During the period 1959–65 the coalition of ten parties plus the armed forces — which were not included in the *Nasakom* slogan, but were still a powerful ally of Sukarno — was always in danger of fracturing, due to major differences in ideology, political interests and degree of belief in the *Nasakom* doctrine.⁵⁵

The clash between the pro- and anti-*Nasakom* groups helped galvanize a collective solidarity among various subject positions from which the structure of opposition was constructed. The oppositional parties were basically made up of the *Masjumi* and PSI. On 24 March 1960 some leaders of these parties supported by the hardliners of *Partai Katholik*, *Parkindo*, IPKI and NU established a common oppositional front, *Liga Demokrasi* [Democratic League].⁵⁶ A few months later, however, Sukarno banned this league and then banned both the *Masjumi* and PSI. A long distrust of Sukarno by both parties' leaders, the involvement of some leaders of these parties in the PRRI rebellions, and the parties' opposition to Guided Democracy provided Sukarno with sufficient grounds to outlaw the parties and imprison their leaders. Yet the parties' followers continued to engage in movements of opposition.

Beyond the party line, opposition came from the intellectual circles of society and more importantly from student organizations, especially those ideologically close to *Masjumi* and PSI. Contesting arguments on the very definition and role of the “intellectual” (which was often confused with the term “intelligentsia”) took place in the public sphere (the media and public meetings).

Soon after martial law came into effect, Mohammad Hatta warned educated people about the derailment of political direction and called for intellectuals to take responsibility for returning it to the right track. Speaking before the *civitas academica* of the University of Indonesia on 11 June 1957, in a speech entitled “*Tanggung Jawab Moril Kaum Intelligensia*” [The Moral Responsibility of the Intelligentsia], Hatta reminded educated people that they had a double responsibility: to become “devotees of knowledge” [*intelektuil*] and “devotees of moral values” [*moril*]. In his view, the Indonesian revolution had been successful in establishing a new state and national identity but had

failed to implement its social ideals, since political independence was being used merely for the sake of communal and personal advantage. Politics was not assuming responsibility for the common good but was abused as simply a means for distributing wealth and position among a limited group. He strongly condemned the intelligentsia for neglecting their social responsibility and for their subjection to material and political passions. Quoting Julien Benda's words in his seminal work *La Trahison des Clercs* [*The Betrayal of the Intellectuals*],⁵⁷ he criticized those intellectuals who had exalted particular political passions at the expense of the universal and moral values and for having betrayed their responsibilities and their nation (Hatta 1957).

Furthermore, Hatta came to envisage the danger of intellectual alienation by what Raymond Aron called (1957) "the opium of the intellectuals"; a situation when the intellectual attachment to public conscience, democracy and moral responsibility is undermined by the myth of an unfinished revolution, cynicism, and a taste for aristocratic values. With regard to this menace, he published an article in *Pandji Masjarakat* (1 May 1960), entitled "*Demokrasi Kita*" [Our Democracy], in which he fiercely attacked the violation of democratic values by the president and his intellectual supporters who had turned the independence dream for democracy into a nightmare.⁵⁸

Conversely, Sukarno, and the partisan intellectuals who rallied behind him, promoted a large-scale anti-intellectual campaign. Indonesian intellectuals who did not support guided democracy and its ramifications were depicted as the "residues" of the old world that had to be wiped out from the earth. Those who were committed to the enrichment of erudite knowledge and critical thinking and distanced themselves from political partisanship were accused of being "textbook thinkers" (Soekito 1966).⁵⁹

In the cultural-literary field Indonesian *literati* were divided, by and large, between proponents of "social-realism" and "universal humanism". The former was the cultural ideology of leftist and other pro-Sukarno literary activists, who idealized the contextualization and subordination of cultural/artistic expression to particular social realities and necessities as defined by political ideology. "Universal humanism" was the cultural ideology of the rightist opposition that idealized the freedom of cultural/artistic expression from the burden of a particular political ideology and dedicated itself to the universal values of mankind.

The main organizational organ of social realism was the PKI artists' and writers' association, *Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat* [*Lekra*, People's Cultural Institute, est. 1950],⁶⁰ supported also by the PNI literati's front LKN [*Lembaga Kebudayaan Nasional*, National Cultural Institute].⁶¹ Both institutes accused many poets and authors of displaying too little interest in the reality

surrounding them because of their intense preoccupation with their own inner life. Based on this judgment both organizations began to launch a severe attack on “bourgeois” artistic expression. In supporting Manipol-USDEK both provided a basis of legitimacy for Sukarno’s official orthodoxy.⁶²

As a reaction to the bitter attacks of pro-Sukarno intellectuals, in August 1963 proponents of universal humanism and other oppositional intellectuals proclaimed the *Manifes Kebudayaan* [*Manikebu*: Cultural Manifesto]. Among other things, the text of the manifesto stated:

We, Indonesian artists and intellectuals, hereby present a cultural Manifesto declaring our principles and ideals and our policy with respect to National Culture. For us culture is the constant effort to bring the conditions of human existence to perfection. We do not regard any one sector of culture as superior to any others. All sectors act in correspondence to achieve this culture to the best of their ability.⁶³

This obviously implied unequivocal criticism of the monolithic cultural ideals of *Lekra*, where politics was asserted to be the leader [*panglima*] and everything else was made subservient to ultimate political goals (Teeuw 1979, p. 35). A fierce counter-attack was launched by *Lekra* and LKN which heatedly denounced the *Manikebu*’s creed of universal humanism as counter-revolutionary for its imperialistic and capitalistic bias.⁶⁴

This political and cultural turmoil during the period of guided democracy ran parallel with the economic deterioration of the country.⁶⁵ As the economic deterioration continued the level of educated unemployment increased dramatically.⁶⁶ This intellectual “proletarianization” provided a driving force for the radicalization of student politics. As a result, the academic world and university students during the early 1960s were intensely politicized, more than they had been at any time in the past.

In the growing political and economic turmoil, a fierce hostility between the PKI and the army was inflamed by foreign intervention in domestic politics as an extension of the Cold War.⁶⁷ Under such circumstances, Sukarno’s strategy of maintaining the balance of power between the two competing forces produced a reverse impact. This hostility finally led to the turbulent and bloody last months of 1965.⁶⁸

Following this so-called “30 September Movement” [*Gestapu*], Major-General Suharto (b. 1921), the commander of *Kostrad* [Army Strategic Reserve Command], took control of the army. Supported by rightwing organizations, the army quickly launched a devastating attack upon its most powerful political contender. At least several hundred thousands of PKI leaders, members and even alleged sympathizers of this party were killed or

imprisoned. With the army gaining control over the political activities of the nation, Sukarno's era came to an end.

As late as early 1966, the idea of Indonesia without Sukarno remained almost unthinkable. The mystification of his charismatic power meant almost no single political group could imagine the nation without him. In late 1966, some newspapers were still running a series of articles on the so-called "*Adjaran Pemimpin Besar Revolusi Bung Karno*" [The Teachings of the Grand Revolutionary Leader Bung Karno]. The breakthrough in demystifying Sukarno's charisma was again taken by the youth, that is, a new generation of politically conscious university students. From late 1965, student organizations, especially those ideologically closed to oppositional political groups, were united in several common fronts to mobilize demonstrations with army backing demanding the disbandment of the PKI and the dissolution of Sukarno's regime.

As the student movement strengthened, some publications which had been banned or had closed during the guided democracy period, suddenly re-emerged, seizing the moment to take revenge on Sukarno's "Old Order" regime. As well, critical *literati* who had begun writing and publishing their works some years before 1966 and shared a common spirit in resisting the political repression and tyranny of the Old Order now wrote with renewed vigour. The main characteristic of the works of these *literati*, who came to be known as the "1966 Generation", was resistance literature, especially poems like those published in 1966 by authors such as Taufiq Ismail, Mansur Samin, Abdul Wahid Situmeang, and Bur Rasuanto.⁶⁹ Their works expressed the spirit of hope of the New Order which they believed would restore democracy and stability lost in Sukarno's Old Order.

THE RISE AND FALL OF POLITICAL ISLAM

When "the seven words" of the Jakarta Charter were dropped from the 1945 Constitution, the protagonists of political Islam failed in their struggle for their Islamic claims. For some Islamic leaders this failure left a painful memory. A collection of Muslim recollections of this shocking experience can be found in Endang Saifudidin Anshari's work (1981, 1997). Just to give an example, Prawoto Mangkusasmita wrote as follows: "Why was the formulation of the 'Jakarta Charter', which was achieved with a great difficulty and by racking our national leaders' brains and energies, changed in just a few minutes in the meeting of the Indonesian Independence Preparatory Committee on 18 August 1945? Why, why, why?" (Quoted in Anshari 1997, p. 48). With the removal of the "seven words", the remaining phrase

expressing the “belief in One, Supreme Divinity” has no specific Islamic content. It is a general and neutral concept of God appropriate for everyone who worships God, as emphasized in an early Sukarno speech before the Study Committee. Henceforth, Indonesia established (to a greater or lesser extent) both the separation of polity from religion and the expansion of polity to perform regulatory functions in areas of social life previously under the jurisdiction of religion.⁷⁰

These processes of secularization, however, need not be understood as extinguishing religious expression and identity in politics. Since the greater bulk of the population remained predominantly religious in orientation, so long as the civic politics of the Indonesian modernizing society remained weak, communal religious parties would continue to be a major political force. As Geertz argued (1973, p. 44):

In modernizing societies, where the tradition of civic politics is weak and where the technical requirements for an effective welfare government are poorly understood, primordial attachments tend, as Nehru discovered, to be repeatedly, in some cases almost continually, proposed and widely acclaimed as preferred bases for the demarcation of autonomous political units.

Moreover, in a society characterized by religious pluralism, religion is frequently used as a symbol of group identity and self-esteem. Communal-religious parties arise in response to the actual or latent conflict in a religiously pluralist society for the sake of protecting communal interests. Religious communities become politicized in conflict situations where the real issues are frequently social, political, and economic (Smith 1970, p. 137).

Religious ideas and identities in Indonesian politics remained strong as the process of secularization of Indonesian political culture was still far from being achieved. The secularization of political culture is a complex matter, because it involves broadly based changes in values and cannot be effectively directed by the ruling elite within a short span of time. The masses' approval for the secularization of political culture is also much more difficult in Muslim societies. For many Muslims, to perceive religion as a purely private matter of faith and thus to be intensely devout personally while functioning politically in a completely secular manner is almost unthinkable, albeit possible historically.

Partly due to the efficacy of religious values as a social frame of reference and the enduring challenge of the religiously oriented political parties and movements, secularization manifestation in Indonesia differs significantly from that in the Western world. Radical secularism in Indonesia was still an

anomalous phenomenon, as the highly secularized individuals were still a small minority. Indonesian regimes have both supported and controlled religious teaching and institutions to a considerable degree. The governments had also played a significant role in the process of Islamic development. A special portfolio had been provided since 1946 to deal with religious affairs, the Ministry of Religious Affairs.⁷¹ What characterizes all of this as secular is the subordination of Islam to national ideas and interests.

When Muslims' post-colonial traumatic remembrance flared up because of the marginalization of Islamic aspirations at the birth of the new republic, some Muslim political leaders continued to struggle to give Islam a proper place in the independent state. "The Muslim community", said C.A.O. van Nieuwenhuijze (1958, p. 65), "has come to hold the explicit belief that during the whole colonial period the colonial government has kept it in an underprivileged position, that it has been the victim of discriminatory attitudes and measures, and that this situation has forthwith to be remedied." Expectations and strengths were now exerted through the *Masjumi* party. As a federation of Islamic political groups, this party was expected to serve as a new vehicle for Islamic ideology and a melting pot for forging Islamic solidarity and identity.⁷²

In fact, the seed for its schism had been present from the very beginning. The composition of the party leadership was biased towards the modernist intelligentsia and reformist *ulama-intelekt*. Overwhelmingly urban and modernist in character, the party leadership offered little to the locally powerful traditionalist *ulama*. This was obvious in the composition of the first Party Executive [*Pengurus Besar*]. Such well-known modernist figures as Sukiman Wirjosandjojo, Abikusno Tjokrosujoso and Wali Alfatah respectively became the chairman, first vice-chairman and second vice-chairman. Harsono Tjokroaminoto became the first secretary assisted by Prawoto Mangkusasmito as the second secretary. Among members of the Party Executive there were prominent modernist intellectuals such as Mohammad Natsir and Mohamad Rum.⁷³ The traditionalist *ulama* only held a dominant position in the Party's Consultative Council [*Madjlis Sjuro*],⁷⁴ which had no major influence on the party's decision-making.

From the very beginning of its establishment, the West Sumatra-based traditionalist organization, *Perti*, refused to join the party because of its long rivalries with the local modernist-reformist leaders. It then established a party in its own right in December 1945. The pre-war PSII, which had been outlawed by the Japanese, amalgamated with the *Masjumi*. The cooperation, however, did not last long. Leaders of the PSII, who were mostly composed of the older-generation of Muslim intelligentsia, felt that the positions they

held within the *Masjumi* were not as high as they merited on the basis of the position they had held in the pre-war Islamic movement. The grounds for the PSII's breakaway from the new party emerged following the *Masjumi* refusal in 1947 to join the Sjarifuddin cabinet. Sjarifuddin, who needed Islamic political backing for his cabinet, approached PSII leaders offering them several ministerial posts. The PSII leaders responded to this by withdrawing PSII from the *Masjumi* to become a separate political organization in July 1947 (Noer 1987, pp. 76–77). Since *Perti* and PSII were only small parties, their separation from the *Masjumi* did not constitute a serious blow to the bargaining power of political Islam. The situation would certainly have been different had the NU, as the biggest Islamic organization in the country, followed this track.

The NU leaders also resented not only the dominance of the modernist-reformist leaders in *Masjumi* but also the fact that most of the *Masjumi*'s cabinet posts during the revolution went to intellectuals with backgrounds of Western education whose connections were principally with the *Muhammadiyah*. Nevertheless, for some years to come, the NU retained its attachment to the party. This was especially because of the key positions of important roles that the NU leaders were offered. From October 1946 up till February 1952, the NU always received one or more ministerial post/s whenever the *Masjumi* joined or led the cabinets. The NU leaders also played important roles in the leadership of Islamic guerrilla organizations, *Hizbullah* and *Sabilillah*, and in the *Madjlis Sjura*. These factors were enhanced by the ability of Sukiman, as the first chairman of the *Masjumi* (1945–49), to stay close to NU leaders.⁷⁵ Nevertheless, with the irrelevance of the guerrilla organizations after the revolution, the demotion of the *Madjlis Sjuro* from a legislative council to a religious advisory council in 1949, and the rise of Natsir as the new chairman of the *Masjumi* in the same year,⁷⁶ the NU leaders became more and more dissatisfied culminating in the NU secession from the party in April 1952.

During the revolution, the threat of an external enemy neutralized ideological tension between the *Masjumi* and secular political parties. According to Feith, members of the Sukiman group, mostly composed of older persons in the party council, had closer political and personal relations with Sukarno and with the PNI leaders than did members of the Natsir group. The Natsir group, composed mainly of intellectuals of the second generation who had risen to prominence in the revolution, had closer political and personal relations with Sjahrir and with the PSI leaders than did the Sukiman group (Feith 1962, p. 137).⁷⁷ In fact, even Natsir and Sukarno remained on good terms during this period. As Natsir admitted:

In Yogyakarta during the revolution, I was one among the ministers who had the closest relations with Sukarno. Sukarno quite often invited me to have breakfast in the presidential palace. During that time I wrote almost all Sukarno's speeches for the commemoration of the Indonesian independence day... Our relationship was so close that whenever he had to leave the country I was the first man he had to invite as his companion. Our bitter polemics of the 1930s on the principles of the Indonesian independence had been forgotten.⁷⁸

With Natsir on good terms with Sukarno, strengthened by his initiative of proposing the so-called "Natsir's Integral Motion", he won Sukarno's support to become the first prime minister of the fully sovereign unitary state of Indonesia, after the breakdown of the RUSI government in August 1950.⁷⁹ By the same token, the breakdown of his relationship with Sukarno led to the fall of his cabinet in March 1951. The friendship between Natsir and Sukarno deteriorated as a result of their different attitudes to the issue of West Irian (West New Guinea).⁸⁰ Although Natsir was as critical as Sukarno of the Netherlands' refusal to negotiate a satisfactory solution to that issue, he viewed Sukarno's confrontational approach as being counter-productive and out of place. In his view, Sukarno's constitutional position as a figurehead president did not permit his involvement in matters of foreign policy (*Panitia Peringatan*, 1978b, pp. 117–20).⁸¹ The relationship between the two leaders became severely damaged and was never restored. The strained relations between both leaders provided the PNI, which was not included in the Natsir cabinet, with the opportunity to oppose the cabinet. Following the inability of the Natsir cabinet to respond to the motion headed by S. Hadikusumo of the PNI, which asked the government to revoke Regulation 39 and freeze the regional councils, Natsir returned his mandate to the president on 21 March 1951.⁸²

The fall of the Natsir cabinet did not automatically end *Masjumi's* political significance. Sukiman succeeded him as prime minister.⁸³ This was made possible by his favourable relationship with Sukarno, and by his ability to convince the PNI to join the coalition government. The strained relations between the government and the Army, however, became a serious impediment to the survival of his cabinet.⁸⁴ Following the controversy surrounding the foreign minister's acceptance of U.S. aid on the terms of the Mutual Security Act (MSA) of 1951, the Sukiman cabinet was accused of being pro-Western in its foreign policy and the cabinet was obliged to step down. To make matters worse, the *Masjumi* executive, following its chairman Natsir, did not want to support and take responsibility for the signing of the MSA agreement. On 23 February 1952 Sukiman returned his mandate to the president.⁸⁵

The next two cabinets were led by the PNI (Wilopo cabinet and the first cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjojo). This posed a crucial problem for *Masjumi* in particular and for political Islam in general. Internal conflicts within *Masjumi* came to a head in the course of the cabinet crisis which followed Sukiman's resignation. At first (on 1 March), President Sukarno appointed Sidik Djojokusarto of the PNI and Prawoto Mangkusasmito of the *Masjumi* as *formateurs* to form a new cabinet. In the process of negotiating the composition of the cabinet, Prawoto faced a serious challenge in the form of a fierce conflict within his own party. The Sukiman group, which was disappointed by the party's decision on the matter of the MSA agreement, once again proposed Sukiman as the new prime minister. At the same time, K. H. Abdul Wahab Chasbullah (of the NU) openly declared that NU would review its affiliation with *Masjumi* unless the party saw to it that Sukiman returned to the post of prime minister and Wachid Hasjim was reappointed the minister of religious affairs.⁸⁶ This internal conflict weakened Prawoto's bargaining power with Sidik. Negotiations about filling the prime ministerial and ministerial positions could not reach agreement and this led to the failure of the *formateurs* to form a new cabinet (Feith 1962, pp. 225–37).

On 19 March Sukarno appointed Wilopo of the PNI as a new *formateur*. *Masjumi* reappointed Prawoto as the party's representative in the negotiations with Wilopo to form a new cabinet. Prawoto offered Wilopo some nominees for each portfolio desired by the *Masjumi*. On the other hand, Wahab Chasbullah again asked Prawoto to nominate only Wachid Hasjim for the Religious Affairs portfolio. He argued that the main supporters of the *Masjumi* came from the NU and *Muhammadiyah*. During the previous cabinets, however, the *Muhammadiyah* had always been given at least two portfolios, but the NU at best could only secure one ministerial position. To maintain the unity of the party, he said, it was important to uphold justice by giving NU the Religious Affairs portfolio. Prawoto actually did not object to the reappointment of Wachid Hasjim as the minister of religious affairs, but left the final decision to Wilopo. This did not satisfy Chasbullah for there was no guarantee that Hasjim would definitely be elected. The uncertainty became even stronger when a modernist leader, Hamka, argued that a fresh man was needed for this ministry, since Wachid Hasjim had held this portfolio three terms in a row (Noer 1987, pp. 221–22).⁸⁷

Prawoto brought back this issue for the party's decision. While the deliberative mechanism to respond to the NU's complaint was in process, Chasbullah took his own way. Bypassing the party's procedure he went to meet Wilopo to express the NU's demand and disclosing his letters of complaint to *Masjumi*. The *Masjumi* executive raised an objection to

Chasbullah's political manoeuvres and then took its own decision concerning the Minister of Religious Affairs based on its own decision making procedures. According to the *Masjumi's* idea of the rules of the game, the basis for the appointment of the nominee should not represent political elements in the party, but should be whoever was elected by the party's democratic mechanism. Based on a majority vote, Fakhri Usman of the *Muhammadiyah* was elected as the party's nominee for the Religious Affairs portfolio, and Wilopo agreed to appoint him as the new Minister (Noer 1987, p. 86).⁸⁸

The cost of this decision, however, was indeed very great. On 5 April 1952, the NU meeting in Surabaya took a decision to secede from *Masjumi*, and to establish a political party in its own right. Apart from its theological and ideological differences with the modernist-reformist elements in the *Masjumi*, this event was a culmination of a series of the NU's dissatisfactions with its marginal political position. This marginality, which resembled the marginal position of political Islam at the birth of the new Republic, was not necessarily caused by the hostile attitude of other political groups. It is more likely that it was caused by the persisting colonial hierarchies of knowledge which placed the mastery of modern scientific knowledge as the benchmark of human achievement.

Apart from the issues of patronage and the NU's desire to gain a position in the government, at the root of this conflict lay a residue of the uneasy relationship between *intelektuil* and *ulama*. There remained a sort of hegemonic consciousness that people with a Dutch (modern-secular) school background were considered superior to those with a traditional religious one. Idham Chalid (b. 1921) of the NU admitted this:

Actually, the NU secession from the Masjumi was not only because of that political position...but rather because of a more principled matter ...Someone with a MULO background considered a graduate from the HIS as being superior to that of the *tsanawiyah* (lower secondary religious school)...At this period of time, one could not imagine that a graduate from the secular university was willing to bow towards the ulama, as a signal of respect. Even a graduate from the AMS at that time talked to K.H. Wahab Chasbullah with arms akimbo, reflecting a superior attitude.⁸⁹

The NU secession from the Masjumi helped free NU leaders from the domination of the modernist intellectuals and gave them more opportunity to gain political positions. This began to bear fruit in the formation of the first Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet. Not only did the NU regain its traditional portfolio, the Ministry of Religious Affairs, with Masjkur as its minister, but also succeeded in elevating Zainul Arifin to the privileged position of the

second deputy prime minister.⁹⁰ On the other hand, for the first time in the period of constitutional democracy, there was no single *Masjumi* representative in the cabinet. Against the background of growing regional and ethnic protests and also the development of internal conflict within the army during and after the Wilopo cabinet, the *Masjumi* along with the PSI put forward the idea of returning to a presidential cabinet with Hatta as prime minister. The PNI, however, could not accept a presidential cabinet, seeing it as unconstitutional unless Hatta were to resign from the vice-presidency. Mohamad Roem of the *Masjumi* and Sarmidi Mangunsarkoro were then initially named as *formateurs*.⁹¹ There soon emerged a charge that the *Masjumi* had put forward the controversial Roem in an attempt to make the *formateur* fail so that it could then draw in Hatta. Such a charge resulted not only in the failure of Roem and Sarmidi to form a new cabinet but also in the absence of the *Masjumi* in the Ali cabinet later on.

The resignation of the first Ali cabinet on 24 July 1955, because of its unresolved dispute with the army, gave the *Masjumi* the opportunity to resume the prime ministership. After PNI rejected the idea of returning Hatta as prime minister, as proposed by the three *formateurs* (Sukiman of the *Masjumi*, Wilopo of the PNI, and Assaat, an independent), Burhanuddin Harahap of the *Masjumi* was appointed a new *formateur* and successfully formed a new cabinet.⁹² This cabinet continued the work of the first Ali cabinet by implementing the long-awaited first Indonesian general election. It is also worth noting that this cabinet was the last parliamentary cabinet led by a Muslim politician in the twentieth century Indonesia.

During the five years of Muslim dominance in the political leadership of the nation, Islamic parties displayed a positive commitment towards democratic principles. Having been in the centre of Indonesian politics, Islamic leaders were also able to forget their painful memories as the basis of identity politics.⁹³ As such, they were less-obsessed with their Islamic claims for a form of Islamic state.⁹⁴ This was proven not only by their rejection of the *Darul Islam* movement of the 1950s — an armed movement aimed at the forceful establishment of an Islamic state — but also by their respect for democratic procedures and mechanisms.

The strong commitment to democratic principles was expressed by Natsir, as a representative par excellence of political Islam. In his capacity as prime minister he strongly opposed the *Darul Islam* rebellion in West Java (1948–62). He believed the concept of an Islamic state could not be achieved by force and must be regarded as an ideal — something yet to be achieved and still very far removed from the reality of that period. In the meantime, he insisted that Muslims should strive for a democratic political order. “As far

as the Moslems are concerned, democracy comes first, because Islam can prosper only in a democratic system" (Kahin 1993, p. 161).⁹⁵ His dispute with Sukarno over the West New Guinea (Irian) issue reflected his strong adherence to the rule of law and democratic procedures, even though such a strict observance of the rules of the game might make him rather inflexible, as happened in the case of the NU's request for the Religious Affairs portfolio.⁹⁶ When the *Masjumi* was in power, he did not hesitate to acknowledge *Pancasila* as the principle of the Indonesian nation. In his speech before the Pakistan Institute of World Affairs in 1952 he defended *Pancasila* as consonant with Islamic principles. By putting forward the "belief in one God" as the first principle of the *Pancasila*, he said, the five principles that became the ethical, moral, and spiritual basis of the Indonesian nation were in accordance with monotheistic belief (Natsir 1954). He repeated this view in his speech on the celebration of *Nuzulul Qur'an* [The first revelation of the *Qur'an*] in 1954:

The formulation of *Pancasila* was a result of deliberation among national leaders during the peak of the Indonesian Independence struggle in 1945. I believe that in such a decisive moment, the national leaders who mostly embraced Islamic religion would not approve any formulation that in their eyes contradicted Islamic principle and doctrine (*Panitya Buku Peringatan* 1978a, p. 244).

The question of Islamic claims over the Indonesian polity was reignited by the Islamic political parties during and after the election campaign of 1955. In an effort to mobilize Muslim support at the grass-roots level, Islamic political parties called for a form of Islamic state and the adoption of the Jakarta Charter. In the struggle for power, identity politics were reproduced by reviving the collective memory of subordination.

In fact, the election of 1955 did not bring victory to any political group or any one of the mainstreams in Indonesian society. The Islamic stream only obtained 43.9 per cent of the total valid votes or 45.1 per cent of total seats in the parliament. Of the total 257 seats in the parliament, Islamic parties obtained 116 seats; *Masjumi*, NU, PSII, *Perti* and other Islamic parties⁹⁷ obtained 57, 45, 8, 4, and 2 seats respectively (Feith 1962, pp. 434–35). The composition of the Islamic stream in the Constituent Assembly showed a similar overall result.

Since the PNI obtained the largest percentage of the total votes (22.3 per cent),⁹⁸ on 8 March 1956, President Sukarno appointed the PNI's leader, Ali Sastroamidjojo, as *formateur*. In this second Ali cabinet, all major Islamic parties had their representatives in the cabinet.⁹⁹ Unfortunately, this cabinet

was doomed to fail due to a fierce ideological and personal rivalry within the cabinet in conjunction with internal disputes within the Army that led to regional rebellions.

The real contestation between the Islamic and non-Islamic political parties took place within the Constituent Assembly. Despite the apparent internal fragmentation within the Islamic stream, the Islamic parties presented a united front when faced with the non-Islamic and anti-Islamic parties on matters of principle. Islamic parties now tried to continue their fight for Islam in the assembly. Notwithstanding the fact that the assembly had reached agreement on many fundamental issues, it failed to arrive at any compromise in the dispute concerning the basis of the state (more precisely, the designation of the state). While the Islamic camp struggled for a state based on Islam, the *abangan*, Christian, and secular camps which had combined into a *Pancasila* bloc defended a state based on *Pancasila* (Boland 1971, p. 85).

To refer to both camps as *Pancasila* and non/anti-*Pancasila* is actually misleading. As Prawoto Mangkusasmitho of the *Masjumi* argued, the Islamic camp actually agreed with all principles of the *Pancasila*. In his eyes, what made it different from the non-Islamic camp was its demand for maintaining the “seven words” of the Jakarta Charter in the first principle of the *Pancasila*. Thus, the phrase “belief in one God”, as the first principle of *Pancasila*, should, it was argued, be expanded by the following clause “with the obligation for the adherents of Islam to practise Islamic law”. For the Islamic camp, he said, the seven words were important as a signal that Islam had now found a proper place in independent Indonesia (Ghazali 1998b, pp. 19–33). This became even more important when facing a real threat from the PKI which had an intention to change the first principle to become the principle of religious freedom (Maarif 1985, p. 155). Because of differences over wording and the constructive effect of labelling by public discourse, however, the two camps were seen as representing the Islamic bloc and *Pancasila* bloc. Henceforth, as Feith noticed, the *Pancasila*, “previously accepted by Moslem political leaders as a symbol to which they could give at least tentative assent, now became anti-Moslem property” (Feith 1963, p. 317).

With the assembly unable to arrive at any compromise, from 1957 Sukarno was busily working towards his “Guided Democracy”. Realizing that the 1945 Constitution gave the president more power than the later constitutions and could thus support his plans for Guided Democracy, Sukarno decided to enforce the return to that constitution. From 5 December 1958 an “exchange of ideas” took place between the president and the cabinet. On 19 February 1959, the cabinet unanimously passed a resolution for the realization of Guided Democracy within the framework of a return to the

constitution of 1945. In the twenty-four points covered by this resolution, one of them (point 9) runs as follows: "In order to meet the desire of the Islamic groups, in connection with the restoration and assurance of public safety, the existence of the Jakarta Charter of 22 June 1945 is recognized." In supporting this resolution, Sukarno made a speech before the assembly on 22 April 1959 again appealing for a return to the 1945 Constitution.

Fierce debates soon emerged both in the parliament and in the assembly about what the status of the Jakarta Charter should be within the 1945 Constitution. For the non-Islamic camp the charter was only one of the historical documents produced in the course of the history of the Indonesian people moving toward the proclamation of their independence. Therefore it might not and could not be a source of law. Conversely, for the Islamic camp the charter had not only influenced the preamble of the 1945 Constitution but the whole constitution so that it had continuing legal significance and could be used as a source of law for the realization of Islamic legislation for Muslims.

With the dispute over the status of the Jakarta Charter unresolved, Sukarno finally issued a Presidential Decree on 5 July 1959 proclaiming a return to the 1945 Constitution and dissolving the Constituent Assembly. In the [preamble of this decree, it was said that "the Jakarta Charter inspires (*mendjiwai*) the 1945 Constitution and is an integral part of this Constitution." Nevertheless, the status of the "seven words" was left unclear and continued to be a controversial matter. This matter was finally overshadowed by the furore caused by *Manipol-USDEK* and *Nasakom*.

During the period of Guided Democracy, *Masjumi* was demoralized, discredited and divided. Already in February 1958, the involvement the *Masjumi* leaders in the PRRI rebellions led to the banning of this party in the regions where the rebellions took place. The involvement of some leaders of the Natsir group in the rebellion provided an excuse for Sukiman to take over the party leadership. Such an action was, however, reined in by his supporters. Natsir remained chairman of the *Masjumi* until April 1959. Prawoto Mangkusasmito of the Natsir group, as the new chairman of the party (1959–60), was asked by both the rival groups within *Masjumi*, as well as external opponents of the party to condemn the *Masjumi* leaders who had been involved in the rebellion. He refused to do so, arguing that the *Masjumi* as an organization had nothing to do with the rebellion. Yet, the fact that some of the party's leaders were involved in the rebellion had a long-term psychological and political impact. The link between *Masjumi* figures and the rebellion, together with the distrust the party's leaders had long felt for Sukarno and the party's rejection of *Manipol-USDEK* and the *Nasakom*,

provided Sukarno with sufficient grounds to ban the party in August 1960. Between 1960 and the end of 1966 the leading figures of *Masjumi*, who had been involved in the PRRI rebellion and who had opposed Sukarno's doctrines, were held in prison for varying periods of time.¹⁰⁰

Other Islamic parties loosely united in the *Liga Muslimin* [the Indonesian Muslims' League]¹⁰¹ had no choice but to accept Guided Democracy. The NU moved even further to become a strategic partner of Sukarno by agreeing to be a major pillar of the *Nasakom*. But this was by no means a united decision. For the hard liners of the party, such as Mohammad Dachlan and Imron Rosjadi, opposition to Guided Democracy was a moral imperative for it "breached the principles of democracy and arbitrarily reduced the influence of Islam whilst bolstering that of communism" (Fealy 1996, p. 33). Yet, the majority of NU's leaders, tended, as they often did, to support the pragmatists' accommodatory approach.¹⁰² The pragmatists of the NU emphasized the importance of risk minimization and retention of political influence as a means of protecting the *ummah*, especially the NU constituency. To justify this and other political choices, they returned to the flexible precepts of the traditional political community.¹⁰³ Above all else, the NU's venerable leader, Wahab Chasbullah, who had always been very influential in the decision making of this organization, tended to get closer and closer to Sukarno because of his resentment of the *Masjumi*.

With the banning of the *Masjumi* in 1960, the public role of political Islam in general became more and more curtailed. With an increasing unease with Sukarno and the communists during the rest of the guided democracy period, some Islamic groups (particularly former adherents of *Masjumi*) had no choice but to build a strategic alliance with the army and place their hopes especially in General Nasution. This rapprochement of the army and Muslim leaders was signified by the co-establishment in 1963 of *Pendidikan Tinggi Dakwah Islam* (PTDI, Higher Education of Islamic Propagation),¹⁰⁴ and the involvement of Islamic groups in the army-sponsored *Sekber Golkar* [Joint Secretariat of the Functional Group, est. 1964].

Thereafter, in the aftermath of the 30 September (PKI) Movement, many in these Islamic action groups became the army's enthusiastic partners in destroying the PKI and ousting Sukarno. Interestingly, the NU as a major pillar of *Nasakom* quickly changed its political alignment to the Army. Apart from its capacity to accommodate prevailing political winds, the growing communist strength in the rural areas had long threatened the material basis and spiritual values of the traditionalist *kjai* and community, most particularly as a result of the PKI's efforts to press for land reform. Thus, as the communist political legitimacy began to crumble, *Ansor* (NU's youth wing) became the

army's most assiduous assistant in the slaughtering of thousands of PKI's members and sympathizers (Hindley 1970, p. 39).

Politically speaking, the period between 1960 and 1965 was a frustrating time for political Islam. On the other hand, this period was a turning point for the positive development of Islamic cultural movements. To a certain extent, Muslim interest began to switch from the political scene to the realms of education, Islamic teaching and propagation, the production of reading matter, and leadership training. Thus, in facing political dislocation, Islamic *dakwah* [outreach] began to concentrate on socio-cultural developments within the Muslim community, just as had occasionally happened in the colonial period, as a result of political frustration.

THE TRANSMISSION OF MUSLIM INTELLECTUAL POLITICAL TRADITIONS

The decline of the political role of the second generation of Muslim intelligentsia, did not obliterate its memories and ideologies. Vehicles for the transmission of these memories and ideologies had been available especially in the form of Islamic student youth associations.

Pioneers in the establishment of such associations in the early years of the new republic came chiefly from students of the STI/UII. Already on 2 November 1945, Anwar Harjono and other students of the STI with the support of *Masjumi* leaders¹⁰⁵ had made an attempt to unite Muslim students and young people from various Islamic streams and educational backgrounds in the *Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia* [GPII, The Movement of Indonesian Islamic Youth]. Led initially by a *pemoeda* leader of the Japanese period, Harsono Tjokroaminoto, this association was intended to achieve three objectives: first, to organize Muslim student-youths for the revolutionary struggle; second, to become a recruiting ground for future Islamic leaders; and third, to become a meeting ground between youths of the *pesantren* and those of secular schools (Harjono and Hakiem 2002, p. 50). It soon became the youth wing of *Masjumi* and involved itself in the revolutionary struggle [*perjuangan*]. Thus, for most its career, the GPII represented itself as an Islamic student youth vanguard organization.

As the number of Muslim students in both the secondary and tertiary education increased, the distinct interests of students could not be satisfactory met by the existing youth organization, for the latter included under-educated *pemoeda*. To accommodate the distinct interests of university students, the *Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam* [HMI, Islamic University Students' Association] was formed early in 1947. To meet the distinct interests of secondary school

students, the *Peladjar Islam Indonesia* [PII, Union of Indonesian Islamic High School Students] was formed later in 1947. In the beginning, the emergence of these student organizations was opposed by the GPII on the basis that they could jeopardize the unity of Islamic youth (Sitompul 2002, p. 2). As it is eventuated, however, the three organizations were able to live side by side.

At the All Islam Congress held in Solo (20–25 October 1945), Muslim leaders of diverse streams recognized the GPII, HMI and PII respectively as the only legitimate Islamic youth association, Islamic university student association, and Islamic secondary student association (Sitompul 1976, p. 39). Nevertheless, a combination of internal (Islamic) disputes and the increasing number of Islamic students led to the multiplication of Islamic student organizations in the following years. To give a clear picture of the development of Islamic student organizations as a breeding ground for the future leadership of Islamic political communities it is worthwhile looking at some of the most important of these organizations including the HMI, PII, PMII, and IMM. In addition to student associations, attention will also be given to the first Muslim association of degree holders [*Persami*] which would accommodate former members of Muslim student associations.

The Rise of HMI

The HMI was established by students of the STI under the initiative of Lafran Pane (b. 1922) on 5 February 1947.¹⁰⁶ He was a younger brother of two prominent Indonesian literary figures, Sanusi Pane and Armijn Pane. Lafran Pane was a man with a strong Islamic background but also with multiple affiliations. Before entering the STI, Pane's main educational background was in a *pesantren*, HIS, MULO and AMS of the *Muhammadiyah*. Nevertheless, he was enrolled also at the nationalist primary schools, *Taman Antara* of Siporok and *Taman Siswa* of Medan. After leaving the *Muhammadiyah* AMS in Jakarta he entered a nationalist school, *Taman Dewasa Raya*. Shortly before the Japanese Occupation, he joined a leftist organization, *Gerindo*, where he socialized with the future communist leader, D.N. Aidit. During the Japanese occupation he joined an underground movement of the *Kaigun* group. His return to the Islamic epistemic community occurred during the revolution, when he enrolled in 1946 at the STI/UII in Yogyakarta.¹⁰⁷

Through Pane's encounter with STI lecturers such as Abdul Kahar Muzakir, M. Rasjidi, Fathurrahman Kafrawi, Kasman Singodimejo and Prawoto Mangkusasmita, he was inspired to revive his Islamic identity and commitment (Sitompul 2002, pp. 45–47). This internal conversion provided him with the psychological driving force to form a new network of young

Islamic intelligentsia. He was stimulated by the desire of the older generation of the Muslim intellectuals to establish an Islamic student organization like the former JIB and SIS, which would serve as a recruiting ground for future Islamic leaders.¹⁰⁸ An additional reason was the failure of the existing local student organizations, *Persjarikatan Mahasiswa Yogyakarta* [PMY, Union of Yogyakarta's University Students, est. 1946] and Solo-based *Sarikat Mahasiswa Indonesia* [SMI, Union of Indonesian University Students, est. 1946] to meet the aspirations of Islamic oriented students.¹⁰⁹ In its competition with secular student organizations to attract followers, HMI resembled JIB and SIS in terms of its project to Islamize the educated community through the modernization of Islamic institutions.

Differing somewhat from the previous generations of Muslim intelligentsia, however, the Pane generation (the third generation of the intelligentsia) as children of the revolution tended to be more "nationalistic" and inclusive in its political orientation. This tendency can be seen in the objective of the HMI which reflected both the spirit of Islam and nationalism. When it was first established, the HMI objective was: (1) "To defend the State of the *Indonesian* Republic and raise the prestige of the *Indonesian* people"; (2) "To maintain and develop the Islamic religion". After its first congress in November 1947, there had been a small change in the ordering of its objectives with the second clause becoming the first. Judging by today's perspective, the nationalistic outlook of such a formulation is probably not so remarkable. Compared to the standard objective of Islamic organizations of that time, however, it signalled an acknowledgment that the Islam-ness [*keislaman*] and the Indonesia-ness [*keindonesiaan*] were not dichotomous but overlapping.

In this spirit, early leaders of the HMI tended to be more willing to accept *Pancasila*. Even a man like A. Dahlan Ranuwihardjo (b. 1925, a student of the UI and the HMI chairman of the 1951–53 period) enjoyed a very close relationship with Sukarno and enthusiastically supported *Pancasila*.¹¹⁰ The HMI had never been formally affiliated with any political party, though it obviously had strong links with the *Masjumi* — for the HMI leaders and the modernist intelligentsia within this political party shared a common outlook. With such a relatively neutral political position, the HMI could also recruit students both from the modernist and traditionalist backgrounds.

Until the mid-1950s HMI did not attract a large membership. In the first month of its establishment its membership was only eighteen, with all students coming from the STI. The HMI's ambition to become a member of *Kongres Mahasiswa Indonesia* (KMI, Congress of Indonesian Students)

obliged it to have at least 150 members as a minimum requirement. This challenge caused it to extend its recruitment to students of other higher institutions in Yogyakarta and its surroundings, especially those from colleges of the embryo Gadjah Mada University (UGM)¹¹¹ and *Sekolah Tinggi Teknis* (STT, College of Engineering). By the time of the KMI congress in Malang on 8 March 1947, the HMI was able to meet the membership requirement (Sitompul 2002, p. 218). Subsequently, in order to attract a larger membership of non-STI students, Lafran Pane as the chairman of the HMI was replaced on 22 August 1947 by M. S. Mintaredja (b. 1921) of the (embryo) UGM with Achmad Tirtosudiro (b. 1922) of the same university being the vice-chairman.¹¹² Yet, the organization continued to remain small compared to the major secular student organizations and was of relatively little political significance until the mid-1950s. During the revolution, most of its leaders joined paramilitary groups leaving little opportunity to consolidate the organization.

It was not until the late 1950s when there was an increase in upper secondary school graduates, together with a rapid expansion of (secular and religious) higher education that membership of the HMI increased. A prelude to this rapid development had actually begun in the early 1950s when students from prestigious secular universities such as M. Imaduddin Abdulrahim (b. 1931) of the Bandung branch of the UI (ITB), Ismail Hasan Metareum (b. 1929) and Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo (b. 1931) of the Jakarta branch of the UI (UI) began to join this organization. In the late 1950s, among new members of the HMI were such well-known names as Sulastomo (b. 1938) of the UI and Endang Saifuddin Anshari (b. 1938) of Padjadjaran University. In response to the increase in its membership, HMI began to set up a systematic basic training [*pendidikan dasar*] in 1959. Because of the scarcity of literature on Islamic ideology in Indonesian, the training programme used Tjokroaminoto's book of the 1920s, *Islam dan Socialisme* [Islam and Socialism] as its main reference.¹¹³ By the early 1960s a huge number of students of *santri* background began to flood universities, including such famous HMI figures as Nurcholish Madjid (b. 1939) of the IAIN-Jakarta, Djohan Effendi (b. 1939) of the IAIN-Yogyakarta, M. Dawam Rahardjo (b. 1942), Ahmad Wahib (b. 1942), and M. Amien Rais (b. 1944) of the UGM, Fahmi Idris (b. 1940) and Ridwan Saidi (b. 1942) of the UI, Adi Sasono (b. 1943) of the ITB, Ahmad M. Saefuddin (b. 1940) of the IPB, and Sugeng Sarjadi (b. 1942) of the Padjadjaran University. Thus, when guided democracy reached its zenith in the mid-1960s, the HMI had become the largest student organization in the country. Its membership in the late 1960s was reported to be well in excess of 100,000.¹¹⁴

As the membership of the HMI began to increase significantly, Indonesian politics was adversely affected by growing ideological conflicts over the basis of the state leading up to the guided democracy period. As most student organizations were affiliated to political parties, disputes in national politics inevitably affected the activities of student movements. Facing vitriolic attacks from the nationalist and communist oriented student organizations, a new generation of the HMI experienced an ideological radicalization. In a departure from its original goal of maintaining harmonious relations between Islam and nationalism, the HMI congress in Medan on 24–31 December 1957 decided to support political Islam in its struggle to claim Islam as the basis of the state. According to Dahlan Ranuwihardjo, this decision was a deviation from the basic principle of the HMI (Sitompul 2002, p. 159). Tensions between proponents of *Pancasila* and Islamic principles would see HMI positioned as a moderate organization.

The Rise of PII

The junior partner of HMI was the PII. Like the JIB in the pre-war period, the PII's membership was mostly comprised of (junior and senior) secondary school students, though its leadership at the national and provincial levels was dominated by university students.¹¹⁵ Established on 4 May 1947, its initiator was again a student of the STI who had been involved in the establishment of HMI, namely M. Jusdi Ghazali (b. 1923), supported by other STI students and those of the Klaten-based medical college of the (embryo) UGM.¹¹⁶ According to Ghazali, its establishment was inspired by the previous existence of the JIB and was designed to unite Muslim students in secular and religious schools to create *intelek-ulama* and *ulama-intelek*. This was considered necessary for strengthening Islam in the national struggle. The actual trigger for its emergence, however, was again the disappointment of Muslim students with the existing *Ikatan Peladjar Indonesia* [IPI, Union of Indonesian Students], which was dominated by left-wing activists (Ghazali 1998a, pp. 19–33).¹¹⁷

Operating among high school students, the PII tended to emphasize a pedagogical approach aimed at implanting Islamic values in adolescents during their impressionable period of emotional development. Thus, compared to the HMI the Islamic-mindedness of the PII was much stronger. This was reflected in its objective: "To perfect education, instruction and culture in accordance with Islam for the entire people of Indonesia." It was not surprising that the PII tended to be more susceptible than the HMI to the ideological influence of the *Masjumi* leaders. According to Utomo Dananjaya, chairman

of the PII during the 1967–69 period, the lack of erudition of most PII members made them more susceptible to the influence of their intellectual patrons.¹¹⁸ However, the emphasis on Islamic teaching was combined with the teaching of modern rationalism and vocational skills. Members were introduced to leadership training, scouting and an English conversation club. One of the most important contributions of the PII to the development of the Indonesian Muslim intellectual was its pioneering effort from 1955 onwards to follow a programme of international student exchange, through AFSIS (American Field Service for International Scholarship). Among the PII members who joined this programme and would become well-known Islamic intellectuals were Mohammad Diponegoro, Taufik Ismail, Z.A. Maulani, Dawam Rahardjo, and Sugeng Sarjadi.

At the time of its first congress on 14–16 July 1947, the PII membership was only 300 students with the majority coming from the STI. Nevertheless, with the amalgamation of some local Islamic student unions throughout Indonesia into the PII from 1948 onwards the membership experienced a rapid increase. The continuing growth of its membership made it a major recruiting ground for the HMI. The strategic alliance between the two organizations was signalled by a tradition that the HMI chairman would be invited to give a speech at the National Congress of the HMI and *vice versa*.

The increase in the number of secondary school graduates in the late 1950s contributed not only to the influx of the PII activists into the HMI but also to the unprecedented growth of the university student segment of the PII. By the early 1960s such famous figures of the PII as Utomo Dananjaya (b. 1936), Hartono Marjono (b. 1937), Usep Fathuddin, A.M. Fatwa (b. 1939), and Moh. Husnie Thamrin had entered universities and continued to retain their association with the PII. In this way, the relationship between the HMI and PII began to transcend the traditional form of senior-junior partnership, as the increasing university segment of the PII helped create a foundation for a more equal relationship.

Like the HMI, during guided democracy, the PII underwent a considerable ideological radicalization with the tendency to be more Islamic-minded than the HMI. During 1960–1965, in an effort to remain on good terms with Sukarno, the HMI as a whole was willing to accept the *Manipol-USDEK* ideology. The PII, however, refused to do so, which made it stronger than the HMI in its identification with the *Masjumi* and *Masjumi* leaders. This situation caused the relationship between the two organizations during the period to be strained. This was indicated by dropping the tradition of inviting the HMI chairman to give a speech in the PII National Congress and *vice versa* throughout the period 1960–66.¹¹⁹

The Rise of IPNU and PMII

The 1950s were also a formative period for the NU intelligentsia. At the moment when members of the modernist-reformist Muslim intelligentsia had become part of the ruling political elite, a significant number of the traditionalist-oriented intelligentsia had just begun entering universities. Rudolf Mrázek provides a good illustration of the scarcity of traditionalist higher intelligentsia before the late 1950s. As the general election of the 1955 approached, the great leader of the PSI, St. Sjahrir, told a Dutch socialist, Salomon Tas, that a leader of the NU had come to him to ask help in placing a few intellectuals from his group at the disposal of the NU, which had practically no cadres. "But I couldn't help him; my people find it much too boring to deal with people of that level," Sjahrir said (Mrázek 1994, p. 432).

For some years after the revolution, students of traditionalist families had no choice but to join the PII and HMI. The reason was not only because of the NU's affiliation with the *Masjumi* until 1952 and the decision of the All Islam Congress of the 1949 recommending that the PII and the HMI to be the sole Muslim student organizations respectively for students from the high school and from the university, but more importantly because of the fact that students from traditionalist families in the modern school system remained relatively few. Thus, students of traditionalist families such as Toha Mashudi (b. 1923) and Mukti Ali of the STI had taken part in the establishment of the HMI and PII respectively.¹²⁰ Traditionalist students who entered universities in the 1950s such as Tolhah Mansur of the UGM, Ismail Makky of the Yogyakarta's IAIN, and Mahbub Djunaedi of the UI also had joined the HMI before establishing their own traditionalist student organizations. Even the secession of the NU from *Masjumi* did not suddenly dissociate the NU students from both the HMI and PII (Wahid 2000, p. 32).

At the same time, the fact that both the HMI and PII were dominated by the modernist-reformist students made traditionalist students feel out of place. This became worse following the secession of the NU from the *Masjumi*. As a result, on 2 February 1954 traditionalist students from various levels and types of school began to establish *Ikatan Peladjar Nahdlatul Ulama* [IPNU, Union of the NU Students]. Founders of this organization were mostly those who had been involved in the HMI, such as Tolhah Mansur, Ismail Makky and Nuril Huda. Following the emergence of this new organization they held a dual membership, since they did not automatically resign from the HMI. A year after the establishment of IPNU, the *Ikatan Peladjar Puteri NU* [IPPNU, Union of the NU Women Students] was founded. Both new organizations were intended to strengthen cooperation

between the NU students in the modern and traditional religious school system in order to provide a recruiting ground for the constitution of the traditionalist intelligentsia (Wahid 2000, pp. 30–31).

Furthermore, as the number of traditionalist university students increased in the second half of the 1950s, efforts were made to set up a separate student organization for the traditionalist university students. In December 1955, traditionalist students in Jakarta under the leadership of Wail Haris Sugiarto established *Ikatan Mahasiswa Nahdlatul Ulama* [IMANU, Union of the NU University Students]. In the same year, traditionalist students in Surakarta under the leadership of Mustahal Ahmad of the Tjokroaminoto University (est. 1955) founded *Keluarga Mahasiswa NU* [KMNU, The Community of the NU University Students], a name which resembled that of the existing NU student organization in the Middle East. Nevertheless, the IPNU leaders considered these early experiments to be premature, for the number of traditionalist university students remained limited and the existence of such organizations was localized and fragmented (Wahid 2000, pp. 33–34).

The number of traditionalist university students rose substantially at the end of the 1950s, especially after the establishment of several religious colleges. Apart from the State's Islamic colleges, in 1958 the NU had established an Islamic college in its own right, *Perguruan Tinggi Nahdlatul Ulama*, in Solo, though it only had a Faculty of Islamic Law. In their exposure to modern rationalism, technology and education these NU students were as modern as those of the *Muhammadiyah*, so that at this juncture, the NU had already had a group of intelligentsia in its own right. It differed from the *Muhammadiyah* intelligentsia in its distinct theological orientation. While *Muhammadiyah* intellectuals were committed to reformist teachings that idealized religious purification, NU intellectuals retained a conservative outlook. The term "conservative" in this context means a preference for conserving the local established traditions of Islam. Thus, it was actually more appropriate to think of these NU intellectuals as forming a "conservative-modernist" intelligentsia rather than a "traditionalist intelligentsia".¹²¹

This growing number of traditionalist students, which coincided with the deepening affinity of the HMI with the *Masjumi* as a result of a severe conflict within student politics, motivated the IPNU leaders to create a long-awaited special body for the traditionalist university students. The IPNU national conference in Kaliurang (near Yogyakarta) on 14–16 March 1960 appointed thirteen members of the IPNU to form the desired organization.¹²² This finally resulted in the establishment on 17 April of the Indonesian Islamic University Student Movement, *Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia* (PMII) with Mahbub Djunaedi (b. 1933) as the first chairman, Chalid Mawardi

(b. 1936) as the deputy chairman, and Said Budairy as secretary-general.¹²³ Its membership in the late 1960s was only a few thousands, consisting largely of IAIN students.

The emergence of the PMII invited scepticism and cynicism from both the conservative *ulama* and the HMI. The conservative *ulama* of the NU were concerned about the violation of the *syari'a* for there was no separation between male and female students in its membership. For the HMI, the establishment of the PMII was a betrayal of the Islamic community which had agreed in 1949 to permit only the PII and HMI as the Muslim student bodies.¹²⁴ Henceforth, traditionalist segments of the HMI were isolated. Traditionalist figures in the HMI such as Mahbub Djunaedi (a vice chairman of the HMI when the PMII emerged), Fahrur Rozi, and Darto Wahhab were accused of masterminding a separatist movement and were then suspended from the HMI (Wahid 2000, pp. 42–43). Afterwards, traditionalist students gave their allegiance to the PMII, though some of them continued to join the HMI or to hold a dual membership. Typically, descendants of the traditionalist *ulama* and religious functionaries tended to join the PMII, while descendants of the “laymen” from the traditionalist community tended to join the HMI.¹²⁵

The Rise of IMM

While NU students considered that the HMI was dominated by the modernist-reformist students, the followers of the *Muhammadiyah* considered the HMI as being less committed to the reformist ideology. They came to realize the importance of creating a training ground for the future leadership of the *Muhammadiyah*. This was driven by the fact that the *Muhammadiyah* university students were numerous. Apart from those who studied in the public universities, from 1958 the *Muhammadiyah* had successfully established universities that offered both religious and general faculties. Soon after the establishment of the *Muhammadiyah* university in Surakarta and Jakarta in 1958, a similar university emerged in Yogyakarta and in several other places in the following years. The actual trigger for the establishment of the *Muhammadiyah* student organization, however, was the desire to counter the real threat to the *Muhammadiyah dakwah* at the grass-roots level, especially from the ideological manoeuvring of the communist student front which was quite strong in Yogyakarta and Solo,¹²⁶ the centres of the *Muhammadiyah* movement (IMM 1998, p. 3).

The Union of the *Muhammadiyah* University Students, *Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah* (IMM) came into existence on 14 March 1964. Founders

of this organization were Djazman Al-Kindi, M. Amien Rais, A. Sulamo, Sudibjo Markus, Kastolani, Slamet Sukirnanto and Dzulkabir (all of the UGM), Rosjad S.H. and A. Muis of IAIN Yogyakarta. Most of these students came from the medical school and socio-political faculty of the UGM (IMM 1998, p. 4). Students from these faculties represented those who were concerned to support social services, especially health services, for people at the grass-roots level and also those who could provide ideological criticism of their political opponents. Already in the mid-1960s Amien Rais, for example, as the head of the politics department of the IMM, launched a strong criticism of the scale of foreign debt and the corruption of the Sukarno regime. The IMM commitment to social advocacy was symbolized by the wearing of a red jacket, instead of green, as a uniform of the organization. It was a sort of proclamation to the people at the grass-roots that the concern about their social plight was not a monopoly of leftwing organizations.¹²⁷

Within a year of its establishment, the IMM membership was 7,000 and it rose to around 30,000 by the end of the 1960s (IMM 1998, p. 5). With such an enthusiastic response, leaders of the IMM who had been involved in the HMI became more concentrated in the IMM, though they did not secede from the HMI. For the *Muhammadiyah* students it was quite normal to hold a dual membership of the HMI and IMM. Typically, students of the *Muhammadiyah* universities tended to join the IMM, while students of the *Muhammadiyah* families in state universities tended to join the HMI.

The Rise of *Persami*

Many students who entered higher education in the 1950s had graduated by the early 1960s. Like their junior counterparts, these senior intellectuals could not escape political partisanship. In response to the establishment of Christian and secular intellectual associations,¹²⁸ some 100 Muslim *sardjana* [degree holders] from various organizational backgrounds (more than a half of them were former HMI activists) decided to form a united Islamic intellectual front. Established in 1964, this front was called *Persatuan Sardjana Muslim Indonesia* [*Persami*, Association of Indonesian Muslim *Sardjana*]. In its attempt to bridge the gap between the traditionalist and modernist intelligentsia, the initial leadership of this organization went to Subchan Z.E. (b. 1931) of the NU as the chairman and H.M. Sanusi (b. 1924, a graduate of the STT) of the *Muhammadiyah* as the vice chairman (Anwar 1995, pp. 251–52).

In the last years of Sukarno regime, *Persami* would play a significant role in an anti-establishment movement by the Indonesian *sardjana* front, *Kesatuan*

Aksi Sardjana Indonesia (KASI). Some of the *Persami* figures such as Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo would pioneer the project of Islamizing the government bureaucracy in the New Order period.

The Making of Muslim Students' Collective Identity

Despite internal fragmentation within the community of Muslim students, the most decisive factor in the construction of their collective identity and ideology in this period was the external threats from communist and nationalist student fronts. The competitive political struggle in national politics penetrated the student world and brought about a rapid politicization of university campuses and university student forums throughout the country. In an effort to recruit potential cadres, most political parties developed student affiliates that attempted to establish chapters on university and college campuses. These party-affiliated student fronts were of relatively minor political significance until the late fifties. By the early 1960s, however, as the number of university students increased dramatically, they had grown in size and activity and soon became influential political elements.

Apart from student organizations based around the Muslim intellectual traditions, there also emerged student organizations of the Christian (Protestant and Catholic) and secular intellectual traditions. Representatives of the Christian intellectual tradition were GMKI¹²⁹ and PMKRI.¹³⁰ Representatives of the nationalist tradition were the Indonesian Nationalist University Student Movement, *Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia* (GMNI)¹³¹ and the Indonesian University Students Movement, *Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia* (*Germindo*).¹³² The socialist intellectual tradition was represented by the Socialist University Students' Movement, *Gerakan Mahasiswa Sosialis* (*Gemsos*).¹³³ PSI-type students might also associate with relatively independent local student organizations, including the federation of local university student associations, *Serikat Organisasi Mahasiswa Lokal* (*Somal*). The communist intellectual tradition was represented by the Unified Movement of Indonesian University Students [*Consentrasi Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia*, CGMI].¹³⁴ In addition to CGMI, there also appeared another radical leftwing student organization namely the Indonesian University Student Association [*Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia*, *Perhimi*]. Formed in the late 1950s out of an earlier Dutch-oriented and exclusively Chinese organization by a small group of radical Sino-Indonesian students *Perhimi*'s membership consisted of approximately 2000 students, mostly from Res Publica University (Maxwell 1997, p. 119).

These organizations, because of their operations beyond the boundary of any one particular university and their links to external organizations (political parties or religious bodies), either formally or indirectly, were commonly referred to by Indonesians as “extra” university organizations. Despite their rivalries, these extra university organizations were loosely united under the Federation of Indonesian University Student Organizations, *Perserikatan Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia* (PPMI, est. 1947). All the extra university organizations competed with each other for the leadership of the PPMI.

Meanwhile, within each university there was also an internal student body that confined its operation to a particular university. It was referred to as an “intra” university organization. The university-wide student government of the intra-university organization was called *Dewan Mahasiswa* [Student Council], while at the faculty level there was also a student-elected faculty senate. The “extra” university student organizations competed with other to place their members within each *Dewan Mahasiswa* and faculty senate. Moreover, beginning in 1957 a national forum for intra student organizations had been set up under the auspices of the Department of Higher Education and Science and was intended to make the universities more accessible to government influence. This national forum of the *Dewan Mahasiswa* was called the Indonesian University Student Assembly [*Majelis Mahasiswa Indonesia*, MMI]. This also became an arena for competitive political struggles among the parties’ student fronts. In the battle for supremacy, a degree of competition also emerged between MMI and PPMI as to which body spoke on behalf of all Indonesian students.

In the early 1960s, tensions within student politics became extremely fierce causing “extra” and “intra” student organizations as well as other student forums to become greatly politicized. Despite their variety, two major blocs emerged reflecting a polarization between the pro- and anti-regime elements. The main protagonist of pro-regime groups was GMNI supported by CGMI, *Germindo* and *Perhimi*. The main protagonist of anti-regime forces was the HMI. It gained support from *Gemsos*, PMKRI, PMII, IMM, and to a lesser degree, from GMKI.

Interestingly enough, although the NU, *Partai Katholik* and *Parkindo* had been included in the National Front of the political establishment, their student affiliates tended to align themselves with anti-establishment students. In the case of PMII, soon after the 30 September PKI Movement [*Gestapu*] of the 1965, it departed from the NU’s political position and joined the anti-establishment student movement.

Most of the PMII leaders in the mid-1960s had been under the patronage of Subchan Z.E (vice chairman of the NU), rather than Idham Chalid (the chairman). Unlike Idham who strongly supported Sukarno, Subchan, as a prominent “modernist” intellectual of the NU, tended to be more critical. He had been educated at a modernist school as a student of the HIS *Muhammadiyah* and obtained religious instruction from a prominent leader of the *Muhammadiyah*, Mas Mansur. He had spent some time sitting in on lectures at the UGM before attending a non-degree programme in economic development at University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA, 1961–62). Raised in a traditionalist family but having been exposed to the modernist intellectual network, Subchan served as a bridge between two intellectual traditions. As such it was not surprising that he had a close relationship with the HMI leaders.¹³⁵ Under his influence, the PMII moved closer to the HMI.

The toughest competitive political struggle occurred between the GMNI and HMI. Both organizations made every effort to dominate student forums, councils and senates with the most acrimonious quarrels taking place in elite universities. Following the ban on the *Masjumi* after 1960, however, the HMI with its alleged connection to this party was increasingly thrown on the defensive.

GMNI and its allies set out to dominate guided democracy forums both on and off the campus. Student forums and a large number of student councils and faculty senates rapidly came under the control of the GMNI supporters at the expense of other student organizations, especially the HMI and groups of students organized in intra-campus bodies. At the Fourth National Congress of the MMI held in April 1964 at Malino (South Sulawesi), GMNI gained control over the newly-elected executive by winning 18 out of the 24 positions. In the wake of this event the student councils of the UI and ITB, which were led by Bakir Hasan of the HMI and Muslimin Nasution of the Independent group respectively, failed to gain a place on the new body. Because of this, the representatives of both universities rejected the election results on the ground that this was an insult to two of the oldest and most prestigious universities in the country. Consequently, both student councils were suspended from MMI membership (Maxwell 1997, pp. 119–20).

The anti-HMI campaign became even more aggressive in the aftermath of the MMI incident. The HMI was frequently accused as being anti-Manipol and counter-revolutionary and was denigrated as an affiliate [*onderbouw*] of *Masjumi*. GMNI and its allies began to demand that it be banned. Sparked off by the decision of the acting secretary of the Law Faculty at the Jember campus of Brawidjaja University, Professor Ernst Utrecht, to suspend the HMI

in May 1964 from all activities within that institution, a fierce public campaign against it soon spread to other cities. In October, the PPMI executive which had been controlled by GMNI and its allies suspended HMI from membership of the federation. Early in 1965 leftwing student fronts attempted to “retool” the newly-formed senate of its allegedly counter-revolutionary elements. On 29 September, the PKI leader D. N. Aidit spoke at a CGMI mass rally in Jakarta challenging the CGMI students with the following statement: “if you all cannot get rid of HMI you may as well put on sarongs” (Maxwell 1997, pp. 20, 25).¹³⁶

In the face of such threats, the HMI survived because of its strategy of remaining on good terms with Sukarno, particularly because of its acceptance of the *Manipol-USDEK* and because of the close relationship between Sukarno and leading HMI figures such as Dahlan Ranuwihardjo and Achmad Tirtosudiro. Its survival was also made possible by the support it gained from an influential NU leader, Saifuddin Zuhri. As the then minister of religious affairs, Zuhri persuaded Sukarno not to dissolve the HMI. Eventually, HMI’s strategic alliances with the army and also with other groups of anti-establishment provided it additional support for its survival.

The mid-1960s was a confusing and a self-defining moment for the HMI’s collective identity. Internally, as a reaction to the ideological onslaught of the leftist student movements, the HMI’s mindset became more Islamized. Externally, because of its urgent need to develop strategic alliances with non-Islamic political actors and groups, and especially to ensure Sukarno’s guarantee for its survival, it was forced to develop a sort of “inclusive” (nationalistic) political language. Tensions between the two currents meant that the Islamic mindedness of the HMI was moderated by its inclusive relationship. Beyond this general tendency, however, HMI members began to split into two relational and ideational inclinations: “exclusive” (Islamist) and “inclusive” (liberal). This latent disputation between the two groups would become evident in early years of the New Order.

The 30 September PKI Movement brought about a turning point for HMI’s resurgence. The failure of the PKI’s political manoeuvre and the army’s quick counter-attack gave rise to a political climate that favoured the anti-establishment student movement. With the PPMI being irrelevant in the new political circumstances, in late October anti-establishment students formed a loose coalition of externally-based student organizations with army encouragement and protection. This loosely united front came to be known as the Indonesian University Students’ Action Front, *Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia* (KAMI).¹³⁷ Considering that Sukarno remained in power and that the NU’s relationship with him remained strong, Zamroni

(b. 1933, a student of the IAIN) of the PMII was appointed the initial chairman of the KAMI presidium.¹³⁸

On 4 November 1965 KAMI began to organize student demonstrations demanding the dissolution of the PKI. Although Sukarno's charismatic power had been severely damaged, he was still in power. As if to prove this he passed a proposal for the establishment of the so-called *Kabinet Dwikora jang Disempurnakan* [the Revised *Dwikora* Cabinet] which was comprised of 100 ministers.¹³⁹ When KAMI came under strong attack from Sukarno forces, a similar high school students' front emerged early in 1966 under the banner of the Indonesian Student Youths' Front [*Kesatuan Aksi Pemuda Peladjar Indonesia*, KAPPI] with Moh. Husnie Thamrin of the PII being the initial chairman. At the same time, there also came into existence the Indonesian University Graduates' Front [*Kesatuan Aksi Sardjana Indonesia*, KASI] with a Masjumi-PSI intellectual core. On 12 January 1966 KAMI began to organize a massive student demonstration under the slogan of the People's Three Demands [*Tri Tuntutan Rakjat, Tritura*]: "Ban the PKI, purge communist elements from the *Dwikora* cabinet, and lower prices of basic commodities!"

When the Revised *Dwikora* Cabinet was inaugurated on 24 February, a disastrous clash occurred between student demonstrators and the regiment of the presidential guard, *Cakrabirawa*. One of the KAMI's demonstrators, Arief Rahman Hakim, was killed.¹⁴⁰ He became a martyr and ignited the students' anger. After Jakarta's streets were taken over by student demonstrators, the army took the opportunity to seize political power. Slowly but surely, Sukarno's charismatic and real power faded, leading to his eventual expulsion from the presidency in March 1967.

The anti-communist student demonstrations around the mid-1960s helped galvanize a collective solidarity among young intellectuals. In sharing a common experience, historical project and the language of anti-establishment, the fourth generation of Indonesian intelligentsia emerged in the public sphere. With the coming of this generation the young Muslim intelligentsia began for the first time in Indonesian history to show its dominant position. By far the largest and most active member organization of the KAMI was HMI, while that of the KAPPI was PII. In celebrating the monumental achievement of a new generation of Muslim intelligentsia in this period, Nurcholish Majid, chairman of the HMI (1966–68, 1968–71), wrote:

If the year 1966 is mentioned, Indonesians will at first associate it with the birth of a generation closely related to the fall of the 'Old Order' and the rise of the New Order. If we concentrate our attention merely on KAMI, the dominant role of HMI within it will be very conspicuous. It is not an

exaggeration of many observers that KAMI was actually parallel with, if not identical to, HMI. This could arouse the envy and jealousy of many other groups (Madjid 1990, p. 21).

CONCLUSION

In contrast to the expectations of Marxist theory, the dominant (economic) class did not necessarily become the dominant political elite in Indonesia. Due to the relative incapacity of other social forces, the intelligentsia and clerical intelligentsia (*ulama-intelek*) as instigators, leaders and executors of national politics became the dominant political elite of the fully independent Indonesia.

As bearers of the traditional intellectual obligations to their people, the task of Indonesian intelligentsia and *ulama-intelek* in political leadership was to activate what Sukarno called the “national spirit”, “national will”, and “national deed”. Inspired by the post-colonial dream of liberty, members of the intelligentsia attempted to translate this vision into a democratic political system.

The implementation of democracy in a plural society — with a multiple structures of knowledge, collective-memories, modes of production as well as a variety of social identities and subject positions — was an uphill task. With the diversity of intellectual political traditions there was an intense ideological struggle to impose upon the state a particular conception and institutional structure. This ideological struggle could not simply be addressed through the invention and imposition of a civil religion such as — *Pancasila* to blunt the variety of social ideologies. Rather, there was a need to establish political institutions and mechanisms within which opposing groups could safely and fairly contend.

The democratic experiment of the constitutional democracy period (1950–57) was an attempt to establish political institutions for safe political competition. This experiment, however, gained no solid democratic foundation. In a country still typified by a high rate of illiteracy, a lower level of education, poor economic conditions, huge social inequalities and authoritarian mentalities, the political terrain remained the property of a tiny layer of elite politicians. At the same time, elite settlement failed to be achieved because of the lack of common will and civility among the elites in general and more importantly because of the failure of collective social learning. In the failure of collective social learning, “the post-colonial dream of discontinuity”, to borrow Gandhi’s words (1998, p. 7), was “ultimately vulnerable to the infectious residue of its own unconsidered and unresolved past”.

Leaders of political Islam were able to forget their traumatic political experiences when they were in power. Between 1950 and 1954 Islamic leaders showed their rejection of the idea of establishing an Islamic state through armed struggle and their willingness to accept *Pancasila* as the principle of the state. Their claim for some kind of Islamic state was revived during and after the election campaign as a reflection of their precarious political position and their disenchantment with the communist effort to deconfessionalize *Pancasila*.

In the struggle of identity politics, symbols were considered as important as substance. Thus, although the Constituent Assembly produced agreements on all other parts of the constitutional draft, it was unable to arrive at any compromise concerning the designation of the state. On the issue of whether the ideological basis of the state should be *Pancasila* or Islam, Indonesian politics was soon divided into two major blocs: the so-called *Pancasila* camp versus the Islamic camp. In fact the Islamic camp itself agreed with all principles of *Pancasila* as long as the phrase “belief in one God”, as the first principle of *Pancasila*, was followed immediately by the clause “with the obligation for the adherents of Islam to practise Islamic law”. For the Islamic camp, maintaining Islam as the symbol of the state was important as an indication that the state had now put the Islamic community in its rightful place. For the *Pancasila* camp, on the other hand, accepting Islam as the designation of the state was too much, for this could open the way to further Islamic claims.

All these political disputes and problems indicated that the implementation of democracy required time for structural adjustment and social learning. For political actors who had been marginalized under the democratic political system, however, such disputes and problems were considered as proof of the incompatibility of Western-style democracy and Indonesian conditions. The failure of the Constituent Assembly to end the dispute over the designation of the state, while national politics was overshadowed by economic crisis and regional movements, provided a rationale for these political actors to impose an authoritarian political system. With army and PKI backing, Sukarno came out with his “guided democracy” project by claiming himself as the meeting ground of the nation. “I have made myself the meeting place of all trends and ideologies. I have blended, blended, and blended them until finally they became the present Sukarno.”¹⁴¹

Under the framework of the state’s official orthodoxy expressed as *Manipol-USDEK* and *Nasakom*, the diversity of the nation had been denied as a story fabricated by colonialism. In this way the political establishment managed to create what Geertz called “a near anarchic politics of meaning”

(1972, p. 324) with its arbitrary imposition of political and cultural homogeneity. This engendered a cynical spirit of anti-intellectualism and various forms of intellectual “prostitution” that came to be called “the betrayal of the intellectual”. This spirit of anti-intellectualism and intellectual partisanship provided a legitimization for the repression and imprisonment of dissenting intellectuals. Oppositional parties such as *Masjumi* and PSI experienced political devastation. Henceforth, the public role of the Muslim intelligentsia of the second generation, mostly affiliated with the *Masjumi*, withered and was not restored by regime change.

The decline of their political role, however, was compensated for by their return to the field of education and Islamic *dakwah*. Meanwhile, the crumbling of social borders and discrimination in the educational field of post-colonial Indonesia had resulted in the influx of the children of *santri* families into the public and private schools/universities. This led to the unprecedented growth of Muslim student organizations. By the mid-1960s the HMI and PII had become the largest student organizations in the country. Both played a very decisive role in the student demonstrations of the mid-1960s leading up to the fall of Sukarno regime.

The dominant position of HMI and PII in the student politics signalled the first significant influence of the Muslim intelligentsia. It would, however, take some time for these young intellectuals to prepare for a decisive role in the political leadership of the nation. As power was transferred from the Old to the New Order, the secular modernizing elite under the leadership of the military intelligentsia continued to dominate the Indonesian polity and bureaucracy.

Notes

1. Gandhi (1998, p. 7).
2. Shils (1972, p. 409)
3. Hatta (1957, pp. 29–30).
4. The nine cabinets were Sukarno’s (Presidential) Cabinet (19 August–14 November 1945), the First (Parliamentary) Cabinet of Sjahrir (14 November 1945–12 March 1946), the Second (Parliamentary) Cabinet of Sjahrir (12 March 1945–2 October 1946), the Third (Parliamentary) Cabinet of Sjahrir (2 October 1946–27 June 1947), the First (Parliamentary) Cabinet of Amir Sjarifuddin (3 July 1947–11 November 1947), the Second (Parliamentary) Cabinet of Amir Sjarifuddin (11 November 1947–29 January 1948), the First (Presidential) Cabinet of Mohammad Hatta (29 January 1948), the Emergency Cabinet of Sjafruddin Prawiranegara (19 December 1948–13 July 1949), the Second (Presidential) Cabinet of Mohammad Hatta (4 August–20 December 1949).

5. The fifteen states consisted of Great Dayak, East Indonesia, Southeast Borneo, East Borneo, West Borneo, Bencoolen, Billiton, Riouw, East Sumatra, Banjar, Madura, Pasundan, South Sumatra, East Java, and Central Java. The original territory of the Republic of Indonesia, which was formed during the revolution, comprised parts of Java, Madura and Sumatra (*Panitia Peringatan*, 1978b, p. 95).
6. The fixed amount of this debt was f. 4.3 billion; "much of this in fact represented the costs of the Dutch attempt to crush the Revolution" (Ricklefs 1993, p. 232).
7. As Robison noted (1978, p. 23): "The early economic policy makers of the PSI, PNI, and the Masjumi were all to some extent influenced by socialist ideals... Many of these ideals were diluted when these leaders were faced with the practical difficulties of dismantling a colonial economy..."
8. There had been a common expectation among the intelligentsia as political elite that their economic deprivation could be compensated for through the empowerment of an indigenous bourgeoisie. Hence various measures had been made to generate an indigenous domestic capitalist class. The most concerted was the so-called *Benteng* [bastion] programme. This programme was intended to secure indigenous dominance in the import sector, through controls over the allocation of import licences, as a base for capital accumulation which would sustain the expansion of indigenous capital into other sectors. The idea of the programme arose during the Hatta (RUSI) cabinet but was implemented first in the period of the Natsir cabinet and was most enthusiastically prosecuted by the first Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet. In fact, the abuse of power and the spirit of communalism again caused the failure of this programme and accentuated corruption and cronyism. Richard Robison noted (1986, p. 45): "As the programme progressed it became apparent that few recipients of import licenses were established indigenous importers but tended instead to be individuals associated with powerful figures in the bureaucracy or the parties who controlled allocation of licences and credit. More disturbing, it also became apparent that the majority of *Benteng* firms were not using the licences for importing but were simply selling them to genuine importers, mostly Chinese, and often failing to repay BNI credit. What was being consolidated was not an indigenous merchant bourgeoisie but a group of licence brokers and political fixers."
9. For an elaborate discussion of the intelligentsia as social estate, social stratum, or class, see G. Konrád and I. Szelényi (1979, pp. 63–184).
10. Herbert Feith depicted those years as follows: "Citizens played a dominant role. Parties were of very great importance. The contenders for power showed respect for 'rules of the game' which were closely related to the existing constitution. Most members of the political elite had some sort of commitment to symbols connected with constitutional democracy. Civil liberties were rarely infringed. Finally, governments used coercion sparingly" (Feith 1962, p. xi).
11. The word might also derive from the term "*mardijker*", a free social class in VOC times.

12. Gradually each branch of the former Dutch University of Indonesia became an independent university: University of Indonesia (UI) in Jakarta in 1950, Airlangga University (in Surabaya) in 1954, Hasanuddin University (in Makassar) in 1956, Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB, in Bandung) in 1959, Bogor Institute of Agriculture (IPB, in Bogor) in 1963, and the Jakarta Institute of Teaching and Education (IKIP, in Jakarta) in 1964.
13. The Nationalization Decree and the Higher Education Decree (1946) mandated that lectures be delivered in Indonesian.
14. For a detailed discussion of effects of the transfer of power on the Indonesian scientific establishment, see A. Messer (1994).
15. As Thomas noted (1973, pp. 213–14): “The Soviet Union furnished over 600 scholarships and provided the financing and expertise for establishing an oceanographic institute on the island of Ambon. Both East and West Germany offered scholarships, and a West German city gave Padjadjaran University a printing press. The China Medical Board of New York gave books for medical-school libraries. The British Council provided greater libraries and lent films for use in schools of Bandung and Djakarta. Christian missionary societies in the US and Australia sent faculty members to Satya Wajana Christian University in Central Java. Catholic organizations in Europe and America sent funds and staff members for several Catholic colleges on Java. And more than a dozen other countries, both communist and non-communist, provided scholarship, books, and supplies for various Indonesian colleges, public and private.”
16. The Indonesian tendency to use the word “intelligentsia” interchangeably with the word “intellectual” reflected a similar tendency among the Western Europeans (see, chapter 1).
17. Sukarno, for instance, in his letter from the prison (in Ende, Flores) to the Persis leader, A. Hassan, on 18 August 1936 wrote the following sentence: “*Rakjat Indonesia, teroetama kaoem intelligentzia, soedah moelai banjak jang senang membatja boekoe-boekoe bahasa sendiri jang ‘matang’ dan ‘thorough’*” [Indonesians, especially the intelligentsia, began to enjoy reading ‘mature’ and ‘thorough’ books in their own language] (emphasis added). See Soekarno (1964, pp. 325–43). Mohammad Natsir, in his article “*Sekolah Tinggi Islam*”, published by *Pandji Islam* (June 1938), identified the existence of what he called “*doea golongan intelligensia*” [two groups of intelligentsia] (emphasis added), namely: *intelektuil* and *ulama-intelek* (Natsir 1954, p. 71).
18. The so-called “*Kongres Muslimin Indonesia*” [All Indonesian Muslims’ Congress], held in Yogyakarta (20–25 December 1949), for instance, included the following in its closing statement: “*Setelah berunding sekian hari, maka 185 organisasi, Alim Ulama dan Intelligensia seluruh Indonesia memutuskan...*” [After several days of discussion, 185 organizations, ulama and *intelligentsia* all over Indonesia came to the decision....] (emphasis added). For a complete statement, see Sitompul (1987, p. 11). Next, the word gained further popularity following the historic speech of Mohammad Hatta before the *civitas academica* of the University of Indonesia (11 June 1957), entitled “*Tanggung Jawab Moril Kaum*

Intelligensia” [the Moral Responsibility of the Intelligentsia] (Hatta 1957). Afterwards, a critical *literatus*, Wiratmo Soekito, wrote his views in *Siasat Baru* (No. 655, 30 December 1959), “*Posisi Kaum Intelligensia Indonesia Dewasa Ini*” [The Contemporary Position of the Indonesian Intelligentsia]. A member of the communist intelligentsia, Jusuf Adjitorop used the term in his article published by the leftist journal *Madju Terus*, 1 (1963, pp. 169–70), “*Kembangkan Terus Pekerdjaan Partai dikalangan Intelligensia*” [To Continue Developing the Party’s Work in the Intelligentsia Community]. The term could also be found in the name of the association of the Indonesian Christian intelligentsia, *Persatuan Intelligensia Kristen Indonesia* (PIKI, est. 1963). Finally, the term was widely used in a heated polemic around the issue of the so-called “betrayal of the intelligentsia” that began to emerge in final years of the Sukarno’s regime.

19. Examples of these Muslim students were M.S. Mintaredja (b. 1921) and Achmad Tirtosudiro (b. 1922) at the UGM.
20. In late 1947, Ali Sastroamidjojo, the then education minister, set up a committee to draft the Educational Bill headed by Dewantara. The drafting of the bill was completed by early 1948 and submitted to the Working Committee of KNIP. “But the debate was interrupted when the Dutch captured Yogyakarta in the second military action on 14 December 1948. It was not until October 1949 that the KNIP could reconvene, and discussion on the Educational Bill resumed” (Lee 1995, p. 35).
21. For a fuller discussion of this issue, see Lee (1995, pp. 47–61).
22. The religious schools that were run by the Ministry of Religious Affairs included the *madrasah ibtida’iya* [primary school], *madrasah tsanawiyah* [lower secondary school], *madrasah ‘aliya* [upper secondary school]. The statistics for 1954 revealed that at that time the government subsidized more than 13,000 primary, 776 lower secondary and 16 upper secondary *madrasahs* (Boland 1971, p. 117).
23. Other IAINs that emerged in the 1960s were IAIN Sjarif Hidajatullah, Jakarta (est. 1963), IAIN Ar-Raniry, Aceh (est. 1963), IAIN Raden Fatah, Palembang (est. 1964), IAIN Antasari, Banjarmasin (est. 1964), IAIN Alauddin, Makassar (est. 1965), IAIN Sunan Ampel, Surabaya (est. 1965), IAIN Imam Bondjol, Padang (est. 1966), IAIN Sultan Thaha Saifuddin, Jambi (est. 1967), IAIN Sunan Gunung Djati, Bandung (est. 1968), and IAIN Raden Intan, Tanjung Karang (est. 1968). By 1995 there were some 14 IAINs throughout Indonesia with their total students being 86,198. On the history and future development of the IAIN. See Censis and Dibinperta (1996).
24. The formal reason for the *pemoeda*’s opposition to this state party was that it would be redundant and competitive with the KNIP. The actual reason, however, was their fear of its potential fascistic influence since the party was headed by Achmad Subardjo, who used to be in close collaboration with the Japanese (Kahin 1952, pp. 147–48).
25. It is worth noting that “a large number of the Indonesian Stalinists, including

- some of the most important of them, did not enter the PKI. Instead they entered one or the other of the three chief non-communist Marxist parties, the Socialist party, Labor Party, and Pesindo” (Kahin 1952, p. 159).
26. The road to the establishment of an Indonesian military force began with the PPKI announcement on 22 August 1945 a *Badan Penolong Keluarga Korban Perang* [Agency for Aid to the Families of War Victims], which organizationally included a *Badan Keamanan Rakyat* [BKR, People’s Security Agency]. In further developments, the BKR — after a series of steps in its transformation to the *Tentara Keamanan Rakyat* [TKR, People’s Security Army] on 5 October, the *Tentara Keselamatan Rakyat* [TKR, People’s Safety Army] on 1 January 1946, and the *Tentara Republik Indonesia* [TRI, Army of the Republic of Indonesia] on 24 January — finally became the *Tentara Nasional Indonesia* [TNI, Indonesian National Army] on 5 May 1947 (Sundhaussen 1982, pp. 7–18; Anderson 1972, pp. 232–34).
 27. For other Muslim *daidanchos* (battalion commanders of the *Peta*), see chapter 3.
 28. The reason has to be found in the nature of the Japanese military training. Unlike more junior officers, the *daidanchos* were not given intensive military training and were not confined to the *asrama* [barracks]. Their essential function was to conduct moral leadership and exercise political supervision over their subordinates (Anderson, 1972, pp. 20–22). Lacking professional military capability, former *daidanchos* suffered a major drawback in the leadership competition. Meanwhile, those who came from the socialist paramilitary background had also their own competitive advantage due to their greater exposure to Western knowledge and training in political manoeuvring.
 29. Some of these ex-KNIL officers had graduated from the Royal Military Academy in Breda (Netherlands), but most of whom had been trained in the Military Cadet School in Bandung.
 30. In late 1940s and early 1950s, there were several rebellions throughout the country under the banner of *Darul Islam* (The House/Territory of Islam) in an efforts to establish the Islamic State of Indonesia, as compensation for their disappointments with the central government. Beginning in West Java in May 1948 the movement then spread to parts of Central Java, to South Kalimantan (Borneo), to South Sulawesi (Celebes) and to Aceh. For further discussion of the cause of rebellions see, among others, C. van Dijk (1981).
 31. Ulf Sundhaussen puts this as follows (1982, p. 46): “Certainly, the officer corps of 1949 was still largely heterogeneous but, compared with 1945/6, something of a common political platform had emerged. The officers were much more self-assured and proud of their achievement, distrustful of politicians, politicking, and party ideologies, and more aware of the corporate interests of the army. But they still had no clear perceptions of what, in their opinion, its position in society should be.”
 32. The Indonesian National Military Academy (AMN) was re-opened by President

- Sukarno on 11 November 1957, as a continuation of the former military academy in Yogyakarta, one of the military institutes to provide the army with young officers, which was established soon after the proclamation of independence in 1945. Because of lack of infrastructures and instructors, this first academy had to close its doors in 1950. About the same time with the appearance of the Yogyakarta military academy, there also emerged an academy for military engineering in Bandung. Later, this Bandung military institute became the technical department of the Magelang-based AMN after its amalgamation in 1959 (AMN, 1969). The appearance of the Magelang-based AMN was soon followed by the establishment of similar institutes for the navy and air force cadets and also other institutions for socio-political education of the military officers such as Staff Colleges of the Armed Forces [*Sesko*], the Joint Staff College of the Armed Forces [*Seskobab*], the National Defence Institute [*Lemhanas*] and so forth.
33. Natsir failed to convince the PNI to join his cabinet. As a result, this cabinet was based on the *Masjumi*, supported by the smaller parties (PIR, PSI, Parindra, *Partai Katholik*, *Parkindo*, PSII and Democratic Fraction) and five prominent non-party persons. The deputy prime minister himself, Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX, was a non-party person (Feith 1962, pp. 149, 150).
 34. Sukiman was able to convince the PNI to join his cabinet. Thus, this cabinet was based on the *Masjumi* and PNI, supported by the smaller parties (PIR, Catholic, Labour, *Parkindo*, *Parindra* and Democratic Fraction) and two non-party persons (Mohammad Yamin and Djuanda). The deputy prime minister was Suwirjo of the PNI (Feith 1962, p. 180).
 35. The Wilopo cabinet was based on the PNI and *Masjumi*, supported by the small parties (PSI, Catholic, Labour, PSII, *Parkindo*, *Parindra*) and three non-party persons. The deputy prime minister was Prawoto Mangkusasmita of the *Masjumi* (Feith 1962, pp. 228–29).
 36. The first Ali cabinet was based on the PNI, PIR and NU, supported by the smaller parties (Progressive Fraction, PRN, SKI, BTI, PSII, Labour, *Parindra*) and one non-party person. This cabinet included two deputy prime ministers. The first deputy was Wongsonegoro of the PIR; the second deputy was Zainul Arifin of the NU (Feith 1962, pp. 338–39).
 37. The Burhanuddin cabinet was based on the *Masjumi*, supported by other parties (PIR-Hazairin, PSII, NU, PSI, Democratic Fraction, PIR, Catholic, PRN, Labour, *Parindra*, *Parkindo*, and Indonesian People's Party). The cabinet included two deputy prime ministers. The first deputy was Djanu Ismadi of the PIR-Hazairin; the second deputy was Harsono Tjokroaminoto of the PSII (Feith 1962, pp. 418–19).
 38. In a plural society, said Furnivall, there is a general disorganization of social demand as the structure of demand and economic motives are not coordinated by common cultural values. "Achieving equality of opportunity, social mobility and an equitable distribution of wealth is, therefore, a greater problem in plural society than in any other type" (Furnivall 1980, pp. 86–88).

39. It has been argued by Klaus Eder (1993, pp. 20–27) that the key to explaining the path of development leading to modernity in the Western experience lies in the learning process and symbolic practices in the sphere of culture. As a society moves from traditional to modern life, the arena for collective learning shifts from closed-communal to open-associational bonds, from estates and castes to class society. The changing arena of social learning will in turn change the symbolic universe. In association the symbolic universe is produced by discursive communication which involves a high degree of rationality and equal rights to free thinking and speech. The more this rationality and equality can be institutionalized, the more the idea of a democratic organization of civil society can be achieved. This culminates in the idea of democratic realization of the good life by civil society.
40. Surprisingly enough the PSI could only gain 2.0 per cent of the total valid vote.
41. The debates in the assembly did not proceed from a draft constitution, but from fundamental principles which later on could be incorporated into the constitution (Boland 1971, p. 90).
42. In the view of Adnan Buyung Nasution (1995, p. 409), it was not impossible that the compromise would have finally been achieved if President Sukarno had not taken an extra-parliamentary decision to forcefully dissolve the Constituent Assembly on 5 July 1959.
43. As Ricklefs noted (1993, p. 252): “In the years since 1952 many regional commanders had forged unorthodox links with outer island interests as a means of financing their units and their personal incomes.”
44. The most influential branch of the Indonesian armed forces was the army. The army with its 330,000 members in the early 1960s was in a dominating position over the navy (30,000) and air force (40,000) (Sundhaussen 1982, pp. 162–207).
45. President Sukarno, despite his great prestige and considerable popularity, continued to play a purely formal role as head of the state. According to the 1950’s (provisional) Constitution, the president and vice-president were formally inviolable and above the political arena. The army, despite claiming to be the bulwark of the nation following its decisive role during the revolutionary struggle was not included either in the parliament or the government. The PKI, despite its great achievement in the 1955 election, was excluded from parliamentary cabinets because of the stigma of its treachery to the new republican government in 1948.
46. Disagreeing with Sukarno in many fundamental issues and frustrated by his limited power as vice-president, Hatta submitted his resignation on 20 July 1956 to take effect on 1 December.
47. An English translation of these speeches by Sukarno can be found in Feith and Castles (1970, pp. 81–89).
48. On 2 March 1957, the territorial commander of East Indonesia in Makasar (Sulawesi), Lt. Col. H.N.V. Sumual, declared autonomy under martial law, the origins of the so-called *Perdjjuangan Semesta* [*Peremesta*, Universal Struggle]

- rebellions. On 8 March the South Sumatra regional assembly voted no confidence in the governor and the local army took over authority in that region.
49. After the implementation of martial law, the army as the most powerful of the Indonesian armed forces emerged as the most powerful political, economic and administrative force in the nation (Sundhaussen 1982, pp. 162–207).
 50. *Formateur* is person or committee appointed by a particular legal authority to form the executive leadership, cabinet, etc.
 51. There were at least three BKS founded between 1957–58: the Youth-Military Cooperative Body [BKS *Pemuda-Militer*], the Labor-Military Cooperative Body [BKS *Buruh-Militer*], and the Peasant-Military Cooperative Body [BKS *Tani-Militer*]. Subsequently, there also appeared the *Ulama*-Military Cooperative Body [BKS *Ulama-Militer*], the Women's-Military Cooperative Body [BKS *Wanita-Militer*] and so forth (Imawan 1989, p. 158, DPP Golkar 1994, p. 95).
 52. Hatta's resignation from the vice-presidency in December 1956 had exacerbated regional dissatisfactions in Sumatra. Born in Minangkabau, West Sumatra, Hatta was very popular in the Outer Islands and had done much to maintain the regional trust in Jakarta. His resignation was seen as signalling the complete severance of regional voices from the central government (Kahin 1999, p. 178). On 10 February 1958, dissident leaders of Sumatra, Lt. Col. Achmad Husein, Lt. Col. Zulkifli Lubis, and Col. M. Simbolon, sent a five-day ultimatum to the central government: "the cabinet must be dissolved, Hatta and Sultan Hamengkubuwana IX must be appointed to form a new business cabinet until elections were held, and Sukarno must return to his constitutional position as a figurehead president" (Ricklefs 1993, p. 262). After the ultimatum was rejected, the dissident leaders declared on 15 February the establishment of *Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia* [PRRI, Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia] in Padang (West Sumatra). This revolutionary government was led by the then governor of the Central Bank, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara (of the *Masjumi*), as prime minister. In addition to Sjafruddin, other *Masjumi* leaders, Burhanuddin Harahap and Mohammad Natsir, were respectively appointed the minister of security and justice and the spokesman of the PRRI. The three *Masjumi* leaders were coincidentally in Sumatra when the dissident leaders were preparing the proclamation of the PRRI, and they were being presented with a *fait accompli* to lead the PRRI (Noer 1987, pp. 376–77). In addition to Masjumi leaders, the PRRI cabinet included former finance minister Sumitro Djojohadikusumo (of the PSI) as the minister of trade and communications and several dissident colonels such as Col. M. Simbolon, Col. Dachlan Djambek, Col. Warouw, and Col. Saleh Lahade, respectively as the minister of foreign affairs; of internal affairs and defence; of development, and of information (Kahin 1999, p. 211).
 53. "*Manipol*" was the acronym of *Manifesto Politik* [Political Manifesto]. This political manifesto was intended to revive the spirit of revolution and social justice. This would be achieved through the implementation of what later in

1960 became known as USDEK, standing for *Undang-Undang Dasar 1945* (the 1945 Constitution), *Sosialisme Indonesia* [Indonesian socialism], *Demokrasi terpimpin* [guided democracy], *Ekonomi terpimpin* [guided economy], and *Kepribadian Indonesia* [Indonesian identity].

54. This option had its antecedents in his old idea, espoused as early as 1926, of uniting the three main component parts of Indonesian society: the nationalists, the religious groups, and the communists. The main supportive elements of this doctrine were the PNI (*nasionalis*), NU (*agama*), and PKI (*komunis*), along with an array of smaller parties representing Protestant, Catholic, Muslim, and other secular interest groups. Crackdowns were carried out on parties that refused to support the doctrine such as *Masjumi* and PSI.
55. The army considered the increasingly powerful Communist Party (PKI) to be a direct threat to its own power. The PNI itself suffered internal differences, with a left wing under the leadership of Ali Sastroamidjojo and Surachman (PNI ASU) working in cooperation with the communists, while a right-centre wing under the leadership of Osa Maliki (PNI Osa Maliki) viewed the Communist Party with suspicion. The Protestant and Catholic parties accepted inclusion in the *Nasakom* alliance but were never happy about their leftwing bedfellows.
56. *Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia* [IPKI, League of Upholders of Indonesian Independence] was established in May 1954 under the initiative of General Nasution and such prominent pro-17 October officers as Gatot Subroto, Aziz Saleh, and Sutoko. In the case of IPKI's support for the Democratic League, Nasution took a neutral position.
57. The word *clerc* [clerk] both in French and English implied originally a man of learning. For a more elaborate discussion of this term and this book, see Herbert Read (1959, pp. xiii–xxxii).
58. In a similar tone, a critical Indonesian literary figure, Wiratmo Soekito, wrote articles in *Siasat Baru* (No. 655, 30 December 1959), “*Posisi Kaum Intelligensia Indonesia Dewasa Ini*” [The Contemporary Position of the Indonesian Intelligentsia] and in *Indonesia* (No. 4, October–December 1960), “*Kesetian Intelektual kepada Masyarakat*” [The Intellectual's Loyalty to Society], complaining of the fading of intellectual criticism and reminding intellectuals of their heroic calling as defenders of a collective conscience. This critique of intellectual alienation culminated in the emergence of polemics around the issue of the so-called “betrayal of the intellectuals” in the early months of the New Order.
59. This campaign of anti-intellectualism was supported by left-wing intellectual organizations such as *Organisasi Tjendekiawan Indonesia* [OTI, Indonesian Intellectual Organization], *Himpunan Sardjana Indonesia* [HIS, Association of Indonesian Scholars], and *Himpunan Pengarang Indonesia* [HIPMI, Association of Indonesian Authors].
60. The leading figure of *Lekra* was the famous writer Pramoedya Ananta Toer.
61. The leading figure of LKN was a well-known poet, Sitor Situmorang.

62. For the repressive actions of the Lekra and LKN toward their intellectual opponents, see T. Ismail and D.S. Moeljanto (1995). For a more sympathetic view of the *Lekra's* literary activity, see Foulcher (1986).
63. The original draft of the manifesto was composed by Wiratmo Soekito on 17 August 1963. It was then discussed by a group of thirteen artists on 23 August leading to the appointment of a drafting committee of six artists. The committee completed the final version of the Manifesto on 24 August. On the same day, it was approved and signed by a group twelve *literati*: H.B. Jassin, Trisno Sumardjo, Wiratmo Soekito, Zaini, Bokor Hutasaht, Gunawan Mohamad, Bur Rasuanto, Soe Hok Djinn (Arief Budiman), D.S. Muljanto, Ras Siregar, Djufri Tanissan and A. Bastari Asnin (Teeuw 1979, p. 35).
64. Sukarno agreed with the accusation that the *Manikebu* displayed a hesitant attitude with respect to the revolution. Claiming that there was room for only one manifesto in Indonesia and that was Manipol-USDEK, Sukarno banned *Manikebu* on 8 May 1964 (Teeuw 1979, pp. 35–37).
65. Already in August 1959 the government's effort to restrain inflation led to the decision to devalue the Rupiah by 75 per cent. A monetary purge was ordered by which all Rp. 500 and 1000 notes were reduced in value to one-tenth, which in turn reduced the money supply from Rp. 34 billion to Rp. 21 billion. The real sector of the economy was very badly affected by this decision which obliged the government to allow an expansion of credit. As a result, within six months the money supply was back to its former level and inflation again crept upwards. From late 1961 to 1964 the country experienced continuing hyper-inflation (around 100 per cent per annum). At the beginning of 1965 this inflation became extreme, with prices rising by something like 500 per cent. To make matters worse, economic planning for an eight-year development programme, which was promulgated at the end of 1960, was given a tragic-comic flavour. "It was a tragic ritual nonsense for the plan to be divided into 17 parts, 8 volumes and 1945 clauses symbolizing the date of the Independence declaration." (Ricklefs 1993, pp. 267, 280)
66. As job openings decreased yearly with a large number of graduates, the problem of how selective universities ought to be in admitting and passing students arose. This problem of intellectual "proletarianization" was exacerbated by a general attitude of Indonesian educated people of the time: the love of clean hands. L.W. Mauldin, for instance, noticed that of the 1,200 students at Bogor Agricultural School of the University of Indonesia in 1957 only one student wanted to be a farmer. The ambition of the rest was to serve as government officials, employment in a government office being regarded as the closest thing to leisure in the *priyayi* tradition.
67. The heightening competition between the Chinese and the Americans to exercise some control over the Southeast Asian region penetrated Indonesian political affairs. In November 1964 Chinese leaders advised Sukarno to set up a "Fifth Force", a new service consisting of armed workers and peasants to be

recruited from the PKI's mass organizations. This was in line with Sukarno's idea of the "*Nasakomization*" of the army. About the same time, American hopes of stopping the leftward swing in Indonesia gave rise to their attempt to collaborate with the army (Sundhaussen 1982, p. 193). An indication of the Americans cum British attempt to build cooperation with the Army was revealed by the discovery of the so-called Gilchrist letter, allegedly found in the villa of an American film distributor and suspected CIA agent at Puncak when it was attacked on 1 April 1965 by a communist youth group. The document, purportedly a secret telegram from the British ambassador in Jakarta, Sir Andrew Gilchrist, to his superiors, mentioned possible future cooperation between the British and the Army (Elson 2001, p. 97).

68. By late September, with tens of thousands of troops gathering in Jakarta in preparation for Armed Forces Day on 5 October, a rumour about a coup planned by a so-called "*Dewan Jenderal*" [Council of Generals] was spread by the PKI. This a rumour transformed quickly into the so-called "30 September Movement". In the course of this event six senior army generals were killed and General Nasution only narrowly escaped the same fate. The generals targeted by the 30 September Movement included Let.-Gen. Jani (minister/commander of the Army), Gen. Nasution (minister/coordinator of defence and security), and key members of the General Staff (SUAD): Maj.-Gen. Suprpto (deputy II, administration), Maj.-Gen. Harjono (deputy III, finance and public relations), Maj.-Gen. S. Parman (assistant I, intelligence), Brig.-Gen. D.I. Pandjaitan (assistant IV, logistics), and the prosecutor general of the army, Brig.-Gen. Sutojo Siswomihardjo (Elson 2001, p. 101).
69. For a more detailed discussion of the formation of this generation, see A. Teeuw (1979, pp. 41–153).
70. For further discussions of this issue, see D.E. Smith (1970) and Y. Latif (1999*a*).
71. There are only a few countries in the world which have a special Ministry of Religious Affairs. The Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs was created for the first time by the second Sjahrir cabinet (March 1946–October 1946) with M. Rasjidi as its first minister. It was intended to assuage Muslims' political disappointments following the omission of the "seven words" from the 1945 Constitution and the repudiation of the establishment of the Religious Affair Ministry in the early birth of the new republic.
72. In a meeting of the *Masjumi* in Cirebon, some weeks before the first "police action", Sukiman complained that under the leftwing government in Yogyakarta, *Masjumi* was having a very difficult time and was not being offered any chance for activity and development. He then said, "We should however wait patiently for our chance to come." Being aware that the *Masjumi* embraced all Muslims, he came to believe that it cannot but be victorious in the end, as it will command an absolute majority (Nieuwenhuijze 1958, p. 55).
73. In addition, these were also some other intellectuals such as Abu Hanifah, Kartosuwirjo, Anwar Tjokroaminoto, and Sjamsuddin and also a small number

- of *ulama-intelekt* such as Fathurrahman Kafrawi and Mohammad Dachlan (of the NU), and Fakih Usman (of the *Muhammadiyah*).
74. The chairman of the first Party's Consultative Council (*Madjlis Sjuro*), was Hasjim As'jari (of the NU). He was assisted by Ki Bagus Hadikusumo (of the *Muhammadiyah*), Wachid Hasjim (of the NU), and Kasman Singodimejo (of the *Muhammadiyah*) respectively as the first, the second, and the third vice-chairman. They were supported by some other members including M. Adnan (President of the Court for Islamic Affairs), Agus Salim (individual), Abdul Wahab Chasbullah (of the NU), A. Sanusi (of the *Al Ittihadijatul Islamijah*), and M. Djamil Djambek (of the Sumatran reformers) and dozens of other *kjais* and Islamic leaders.
 75. A Javanese by origin and having been deeply exposed to secular political ideas during his study in the Netherlands, Sukiman had a close relationship with the Javanese NU leaders and was less obsessed with the modernist-reformist ideology.
 76. Being a non-Javanese (Minangkabau) by origin and having long been exposed to the modernist-reformist teachings, especially after his deep engagement in the *Persis* organization, Natsir was a true believer in the modernist-reformist ideology and drew support mainly from non-Javanese. This made the NU leaders tend to mistrust him.
 77. "During the revolution, Natsir joined Sjahrir's second and third cabinets (12 March 1946–27 June 1947) as a representative of the *Masjumi* with the portfolio of minister of information. And with the formation of Hatta's cabinet (29 January 1948–19 December 1948) he served again in that post" (Kahin 1993, p. 162).
 78. Quoted in Maarif (1996, p. 70).
 79. In addition to Natsir as prime minister, some three other *Masjumi* leaders, Mohamad Roem, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, and Wachid Hasjim respectively held the posts of minister of foreign affairs, minister of finance, and minister of religious affairs. Another Islamic party, PSSI, had also its representative in the cabinet, namely, Harsono Tjokroaminoto as the minister of state without portfolio, though he resigned from the cabinet as of 31 December 1950.
 80. Based on the Round Table Conference, West New Guinea was excluded from Indonesian territory. The integration of this region into the Republic of Indonesia became an increasingly prominent object of concern in the middle months of 1950. President Sukarno had for some time been setting his own tone for pronouncements on this issue and acting independently of the cabinet. In his Independence Day address on 17 August 1950, and in several other speeches he repeatedly promised his audiences that Irian would be in Indonesian hands before the sun rose on the year 1951 (*Panitia Peringatan* 1978b, pp. 117–20).
 81. In Natsir's view, the Irian issue was legally determined by international agreement and any decision on this issue should be made through the parliamentary mechanism. Natsir brought this issue into the cabinet meeting. Twelve ministers

- supported his position, while the remaining five ministers supported Sukarno's view (Maarif 1996, pp. 71–72).
82. Herbert Feith depicted the Natsir cabinet as a cabinet of administrators. "In the very short time it had been in the office the Natsir cabinet pursued its policy goals intently and with some success. It moved the country several steps along the road to civil security, administrative routinization, increased production, planned economic growth. That it failed was clear from the fact of the very short time it had in office: it had failed to build itself a basis of political support" (1962, pp. 176, 220).
 83. In addition to Sukiman as prime minister, some four other *Masjumi* representatives, Achmad Subardjo, Jusuf Wibisono, Samsudin, and Wachid Hasjim, respectively held the posts of minister of foreign affairs, minister of finance, minister of social affairs, and minister of religious affairs. No one, however, could be said to be a true believer in Islamic reformism-modernism associated with the Natsir group.
 84. There were some political events that contributed to the strained relationship between the Sukiman cabinet and the army. On 7 June 1951, the Justice Minister Yamin released 950 political prisoners without the army leader's approval. In revenge, the army leaders refused to assist the prime minister when he sought to invoke the State of War and Siege regulations as a legal cover for the mass arrests following the anti-communist raid in August 1951. In the case of these arrests, the cabinet again had not consulted the army leaders, and the same pattern repeated itself over the matter of the agreement on Mutual Security Act with the U.S.A. (Feith 1962, pp. 185–207).
 85. The Sukiman cabinet was mainly made up of men who were solidarity makers. This cabinet was able to register some important achievements, especially in the field of labour and education. The internal friction within the cabinet and the cabinet's persistent difficult relationship with the army, however, presented serious challenges for its achievement in a broader sense (Feith 1962, pp. 218–24).
 86. In addition, Chasbullah also nominated Abu Hanifah as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Zainul Arifin for the Minister of Defence (Noer 1987, p. 222).
 87. According to an NU observer, Greg Fealy, Hasjim himself actually no longer wanted the job. Fealy, personal communication (3 July 2003).
 88. In addition to Fakhri Usman as the minister of religious affairs, some other *Masjumi* representatives in the Wilopo cabinet were: Prawoto Mangkusasmita as the deputy prime minister, Mohamad Roem as the minister of interior, and Muhammad Sardjan as the minister of agriculture. Another Islamic party, the PSII, had also its representative in the cabinet namely, Anwar Tjokroaminoto as the minister of social affairs.
 89. Quoted in A. Fadhal (1969, pp. 25–26).
 90. Besides the NU, the PSII also had its representative in the cabinet namely, Abikusno Tjokrosujoso as the minister of communications.
 91. After Roem and Mangunsarkoro failed to form the cabinet there were still two

- other *formateurs* (Mukarto and Burhanuddin) who also failed to do so. Wongsonegoro of the PIR was the last appointed *formateur* who successfully put forward Ali Sastroamidjojo as the new prime minister and he himself as the first deputy prime minister (though he resigned from this post on 17 November 1954).
92. In addition to Burhanuddin the Masjumi representatives in the cabinet were Mohammad Sardjan as the minister of agriculture and Abdul Hakim as the minister of state without portfolio. The NU party also had its representatives namely, Sunarjo as the minister of interior and K.H. Iljas as the minister of religious affairs. Another Islamic party, PSII, had two representatives namely, Harsono Tjokroaminoto as the second deputy prime minister and Sudibjo as the minister of social affairs.
 93. According to Judy Rebick, a prominent Canadian feminist political activist, identity politics is the politics of marginalized groups in search of a language to articulate their social discontent. "Identity politics is born when that identity becomes the basis for political thinking, sometimes the basis for politics" (Rebick 1996, p. 31).
 94. This situation will of course be different in Muslim countries where Islam is treated as the formal state-ideology, rather than just an icon of identity politics.
 95. Like Sukarno's *Pancasila* speech (1 June 1945) he held that through democracy Muslims could ultimately have the opportunity for putting through legislation consistent with Islamic precepts. Moreover, he believed that if "there was enough time and freedom to educate Indonesians as to the character of Islam, more and more of them would come to love it". But he acknowledged that this would be a long-term process that would take generations (Kahin 1993, p. 161).
 96. The reformists' strict observance of rules of the game seems to be a positive reflection of their strong adherence to religious laws.
 97. These other Islamic parties were the *Tharikah* Unity Party (PPTI) and the Islamic Victory Force (AKUI); each won one seat.
 98. In terms of the total seats in the parliament, the PNI obtained a result similar to that of Masjumi (57 seats).
 99. The Masjumi representatives were Mohamad Roem as the first deputy prime minister, Muljanto as the minister of justice, Jusuf Wibisono as the minister of finance, Suhjar Tedjasukmana as the minister of communications, and Pangeran Noor as the minister of public works and power. The NU representatives were Idham Chalid as the second deputy prime minister, Sunarjo as the minister of interior, Burhanuddin as the minister of the economic affairs, Fatah Jasin as the minister of social affairs, and K.H. Iljas as the minister of religious affairs. The PSII representatives were Sudibjo as the minister of information and Sjeikh Marhaban as the deputy minister of agriculture. The *Perti* had one representative namely, H. Rusli Abdul Wahid as the minister of state for parliamentary relations.
 100. They were, among others, Mohammad Natsir, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara,

- Burhanuddin Harahap, Asaat, Prawoto Mangkusasmito, Mohamad Roem, Kasman Singodimedjo, Isa Anshary, E.Z. Muttaqin, Junan Nasution, and Hamka (Ghazali 1998*b*, pp. 8–9).
101. After the NU established a political party in its own right, its leaders proposed the idea of establishing a sort of federation of Islamic parties. Receiving no response from the *Masjumi*, the NU then turned to other small parties, PSII and Perti. Both responded this idea warmly. This federation was called *Liga Muslimin Indonesia* [the Indonesian Muslims' League]. In addition to the three parties, the South Sulawesi-based *Dar al-Da'wah wal-Irsjad* and the Chinese Muslims' association, *Persjarikatan Tionghoa Islam Indonesia*, also joined the federation. This federation, however, did not operate effectively and as such had no significant advantage for the empowerment of political Islam (Noer 1987, pp. 94–95).
 102. Politically, the NU tended to be conservative reflected by its preference for four core values of conservatism: authority (the primacy of traditional religious authority), hierarchy (based on heredity with grand *ulama* and their related-families and descendants being at the top), property (a firm commitment to individual rights to private property), and community (advocating the maintenance of solidaristic unitary traditional religious communities). The conservative nature of the NU frequently led it to use political expediency for the sake of the elite and communal interests. For a more elaborate discussion of the four core values of conservatism see, among others, K. McLeish (1993, pp. 159–61).
 103. The pragmatists of the NU emphasized the importance of risk minimization and retention of political influence as a means of protecting the *ummah*, especially the NU constituency. To justify this and other political choices, they returned to “elastic” precepts of the traditional political community. Among the most commonly used precepts were “*maslahah*” and “*mafsadah*” (respectively, the pursuit of benefit and avoidance of harm), “*akhaffud-dararain*” (in essence, choosing the lesser of two risks), and “*ma la yudraku kulluhu la yutraku ba'dhubu*” (in essence, if a complete whole cannot be obtained, the portion that can be achieved should not be disposed of). In the case of the NU's acceptance of “guided democracy”, Chasbullah encapsulated this principle in the catchphrase: “*masuk dulu; keluar gampang*” [getting in is essential, getting out is easy]. With the *Masjumi's* demise as a political force, the NU support for *Nasakom* was said to be important to open the way for Islamic representation within the government as well as to promote a moderating influence on Sukarno and a counter to the activities of the PKI. This accordingly would bring the greatest benefit for the *ummah* or at the very least could minimize harm. On the NU and the role of Wahab Chasbullah during the guided democracy period, see G. Fealy (1996).
 104. The PTDI was a kind of extramural instruction for *Islamic dakwah* [propagation], founded under sponsor of senior officers of the military (General

- Sarbini and General Sudirman of the army, General Sutjipto Judodihardjo of the police, and Commodore Sukmadi of the navy). These military officers were aware of the danger of communism and wanted to fight it by means of *dakwah* (Boland 1971, pp. 194–95).
105. Among *Masjumi* leaders who inspired the establishment of the GPII were Mohammad Natsir, Wachid Hasjim, Anwar Tjokroaminoto, Wondoamiseno and Mas Mansjur (Harjono and Hakim 1997, pp. 48–50).
 106. In addition to Lafran Pane, the other fourteen students of the STI who jointly established the HMI were Karnoto Zarkasji, Dahlan Husein, Suwali, M. Jusdi Ghazali, Mansjur, M. Anwar, Hasan Basri, Marwan, Zulkarnaen, Tajeb Razak, Toha Mashudi, Bidron Hadi, Maisaroh Hilal and Siti Zainah (the last two were females). See Sitompul (1976, p. 23).
 107. Next in 1948 Lafran Pane left the STI and entered the political college (AIP) that would become the Arts Faculty of the UGM. He graduated from the UGM in January 1953.
 108. In an article published by a bulletin of the Eastern Indonesian chapter of the HMI (1971, p. 19), “*Warga Hijau Hitam Membina HMI*”. it is said that the HMI establishment had been inspired by some modernist leaders and ideas put forward by JIB and was oriented to achieve a long-term goal of the JIB in creating Muslim intelligentsia who had a balance between erudition in general knowledge and respect for Islamic values (Tanja 1982, pp. 51–52).
 109. The PMY and SMI were dominated by leftwing students (interview with Achmad Tirtosudiro, 11 October 1999).
 110. Interview with A. Dahlan Ranuwihardo (29 December 1999).
 111. The UGM was officially established on 19 December 1949.
 112. Later in the 1990s Achmad Tirtosudiro would play a very decisive role in the formation and development of *Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Se-Indonesia* [ICMI, the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intelligentsia].
 113. For the contents of the book, see chapter 4.
 114. For a description of the development of HMI membership, see Sitompul (2002, pp. 217–40).
 115. The PII membership was open to students under 40 years of age.
 116. Other pioneers of the PII were Anton Timur Djaelani, Ibrahim Zarkasji, Karnoto, Halim Tuasikal, and Mukti Ali of the STI, Tedjaningsih (female) and Nursjaf of the (embryo) UGM.
 117. On the history and development of the PII, see M. H. Thamrin and Ma’roov (1998).
 118. Interview with Utomo Dananjaya (7 December 2000).
 119. Interview with Utomo Dananjaya (chairman of the PII — 1967–69, 7 December 2000).
 120. For the religious background of Toha Masduki, see Sitompul (1976, p. 23). For the religious background of Mukti Ali, see Munhanif (1998, pp. 278–79).
 121. Even so, because of the common use of the term “traditionalist intelligentsia”,

this term will be used hereafter to mean “the traditionalist-oriented intelligentsia”.

122. The thirteen members of the committee were A. Chalid Mawardi, M. Said Budairy, and M. Sobich Ubaid (Jakarta), M. Makmun Sjukri and Hilman (Bandung), Ismail Makky and Munsif Nachrowi (Yogyakarta), Nuril Huda Suaidi and Laili Mansur (Surakarta), Abdul Wahab Djaelani (Semarang), Hizbullah Huda (Surakarta), M. Chalid Marbuko (Malang), and Ahmad Husain (Makassar).
123. On the history and development of the PMII, see N. Wahid (2000).
124. Actually, some years before the emergence of the PMII Muslim students who affiliated with the PSII had left the HMI and founded on 2 April 1956 a separate organization, *Serikat Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia* [SEMMI, Union of Indonesian Muslim Students]. Nevertheless, this did not bother the HMI because the influence of the SEMMI was never great.
125. The leadership and vertical mobility in the HMI is based on a merit system, while in the PMII it is based on a combination of merit and heredity. Thus, for descendants of “laymen” it was safer to join the HMI.
126. For Solo and its surroundings as a stronghold of leftist students, see McVey (1990, p. 20).
127. Interview with Piet Haidir Hizbullah, chairman of the IMM of the period 2001–03 (10 January 2003).
128. These Christian and secular intellectual associations included *Ikatan Sardjana Katolik Indonesia* [ISKI, Union of Indonesian Catholic Sardjana, est. 1958], the *Persatuan Intelligensia Kristen Indonesia* [PIKI, Union of Indonesian Christian Intelligentsia, est. 1963], the PNI’s Union of Indonesian Republic *Sardjana* [*Ikatan Sardjana Republik Indonesia*, ISRI], and the communist’s intellectual fronts, the Association of Indonesian *Sardjana* [*Himpunan Sardjana Indonesia*, HSI], and Organization of Indonesian Intellectuals [*Organisasi Tjendekiawan Indonesia*, OTI]. The latter three were established in the first part of the 1960s.
129. In February 1950 *Christelijke Studenten Vereeniging op Java* (est. 1926, officially proclaimed in 1932) of the “federal” territory merged with *Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia* (est. 1947) of the “republican” territory to establish the Indonesian Christian University Student Movement, *Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia* (GMKI). GMKI was affiliated to the *Parkindo*. See GMKI (of the Malang chapter) website <www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/87666> (20 February 2002).
130. In June 1950 a federation of Catholic student associations, *Katholieke Studenten Vereniging* (KSV), of the federal territory merged with *Perserikatan Mahasiswa Katolik Indonesia* (est. 1947) of the “republican” territory to establish the Union of Indonesian Catholic University Students, *Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katolik Indonesia* (PMKRI). PMKRI was affiliated to the *Partai Katolik*. Its national membership in the 1960s was around 10,000 students. See PMKRInet: <www.geocities.com/pmkri_web/profil-sejarah.htm> (20 February 2002).

131. Founded in 1954 GMNI was a fusion of the three nationalist student organizations emerged during the revolution: *Gerakan Mahasiswa Marhaenis*, *Gerakan Mahasiswa Merdeka*, and *Gerakan Mahasiswa Demokrat*. See GMNI website: <www.geocities.com/gmni_jkt/profile.htm> (20 February 2002). It was formally affiliated with the PNI with its national membership in early 1960s being around 77,000 (Maxwell, 1997, p. 118). Most of its members were protagonists of the nationalist ideology, but most students with leftwing inclinations also preferred to join GMNI, since it offered useful connections for getting political or bureaucratic positions later (McVey 1990, p. 20).
132. *Germindo* was established in the late 1950s as a student affiliate of *Partindo*, a political party which was re-established in 1956 and claimed to be the embodiment of Sukarno's leftwing, radical-nationalist, non-communist ideology. This student organization never attracted more than a few hundred members (Maxwell 1997, p. 119).
133. The socialist university students who had been part of the Indonesian Socialist Youth [*Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia*, *Pesindo*, est. 1945] during early years of the revolution began to establish *Gemsos* in 1955. It attracted those in student circles who were supporters of the PSI and had never attempted to attract large numbers of students to its membership. Even so, it was quite influential in elite universities such as the UI and ITB.
134. Formed in 1956 as an amalgamation of three local student organizations in Bandung, Bogor and Yogyakarta, CGMI claimed to have around 35,000 members by 1964–65. But only a few (3,000 members) of these were in Jakarta and fewer still at elite institutions such as the UI (Maxwell 1997, p. 111). It accordingly tended to draw its greatest support from peripheral private universities, especially from places like Yogyakarta and Solo, many of whose students were socially insecure. A good portion of the Jakarta membership came from the Baperki-sponsored Res Publica University (McVey 1990, p. 20). *Badan Permusyawaratan Kewargaan Indonesia* [Baperki, Consultative Body of Indonesian Citizenship] was a leftist-incline political movement of the 1950s and 1960s intended originally to integrate ethnic Chinese into Indonesian society. In addition to Res Publica University, from 1958 onwards the PKI established its own university, the People's University, *Universitas Rakjat (Unra)* operating in eight cities (Jakarta, Bandung, Solo, Semarang, Surabaya, Malang, Palembang, and Medan). Its enrolment in 1959 was claimed to reach 2,816. For a fuller discussion of the communist educational institutions see R. McVey (1990).
135. Subchan's house firstly in Jalan Wahid Hasjim and later in Jl. Banyumas was the meeting ground of the HMI. He was regarded by the HMI activists as a senior because of his smartness and financial support. His younger sister, Aniswati, also became a member of the HMI. On the biography of Subchan, see A.M. Mandan (ed. 2001).
136. *Sarung* (sarong) is a traditional dress of the traditional Muslim community. The

term “*kaum sarungan*” [the sarong community] was often used a derogative term associated with the (traditionalist) Muslim community.

137. In Indonesian the word “*kami*” means “we”. This was used as an opposite to the word “*kamu*” [you] that was used to identify students affiliated to the PKI.
138. On the formation of KAMI, see Sulastomo (2000).
139. *Dwikomando Rakyat* (*Dwikora*) stands for the people’s two mandates: crush Malaysia and defend the revolution. It was Sukarno’s slogan to turn public attention away from internal domestic problems to alleged external threats. There were three different *Dwikora* cabinets. The first *Dwikora* cabinet was launched in August 1964 and to be in effect until February 1966. It was followed by the *Kabinet Dwikora yang Disempurnakan* [the First Revised *Dwikora* cabinet, February 1966–March 1966], and finally there emerged the *Kabinet Dwikora yang Disempurnakan Lagi* [The Second Revised *Dwikora* cabinet, March 1966–July 1966]. The last Sukarno cabinet was *Kabinet Ampera* [the *Ampera* cabinet, July 1966–October 1967].
140. Other Muslim students who were murdered in the student demonstrations in other cities were Hasanuddin Noor (Banjarmasin), and Sjarif Alkadri (Makassar).
141. Quoted in Geertz (1972, p. 322) and Fischer (1959, p. 154).

5

THE NEW ORDER'S REPRESSIVE-DEVELOPMENTALISM AND THE ISLAMIC INTELLECTUAL RESPONSE

They have treated us like cats with ringworm.

Mohammad Natsir (1972)¹

The impetus for change in Islam has more often come from the bottom rather than from the top, from the edge than from the center.

Richard W. Bullett (1994)²

When the Sukarno regime crumbled in 1966, the rising new power began to designate the period of Guided Democracy as the Old Order [*orde lama*] and celebrate the new era as the New Order [*orde baru*]. Although Sukarno was still granted official status as the President of Indonesia until 17 October 1967, his real power declined after the 30 September movement [*Gestapu*] of 1965. The groundwork for the New Order regime was signalled by the issuing of Sukarno's controversial "mandate" on 11 March 1966 entrusting Lieutenant-General Suharto, the army commander since October 1965, with the task of coordinating the power of the government.³ This mandate came to be known as *Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret* [*Supersemar*, 11 March Letter of Instruction]. Suharto took over the command of national politics following massive army-backed anti-Sukarno and anti-communist student demonstrations in the national capital and other cities. On 12 March 1967, the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly [*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara*, MPRS] appointed Suharto as the acting President of Indonesia.

To emphasize that this would be a new era, the new regime re-opened the public sphere but with some controls. All kinds of groups, individuals and publications who had been virtually silenced during guided democracy began to make themselves heard again. Conversely, those who had been so vocal during the Old Order period were silenced.

The rise of the New Order marked the ascendancy of the third generation of Indonesian intelligentsia. Members of this generation, who grew up during the Japanese Occupation and revolution, generally lacked exposure to Western academic training but were highly imbued with militaristic and nationalistic mentalities. The new regime was dominated by the military intelligentsia who had a long-standing aversion to the "unpatriotic" and disputatious politics of civilians.

Intellectuals of the PSI and Christian communities became the military's main partners in the formation of the New Order. Their decisive role owed much to their superior educational qualifications and the powerful influence of the PSI and Christian lobbies among the central army command. Moreover, the fact that political followers of the PSI and Christian communities were relatively insignificant, freed intellectuals from these groups from being perceived as menacing threats to the military's ambition to dominate Indonesian politics.

With the state dominated by the military intelligentsia, there would be no quarter allowed its enemy number one, the PKI.⁴ Meanwhile, the new regime's fear of potential political threats that could come from parties with large constituencies prompted intervention policies to paralyse the PNI and to refuse the rehabilitation of the *Masjumi*. The exclusion, or at least domestication, of the three former major political forces from the New Order's public sphere was regarded as an essential hallmark of the new political order.

In dealing with the inherited economic crises, the New Order came to the conclusion that mass political mobilization and the disputatious civilian politics of the previous regime had neglected basic problems of the economy and social welfare. Economic recovery was needed to turn the attention of the people from politics to the economy by changing the national outlook from "*politik-sebagai-panglima*" [politics as commander], as practised during the Old Order, to "*ekonomi-sebagai-panglima*" [economy as commander].

In emphasizing the importance of economic growth and modernization, the new regime made every effort to restore links with the capitalist world and multinational organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, from which Indonesia had withdrawn in August 1965 as part of Sukarno's campaign of anti-imperialism and capitalism. Economic development required capital, but as the country was bankrupt,

the New Order had no choice but to open itself to foreign debt and investment. To guarantee the inflow of foreign capital and the success of economic development, political stability was considered essential.

This provided the new regime with the justification to dismantle what it perceived as political barriers to modernization. Under the slogan "*pembangunan*" [development], developmentalism was inaugurated as a new official orthodoxy. This was officially signalled by the launching of Suharto's first cabinet as president (June 1968–March 1973),⁵ which was named "*Kabinet Pembangunan I*" [First Development Cabinet]. Alongside this state technocratic ideology, political stability was made the primary political objective reinforced by a doctrine entitled the "Military's Dual Function", which legitimized the military's role in non-military affairs. With this pair of "magic" formulae, "*pembangunan*" and "stability", the New Order recycled a relic of the colonial-promoted *kemadjoean* and *rust en orde*, and soon transformed itself into what Feith called (1980) a "repressive-developmental" regime. Consequently, the Indonesian honeymoon with freedom in the New Order's public sphere did not last long. The regime used various repressive measures to curb freedom of speech and association as well as political opposition and intellectual criticism, as all of these were perceived as serious threats to political stability.

There has been a range of scholarly views on the nature of the New Order state as it developed during the 1970s–1980s. In assessing that the New Order state had been so isolated from the people's conscience and left little room for give-and-take on policy issues or for sensitivity to public needs, some analysts, such as Benedict Anderson, have described it as a strong, monolithic and purposeful state or a "state-for-its-own-sake" (Anderson 1972*b*).⁶ In finding that the state had suppressed class, interest groups and oppositions through the creation of a system of non-competitive representational monopoly expressed by particular functional categories, other analysts, such as Dwight Y. King, have described it in terms of "state-corporatism" (1977). Judging that the state had been factionalized and incompetent with cliques, circles and patron-client ties overriding the importance of institutions, some analysts, such as Karl D. Jackson, have described it as a weak and faction-ridden "bureaucratic polity" (Jackson and Pye 1978). Finding that the state had been personalized — because the control over key political and economic resources was in the hands of President Suharto and his immediate military circle and the ruler's power depended on his capacity to win and retain the personal loyalty of key sections of the political elite — some analysts, such as Harold Crouch, have described it as a — "patrimonial" state (Crouch 1979). Using the criteria that state-sponsored modernization had been

accompanied by authoritarianism characterized by the state's dependency on imperatives of international capital accumulation and division of labour in conjunction with the military's leading role in politics and economic development, some analysts, such as Mochtar Mas'od, have described it in terms of Guillermo O'Donnell's Latin American "bureaucratic-authoritarian" state (Mas'od 1983).

Such wide variations in theorizing about the nature of the New Order state reflect the differences in the vantage points of the observers. These different perspectives may also reflect the difference in synchronic political trends when these studies were undertaken. Taken as a whole and from the distant present, it could be argued that these views may actually complement one another.

This chapter describes the authoritarian nature of the New Order state and its implications for the educated community and the political careers of the civilian intelligentsia, especially those of the Muslim intellectual political traditions. Special attention is given to various and conflicting Muslim intellectual responses to the New Order's modernization and marginalization of political Islam. Discussions will also deal with the variety of responses based on generational criteria as well as on internal fragmentation within a new generation of Muslim intelligentsia, followed by discussions of the implication of these differences for the upcoming Muslim intellectual movements and the polarization within the community of Muslim intelligentsia. The chapter argues that the New Order's promotion of education and advanced training in Western countries, as well as changes in the international environment, had significant influence on the formation and positioning of Islamic intellectual movements.

MASS EDUCATION AND THE DEVALUATION OF THE INTELLIGENTSIA

The New Order's modernization project necessitated educational development. Thus, despite its hostility towards intellectual-criticism, this regime actively promoted the improvement of education. From *Repelita II* (Five-Year Development Plan II, 1974/5–1978/9) up till *Repelita IV* (1984/5–1988/9) the Indonesian educational budget experienced a steady increase,⁷ though as an average percentage of the GNP during the period (2.5 per cent) it was always lower than the same figure of the neighbouring countries such as Malaysia (4.2 per cent) and Singapore (3.0 per cent).⁸

As a result, the Indonesian educational profile of the 1980s was vastly different from that of the 1960s. This can be seen from comparative figures

of students (of the public and private schools) affiliated to the Ministry of Education and Culture. During the period 1965–90, total enrolments in primary schools increased from 11,577,943 to 26,348,376; those in the junior secondary school increased from 1,052,007 to 5,686,118; those in the senior secondary school increased from 412,607 to 3,900,667 (Ministry of Education and Culture 1997); those in tertiary education (including the degree and diploma programmes) increased from 278,000⁹ (Thomas 1973, pp. 13, 173) to 1,590,593 (Ministry of Education and Culture 1997).

From 1984, a national policy of six-year compulsory education was implemented. In effect, by the early 1990s there was virtually universal primary school attendance. For this achievement, in 1993 Indonesia won the Avicenna Award from UNESCO. This progress would soon be expanded to the (junior) secondary school, especially after the implementation of nine-years of compulsory education in 1994. The enrolment in the higher levels of education remained small but a significant increase is noticeable. The enrolment in tertiary education based on age group increased from 1 per cent in 1965 to 7 per cent in 1986. This would increase even more markedly following the proliferation of higher institutions, especially private ones from the 1990 onwards. In 1960 there were only 135 higher institutions (public and private) in the country. By 1990, the number was 921, comprised of 872 private institutions and 49 public ones (Oey-Gardiner and Suryatini 1990).

Apart from this quantitative development, the anti-communist sentiment of the new regime drove it to be supportive of religious instruction in public schools and universities. Based on the (Provisional) People's Representative Assembly (MPRS) Decree, Number II/1967, attendance at religious instruction became compulsory for students in the general school [*sekolah*] system, ranging from elementary school until higher education. Thus, despite the government's attempt to dissociate Islam from the public life, the New Order was responsible for assisting with the Islamization of the academic world.¹⁰

The schools under the Ministry of Religious Affairs also underwent a similar trend. Total numbers of students in *madrasah* of all levels, both in the state and private school, increased from 2,745,589¹¹ in 1965 to 4,577,523¹² in 1990/1 (Lee 1995, p. 105; Dhofier, 2000, p. 98). A radical transformation in the curriculum of *madrasah* began in the 1990s. By this time, attendance in the *madrasah ibtidaiyah* and *tsanawiyah* was recognized as part of the compulsory education system, while the *madrasah 'aliyah* was given equal status with the general secondary school in terms of meeting the criteria for its students to enter any state university. Under this policy, the emphasis of teaching in the *madrasah* was placed on general (secular) subjects.

At the tertiary level, the pro-modernization and accommodation policy of the Ministry of Religion Affairs from the time of the Mukti Ali period (1973–78) was responsible for the improvement of general subject instruction in the IAIN. This was supported by the *madrasah's* emphasis on the teaching of general subjects which put pressure on the IAIN, as the main producer of *madrasah* teachers, to accommodate a larger portion of general subjects and even to open non-religious faculties. Alongside this development, the number of state IAIN multiplied from only one in 1960 (namely IAIN Yogyakarta with its affiliate in Jakarta) to become fourteen in the 1990s.¹³ Total student enrolment increased from 19,871 in 1970 to 84,037 in 1990 (Thomas 1973, p. 78; Dhofier 2000, pp. 93–94).

This growing number of educated people outnumbered the growing job opportunities in public sectors. Thanks to the growth of the private sector which offered more lucrative salary and other incentives, the *priyayi* mindset of those with higher education, as reflected in their preference to serve as government officials, began to change. Beginning in the mid-1980s graduates of universities tended to favour the private sector, and the prestige of being a public servant faded away. Since the late 1980s, there has been a huge influx of intelligentsia into the private sector, more than at any time in the past.

Yet, the demand side of the private sector was limited. By 1985, 9 per cent of the university graduates could not be absorbed by the job market.¹⁴ This percentage steadily increased in the following years. The threat of educated unemployment was experienced most seriously by students of the social sciences and humanities, since more than 70 per cent of university enrolments until the early 1990s remained in these academic disciplines (Latif 1994, p. 60). The matter was even more serious for IAIN students whose traditional job opportunities were confined mainly to the department of Religious Affairs. Already in the late 1980s, this department had no more capacity to absorb the bulk of IAIN graduates. This culminated in 1993 when the department began to apply a policy of zero growth, while at the same time the number of graduates of the IAIN reached 11,299 (Dhofier 2000, p. 96). Many IAIN graduates became teachers in private Islamic schools. However, the absorptive capacity of private *madrasah* and *pesantren* was also limited. In facing this reality, IAIN students had to find alternative jobs outside the traditional religious sector. This pressure certainly influenced their religious attitudes and outlook.

When large numbers of higher educated people could not be absorbed by the job market, the social prestige of the intelligentsia in general began to be eroded. Even university students, who since the colonial period had been regarded as part of the Indonesian *intelektuil*, began to lose their status

as *ex officio* intellectuals. Henceforth, Indonesians tended to associate the term *intelektuil* with people of ideas, especially those who held degrees.

The exponential growth of Muslim university students from the 1960s resulted in an unprecedented number of Muslim *sarjana* [degree holders] in the 1970s. These *sarjana* projected themselves as noble bearers of degrees who expected meaningful public roles. With their career paths as leaders/members of Islamic parties obstructed by the state repression of political Islam, they had to find alternative ways to channel their need for self-actualization. This challenge influenced their politico-religious forms of expression and interpretations of Islam. This in turn led to internal disputes within the Muslim intellectual community.

Finally, the regime's ambition to adopt Western technocratic policies in order to catch up with Western technological and industrial development resulted in its strong encouragement of Indonesian scholars both from secular and religious institutions to obtain higher training in Western centres of study. In addition to international scholarships, Indonesian government agencies such as the *Bappenas* and the Ministry of Research and Technology (particularly under minister B.J. Habibie from 1978 onward) through their partnership with international donors or soft-loan funds from international financial organizations were able to provide their own scholarships. Because of the steady growth of Muslim *sarjana* from the late 1960s, many Muslim intellectuals benefited from these scholarships. This contributed to the growing number of Muslim intellectuals with Master's and Ph.D. degrees, which strengthened their bargaining power and the credibility of the Muslim intellectual movement.

DISCURSIVE PRACTICES AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE: MODERNIZATION AND REPRESSION

The openness of the public sphere during the early years of the New Order period provided the opportunity for some media that had been banned during the guided democracy period to resume publication.¹⁵ Some dailies that had survived Sukarno's regime such as *Kompas* (est. 1965) and *Sinar Harapan* (est. 1962) became even more important.¹⁶ But new media also emerged with army newspapers being more prevalent after 1965.¹⁷

In the new public sphere, reminiscences about the so-called "intellectual betrayal" [*pengkhianatan intelektuil/inteligensia*] or "intellectual prostitution" [*pelacuran intelektuil/inteligensia*] during the guided democracy period appeared as articles in the mass media. During April–August 1966, *Kompas* ran several pieces on this issue, side by side with articles on Sukarno's

doctrines.¹⁸ Later, from 14 to 23 April 1969, *Indonesia Raya* ran a series of articles on “*Tjontoh-Tjontoh Pelatjuran Intelektuil di Zaman Resim Soekarno*” [Examples of the Intellectual Prostitution during the Sukarno Regime]. Written by someone with the penname Wira,¹⁹ these articles attacked those academic intellectuals who allegedly had produced scientific falsehoods in order to support the *Manipol-USDEK* and other official orthodoxies,²⁰ while praising those who had bravely maintained their intellectual integrity at all costs.²¹ Ironically, according to the articles, many of those who had prostituted their intellectual integrity in the past successfully assumed strategic positions as technocrats in the transitional government of the New Order.²²

These articles soon ignited polemics between the accused intellectuals and other participants.²³ Although they differed in various ways, they shared a common concern about the moral responsibility of the intellectual and intelligentsia: to speak truth to power. In actual fact, those who had been “quiet” (cooperative) with power holders in the past — because of their long-standing control over politico-economic resources — tended to benefit from the regime change. The Suharto interim cabinet, *Kabinet Ampera yang Disempurnakan* [the Revised *Ampera* Cabinet] (11 October 1967–6 June 1968)²⁴ reflected this tendency. It was largely composed of those who had supported guided democracy, with a dominant representation of the military intelligentsia.²⁵

As the terms *intelektuil* and *intelligentsia* became derogative terms because of their frequent use in association with intellectual betrayal, an Indonesianized Hindustani (Sanskrit) term “*cendekiawan* or in old spelling “*tjendekiawan*” [intellectual or intelligentsia] began to gain new signification.²⁶ Associated with intellectual responsibility, the new term began to be widely used in intellectual discourses. In March 1966, the Bandung chapter of the Indonesian anti-establishment *sardjana* front (KASI) launched its resistance journal, *Tjendekiawan Berdjuang* [Intellectuals in Struggle]. Next, with the New Order's project of replacing foreign loan words with indigenous ones, the term *cendekiawan* became popularly used in the public sphere.

Under the flag of intellectual responsibility, *cendekiawan* and mass media set up a fresh intellectual agenda as the new historic project for the nation. They began to popularize the term “*modernisasi*” [modernization] side by side with the term “*pembangunan*” [development]. Scholars and journalists engaged in this discourse. On 6–9 May 1966, KAMI and KAPPI in cooperation with the economic faculty of the UI (FE-UI) held a symposium under the title *Kebangkitan Semangat 1966: Mendjeladjah Tracée Baru* [The Rise of the Spirit of 1966: In Quest of a New Plan]. Among other things, this symposium criticized the primacy of Sukarno's “politics in command” for its failure to

address the socio-economic problems of the nation. Then, from July until December 1966 a prominent Indonesian journalist, Rosihan Anwar, wrote a series of articles on modernization in *Kompas*²⁷ which stimulated a flood of publications on the same issue. Discourses on the will to maintain economic growth and political stability provided the military elite with a *raison d'être* to play a leading role in politics. Thus, these new intellectual themes gained strong support from the military officers.

The military conviction about the importance of the new agenda, “economy in command”, gained scientific justification from academic intellectuals. During the final years of the Sukarno regime a group of economists from the UI, including Widjojo Nitisastro, Ali Wardhana, M. Sadli, Emil Salim and Subroto, had given lectures on the economy at the Army Staff and Command School [*Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat (Seskoad)*]. Among the senior army officers who had attended the eight-month *Seskoad* course was General Suharto. It is from this course that he obtained his basic knowledge of economics (Sadli 1993, p. 39). As the Sukarno regime began crumbling, these economists began to openly criticize Sukarno’s economic policies and published their thinking in a special book in November 1965. Following on from this criticism, on 25–31 August 1966 the army held a seminar giving the same group of economic professors an opportunity to elaborate their economic theories, which later metamorphosed into an economic blueprint for the New Order. Henceforth, modernization and stability became the dominant discourse in the public sphere.

From September 1966, Suharto (now general), in his capacity as the appointed chair of the presidium for all practical purposes in charge of the government, appointed a “Team of Experts in the Field of Economics and Finance”. This team was comprised of the aforementioned five economists from the UI and coordinated by the late Major-General Sudjono Humardani, an aide to Suharto.²⁸ The decisive role of this economic team in formulating the New Order’s economic orthodoxy marked the ascendancy of the so-called “economic technocrats”. They were largely comprised of PSI-type economists from the UI who came to be known as the “Berkeley Mafia”, as several of them, including their leader Professor Widjojo Nitisastro, had pursued their postgraduate study at the University of California at Berkeley. The principal supporters of this mafia were its Christian counterparts, including Frans Seda, Radius Prawiro, and J.B. Sumarlin.

The pre-eminence of these economic technocrats cannot be isolated from a conducive environment. The implementation of their economic policies was made possible by the full support and confidence of Suharto, the guarantee of political stability, the strong support of multinational organizations,

including Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI, the international aid consortium chaired by the Netherlands, est. 1967), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, plus the profits which came from the world oil boom of 1973–81.

With the combination of effective economic management, a supportive environment and political stability, Indonesian economic development soon became a fairytale story of success. By the late 1960s price stability had been achieved, and the Indonesian economy began to experience an unprecedented rapid growth, which was sustained for the next three decades. Throughout 1965–96 the Indonesian Gross National Product (GNP) grew steadily at an average annual rate of 6.7 per cent.²⁹ The economic growth that Indonesia experienced during this period transformed the country from being a so-called economic “basket case”, which was poorer even than other Southeast Asian countries, into a Newly Industrializing Economy (NIE). In 1993 the World Bank, in its famous but controversial report on the “East Asian Miracle”, classified Indonesia as one of the “high performing Asian economies” (Hill and Mackie 1994, p. xix; Thee 2002, pp. 196–98).

Alongside this economic development, Indonesian social structure underwent a dramatic change. A successful family planning programme reduced population growth from an average of 2.4 per cent in the period 1965–80 to an average of 1.8 per cent in 1980–96 (World Bank 1998, p. 43). The poverty rate decreased considerably from 70 per cent at the end of the 1960s to 27 per cent in the middle of the 1990s. The proportion of Indonesia's population living in urban areas rose from 17 per cent in 1971 to 31 per cent in 1990. The share of professional, managerial and clerical occupations rose from 5.7 per cent in 1971 to 8.8 per cent in 1990 (Hull and Jones 1994, pp. 123–78). Beginning in the 1980s, sustained economic growth had given rise to the unprecedented accumulation of private capital. Vast private commercial conglomerates emerged, many owned by Sino-Indonesians and a few by client indigenous bourgeoisie, all possessing high-level political connections (Hill and Mackie 1994, p. xxv). All these tremendous socio-economic achievements had their costs. The greatest cost was the sacrifice of political freedom. With the economy being in command, the role of politics was reduced to simply maintaining national stability.

To strengthen his basis of socio-political legitimacy (domestically and internationally) in the early years of the New Order, Suharto recruited to his cause prominent civilian intellectuals who had an immense popular stature. Two particularly important ones were Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX (the Sultan of Yogyakarta who was influential among the Central Javanese) and Adam Malik (a famous *pemoeda* figure during the revolution who

had an established reputation in diplomacy and international affairs). Hamengkubuwono IX first became Suharto's coordinating minister for economy and industry (1966–73) and then became the first of Suharto's vice-presidents (1973–78). Adam Malik first became Suharto's minister for politics and foreign affairs (1966–78) and then replaced Hamengkubuwono as the vice-president (1978–83).

To guarantee national stability for the sake of economic modernization, the military made itself the principal power broker of New Order politics³⁰ supported by civilian “technocrats”. At the nerve centre of the polity, President Suharto took control over key political and economic resources. To guarantee the personal loyalty of key sections of the political elite, he selected a group of army officers who enjoyed his confidence, and with whom he had worked in earlier postings, to play a decisive role in policy decisions.³¹ Although this favoured circle was factionalized with various particularistic ties, interests and rivalries,³² members of this inner circle were unified in their subservience to the president.

A crucial component of Suharto's structure of patronage was his creation of a small team of personal staff [*staf pribadi*, *Spri*] headed by Maj.-Gen. Alamsjah Prawiranegara.³³ In response to growing public criticism, the *Spri* was dissolved in late 1968. As a replacement, Suharto created another smaller kitchen cabinet called ASPRI (*Asisten Pribadi*, Personal Assistants) with Ali Murtopo and Sudjono Humardhani as key figures (Crouch 1978, pp. 243–44; Mas'oed 1983, p. 31). Murtopo's group of ASPRI-intelligence officers formed a strategic alliance with officers in the Murtopo-led Special Operation intelligence agency [*Opsus*],³⁴ with those in the State Intelligence Coordinating Body [*Bakin*]³⁵ and with the office of the Operations Command to Restore Security and Order [*Kopkamtib*].³⁶ The latter was the most oppressive security regime, interfering in the activities of every organization and arresting people at will with allegations of subversion. The axis of ASPRI and the upper echelons of *Opsus*, *Bakin* and *Kopkamtib* was a vertically shaped structure of patronage which played a decisive role in shaping the political architecture of the New Order.

Policy-making by the New Order was techno-bureaucratic in nature, in contrast to that which requires a long process of bargaining among various political parties and interest groups. This was made possible by the government imposition of political mechanisms and infrastructure. Prior to the general election in July 1971, political rules and infrastructure for securing the regime had been settled. On 22 November 1969, the Indonesian provisional parliament (DPR-GR) passed a law on general elections and the composition of the new parliament (DPR), legalizing President Suharto's

rights of appointment to legislatures and the allocation of 100 of 450 seats in the DPR to members of the armed forces.

The government also made every effort to paralyse the established political parties through intervention policies in order to isolate their influential leaders and to secure compliant leadership in the parties.³⁷ More importantly, prior to the election it had also prepared its own “gold car” as a new political vehicle to win the elections, namely, the Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups [*Sekber-Golkar*], that from 17 August 1971 came to be known as *Golongan Karya* [Golkar, Functional Group].³⁸

Murtopo “hijacked” the old Sekber-Golkar and gave it a new mission. He then recruited a committee known as *Bapilu* [The Body to Manage the General Elections], consisting largely of young intellectuals from his Catholic, *abangan*-Javanese, and secular-socialist networks, which would become the embryo of *Golkar*’s intellectual organ.³⁹ The committee devised numerous strategies to cripple the electoral support of the parties and embellish that of *Golkar*.⁴⁰ By these means as well as crooked vote counting,⁴¹ *Golkar* scored an overwhelming victory in the 1971 election⁴² and continued to be the only ruling majority for nearly three decades.

Furthermore, to divert the people’s and parties’ attention from ideological passions into New Order modernization projects, participation in politics was restricted and the masses, including educated people, were depoliticized. In January 1973, the nine existing parties were forced to fuse into two composite programmatic parties.⁴³ The fusion of parties reduced the arena of conflict but intensified internal conflicts among parties. Elements within the parties competed with each to promote their candidates to be appointed as the party’s representatives in the parliament. As a result, the two composite parties were crippled by perennial intra-party divisions. After the 1971 election, the government introduced the so-called “floating mass” [*masa mengambang*] concept which prohibited people at the grass-roots level from involvement in party activities. Actively using *Opsus*, *Kopkamtib*, *Bakin*, and the army structural command to intervene in civilian political affairs, this concept was actualized as a means of prohibiting the parties’ operation in the villages and mobilizing villagers to vote for *Golkar*.

The depoliticization of the academic world became more obvious from the late 1970s. After a series of student demonstrations during 1974–78, protesting against the deepening penetration of foreign investors, Sino-Indonesian financiers and government officials as well as Suharto’s family in business activities, the *Kopkamtib* responded in January 1978 by disbanding all university student councils [*dewan mahasiswa*]. Afterwards, student politics was regarded as “abnormal”. To normalize academic life, Ali Murtopo’s

right-hand man in the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS, est. 1971),⁴⁴ Daud Jusuf, was appointed the new minister of education and culture (1978–83). Under his repressive policy, academic fora and student organizations were soon depoliticized through a policy known as “*normalisasi kehidupan kampus*” [the normalization of the campus life]. Thus, as student numbers grew exponentially, the fifth generation of the Indonesian intelligentsia (largely born in the 1950s–1960s) was rendered powerless politically. For this generation, academic fora, student organizations, publications, discussion groups and religious clubs were strictly controlled by the security apparatus.

A systematic effort to maintain the hegemony of the state over the public conscience was carried out through the imposition of the state ideology. The “abstract” ideology of the New Order was the official monolithic version of *Pancasila* as the sole legitimate political ideology, while the “concrete” ideology which guided day-to-day social action and policy-making was developmentalism. This ideology was a technocratic ideology idealizing values of efficiency, effectiveness, harmony, consensus and stability as prerequisites of economic growth. From 1978 the regime began to conduct a massive indoctrination campaign of official and monolithic interpretations of *Pancasila* known as P4 (*Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila*) [Guide for the Internalization and implementation of *Pancasila*]. In a more excessive and thorough way than the indoctrination of the *Manipol-USDEK* during the Old Order, P4 was applied not only at all levels of education and government but also forced on many social communities. Furthermore, the regime between 1982–83 insisted that *Pancasila* be proclaimed the sole philosophical basis [*azas tunggal*] of political parties and all other socio-political organizations.

To curb opposition, the regime exercised a combination of state-corporatism⁴⁵ and repressive measures. Beyond the corporatization of political parties, at the end of 1971, the government began to create a single organization to cater for all government employees known as *Korpri* [Civil Servants Professional Association]. The FBSI (All Indonesian Workers’ Federation) was established in February 1973 under the direction of the manpower minister as a single trade union organization to embrace the needs of all workers. Soon similar associations emerged in a variety of social sectors.⁴⁶ Alongside state-corporatism, repressive measures were applied to inhibit criticism and resistance movements. This was especially evident in the violation of press and academic freedom and of the rights to speech, to assembly and to demonstration. Throughout the New Order, thousands of people were arrested, hundreds of them imprisoned with or without trial, and no less than twenty-eight newspapers and magazines were banned.⁴⁷

Last but not least, the regime deliberately promoted the politics of language in order to maintain ideological conformity to an extent that is well depicted in Evert Vedung's phrase (1982, p. 131): "Manipulation of language occurs in political contexts in all countries, but the dictatorships tend to be particularly systematic in these machinations."⁴⁸ Indonesian public discourse was coloured by the use of ideologically laden language. Euphemism was excessively used as a defensive mechanism to hide the government's responsibility for its failures and oppressions, while dysphemism was used as an offensive mechanism to curb dissidents by discrediting critical voices as terrorism of the "extreme left" [*ekstrem kiri*] and "extreme right" [*ekstrem kanan*].⁴⁹

In the absence of the PKI, the first victim of this repressive regime was political Islam. The extreme right, so to speak, became the scapegoat for past political disorder. As a signal of the new political order, political Islam was marginalized from the formal political arena.

THE IMPASSE OF POLITICAL ISLAM

The New Order regime moved further in continuing the project of deconfessionalizing the political arena. Although Islamic groups provided critical support for the army in dismantling the Old Order, the New Order's actions over the ensuing two decades did not allow Islamic involvement in the exercise of state power. Once it had consolidated its power, the new regime set about systematically neutralizing Islam as a basis for political and legal mobilization and increasing bureaucratic leverage over Islam.⁵⁰

Acknowledging their major contribution as the main army's partners in the eradication of communism, Islamic groups welcomed the rise of the new regime with jubilation. The New Order's release of former *Masjumi* leaders from their imprisonment raised the hopes of its former members and sympathizers for the rehabilitation and fulfilment of their political rights.⁵¹

To boost their own political chances, all Islamic groups that had joined the *Sekber-Golkar* in the late years of the Sukarno era withdrew from this organization.⁵² Because of this withdrawal, Islamic groups for a long period lost the opportunity to co-steer *Golkar* from within and left an uncontested space for their secular (*abangan*, Christian, and socialist) counterparts to dominate the government's political machine.⁵³

In fact, the new regime was not interested in sharing power with influential leaders of political Islam. The army's bitter experiences in facing Islamic-inspired political resistance coupled with the pre-eminence of the *abangan* and non-Islamic lobbies in policy decisions of the new regime gave rise to a political climate that was unsympathetic to the revival of political

Islam. Army officers who showed their sympathy towards Islam were subject to exclusion from the elite circle. Consequently, political Islam had to face the reality that the transformation of the public sphere from the Old to the New Order was fairly similar to the transition from the Dutch to Japanese Occupation, as depicted in the Indonesian proverb "exit from the mouth of the crocodile, to enter into the mouth of the tiger". The new regime went much further in some ways towards restricting the political and social role of Islam than its predecessor had dared.

The efforts of Muslim leaders to seek government recognition for the rehabilitation of *Masjumi* were not viewed with sympathy by the majority of the New Order's leaders. In reply to a letter from the last *Masjumi* chairman, Prawoto Mangkusasmita, in January 1967, Suharto concluded: "Legal, political, and psychological factors have led the armed forces to the opinion that the armed forces cannot accept the rehabilitation of the former political party, *Masjumi*."⁵⁴ As compensation, in May 1967 Suharto allowed the formation of a new party based on mass organizations in the *Masjumi* stream, but did not permit influential *Masjumi* leaders to lead the party.

After negotiations that resulted in the appointment of Djarnawi Hadikusumo and Lukman Harun (both of the *Muhammadiyah*) as the chairman and secretary general for the new party, in March 1968 the government accepted the establishment of this substitute party, known as *Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Parmusi)*. Because all influential figures of the *Masjumi* had been excluded, delegates of the party's first congress held in November 1968 decided to elect Mohamad Roem, a senior but moderate leader of the *Masjumi*, as the general chairman of the *Parmusi*. Out of respect for the old *Masjumi* leaders, Hadikusumo and Harun agreed with the idea, but the government refused to agree to any arrangement to replace the leadership. Suddenly on 17 October 1970, one of the government-sponsored *Parmusi* functionaries, Djaelani Naro (Ali Murtopo's original nominee for the chairman of the party), announced that he had taken over the general chairmanship of the *Parmusi*. This political manoeuvre ignited disputes both within the party and within Suharto's inner circle, as Alamsjah Prawiranegara (the coordinator of the State Secretariat) sided with the incumbent Hadikusumo-Harun leadership.⁵⁵ To handle these disputes, Suharto compromised and appointed M.S. Mintaredja (a minister of state, and an early leader of the HMI) as the new general chairman.⁵⁶

In barring influential leaders of the *Masjumi* from the political arena, Suharto's right-hand men manufactured the image that the *Masjumi* leaders were unwilling to support the New Order. To refute this story, Mohammad Natsir revealed the untold story to *Tempo* magazine, of how he had supported

the regime by voluntarily persuading foreign authorities such as the government of Japan, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab countries to take a particular course of action to aid, or to rehabilitate their relationship with, Indonesia (*Tempo*, 21 August 1971). Yet the regime remained unmoved. As leaders of the New Order continued to obstruct the comeback of *Masjumi* leaders to the political arena, Mohammad Natsir shouted at a meeting of the reformist-modernist leaders on 1 June 1972: "They have treated us like cats with ringworm" (Quoted in Hassan 1980, p. 125). The political career of *Masjumi* leaders was over.

In addition to the rejection of *Masjumi* and the exclusion of its leaders from an active role in politics, many Muslims were disappointed with the government's strategy of buying time. The postponement of the general election schedule from 1968 to 1971 was damaging for Muslim groups who believed that an early election would guarantee favourable results for them.

Unlike the *Masjumi*, the outlook for NU was much more favourable. After assessing the character of the NU's "old-guard" leaders, Suharto's advisers concluded that it was not a potential danger to the New Order, "since its habit had always been to shape itself to accommodate prevailing winds" (Elson 2001, p. 185). In the eyes of Suharto's advisers, Idham and his colleagues would support Suharto just as they had supported Sukarno earlier if they were given status and funds for their religious and other activities (Crouch 1988, p. 264). Thus, NU political interests for a considerable period of time remained secure. Influential NU figures as Idham Chalid and Mohammad Dachlan were appointed ministers in the First Development Cabinet (1968–73). Until the general elections of the 1971, NU also did not seriously suffer the indignity of Opsus intervention in its internal affairs.⁵⁷ Apart from the NU, the other two Islamic parties, PSII and *Perti*, experienced government intervention to a lesser degree than the *Parmusi*, since they were assumed to be minority parties.

Because of the regime's "bulldozer" tactics, the overall results for Islamic parties in the general elections of the 1971 were very disappointing. The total percentage of all Islamic parties was only 27.1 per cent. The exclusion of the influential *Masjumi* leaders from *Parmusi* and government intervention in the party's internal affairs alienated many of the traditionalist supporters of reformist Islamic activism. Consequently, *Parmusi*, the heir to *Masjumi* which won 20.9 per cent in 1955, suffered seriously, winning only 5.4 per cent. Being relatively free from the regime's intervention, the NU's results increased slightly from 18.4 per cent in 1955 to 18.7 per cent in 1971. The result of the other two parties was only 3.0 per cent.

Although Golkar won the elections overwhelmingly (62.8 per cent), the regime still felt threatened by the slight increase in the NU vote. Shortly after the elections, the government began to intervene in NU's internal affairs when two independently minded NU leaders, Mohammad Dachlan and Subchan Z. E., became the victims of an *Opsus* move that dumped them from the NU leadership in early 1972. Henceforward, no NU leader was appointed to Suharto's cabinets. Responding to the new swing against it, at the end of 1971 on the occasion of the NU Congress, Idham Chalid as the NU chairman called for a return to the spirit [*khitab*] of 1926, foreshadowing that the NU might soon shed its political functions to concentrate on socio-religious activities (Crouch 1988, p. 271).

In January 1973 all existing Islamic parties were squeezed into one, United Development Party (PPP). This fusion meant to some extent shifting the arena of conflict from an outer locus of conflict (inter-parties) to an internal locus of conflict (within the party). It was at this time that the government introduced the so-called "floating mass" concept, which for Islamic groups meant detaching people's affiliation to political Islam. These measures were exacerbated by the government's interference and intimidation of the party's activists, especially to secure its preferred leadership to guarantee the party's acquiescence in parliament.

The unpleasant experience of the PSII and NU working in a single party (under the *Masjumi*) caused both parties to resist the government's idea of political fusion. On the other hand, the *Parmusi* welcomed the idea because of its possible positive impact on the strengthening of the Islamic brotherhood [*ukhuwah Islamiyah*]. This possibility also caused many army officers to disagree with the idea of merging the Islamic parties. But despite the controversies surrounding the idea, the government insisted and the Islamic parties had no choice but to accept the fusion. At the first party congress in 1975, agreement was reached to use the framework of federation as an expression of the fusion which would guarantee the relative autonomy of individual parties and reflect the proportional seat allocation based on the achievement of each party in the 1971 elections. In the newly established PPP, Idham Chalid and Bisri Sjansuri of the NU respectively held the position of token president and the head of Judicial Council of the party, while M.S. Mintaredja of the *Parmusi* (hereafter called *Muslimin Indonesia* (MI)) became the chairman of the party's executive board. From the very beginning of its establishment, however, the federative structure of this party meant that the four parties did not truly fuse into a new cohesive political entity. This made the PPP very susceptible to internal rivalries especially in the face of government interference in its affairs.

Under the agreement, the NU theoretically held a leading position in the party, and this was evident until at least the next 1977 elections — although it did not hold the chairmanship. Even though the government used repressive measures and dirty tactics, the PPP still won 29.3 per cent of the total vote in the 1977 elections. This was slightly better than the total percentage of Islamic parties in the 1971 elections. This increase along with the severe criticism of the party's leaders towards many government policies invited further government intervention to isolate the party's vocal leaders and to install its preferred leadership in the party. Soon after the 1977 elections, the government-backed Djaelani Naro once again declared himself a new chairman of the party's executive board without the agreement of the party's functionaries, let alone the party congress.

Instigated by Naro, critical activists in the party, composed largely of the NU elements, were removed from the party leadership and gradually forced out of parliament. This situation advantaged the MI activists, to the detriment of the NU faction. With the party's energy being spent in severe intra-party divisions and rivalries, PPP elections result continued to disappoint Islamic communities. The total percentage of this party in the 1982 elections decreased by 1.3 per cent (or 28.0 per cent of the total vote). In the lead up to the next elections, the NU's political disappointment peaked. This was signalled by the decision of this organization at its December 1984 Congress to totally withdraw from party politics and fully return to the spirit of 1926. This would be expressed in concentration on social and educational pursuits. After this decision, members of the NU were free to choose their own preferred political vehicles, which dealt a strong blow to the PPP. With the absence of the NU support, the PPP's election result in 1987 dropped sharply to 16 per cent of the total vote and in the 1992 elections only increased by 1 per cent. By the 1980s, the PPP was demoralized and had no capacity to articulate Islamic aspirations.

The powerlessness of the PPP was made worse by the government's deliberate strategies designed to cripple the intellectual and electoral support of the party and strengthen that of Golkar. Through the creation of the Civil Servants Professional Association [*Korpri*] in 1971, the government introduced regulations as well as intimidations that prevented civil servants from becoming members of the Islamic party. Moreover, the PPP's opportunity to have significant influence both in the parliament (DPR) and the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) was obstructed by President Suharto's entitlement to appoint a significant number of the DPR and MPR membership. As a result, the PPP's political role was reduced to providing legitimacy for government policy.

The paralysis of the Islamic party was in contrast to the position of the Javanese *abangan* and Christian minority who were over-represented both in the cabinet and parliament for a considerable part of the New Order period. The formation of Suharto's cabinets ignored religious representation, and the Christian communities benefited from their superior educational qualifications and strong lobbies inside Suharto's inner circle. Up until the Fourth Development Cabinet (March 1983–March 1988), the number of Christians (Catholic and Protestant) in the cabinet steadily increased from three in 1968–73, four in 1973–78, five in 1978–83, to become six in 1983–88.⁵⁸ This in turn reflected the powerful influence of Christians in particular government offices. The same phenomena prevailed in the composition of the parliament. Based on data from the Indonesian Statistical Bureau, the national average percentage of Catholics and Protestants in the population throughout 1971–87 was respectively 3 per cent and 5.5 per cent of the total Indonesian population (Surbakti 1991, pp. 52–94). At the same time, the average percentage of Catholics and Protestants in the parliament was respectively 8.2 per cent and 9.2 per cent (Karim 1999, p. 121; Haris 1997, p. 96).⁵⁹ Thus, the percentage of Christians in the parliament was greater than their population percentage. By contrast, the average percentage of Muslims in the Parliament (80.2 per cent) was below the average percentage of the Muslim population (87 per cent).⁶⁰

Besides the marginalization of political Islam, the regime made efforts to neutralize Islamic overtones in the political sphere. Leaders of the New Order were not only concerned to reduce Islamic cultural influence but also strove to increase the autonomy of the *abangan* religious variant as a political counterbalance. The new regime's refusal to accord Islam even a symbolic place in the official sphere resembled the attitude of Javanese courts (under colonial rule) in the latter part of the nineteenth century. It began to glorify the neo-classical Javanese polity and culture developing a political language that was excessively Sanskritized. The glorious Hindu Majapahit kingdom was made an exemplary centre. The presidential palace was named *Bina Graha*, the *Pancasila* doctrinal education was named *Eka Prasetya Pancakarsa* and so on. In 1973 the *abangan*-oriented leaders of the New Order went so far as to recognize "*kebatinan*" [spiritualism] as a separate religious orientation. Their attempt to legalize this recognition through the so-called GBHN (The National Policy Guidelines) faced fierce opposition from orthodox Muslims, to whom this appeared as an attempt to encourage *abangan* Muslims away from the faith entirely.

The government also moved to increase bureaucratic leverage over Islam. In 1973, leadership of Ministry of Religious Affairs, which was traditionally

allocated to a representative of NU or *Muhammadiyah*, was controlled by an “independent” intellectual with Western (McGill University) postgraduate training, Professor Mukti Ali.⁶¹ Five years later, this portfolio was even given to a military man with no Islamic credentials, Alamsjah Prawiranegara (a former member of Suharto's *Spri*). The appointment of these men with strong accommodationist tendencies was intended not only to lessen the influence of organized Islam but also to direct Muslim leaders towards cooperation with government authorities for the purpose of national development.

Having ensured that the Ministry of Religious Affairs would support national development, the government moved further to secularize Islamic law. In July 1973, the administration put forward a marriage law proposal which (on the face of it) would have deeply secularized Indonesian marriage law and effectively abolished much of the country's Islamic court system. Although the proposal was ostensibly the initiative of the Department of Justice, its impetus came from Ali Murtopo and his think-tank, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Bypassing the authority of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, this law was also drafted without reference to or advice from organized Islam. Mark Cammack described this proposed marriage law as follows (1997, p. 151):

The proposal provided for a single set of marriage and divorce rules applicable to all Indonesians regardless of religion. It required civil registration for marriage and court approval for divorce and polygamy. Both divorce and plural marriage, moreover, would become subject to tight restrictions. Enforcement of the law was to be entrusted to the civil courts, which would have reduced the jurisdiction of the outer island courts to matters of inheritance only and left the Islamic courts in Java, Madura, and South Kalimantan with literally nothing to do.

This provision can be interpreted as an attempt to secularize family law. At this point, the process of secularizing Islamic law had come a long way. Since the last century of the colonial era, criminal and commercial law had been almost wholly secularized, while family law remained relatively Islamic. The secularization of family law seemed to have remained a problem and a serious one in Indonesia, as in many other parts of the Muslim world. The reason may have rightly been given by Anderson (1959, p. 90): “It is the family law that has always represented the very heart of the *shari'a*, for it is this part of the law that is regarded by Muslims as entering into the very warp and woof of their religion.” Probably for this reason, this proposal met with angry and determined Muslim opposition both inside and outside the legislature. Islamic action groups with several hundred Muslim youths overran

parliament until eventually the law was modified to meet some of the objections put forward by the PPP. A breakthrough in solving this conflict was reached only after General Sumitro, a rival of Ali Murtopo, took over the matter by initiating discussions with Muslim leaders outside the formal legislative process.

To ensure Islamic conformity with the official orthodoxy, in 1975 the government succeeded in establishing a single corporative-body of Indonesian *ulama* known as the *Majelis Ulama Indonesia* (MUI), led initially by a prominent Indonesian *ulama-intelektel*, H. Abdul Malik Karim Amrullah (Hamka).⁶² Government intervention was involved in the election of its leadership at all levels. To ensure that all religious forums would be free from Islamic-oriented political messages the government, through a decision of the Ministry of Religion Affairs No. 44/1978 and 70/1978, officially forbade political issues to be used as major themes in religious propagation, sermons, and lectures. This was reinforced by the *Kopkamtib* Commander's Decree No. 152/1978 which among other things forbade religious preaching or outreach to engage in political matters or to dispute *Pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution. About the same time, the government with the legal support of the MPR's decision No. II/1978 began its *Pancasila* indoctrination programme (P4). With elaborate guidelines on moral values for everyday life, the P4 offered a challenge to the Islamic worldview. Leaders of Islamic organizations were special targets for this indoctrination.

A further breakthrough in secularizing the Indonesian polity was achieved through the New Order's enforcement of *Pancasila* as the sole basis for social and political organizations. The debate in Indonesian religious circles regarding *Pancasila* as the *azas tunggal* [sole foundation or principle] came to the fore in August 1982 when President Suharto stated that all social-political forces, particularly the political parties, should accept the state ideology as their *azas tunggal*. A major item on the agenda for the March 1983 general session of the MPR was the drafting of GBHN. Incorporated in these guidelines was an MPR resolution that the two political parties and Golkar now adopt *Pancasila* as their sole foundation.

The concept of *azas tunggal* attracted opposition from various Islamic elements and figures. Some perceived it as the government's imposition of a secularization programme against the Islamic worldview. Some others viewed this government policy as reminiscent of the Dutch colonial policy of permitting Islamic religious expression while restraining all forms of political Islam. For people like Sjafruddin Prawiranegara (a moderate *Masjumi* leader) and the great bulk of Muslim leaders at the time, the establishment of *Pancasila* as the foundation of the state and the basis for the constitution was

acceptable. Nevertheless, they raised objections to the imposition of *Pancasila* as the sole foundation/principle of political and social organizations. Sjafruddin criticized this policy using the government's own terms, by arguing that it contradicted the 1945 Constitution. In his personal letter to President Suharto on 7 July 1983, he basically stated that although "*Pancasila* was intended to be the Foundation of the State, and the basis for the Constitution, it was not intended to become the foundation of citizens' organizations, whether of a political, social or other character". He based his argument on Sukarno's words in his *Pancasila* speech (1 June 1945) that "this Indonesian state that we are founding must be a '*gotong-royong*' [mutual assistance] state." "This idea of *gotong-royong*", Sjafruddin argued, "implies that each person joining in this *gotong-royong* preserves his own identity and personality. The Muslims remain Muslim, the Christians remain Christian, the Buddhists remain Buddhist, the Hindus remain Hindu, and so on."⁶³ He concluded with the following rhetorical statement:

But if Christians are no longer permitted to form organizations based on Christian principles, ...and if Muslims cannot establish organizations based upon Islamic principles, and the same is the case for other citizens espousing other religions or ideologies, who are forbidden to found organizations based upon their respective faiths or ideologies, but all citizens are allowed only to have organizations based upon the Pancasila, then Indonesia, this fertile and prosperous county, with its many hills and valleys, must, as it were, be transformed into a barren Sahara desert, consisting of only stones and undifferentiated particles of sand [*yang zatnya sama*].⁶⁴

Despite severe dissatisfaction and opposition from Islamic groups and leaders, however, this policy was finally accepted by major Islamic organizations. Islamic organizations such as the PII and a splinter group of the HMI known as HMI-MPO (*Majelis Pertimbangan Organisasi*, Organizational Consideration Council, est. 1986), which remained unwilling to accept *azas tunggal* were banned or forced to become underground movements.

To curb Islamic resistance, the government also used various forms of blackmail and repressive measures. What concerned many Muslims was not just the repression itself, but also the decisive role of Christian and *abangan* officers as key figures in the state-repressive apparatus. This concern was expressed emotionally in the many books published following the fall of Suharto.⁶⁵ Until the late 1980s, Christian and *abangan* military officers had control over the three main components of the security regime: the military command and defence ministry, intelligence offices, and Kopkamtib. Firstly, M. Panggabean (a Protestant) was appointed commander-in-chief of the

Armed Forces and defence minister in the 1973–78 period, and L.B. Murdani (a Catholic) held the same position in the 1983–88 period. Second, Ali Murtopo (an *abangan* with Catholic intellectual network) took control of the intelligence offices (*Opsus* and *Bakin*) after 1968. He was succeeded by his intelligence protégé, L.B. Murdani, who also was responsible for the construction, in 1983, of the new military strategic intelligence body (BAIS). Third, M. Panggabean was appointed the head of *Kopkamtib* in 1969 and then Sudomo (then a Protestant)⁶⁶ held the same position from 1974 onwards.

Ali Murtopo was well known for his covert operation to persuade militant Muslims, especially those associated with past Muslim rebellions (DI/TII), to launch a renewed drive for an Islamic state. This was intended to discredit the Muslim political party, the PPP, and also to provide a pretext for a more general round-up of Muslim political activists.⁶⁷

Admiral Sudomo had a bad reputation in the eyes of Islamic community for allowing *Kopkamtib* to control the content of Islamic preaching and to interfere excessively in the activities of Islamic organizations. He was responsible for the arrest and imprisonment of Islamic activists whom he accused of subversion. Between 1977–80 alone, around 6,000 Islamic activists were arrested (*Sinar Harapan*, 3 April 2003) and many of them were detained with or without trial.⁶⁸

General L.B. Murdani was the last member of the Ali Murtopo group. As an intelligence officer and then commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces, he had a reputation for the “Christianization” of the intelligence offices and also for promoting *santri* officers more slowly than their *abangan* or Christian counterparts (Liddle 1995, pp. 18–19). He was also responsible for the massacre of hundreds of Muslims in Tandjung Priok (Jakarta) on 12 September 1984, following the protest of local Muslims against disrespectful behaviour by local military officials.⁶⁹

Frustrated politically and economically, several Muslim leaders turned to opposition movements. Thus, old *Masjumi* leaders as Mohammed Natsir, Burhanuddin Harahap and Sjafruddin Prawiranegara and younger Muslim activists such as Anwar Harjono and A.M. Fatwa, joined with a group of retired generals, including Nasution, Mokoginta, Yasin, Hugeng and Ali Sadikin. This group, sometimes referred to as *barisan sakit hati* [people who are sick at heart], established an oppositional movement that came to be known as *Kelompok Petisi 50* [Petition-of-50 Group].⁷⁰

Some militant Muslims with radical fundamentalist beliefs even turned to violent activities. Typically believing themselves to be the victims of non-Muslim conspiracies, the typical targets of their terrorist activities were non-Muslim properties.⁷¹ When the government clamped down on terrorist

activities, some of these militant Muslims were drawn into underground movements or fled to neighbouring countries.

Given the dangerousness and the vulnerability of these radical movements, there were two other possible options to address the Muslim's political and economic frustration: accommodation with the state's orthodoxy and political structure, or the return to cultural-educational movements in general and the mosque-based intellectual movement in particular. These became the two mainstreams of the Muslim intellectual response to the impasse of political Islam.

INTELLECTUAL RESPONSES OF THE SECOND GENERATION OF MUSLIM INTELLIGENTSIA

Already in 1967, though it allowed its individual members to join political parties, the *Muhammadiyah* had officially reaffirmed its role as being exclusively one of *dakwah* [call or invitation, missionary endeavour] through non-political social welfare and educational work. In 1973 it had 7,000 primary and secondary schools, several universities, five hospitals, 451 clinics, 3,250 mosques, 104 orphanages and 2,750 offices from which *dakwah* was organized.⁷² In 1987 it operated 20,000 primary and secondary schools, sixteen universities, twenty-one academies, nine hospitals, hundreds of smaller clinics and over 10,000 mosques (Tapol 1987, p. 5).

Early in the same year, former leaders of the *Masjumi* began to realize the importance of extending the scope of the Islamic struggle to non-political arenas. Having just been released from prisons and immediately encountering a new political stumbling block, they started questioning the shaky ground of political Islam. Soon after Suharto refused to rehabilitate the *Masjumi* in January 1967, *Masjumi* leaders and some reformist *ulama* held a meeting in *Al-Munawwarrah* mosque (Tanah Abang, Jakarta) on 26 February 1967.⁷³ The meeting attempted to find reasons behind the weakness of political Islam, and then concluded as follows:

First, Islamic parties have not gained enough support from the *ummat* in this country; second, Islamic leaders have no common vision and mission in their political struggles; third, the number of Indonesian Muslims was statistically large, but qualitatively small, whether in the quality of their *aqidah* (correct belief), *ibadah* (worship) and *akhlak* (ideal moral behaviour) or in their mastery of general knowledge and economy.

Based on these considerations, the meeting recommended the urgent establishment of a special "missionary" agency oriented to carry out Islamic

endeavours in a wider and more comprehensive way. This agency, called the *Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia* [DDII, Indonesian Council of Islamic Dakwah], came into existence in May 1967. The first executive committee of this organization was led by Mohammad Natsir and H.M. Rasjidi as chairman and vice-chairman, supported by prominent figures of the *Masjumi* and reformist *ulama* such as Prawoto Mangkusasmita, Osman Raliby, Zaininal Abidin Achmad and some others as members.⁷⁴

The DDII establishment was the last attempt by Muslim intellectuals of Natsir's generation to Islamize national politics through non-political means. In Natsir's words: "We are no longer conducting *dakwah* by means of politics, but engaging in political activities by means of *dakwah*. The result will be the same" (Quoted in Mahendra 1995, p. 129).

Henceforth the term *dakwah* became popular in the Indonesian public sphere, especially among the Muslim community. Before then, Indonesian Muslims tended to use the term *tabligh* [transmission] which is more associated with verbal propagation. With the introduction of the term *dakwah*, which implies a broader missionary endeavour, Islamic propagation moved from its preoccupation with verbal preaching [*bi'l-lisan*] to more practical action [*bi'l-hal*]. Many Muslim leaders and scholars believed that the *dakwah* was the appropriate answer to the government-sponsored modernization and Muslim political frustration. The *dakwah* approach was also believed to be an effective means for achieving the integration of the *ummat* both religiously and politically.

"Integration" of the *ummat* and "*dakwah*" became the main themes of Islamic discourse, especially among senior Islamic leaders. A special seminar on this issue, held in Malang in July 1968 by the Foundation for the Collection of Funds to Aid Indonesian Candidates for the Pilgrimage (JDBTHI), highlighted the primacy of the *dakwah* approach over the political one. In the same year, calls for the unity of the Islamic community, as frequently happened in the past, gave rise to the widespread demand for an All-Indonesian Islamic Congress. In the eyes of a prominent reformist *ulama*, E.Z. Muttaqien:

Through the *dakwah* approach all Islamic forces can participate and be assigned tasks commensurate with their respective capacities. Inter-group conflicts will be minimized because whatever gains are made will have come from the *ummat's* own efforts and labor, and not from rewards handed out by the distributors of favors at the helm of national affairs (Quoted in Hassan 1975, p. 83).

This view was supported by other seminar participants such as Zakijah Daradjat, Shalahuddin Sanusi, Anwar Harjono, and Mukti Ali. According

to Sanusi, the author of the well-known *Integrasi Ummat Islam* [The Integration of Muslim Community], published in 1967, the root cause of Islamic disintegration as well as of social and personal problems in the Muslim community was the non-practice of Islamic social and moral teachings. As such, the method of integration as well as of regeneration and reconstruction of the Muslim community had to be *dakwah* as opposed to party politics.⁷⁵

To celebrate Muslims' euphoria about the *dakwah* enterprise, in the late 1960s the DDII set up a special *dakwah* publication called *Media Dakwah*. Mohammad Natsir wrote a special handbook in this issue entitled *Fiqhud-Da'wah* [Islamic Jurisprudence on *Dakwah*], published in 1969. Subsequently, more than twenty-five books under the title "*dakwah*" were written by other Indonesian authors in the 1970s alone.⁷⁶

The DDII positioned itself as the primary source and consultation agent for the effective propagation of Islam in modern society. In its concern to help improve social hygiene and medical care, the DDII ran a special birth control clinic and worked closely with doctors on the Jakarta Muslim Students' Health Institute (LKMII) and with the private Islamic medical college of the Islamic Hospital Foundation (JARSI) in Jakarta. In its concern for the improvement of Islamic education, it helped to build and equip libraries in mosques, universities and *dakwah* institutions. It also made an effort to standardize the curriculum of *pesantren* through cooperation with a number of reformist-oriented *pesantren* associations (Hassan 1975, pp. 105–06).⁷⁷

The DDII also experimented with bringing together leaders of *pesantren*, Islamic activists from universities and social figures to continue what had been initiated by the Wirsosandjojo brothers (Satiman and Sukiman) in the pre-war period, namely "advanced *pesantren*" [*pesantren luhur, ma'had'aly*]. This kind of *pesantren* was able to offer advanced religious teaching and secular subjects to students [*santri*] from *pesantren* backgrounds or to offer in-depth Islamic study to students from secular university backgrounds.⁷⁸ *Pesantren Ulil Albab* in Bogor was the most success example of this experimentation. From this *pesantren*, prominent Islamic figures such as Didin Hafiduddin, an influential leader of the *tarbiyah* (Islamic educational) movement that became influential from the late 1980s, emerged.⁷⁹

Moreover, the DDII also began to promote Islamic *dakwah* through the mass media (notably the radio) and Islamic publications, and also regularly set up special training programmes for Islamic proselytizers termed *da'i* (many of whom would be sent to remote districts and transmigration zones). It also engaged in international Islamic fora and multilateral organizations, through

which, especially from Natsir's lobby in the Muslim World League [*Rabithat Al-Alam Al-Islami*] (established 1962), the DDII gained access to donor institutions from the Middle East countries. This made it possible to finance *dakwah* activities and to send Indonesian students to pursue overseas studies in these countries.⁸⁰ Last but not least, the DDII made early efforts to recruit young cadres for the purpose of creating "organic" intellectuals for the mosque movements. All these efforts, especially the last, were the final step of the Natsir generation in the historical project of Islamizing the Indonesian intelligentsia.

INTELLECTUAL RESPONSES OF THE THIRD GENERATION OF MUSLIM INTELLIGENTSIA

The third generation of intelligentsia, composed largely of those who were born in the later part of the 1910s and in the 1920s, played a major role in the early political leadership of the New Order. However, the intellectual and political roles of Muslim intelligentsia of this generation was negligible. There are at least two possible reasons. First, the New Order's political leadership was dominated by the military intelligentsia, while Islamic elements in the armed forces had been marginalized from the time of the revolution, especially after the desertion of Islamic guerrilla forces from the national military corp. Thus, by the time of the rise of the New Order, there were very few Muslim military officers in the armed forces.⁸¹ Second, the intellectual development of Muslim intelligentsia of this generation was overtaken by history. Born in the late colonial era, this generation had experienced the Dutch educational policy of favouring *priyayi*, resulting in small numbers of Muslim intelligentsia. To make matters worse, the higher education of this small number of Muslim intelligentsia was interrupted by the Japanese occupation and the independence revolution. In effect, very few *santri* of this generation completed their tertiary education.

Prominent Muslim personalities of this generation who completed their tertiary education were Lafran Pane (b. 1922), M. Jusdi Ghazali (b. 1923), Mukti Ali (b. 1923), Anwar Harjono (b. 1923), Anton Timur Djaelani (b. 1923)⁸² M.S. Mintaredja (b. 1921), Dahlan Ranuwihardjo (b. 1925), Harun Nasution (b. 1919), Achmad Baiquni (1923), Deliar Noer (b. 1926), Bustanil Arifin (b. 1925), Barli Halim (b. 1927), Ismail Suny (b. 1929), and Ismail Hasan Metareum (b. 1929). Most of them became key figures in the establishment and development of the GPII, HMI, and PII. Most had their studies disrupted by the revolutionary struggle and were only able to finish their undergraduate education in the 1950s or even in early 1960s.

By the beginning of the New Order in 1966, there were only a few Muslim intellectuals who had attended a postgraduate programme in Western universities. They included Deliar Noer, Achmad Baiquni, Mukti Ali, Harun Nasution, Anton Timur Djaelani, Barli Halim and Ismail Suny.⁸³ Mintaredja had actually been exposed to Western higher education at the University of Leiden in the late 1950s, but he only attended courses in a non-degree programme at the School of Law.

Besides these people, there were actually four other well-known Muslim intellectuals who had studied at Western Universities (all in the USA) at this time: Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo (b. 1931), Subchan, Z.E. (b. 1931), Imaduddin Abdulrahim (b. 1931) and Ibrahim Hasan (b. 1935).⁸⁴ Each of these men was born in a transitional period between the third and fourth generation and so were actually closer to the fourth generation, though the first two held senior leadership positions in the Islamic intellectual movement at the time of the rise of the New Order.

The lack of competitive advantage of this Muslim generation also came from their academic disciplines. Most of them were trained in humanities and social sciences, which were not really compatible with the New Order's technocratic modernization project.⁸⁵ With the scarcity of higher-educated Muslims, let alone those with Western training, this mismatch meant there were very few Muslim intellectuals who could hold strategic positions in the early years of the New Order.

Muslim intellectuals of the third generation shared a common dream with those of the Natsir (second) generation for the revival of Islamic political leverage, after its devastation in the late Sukarno era. Even so, while intellectuals of the second generation generally considered what Mintaredja called "formal victories" (for example, the rehabilitation of the *Masjumi* and the acceptance of the Jakarta Charter) as essential measures of the success of the Islamic struggle, those of the third generation generally gave priority to "material victories" (substantive achievements).⁸⁶ Thus, the latter tended to be more willing to accept a new political arrangement so long as Islamic aspirations and political representatives were accommodated in the new polity and bureaucracy. Even for a man like Deliar Noer, the New Order's modernization project did not pose a theological problem because the essence of the modernization project conforms to the social teachings of Islam. In his efforts to support Hatta's proposal in the early years of the New Order to establish a new inclusive Islamic political party, Noer also called on Muslim leaders to end their obsession with the Jakarta Charter (Wahib 1981, p. 1947). Generally speaking, as children of the revolution who had intensely shared a common nationalistic identity and fraternal

solidarity with other political groups and the national army, the third generation of Muslim intelligentsia tended to be more accommodative in their political orientation, except those who were closely linked to the Natsir group, like Anwar Harjono.

Yet, even adopting accommodative attitudes was not a guarantee for substantial political gains. Because of their educational profile, Muslim intellectuals of this generation could not, by and large, compete with the superior and more “appropriate” educational qualifications of their secular and Christian counterparts. Furthermore, at the historical juncture when this generation was ready to play intellectual and political leadership roles, the New Order policy of domesticating political Islam constricted the public role of Muslim intellectuals. Thus, Muslim (civilian) intellectuals of this generation were unable to play a substantial role in the New Order polity and bureaucracy. At best, only two of them became ministers of the Suharto cabinets. Due to his political accommodationism and his role as Suharto’s “henchman” in the leadership of *Parmusi*, Mintaredja was appointed a state minister (1958–73) and then social minister (1973–78). For his expertise in comparative religion, Mukti Ali was appointed the minister of religious affairs (1973–78). The remaining intellectuals could only occupy second-rank or mostly peripheral political and bureaucratic positions.⁸⁷

Beyond the formal political arena, the major contribution of this generation to the development of Muslim intelligentsia was their pioneering efforts in the establishment and development of Islamic student and intellectual associations. In the early years of the New Order, Muslim intellectuals of this generation attempted to strengthen their political leverage through the *Association of Indonesian Muslim Sardjana (Persami)* that had emerged in 1964. Given the engagement of the Muslim intelligentsia of the third generation, the chairman of this organization for two periods ahead (1966–71, 1971–74) was a man of the transitional period, Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo, who served as a bridge between the third and fourth generation of intelligentsia. However, severe internal conflicts jeopardized the bargaining power of this organization. Former members of the HMI and PMII within *Persami* clashed with each other especially over leadership issues. In 1968 traditionalist intellectuals of *Persami* seceded from and established a new association of traditionalist *sardjana*, *Ikatan Sardjana Islam Indonesia* (ISII), under the leadership of Subchan Z.E. After the death of Subchan in 1970, however, the ISII soon disappeared from the public scene. Meanwhile, *Persami* continued to exist for some time to come with its membership in 1974 being around 400 (Anwar 1995, p. 252).

Persami’s ideology and orientation reflected to some extent the accommodative tendency of the third generation of Muslim intelligentsia and

the more pragmatic interests of its chairman, despite the fact that supporters of political Islam also existed in the organization. Occupying a relatively strategic position in the government bureaucracy, as a personal assistant to the president (1966–67) and secretary of the National Planning Board (Bapennas 1967–68), Tjokroamidjojo led *Persami* to be supportive of the government modernization project. In his view, Muslims had to assess and respond to their socio-political environment dynamically, in order to adjust adequately to the continuous changes of the socio-political environment. So as not to miss the development train of the New Order, Muslims were expected to take an active role in the process by offering constructive thoughts and actions. *Persami* engaged more in practical matters than in philosophical ones. In the early 1970s, for instance, *Persami* conducted seminars on regional development, and began to popularize so-called alternative development (Hassan 1980, pp. 140–41; Rahardjo 1993, p. 23).

In this way, *Persami* and early upper-echelon *santri* bureaucrats in the New Order bureaucracy, such as Achmad Tirtosudiro, Bustanil Arifin, Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo, Deliar Noer and some others,⁸⁸ created the embryo of a Muslim “bloc within” (inside the New Order polity and bureaucracy), which provided the foundation for a rapprochement between the Islamic intelligentsia and the New Order government in the future. For a while, this process did not run smoothly as the New Order policy after 1973 became more and more repressive and provided little room for the expression of Islamic ideas and identities in the public sphere. To avoid any possible consequences of being seen as the spokespeople for Islamic aspirations, the *santri* bureaucrats distanced themselves from overt connections to and protection of Islamic collective actions. Thus, following the death of its secretary-general, Sudjoko Prasadjo, in 1974, Tjokromidjojo withdrew from *Persami*, resulting in its disappearance from the public sphere (Rahardjo 1993, pp. 23–24). In the absence of *Persami*, however, the Islamic intelligentsia within the bureaucracy continued to maintain a covert informal Islamic network, for example through information exchange and family gatherings. This provided mutual support and resource mobilization, such as in the dissemination of information on particular projects or job opportunities in government departments to fellow Islamic activists.

INTELLECTUAL RESPONSES OF THE FOURTH GENERATION OF MUSLIM INTELLIGENTSIA

It was the fourth generation of Muslim intelligentsia, composed mainly of those who were born in the 1930s and 1940s, who responded to the challenge of modernization and Muslim political frustration with energy and creativity.

Like the generation of Salim and Natsir, this generation (in its formative phase) experienced, to a lesser degree, an intense exposure to ideological (Islamic) radicalization, conditioned by political disputes on the national scene that ignited conflicts and tensions within student politics during the guided democracy period. On the other hand, it was similar to the Pane generation in terms of its intense exposure to the nationalistic language and solidarity, conditioned by the urgency to build a common historical bloc to counter pro-establishment political and intellectual forces and to dismantle the Sukarno regime around the mid-1960s. Unlike previous generations, however, this generation was much more confident psychologically and intellectually, conditioned by the dominant position of Islamic student organizations in the student politics of the 1960s.

Organic intellectuals of this generation largely came from the HMI. In the early decades of the New Order, the standing of PMII and IMM remained below that of the HMI. At the time of the rise of the New Order, the appearance of PMII and IMM in the public sphere remained relatively new. As affiliates of the NU and *Muhammadiyah*, intellectuals of the PMII and IMM were also overshadowed by leaders of the NU and *Muhammadiyah*.⁸⁹ Sometime in the future, there would emerge young intellectuals of the NU and the *Muhammadiyah* who would play pre-eminent roles in intellectual-political leadership of the Muslim community. These intellectuals, however, would be considered as the spokespeople of the NU and the *Muhammadiyah* rather than as those of the PMII and the IMM. Thus, during the early decades of the New Order, the HMI with its relative independence was a far cry from other Islamic student organizations in its ability to produce outstanding intellectuals in its own right.

Because university life of the 1960s was interrupted by a series of student demonstrations and tensions within the student politics, many HMI activists of this generation only completed their tertiary education in the late 1960s. Meanwhile, it was quite normal for activists of the HMI at that time to continue to take part in the activities of this organization though they might no longer be university students. Thus, during the rise of the New Order, the future shape of the HMI in particular and the Islamic intelligentsia in general was in the hands of this generation.

As a synthesis of the internal tensions between Islamic-mindedness on the one hand and nationalistic solidarity on the other hand, the HMI as an entity underwent a degree of political moderation. The HMI as an organization continued to maintain a balance between its Islamic and nationalistic orientations. Yet, individual intellectuals of the HMI were divided by and large into two streams: those who were inclined towards the aspirations

of political Islam *versus* those who were inclined towards more inclusive political aspirations. Apart from individual psychological predispositions, the intellectual milieu and networks would strongly determine the ideological and political inclinations of these HMI intellectuals.

The chairman of the HMI during this crucial period of the early years of the New Order was Nurcholish Madjid. He was a unique person by origin. He was born in the stronghold of the traditionalist community, Jombang (East Java), with his father, Abdul Madjid, belonging to the NU community by religio-cultural affiliation, but remaining a member of *Masjumi* after the NU split. His father's political background made it difficult for him to study in a traditionalist school. Thus, after finishing his primary school plus two years of study in the traditionalist *pesantren*, *Darul 'Ulum*, in 1955 he continued his study at the most prominent modern Islamic boarding school in the country, *Darussalam* (est. 1926), in Ponorogo (East Java), which is commonly known as "*Pesantren modern Gontor*".⁹⁰ In 1961 he left for Jakarta to enter higher education at IAIN Syarif Hidajatullah. In this city he began to encounter influential *Masjumi* and reformist leaders. More importantly, he gained greater access to scientific literature and general knowledge. His encounter with students of diverse university and academic backgrounds in the HMI provided him with a testing ground for strengthening his intellectual capacity.⁹¹

With his intellectual capacity and multiple religio-educational affiliations, he was the right man at the right time. His all-encompassing and non-sectarian outlook enabled him to be a bridge-builder in the internal fragmentation within the HMI. He was a leader and solidarity maker in the Tjokroaminoto mould. His invigorating Islamic ideas up until the late 1960s provided a common ground for his fellow HMI intellectuals of different ideological inclinations. The combination of his intellectual qualities and leadership style placed him in a special position. He was elected as the chairman of the HMI for two consecutive terms (1966–68, 1968–71), which had no precedent in the HMI tradition.

During the period of Madjid's leadership, HMI activists experienced a kind of identity crisis. The HMI identification with *Masjumi* during the Old Order period meant that the domestication of political Islam at the beginning of the New Order was a great disappointment. On the other hand, the dominance of the HMI among student organizations from the early 1960s had given rise to expectations of a significant public role in the future of the nation. This confusing situation placed them in limbo, between a return to the unfinished project of Islamizing the Indonesian polity-cum-intelligentsia or embracing the project of liberalizing Islamic thinking and political action.

Faced with these choices, this generation was forced to develop a discourse on some crucial issues concerning the future shape of Islam and the HMI's historicity. Externally, there was a demand to produce strategic and rigorous responses to the challenge of modernization and the peripheralization of political Islam. At the same time, a response was required to the dilemma of whether to support the so-called "*integrasi ummat*" [integration of the *ummat*] or to side with the agenda of liberalizing Islamic thinking that came to be known as the "renewal movement" [*gerakan pembaharuan*]. Internally, HMI had to choose whether it should be politically independent or side with Islamic socio-political organizations and also whether it had to be a cadre or mass-based organization.

Early general reaction of the HMI intellectuals to the modernization project was defensive. Modernization was perceived as a pretext for Westernization that contained within it a perilous process of secularism. In a further development, there emerged three kinds of response: liberal, reactionary (Islamist), and moderate (moderate-reactionary).

The initial liberal response came from a circle of HMI activists in the Yogyakarta branch, sometimes referred to as the Yogya Group; the branch that had supported *Manipol-USDEK* during the guided democracy period. Among prominent intellectuals of this group were Djohan Effendi, Ahmad Wahib and Dawam Rahardjo with Djohan and Wahib being far-liberals and Dawam being a moderate (centre)-liberal.⁹² Outside the HMI, another Islamic epistemic community that influenced the intellectual development of these young intellectuals was a study group known as the Limited Group (using the English words). This study group operated from 1967 up to 1971 under the mentorship of Mukti Ali, a Western trained Islamic educator (a lecturer of the IAIN Yogyakarta) who introduced them to his expertise in comparative religion and to modern Islamic thinking. In Ahmad Wahib's case, he had a strong emotional and intellectual connection with some Catholic priests for he had spent some years at a Catholic student's dormitory, Realino. For this group, modernization was first welcomed and then was perceived as a necessity for Indonesian Muslims, even if it might lead to Westernization (Wahib 1981, pp. 40, 149).

The reactionary-Islamist response came notably from activists of the HMI *Dakwah* Body [*Lembaga Dakwah Mahasiswa Islam*, LDMI]. Established in 1966, the first chairman of this body was Imaduddin Abdulrahim assisted by Endang Saifuddin Anshari (both of the HMI's Bandung Branch), and Miftah Faridl (of the Solo branch). As its central leadership was located in Bandung, a group of intellectuals associated with this body was often referred to as the Bandung Group. During the guided democracy period, the HMI's

Bandung branch was a strong opponent of *Manipol-USDEK*. The general attitude of this group to the modernization project tended to be reactionary and suspicious, for semantic and political reasons. This group did not object to modern rationalism, science and technology, because the Islamic doctrine and scientific discovery, according to the standard apologetic argument of the Islamist, are not really conflicting but complementary forms of belief. Nevertheless, this group objected to the term "modernization" since it was perceived as closely associated with the process of Westernization and secularization, and its adoption by the New Order regime was suspected to be a pretext for marginalizing Islamic political influence.

That the views of this group echoed those of *Masjumi* leaders was not very surprising. Leaders of the LDMI, especially Imaduddin and Endang, maintained an emotional and intellectual connection with *Masjumi* leaders and the DDII. Fathers of these two men (Abdulrahim and Muhammad Isa Anshari) originated from Langkat (East Sumatra) and West Sumatra respectively. An Al-Azhar graduate, Abdulrahim was well known as a local *Masjumi* leader in Sumatra, while Isa Anshari, after moving to Bandung, was prominent as a militant *Masjumi* and *Persis* leader. Moreover, both Imaduddin and Endang had been exposed to the same religious teacher, Rusjad Nurdin (a *Persis* and *Masjumi* leader). As the son of a *Persis* leader, Endang had a long association with Nurdin, while Imaduddin was in close contact with him after Nurdin became a lecturer in Islamic studies at the ITB in 1962.⁹³ Thus, ethnically, ideologically, and intellectually, both Imaduddin and Endang had a predisposition to identify themselves with Natsir.⁹⁴ Moreover, both also belonged to a group of young intellectuals who had been trained by the DDII from the late 1960s to become Islamic propagandists for the Muslim community in secular universities.

The moderate group, which tended to reinforce the reactionary view and as such is appropriately referred to as moderate-reactionary (moderate-Islamist), accepted modernization with qualification. This view represented a general attitude of the HMI's central leadership (*Pengurus Besar*, PB) in Jakarta. As a group with a wide range of ideological inclinations, the PB was situated in the middle of a tug-of-war between the Jakarta-Bandung axis *versus* the Jakarta-Yogyakarta axis, with the former being what Madjid called the "lane of politics" [*jalur politik*] and the latter being the "lane of ideas" [*jalur ide*]. Madjid himself originally belonged to this moderate-reactionary position.

In 1968, Madjid wrote a series of articles entitled "*Modernisasi ialah Rasionalisasi Bukan Westernisasi*" [Modernization is Rationalization, not Westernization], published by *Pandji Masyarakat*⁹⁵ and *Liga Demokrasi*. According to him, a simplified definition of modernization is "that which is

identical, or almost identical, with rationalization” and if the term is defined in this way, modernization to a Muslim is an imperative. Nevertheless, he then warned that there was a possibility of secularism (including humanism, liberalism and communism) and Westernization being disguised under the cloak of “modernization”. In his view, secularism should be resisted for it could destroy the religious basis of the Indonesian state. At the same time, he emphasized the necessity of ideology and the indispensability of religion as conditions for purposeful national existence. Modernization in the Indonesian context, he added, should not entail the end of ideology, because life is not possible without a set of beliefs, ideas, attitudes and convictions. He finally warned that there was a hidden agenda developed by some of the Indonesian Westernized elite who developed a strong dislike for anything Islamic. They therefore directed modernization toward Westernization in accord with the spirit of what he called “Snouckism”⁹⁶ to marginalize Islamic political aspirations. He then came up a proposition:

Whoever is courageous enough to be honest with himself will admit that the present difficulties are due to the fact that minority groups which do not enjoy the popular support of the people are playing too big a role, while the majority group is being obstructed from playing their decisive role. The role it is playing does not correspond to its majority position.⁹⁷

Given that the article exhibited Madjid’s advocacy for Islamic political aspirations, soon afterwards he was celebrated as “Natsir Muda” [the Young Natsir].⁹⁸

When the New Order refused to rehabilitate the *Masjumi*, the HMI intellectuals were at the outset overwhelmed by a general sense of frustration. The liberal group then came to the view that commitment of the HMI and Muslims in general was not to Islamic organizations or leaders but rather to Islamic values. In their view, Islam itself was not supposed to be treated as an ideology but rather as a source of universal moral and ethical precepts. For this group, the formal demand for an Islamic party or Islamic state was not only unnecessary but also misleading. With this kind of thinking, the group moved further towards explicitly supporting *Pancasila* as the principle of the state.

On the other hand, the reactionary group continued to be preoccupied with a standard apologetic argument that Islam is not only a religion but also a complete way of life and that in Islam there is no separation between religious and political life. Despite of the New Order’s repression of political Islam, intellectuals of this kind managed to find other ways to socialize their Islamic political aspirations.

The moderate group attempted to avoid apologetic arguments through its willingness to criticize standard Islamic arguments as well as the shortcoming of the Muslim community, but it continued to perceive Islam as an ideo-political system. Madjid, for instance, in the first term of his chairmanship had criticized the HMI's use of Tjokroaminoto's book, *Islam and Socialism* in cadre trainings, for its apologetic tendency. At the same time, he wrote a famous handbook for HMI training purposes entitled *Islamisme* (Islamism), which continued to present Islam as an alternative ideology to communism, capitalism and other secular ideologies (Malik and Ibrahim 1998, p. 125; Wahib, 1981, p. 156).

Concerning the integration of the *ummat*, the HMI intellectuals at first viewed this issue as a prime concern. The eighth National HMI Congress in Solo (10–17 September 1966) supported the idea of an All Islam Congress. The liberal group then came to favour the agenda of the Islamic renewal movement, even though prioritizing this agenda could cause a strained relationship with the *ummat*. For this group, the main problem for Indonesian Muslims was not Islamic fracturing, but rather the obstinacy of Islamic thinking. For the Islamist group, however, Islamic disputes were regarded as at the root of Muslims' powerlessness, and the preservation of Islamic solidarity was considered as far more important than the self-indulgence of intellectual adventure. For the moderates, the reconstruction of Islamic thinking was important, but not at the risk of severing the relationship with the *ummat* and other Islamic organizations.

Despite severe external (political) pressures imposed by the new regime, there was a positive internal development that helped boost HMI intellectual confidence and expectation. The preponderance of young Islamic intelligentsia during the Old Order became even stronger after the changeover to the New Order polity. In the wake of the dismantling of leftist movements, there was an upsurge in student interest to learn about Islam and to join Islamic student organizations. At the same time, religious instruction in secular schools and universities was made compulsory. Consequently, in the stronghold of secular students such as the ITB, for instance, where students who practised the weekly Friday communal prayer [*shalat jum'at*] were previously referred to as "Arabic Camels", many students now began to turn to Islam.⁹⁹

The growing interest in Islamic studies, practices and organizations (hereafter, referred to as the "Islamic turn") received a different reaction from the HMI intellectuals. For the liberal group, the phenomena of the Islamic turn provided a means to end obsessions with formal and quantitative Islamic achievements. The HMI, according to this view, should become an independent organization and detach itself from Islamic organizations.

Moreover, as this group believed that the urgent need was for the renewal of Islamic thinking, it was argued that the HMI should position itself as the nurturer of a creative minority rather than as mass organization. In contrary, the *dakwah*-oriented Islamist intellectuals viewed the growing interest in Islam as a fine opportunity to bring educated people to the “house” of Islam. For this group, the HMI should increase its *dakwah* efforts to reach a wider audience. In its eyes, to bring new converts into Islamic action groups was of paramount importance in order to strengthen their Islamic socio-political consciousness. To better respond to this challenge, the HMI, according to this view, should maintain its network with other Islamic organizations.¹⁰⁰ The moderate members agreed with the idea that the HMI should position itself as an independent and cadre organization, but by no means it should detach itself from other Islamic organizations and terminate its missionary efforts.¹⁰¹

POWER GAMES: CONSOLIDATION AND CONTESTATION

The internal disputes among the HMI intellectuals reached a climax in the wake of the deepening affinity of the *dakwah*-oriented intellectuals with the DDII and the changing face of Madjid’s intellectual orientation. This development began on the eve of the second term of Madjid’s chairmanship.

The affinity of the *dakwah*-oriented intellectuals of the HMI with the DDII was especially strengthened by a common concern with the challenge of the *dakwah* movement. In the face of the Islamic turn, there had already emerged in the late 1960s embryos of the mosque movement in the milieu of secular universities. At the same time, when religious instruction became compulsory, secular universities demanded a huge supply of lecturers for religious instruction. Already in 1968 Imaduddin, for instance, was asked by the ITB to be a lecturer in Islamic studies, though his academic background was electrical engineering. In response to such circumstances, in late 1967 the DDII began to promote the establishment of campus mosques in Bandung, Semarang, Yogyakarta, Medan and Makassar. It provided not only motivation but also financial assistance. About the same time, it also began to recruit *dakwah*-oriented intellectuals from diverse secular university backgrounds (mostly former activists of the HMI/PII) to be trained as lecturers for religious instruction and as mentors for the mosque movement.¹⁰²

The cadre training of the *dakwah* movement were largely conducted in Jakarta with headquarters being in the ashram of *Panitia Haji Indonesia* [PHI, Indonesian Haji Committee] in Kwitang (Central Jakarta). The principal trainers were DDII intellectuals, such as Mohammad Natsir, Prawoto

Mangkusasmita, M Rasjidi, and Osman Raliby. Besides an in-depth study of various aspects of Islam and Islamic teaching, this *dakwah* group, sometimes referred to as the PHI group, made an attempt to standardize the content of religious instruction in universities under the banner "Islam as a Scientific Discipline" (*Islam Disiplin Ilmu*, IDI). This effort gained official support from the Ministry of Religious Affairs during Alamsjah Prawiranegara's period (1978–83), but was then ignored by his successor, Munawir Sjadzali, who disliked the formalization of Islam.¹⁰³ The IDI was in fact a prelude to the ambitious project of the Islamization of the sciences that would become an important Islamic theme in the following years. The network of the *dakwah*-oriented young intellectuals with the DDII group provided the channel for the transmission of Islamic historical ideas and the impetus for the mosque movement that became more apparent from the early 1970s.

Until the late 1960s, the *dakwah*-oriented intellectuals also benefited from Madjid's tendency as the chairman of HMI to be sympathetic to the Islamist's ideas. Madjid had previously shared similar views with the Bandung group, in their opposition to the pro-*Manipol* and pro-liberal ideas of the Yogyakarta group. He had been admired by the *dakwah* group so much that Imaduddin named his son Nurcholish. Later, however, Madjid dissociated himself from the Islamist [*dakwah*] group.

Madjid's shift towards liberal Islamic thinking was partly a result of his intellectual dynamism and environment. As Wahib stated (1981, pp. 160–61): "Nurcholish Madjid is a man of learning and reading. The book is his first beloved friend. Even if he has felt right, his willingness to continuously learn will in turn force him to re-question what he has previously believed." Because of his reading hobby, Wahib, added, "Madjid has enough scientific tools so that with a mental switch he can leapfrog to catch up what other people have initiated" (p. 163). Madjid was also an independent individual with no special older mentor.¹⁰⁴ For an IAIN student, becoming the chairman of the HMI was very unusual and is also a reflection of his personal strength. Madjid also exhibited the strong tendency among students of the IAIN and traditionalist *pesantren* to be relatively less radical and to (strongly) desire Western scientific knowledge and the language of modern intellectual discourse.

The impetus for his shift to the liberal cause, however, was his direct encounter with the Western world. In October 1968, he was invited to visit the United States by the State Department of the Federal Government of the United States of America under the sponsorship of the Council for Leaders and Specialists (CLS). The reason behind this invitation, according to an official of the American Embassy in Jakarta, was "just to show him what he

dislikes so far" (Wahib 1981, p. 161). During two months of his travels in America, he visited universities and learned about the academic life of university students, attended seminars and discussions with several academic and political figures, and witnessed some of the achievements of Western civilization. He also had the opportunity to meet with his compatriot, influential socialist intellectual, Sudjatmoko, then the Indonesian ambassador to the United States, who welcomed his visit with great hospitality. Shortly afterwards, he continued his journey to France, Turkey, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Egypt, and Pakistan. Next in March 1969, at the invitation of King Faisal of the Saudi Arabia, he made a pilgrimage to Mecca along with some ten other HMI functionaries. Reflecting on his visit both to the Western and Islamic worlds, he came to realize the disjuncture between Islamic ideals and the reality of life in the Muslim world. On the other hand, the West that he had been so critical of, exhibited many positive dimensions and achievements. Henceforth, "he began to appreciate the good aspects of Western humanism" (Wahib 1981, p. 161).

Madjid's mental switch had begun, though this did not lead to a sudden radical change. For sometime, his new insight was submerged under a thick sediment of his established intellectual thinking as recorded in his work *Islamisme*. His thinking as described in *Islamisme*, combined with his new insights and other HMI intellectuals' ideas, were synthesized during and in the aftermath of the Ninth HMI National Congress in Malang (3–10 May 1969), to become a new formulation and guidance for HMI ideology, known as *Nilai-Nilai Dasar Perjuangan* [NDP, the Basic Principles of the Struggle].¹⁰⁵ Among other things, this ideology emphasized the centrepiece of Islamic monotheism, the *tauhid* doctrine (the nature of God as an all-inclusive being), as the central guidance of the Islamic struggle. For the HMI in particular, it emphasized the need to maintain integration and coherence between *iman* [belief], *ilmu* [knowledge] and *amal* [action] as well as between an Islamic and nationalistic orientation.¹⁰⁶

The remaining months of 1969 were critical ones for Madjid's thinking about Islamic liberalism. He continued to be overwhelmed by a process of self reflection, whether to side with the integration effort or to embark on the renewal movement. An influential factor in his move towards the renewal movement came from informal small group discussions which involved his closest fellows and one of the key figures involved in this process was Utomo Dananjaya. He was a moderate leader of the PII (chairman of the PII, 1967–69) and an intimate friend of Madjid who in 1969 reactivated the tradition of inviting the HMI chairman (at that time Madjid) to give a speech to the PII National Congress (held that year in Bandung). In the same year, at a

post-*'Id al-Fitr* (Feast of Breaking the *Ramadhan* Fast) social evening [*halal bihalal*], Utomo conducted a discussion under the theme "Integration of the Islamic Community", which involved Subchan Z.E. (of NU), H.M. Rasjidi (of *Muhammadiyah*), Anwar Tjokroaminoto (of PSII), and Rusli Khalil (of *Perti*). In the aftermath of the event, however, Dananjaya got the impression that the agenda of integration had not been well received. So he began to conduct small group discussions, which involved his close fellows: Nurcholish Madjid (of HMI), Usep Fathuddin (of PII), and Anwar Shaleh (of GPII), to solve the dilemma of whether to support the impractical aims of integration or to side with the disintegrating renewal movement.

In addition to the small group discussions, Madjid also conducted discussions with *Masjumi* leaders such as Prawoto Mangkusasmita, Mohamad Roem, and Osman Raliby from which he got the impression that these men did not really consider the idea of an Islamic state as an urgent priority. In his view: "They had an idea about something like an Islamic state, but it had yet to be achieved through democratic mechanisms. Even a man like Roem had no aspirations about it, though he retained his empathy with its supporters."¹⁰⁷

Although these small group discussions did not arrive at any conclusive result, they provided new inspiration for the participants. Already in late November 1969, Madjid wrote personal letters to Ahmad Wahib and Djohan Effendi, two liberal protagonists who had resigned from the HMI on 30 September and 10 October 1969 respectively because of their disagreement with the Islamist group of the HMI. In his letter he stated his agreement with the principal ideas of these two men, while asking their understanding about the difficulty of implementing such ideas in the HMI (Wahib 1981, pp. 165–66). Then, in preparing a post-*'Id al-Fitr* social evening in 1970, which was organized jointly by four Muslim student-youth and *sardjana* organizations, HMI, GPI, PII, and *Persami*, the committee, which involved those participants in the small discussions, agreed to choose "rethinking and integration" as the theme of the *halal bihalal* discussion. The original intention of choosing this theme was simply to stimulate discussion and to underscore the determination of the leadership of the Muslim youth groups to find solutions to the deeply agonizing problems of the *ummat*. Initially, the intellectual invited to give the speech on this occasion was Alfian (a Muslim intellectual from the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, LIPI). But he was unable to come, so Harun Nasution (a rationalist Islamic scholar of the IAIN) was chosen to be his replacement. In fact, Nasution was also unavailable. Finally, Madjid was appointed to be the speaker and "the rest is history".¹⁰⁸

In this *halal bihalal* event, held on 3 January 1970, Madjid presented a paper entitled “*Keharusan Pembaharuan Pemikiran Islam dan Masalah Integrasi Ummat*” [The Necessity of Renewing Islamic Thought and the Problem of the Integration of the *Ummat*]. In the speech he explained that in his view the agenda of integration was an impractical approach. The political opportunity structure of the New Order necessitated changes in the behavioural and emotional condition of the Muslim community, whereas the idealistic approach of integration would only help to perpetuate intellectual impotence and stagnation within the *ummat*. He believed that the Muslims’ loss of what he referred to as “psychological striking force” had caused a 25-year setback for the *ummat* and was too complex to be solved through an integration-oriented approach. Thus, he considered the agenda for renewing Islamic thought to be a cure for the malaise of the *ummat*. Controversial issues of this agenda might undermine integrative efforts, but, in his judgement, the risk was worth taking; even if this project failed to produce the desired results, it would still be useful at least as an attempt to cast aside the burden of intellectual stagnation. This project, he added, became more urgent in view of the fact that established reformist Islamic organizations such as *Muhammadiyah*, *Al-Irsyad*, *Persis* and others had lost their reformist verve and *Èlan vital* that caused them to be indistinguishable from, and even less progressive than, the traditionalist Muslim organizations.

As he went on to outline his thinking on renewal, Madjid came to a very crucial point. He believed that the renewal process should begin by liberating the *ummat* from “traditional values” in favour of “future-oriented” values. This liberation process, he continued, necessitated the adoption of “secularization”, the promotion of intellectual freedom, the pursuit of the “idea of progress” and the cultivation of open attitudes. What he meant by the term “secularization” here is not identical with secularism, as the latter, in his view, is admittedly alien to the Islamic worldview. Madjid borrowed the interpretation of a Christian theologian, Harvey Cox, and of an American sociologist, Robert N. Bellah, so that by secularization he meant a process of temporalizing values which are indeed temporal, but which the *ummat* had a tendency to regard as otherworldly *ukhrawi*. The term also meant to him the “desacralization” of everything other than that which is truly transcendental. Last but not least, in response to an encouraging growth of people’s interest in Islam on the one hand and the impotence of political Islam on the other hand, he came to the conclusion that numerous Muslims at that time were in favour of “Islam, yes; Islamic party, no!”

Madjid's courage in taking the unpopular step of favouring the renewal movement although he ran the risk of attracting popular criticism was a decisive moment for his initiation as an avant-garde intellectual. As Max Weber indicated: "Intellectuals often face the dilemma of having to choose between intellectual integrity and extra-intellectual contingencies, between rationalizing the flow of ideas and dogmatic stagnation. Any decision in favour of the latter involves a 'sacrifice of intellect'."¹⁰⁹ A typical ambivalence arises from this position, described by Bernhard Giesen as follows (1998, p. 43):

Intellectuals bewail the lack of understanding from a public that is unaware, insufficiently aware, or even hostile to their interpretations. On the other hand, precisely this rejection by the public typically creates the tension that can be understood as the interpretative head start of the intellectual avant-garde. In his or her complaint about the public, the intellectual initially constructs the basic structure within which he or she can gain exceptionally as an intellectual. Conversely, the adoption of intellectual interpretations by a wider public always poses a danger to the distinction of an intellectual.

By prioritizing ideas over public opinion, Madjid tended to be indifferent towards the social implications of his contemplative questionings and statements. This is especially true in his crucial statement about the necessity of "secularization". No matter what his definition of secularization was, language or terminology does not operate in isolation and cannot escape from history. Meaning is always constructed in social and historical contexts where social institutions and struggles engage in the process. As Jay L. Lemke argued (1995, p. 9): "All meanings are made within the communities and the analysis of meaning should not be separated from the social, historical, cultural and political dimensions of these communities." In the cognitive structure of the Indonesian Muslim community, the term "secular" and its derivations had an established negative connotation as signifiers of otherness. The term was commonly associated with the removal of religious influence from the public and political sphere — which is considered as alien to an Islamic worldview — with a specific reference to a repressive Dutch colonial policy under Snouck Hurgronje's influence to marginalize political Islam. Muslims' objections to the term were exacerbated by Madjid's excessive reference to Western academic sources, which reinforced the sense of otherness of the term.

For similar reasons, Madjid's statement about "Islam, yes; Islamic party, no!" had also been misunderstood. Like Tjokroaminoto's statement before the — *Sarekat Islam* congress in Surakarta in 1913 that "SI is not a political party, and not an organization that desires a revolution, and it is loyal to the

government” Madjid’s statement is actually not void of political intention. It can be considered as a political strategy in the guise of a non-formal political approach; that in the powerlessness of political Islam, Muslims should seek other ways to survive. But again because it was perceived as part and parcel of his statement on secularization, his critics could not read the nuances of his statement.

The clash between vision and tradition occurred around these two crucial points in Madjid’s position and exhausted intellectual debates thereafter. The debate was trapped in a semantic contention, which failed to deal with substantial issues. The scale of controversy and the seriousness of Madjid’s vision became even more widespread and forceful because of the intensity and density of media coverage, especially by *Tempo* and *Pandji Masjarakat* magazines which became the main instigators of the polemic. Fired by the media coverage, the reactionary elements of the Muslim community both from the older and younger generations of Muslim intellectuals, such as H.M. Rasjidi (a *Masjumi*/DDII leader), Abdul Qadir Jaelani (a militant PII leader), and Endang Saifuddin Anshari (a *dakwah*-oriented intellectual of the HMI) began to launch severe attacks. Among others, Rasjidi criticized Madjid’s view of secularization as being an arbitrary interpretation, for it already had a standard signification. Rasjidi also emphasized that Madjid ignored the fact that the secularization process would in turn lead to secularism. In supporting Rasjidi’s critique, other polemicists objected to what they perceived as Madjid’s rejection of Islamic politics. They believed in “Islam, yes; Islamic party, yes!”¹¹⁰

Polemics and categorization made by the media or by analysts often force polemicists to hold a particular intellectual position more firmly even when they previously had some doubts. Although the original intention of Madjid’s speech was only to stimulate discussion, the effect of hostile criticism and media exposure pressed him to move further along the path of the liberal cause. His move in this direction was welcomed by the liberal camp. Ahmad Wahid expressed this as follows (1981, p. 166):

As we [Wahib and Effendi] got Nurcholish Madjid’s paper from Dawam, via the post, we expressed our happiness by going around Yogyakarta to meet with leaders of the HMI and the *ummat* [to tell them about his speech]. To be frank, we exploited Madjid authority as the chairman of the biggest and the most respected student organization, who was often called ‘the second Natsir’, to popularize the liberal thinking.

On the other hand, Madjid’s departure from his original position greatly disappointed the *dakwah*-oriented group. This disappointment provided the impetus for the group to engage more seriously in the mosque movement.

The Development of the *Dakwah* Movement

To analyse the development of the *dakwah* movement — as well as the renewal movement — theories of social movements provide useful insights. There are two major paradigms in the current debates about social movements. The first is the so-called “resource mobilization” approach, and the second is the “personal motivation” approach. The first approach takes as its starting point the analysis of organizations rather than the individual. The prime research question of this approach is not who the actors are or what motivates them but rather, why some movements are more successful than others. The resource mobilization approach studies the mechanisms through which movements recruit their members and the organizational forms through which mobilization of both human and social resources takes place. The second approach focuses on the personal motivations that lead to participation in social movements. This approach investigates individuals’ socio-psychological backgrounds or upbringing that lead them to become involved in a particular movement (Eyerman and Jamison 1991, pp. 23–29). Based on these approaches, this analysis of the *dakwah* movement will use a productive exchange between the two perspectives, rather than an either/or choice.

The driving force for the early development of the *dakwah* movement was the socio-political dislocation of Islamist intellectuals. They had to face threats from two directions: state political repression and the challenge of the liberal-minded Muslims. Driven by Islamic political aspirations on the one hand, but confronted by the government’s obstruction of political Islam on the other, this Islamist group experienced acute political dislocation. In the meantime, the general mass media, as another manifestation of the public sphere, tended to serve as the state ideological apparatus in championing modernization. The media was thus preconditioned to be sympathetic to the renewal movement. Realizing that the public sphere was hostile to their ideological aspirations, the Islamist intellectuals created a subtle and fluid social movement, which was relatively impervious to state control, as a new foundation for constructing collective solidarity and identity. In so doing they began to create the Muslims’ “bloc without” (outside the New Order formal political structure).

The alternative resource for the mobilization of new Islamists’ collective action was found in the relatively “free” space of ‘independent’ mosques located in the milieu of university campuses.¹¹¹ The function of the mosque as the central ground of religio-political movements is not alien to the Muslim world. Even so, the presence of permanent mosques in the milieu of secular universities and their use as the base camps of religio-political movements of

secular university students was a new phenomenon in Indonesian history. Most of the secular university mosques began to emerge in the New Order period.¹¹² The hallmark of this phenomenon was the establishment of campus mosques within the milieu of prestigious universities such as the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB) and the University of Indonesia (UI).

The establishment of the ITB mosque, known as Salman Mosque, had been planned by a nucleus of Islamic activists of this institution since 1958. However, material and psychological barriers, especially the unfavourable response of the rectorate to the idea of establishing a mosque inside “the bastion of the secular intellectuals”, delayed its materialization so it was only completed in 1972.¹¹³ The UI mosque began to be established in 1966 and was finished in 1968. It was named Arief Rahman Hakim Mosque to commemorate the name of an Islamic activist of that university who became a martyr of the student movement of 1966. Most other campus mosques began to emerge from the latter part of the 1970s onwards.

In the absence of mosques, Islamic activists began their religious activities in public spaces such as classrooms or auditoriums. With the frequent difficulty of getting official permission to establish a mosque inside the campus, many clever strategies had to be developed. The establishment of the IPB mosque, *Al-Ghifari*, in early 1980s, for instance, is an interesting case. It was originally proposed to the authorities as a laboratory building. Once it had been built, however, Islamic activists shifted the function of the building from scientific laboratory to “spiritual” laboratory.¹¹⁴ On most other campuses, the strategy of involving the rectorate on the committee for the mosque establishment was very effective. This approach was effective because of the early performance of the mosque movement which gave the impression that it had no political agenda.

It is worth noting that intellectuals who had been trained by the DDII in the PHI played a decisive role in the establishment and development of many early campus mosques, as most of them became lecturers in the secular universities where they originated. In short, the presence of mosques inside secular universities was a monument to the ascendancy of the *dakwah*-oriented intellectuals.

Early leaders (organic intellectuals) of these mosque movements were largely drawn from the *dakwah*-oriented HMI/PII intellectuals of the fourth generation. Their initial audiences were Islamic activists of the fifth generation of intelligentsia, especially those who entered university in the 1970s. In the gestation period, the principal proponents of this movement were composed largely of the HMI/PII members as well. Although the leftist student groups

had been dismantled, activists of Islamic student organizations of the 1970s were still motivated by a fierce competitive political struggle with those of secular student fronts, especially to control intra-university student governments. In the face of this challenge, these Islamic activists shared the vision of the older generation of the *dakwah* activists to make the campus mosque the base of student activities, both to prepare and enlarge Islamic cadres and constituencies and to find ways of bridging the differences between student activists of different organizational backgrounds. For the older generation, however, there was another additional interest: to protect students of the secular universities from the influence of the renewal movement.¹¹⁵

The prototype of this mosque movement emerged in the ITB's Salman Mosque in early 1970s, which adopted ideology and "movement intellectual"¹¹⁶ from the so-called *Latihan Mujahid Dakwah* (LMD, Training of the *Dakwah* Fighter). The LMD was first introduced by Imaduddin Abdulrahim and his fellows¹¹⁷ to the community of Salman Mosque in 1973. Interestingly, the basic material of the LMD's ideology was in fact a modified version of the Madjid-composed NDP (of the HMI) with a stronger emphasis on the *tauhid* doctrine and a special caution about the threat of the so-called intellectual warfare [*ghazwul fikr*] with Western-influenced secular ideas.¹¹⁸ Inspiration for the emphasis on the *tauhid* and *ghazwul fikr* was taken from the doctrine of the well-known Egyptian Islamic movement, *Ikhwanul Muslimin* [IM, Islamic Brotherhood] established in 1928.

The exposure of the Islamist group to aspects of the IM ideology and *dakwah* methods was made possible especially by the involvement of Abdulrahim in international networks of Islamic students. One of the most important was the International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations (IIFSO, est. 1969). With Natsir's encouragement, Abdulrahim began to be actively involved in this organization in 1971 and soon assumed the position of vice-secretary-general.¹¹⁹ Many leaders of this organization had been influenced by the IM ideology. Abdulrahim's encounter with them seemed to provide a catalyst for his rudimentary understanding of the IM ideology and methods, which had a certain influence on the curriculum and method of the LMD (Damanik 2002, p. 71).

What made the LMD special and influential was its training approach. Participants had to stay in the Salman Mosque complex for about a week and were isolated from external contact. The training began an hour before early morning prayer (about 4.00 a.m.), and during the day participants were involved in intense and stimulating small group religious discussions. At night they had to perform the midnight (optional) prayer, and on the final night

they had to swear an oath before the trainers containing the profession of the Faith [*kalimat syahadat*], “There is no god but God, and Muhammad is the Prophet of God.”¹²⁰

This very short-term Islamic training in fact stimulated a radical new religious awareness. The birth of this new religious-mindedness was signalled by the wearing of *jilbab* [headscarf] by female activists, which speedily became the very symbol of the mosque [*dakwah*] movement. In later developments, the LMD became the recruiting ground for junior mentors who led Islamic tutorials known as “mentoring” (using the English term) for other ITB students. As the mentoring activity attracted students from other universities and even high school students in Bandung, the Salman accommodated this enthusiasm through the establishment of a Salman Islamic Youth Community (KARISMA).

The mentoring activities, in which participants were organized into small discussion groups, became the basis for the creation of circles of cohesive groups, termed *usrah* [family]. Each *usrah* cell had its own mentor who served as a motivator and role model, as well as a bridge to connect the small groups into the whole entity of the mosque movement. Members of *usrah*, in turn, became new propagandists who actively recruited new followers.

The LMD soon attracted Islamic activists from other secular universities. Thus, its participants were extended to include students of diverse universities throughout Indonesia.¹²¹ After attending the LMD, representatives from each campus began to introduce the *dakwah* training and mentoring programme on their own campuses by modifying the material and approach of the Salman Mosque. In this way they laid the foundation for the establishment of the campus mosque *dakwah* body that came to be known as *Lembaga Dakwah Kampus* (LDK). Furthermore, former participants of the LMD also provided connection chains for informal networks of *dakwah* activists across universities and for the dissemination of the Islamist ideology. This informal network facilitated resource mobilization such as the coordination of a common action plan, the exchange of information and the provision of religious preachers or instructors for particular religious events. The simultaneous action of the campus *dakwah* bodies rapidly extended the sphere of influence of the Islamist ideas.

The success of the LMD programs propelled the mosque movement outside the campus. The rise of the mosque movement outside the campus itself actually coincided with the “Islamic turn” in the secular universities. The 1970s was the formative period the emergence of the so-called “*remaja masjid*” [the mosque youth] movement throughout Indonesia with many activists of the HMI/PII background being involved in its gestation period.

In a growing frustration with politics, the mosque youth began to popularize the slogan “Back to the Mosque” (using the English phrase). Among major mosques in large cities which were well-known for the activity of their *remaja masjid* movement were Al-Azhar, Sunda Kelapa, and Cut Meutiah mosques in Jakarta, the Istiqomah and Mujahidin mosques in Bandung, Syuhada mosque in Yogyakarta, and Al-Falah mosque in Surabaya.¹²² In recruiting cadres and enlarging their constituency, these groups of mosque youths benefited from the material, method of training and mentoring programmes of the campus mosque movement.

As the mosque youth movement grew in members throughout Indonesia, the Communication Forum of the Indonesian Mosque Youth [*Badan Komunikasi Pemuda Masjid Indonesia*, BKPMI] was established in 1977 to improve networking among them. Structurally, the BKPMI operated as an autonomous institution in the Indonesian Council of Mosques, while the latter was part of the World Council of Mosques (an affiliate of the Muslim World League) with Mohammad Natsir being one of its members. The BKPMI, which transformed itself into BKPRMI¹²³ after 1993, became the catalyst for the dissemination of Islamist ideas beyond the campus.¹²⁴

By the end of the 1970s, the scope and force of this mosque movement began to enter a new stage in the wake of the New Order's increasing political repression. By this time, student politics had reached a low point. Following the dissolution of the *dewan mahasiswa* [student councils] and the imposition of the so-called “*normalisasi kehidupan kampus*” [NKK, the normalization of campus life] in 1978, student politics gradually lost its political significance. By the early 1980s, the ability of both extra-campus student organizations and the remaining intra-campus student government bodies (faculty-based student senates) as mediums for the actualization of students' political aspirations had been severely impaired. The HMI, for instance, began to lose its attraction for Islamic students.

In the face of the NKK-policy to isolate campuses from the influence of external socio-political organizations, the HMI lost its firm foothold inside universities. It also increasingly lost its credibility in the eyes of the campus-based Islamic activists because of its increasing cooperation with the state orthodoxy and political structures. The HMI officially changed its organizational principle from Islam to *Pancasila* at the sixteenth HMI National Congress in Padang (24–31 March 1986). This change caused the organization to split into two camps, as those who refused the acceptance of *Pancasila* as the sole principle of the organization seceded from the HMI and established a new rival organization that came to be known as the HMI-MPO (*Majelis Pertimbangan Organisasi* [Organizational Consideration

Council]. After this, the leadership of the HMI tended to follow an accommodationist line.

With the depoliticization of the student world, student activity inside campuses was channelled into intra-student organizations which catered for students' demands for recreation and professional development. Some student activities, however, did manage to actualize their criticism through the mosque movement and through the creation of general discussion groups that began to mushroom in the early 1980s.

The campus mosque movement and the general discussion groups displayed antithetical tendencies. While the former operated inside the milieu of the university, the latter operated beyond the walls of the university. The former aimed to recruit a larger constituency and this was made easier by its operation inside the campus. The discussion groups never attempted to recruit a large membership and tended to be alienated from day-to-day student life due to their operation outside the campus. While the resistance ideology of the mosque movement derived from Islamist ideologies, that of the discussion groups in general was highly influenced by leftist and new-leftist ideologies. Whereas the mosque movement connected itself with local and global networks of Islamic *harakah* [movements], the discussion groups were mostly connected with local and global networks of socialist-minded non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

In a further development, the mosque movement became more successful than the general discussion groups and NGO movement, in being able to maintain its "communicative sphere" as a necessary condition for continuing and enlarging the intellectual community. Operating within the mosque, the former had a sort of cover to protect itself from direct control by the security apparatus, while the latter had no such cover and hence were more easily controlled or eliminated by the government. Taufik Abdullah takes it further (1996, p. 59): "It is clear that religious discourses, with their references to the sacred texts, are one of the few channels relatively free from the imposition of the mastery of meaning by the powers that be."

Besides being an unintended consequence of the New Order's policy of political repression, the mosque movement benefited indirectly from the modernization project. In deviating from the general theory of modernization, which tends to assume that as modernization increases, religious faith and observance declines, the New Order's modernization project brought a new religious awareness among a large segment of the modernized secular university students.

One of the possible reasons from the growing religious awareness had something to do with the socio-psychological deprivation of newly urbanized

students. Moving from the countryside or small towns into metropolitan cities for the sake of learning, these new student migrants were plunged into a sort of silent atomized individualism and experienced serious problems of dislocation. As R.W. Bulliet argued (1994, p. 202):

Village life changes over time, but usually change is slow enough to leave undisturbed, at least in later memory, the illusion of stability and continuity. Migration to the city, however, is a profoundly disrupting experience. Even when there are previous migrants from the same village to cushion one's entry into urban life, the loss of routines of the agricultural cycle, and of the village's closed society, is not easily compensated for.

For students from the middle and upper classes, who had long stayed in metropolitan cities, a feeling of spiritual deprivation seemed to be a major drive for their turn to the mosque movement. One of the results of the New Order's modernization project, for those with money, was a hedonistic life-style and exhibitionism among the new rich, as well as corruption among state officials and government servants. Some idealist students of these classes experienced a sort of "cognitive dissonance", as a result of disjuncture between their conception of the good life and the real life of their family. Some of them attempted to find a spiritual sanctuary, as an escape from the "dirty" world.

These problems of social and spiritual deprivation became more acute because of the presence of heterogenous post-modern (global) cultures brought in by the New Order's technological successes. This was signalled by the emergence of a diversity of means of mass communication and a bewildering experience of the proliferation of life-worlds, consumer lifestyles and the secularization of culture. Trapped in this situation, urban settlers "need new sets of moral precepts to provide them with a sense of meaning and purpose" (Huntington 1996, p. 97). To meet this need for moral precepts, the urban educated-Muslims faced a dilemma. Should they embrace materialistic and secularistic modern values in order to feel fully part of the new world (thereby spurning their traditions), or should they, on the contrary, revive their local traditions, even at the price of material disadvantage. It was painful to spurn indigenous traditions, but it was also painful to remain under-developed. Many Muslims attempted to solve this dilemma by embracing neither modern Western values nor local indigenous tradition, but rather returning to what they perceived as their true origin; that is the *Qur'an*, the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad, and a religious community (Gellner 1992, p. 19). In extreme cases, this obsession with returning to Islamic authenticity led to the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism.

Having been poorly educated in religious matters, new migrant and urban students who crowded into secular universities in metropolitan cities from the latter part of the 1970s constituted what R. W. Bulliet called (1994) the “new edge” of the Muslim community. In the relative absence of corporate life (civil society) — in the European sense — in Indonesia, the need of these new edge Muslims for a new community and moral precepts was met particularly by the presence of the network of mosque movements, *sufi* orders and other Muslim institutions.

In their encounter with the Islamic epistemic community, these new edge Muslims began to question their existence as Muslims. At the same time, secular policies that had created the public education system diminished the status of traditionally-trained *ulama*. Thus, when the new edge began to ask questions about Islam, they did not turn automatically to the traditional *kyai* from whom their parents would have sought advice. They turned rather to “non-scholastic” assertive Muslim thinkers who, in many cases, had not received an established traditional religious education. As Bulliet noted (1994, p. 200): “The fact that the answers these thinkers gave to the questions asked them were often at odds with traditional teaching, or manifestly predicated upon ideas deriving from Western academic study, did not deter the young men and women of the new edge from following them.”

The religious curiosity of this new edge was also fed by the flourishing of new Islamic publications. Beginning in early 1980s, the fifth generation of Muslim activists established new Islamic publishing houses, such as *Pustaka-Salman* and *Mizan* in Bandung, *Gema Insani Press* in Jakarta, and *Shalahuddin Press* in Yogyakarta, which provided alternative Islamic reading for the new edge. This reading material was initially derived from the translated works of foreign Islamic thinkers and then from anthologies of articles by Indonesian intellectuals. Throughout the 1980s there also emerged new Islamic journals and magazines such as *Risalah*, *Amanah*, *Pesantren*, *Salman Kau* and *Ulumul Qur'an*. The emergence of this number of Islamic publications reflected and affected the Islamic enthusiasm of the new edge. This contributed to making Islamic publications the trend setters in book production in the 1980s. Based on a survey of the “Library and Documentation Section” of *Tempo* magazine, of the 7,241 total book collected by this section between 1980–87, the number of books on religious themes was 1,949 — most of which being on Islamic themes (*Tampi* 1987).

The Islamic zeal of this new edge found its actualizing space in the campus mosque. In this context, the mosque served as the melting pot for the new edge of different Islamic streams. Having no direct connection to any major organized Islam, the campus mosque was able to distance itself

from historical Islamic disputes on matters of different interpretation. Slowly but surely, activists of the mosque movement began to form a new Islamic hybrid which disengaged itself from the long-established divide between traditionalist versus reformist Islamic groups. At the same time the Islamic teaching of the campus mosque seemed to suit the religious disposition of new urbanized students. There was a strong indication that urbanization had been followed by the shift in the religious disposition and affiliation of many students, from the characteristics of rural Islam that tends to stress "anthropolatry" towards the characteristics of the urban middle class Islam that tends to stress "bibliolatry" (Gellner 1992). The shift in religious disposition and affiliation is evident in my survey of the religious profiles of the membership of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intelligentsia (ICMI), an organization which attracted many of the newly urbanized Muslims.¹²⁵

Another aspect of modernization that helped boost the reputation of the mosque movement was the growing number of Muslim intellectuals with Master's and Ph.D. degrees. Benefiting from the government's drive for human resource development through overseas training, many *dakwah*-oriented scholars were able to improve their educational qualifications in Western countries, the very countries that were often viewed by Islamists with a double-consciousness. On the one hand, these Western countries were often portrayed as a source of moral degeneration and as a menacing threat to Islamic civilization. On the other hand, they were commonly viewed as a source of admiration since those who were able to study in the Western world were highly respected by their fellow compatriots. A significant number of Islamic scholars from secular university backgrounds began to pursue Ph.D. or Master's degrees in Western universities in the 1970s. Among them were such prominent *dakwah* activists as Amien Rais, Imaduddin Abdulrahim, Syafi'i Ma'arif, Kuntowidjojo, Fuad Amsjari, and Djalaluddin Rahmat (all went to the United States), Endang Saifuddin Anshari (to Canada), A.M. Saefuddin (to Germany). When they returned home, mostly in early 1980s, they contributed to the strengthening of the intellectual credibility of the mosque movement.

In addition to the unintended consequences of political repression and modernization, another driving force for the development of the mosque movement was the reconnection of the Indonesian Islamic movement to that of global Islam. Since the late 1920s, much of the attention and energy of the Indonesian Muslim community had been focused on domestic political struggles and intra-religious tensions that caused Indonesian Islamic movement to be inward looking. The New Order obstruction of political Islam, which coalesced with the deepening modernization-driven international

penetration of domestic life, provided the impetus for the younger generation of Muslim intelligentsia to reconnect itself with the global *ummat*. In this way the new Islamic movement tended to be more outward looking.

This reconnection with the global *ummat* took place at the very time when the entire Muslim World was swept by a great tremor of Islamism as the new ideological passion. Beginning in the 1970s, the failure of secular elites and their secular ideologies to offer an effective redemption for the socio-economic plight of Muslim societies in previous decades gave rise to a general social dissatisfaction. This disappointment, in the context of the Arab world, culminated in the defeat of Arab countries in the 1967 Arab-Israel war. Henceforth, the efficacy of secular ideologies such as socialism, liberalism, and Arabism were seriously questioned, and many Islamic activists began to call upon the Muslim community to return to the authentic source [*ashala*] of Islamic values. In countries with a moderate-secularism like Egypt, for instance, the literature of Marxism, existentialism, and other Western theories that were widely circulated among student activists in the 1950s and 1960s now began to be replaced by the Islamists' works, especially those of the *Ikhwanul Muslimin* [IM, Islamic Brotherhood] figures, such as Sayyid Qutb and Hasan al-Banna. Groups of Islamic fundamentalist intelligentsia such as the *Jama at Islamiyya* in Egypt began to attract large numbers of recruits within the milieu of the universities in the Arab world and beyond. Even in a secular Muslim country such as Turkey, the term "*aydin*" [Islamist intellectual] became popular from the 1980s onwards. This tide of Islamism gained its material foundation from the boom in oil prices in the 1970s giving rise to "Petro-Islam". The trickle-down effect of this oil boom brought benefits for the dissemination of Islamism, as giants of Petro-Islam like Saudi Arabia provided financial assistance to the *dakwah* organizations, especially through the Muslim World League (Abaza 1999, pp. 86–92).

Being receptive to external influences, the mosque movement in Indonesia became interested in Islamic ideas and methods of contemporary Islamic movements [*harakah*] in the Muslim World. In 1969, one of Sayyid Qutb's works, *This Religion of Islam* (published 1967) was translated into Indonesian [*Inilah Islam*] by A.R. Baswedan and A. Hanafi and published by Hudaya (Jakarta). In 1978 another translated work of Qutb, *Masyarakat Islam* [*Islamic Society*], was published in Bandung.¹²⁶ Thus, in the 1970s, Islamic ideas of this venerable intellectual of the Egypt-born Islamic *harakah*, *Ikhwanul Muslimin* (IM), became accessible to a particular segment of the Indonesian Islamic epistemic community. This would be followed in the subsequent decades by the arrival of the Malaysian movement *Darul Arqam*, the Indo-

Pakistan-originated *Jama'ah Tabligh*, the Jordan-originated *Hizbut Tahrir*, and some others.¹²⁷

The DDII was the agent most responsible for the dissemination of the *Ikhwanul Muslimin* ideology and *dakwah* method. Natsir had a close relationship with leaders of the IM. The banning of *Masjumi* made him sympathetic to the IM that faced a similar fate in Egypt.¹²⁸ Moreover, the IM's emphasis on the so-called *tarbiyah* movement (social-education based on a tight network of *usrah*), was regarded by the DDII as a useful method for the *dakwah* movement in Indonesia. In 1980, the DDII's magazine and publishing house, *Media Dakwah*, published a translation of Sayyid Qutb's work, *Ma 'ālim fi al-Tharīq*, under the title *Petunjuk Jalan* [*Signposts along the Road*].¹²⁹ Moreover, in 1979/1980 Natsir and DDII began to support the establishment of *Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab* [LIPIA, Institute for Islamic and Arabic Studies]. This institution was founded by Abdul Aziz Abdullah under the sponsorship of Mohammad Qutb (IM figure, brother of Sayyid Qutb) and Syaikh bin Baz (*Salafi* Figure). The two gurus advised Abdullah to contact Natsir to ask for his support. It was due to this strong connection with *harakah* figures that the LIPIA's library in its early formation had a predominance of IM literature.¹³⁰

Meanwhile, by the early 1980s some students who had been sent by Natsir to undertake overseas studies in the Middle East had returned home. Among them were people like Abu Ridho¹³¹ who had studied in Saudi Arabia and had been influenced by the teaching and method of the IM *harakah*. When he returned in 1981, he began to promote IM ideologies and methods of *dakwah* among the DDII activists. Thus, there emerged an early circle of the IM followers within the DDII, composed of Abu Ridho and some younger activists such as Mashadi (personal secretary of Mohamad Roem) and Mukhlis Abdi.¹³²

IM ideas then spread to activists of the PII. Besides the long history of a close relationship between the PII with *Masjumi*/DDII activists, the PII central office was located in the same complex as the DDII office. During the period of Mutammim Ula's leadership (1983–86), Qutb's translated works, particularly *Petunjuk Jalan*, were used in the cadre training of the PII.¹³³ The same book became compulsory reading material for alumni of the Salman's LMD (Damanik 2002, p. 96). Following the PII's rejection of *Pancasila* as the sole basis of the socio-political organization, the PII was banned from the public sphere which hindered the marketing of the IM ideologies in this organization. Nevertheless, Islamic ideas and *dakwah* methods of the IM continued to influence the Indonesian *dakwah* movement. Other works of

IM leaders were translated by graduates of the Middle East universities. Abu Ridlo played a conspicuous role in this project by translating works of Hasan Al Banna, Mushtafa Masyhur and Sa'id Hawwa, and establishing his own publishing house, *Al-Isblahy* Press to print them (Damanik 2002, p. 95). New Islamic publishers such as *Gema Insani* Press, *Al-Kautsar*, *Robbani* Press and *Era Intermedia* enhanced the success of IM popularization by translating and publishing other works of Qutb as well as works of IM figures such as Muhammad Qutb, Muhammad Al Ghazali and Yusuf Qardhawi. As a result, IM ideologies and *dakwah* methods greatly influenced Islamic activists of the campus mosques and were soon adopted by the training and mentoring programme of the LDK.

The reconnection of the Indonesian Muslim community to global Islam was also signified by the increase in numbers of Indonesian students in the Middle East. According to Mona Abaza's records (1999, pp. 95–96, 117), in 1966 the total membership of the Indonesian student association in Egypt was 36; in 1982–83 the number of Indonesian students in this country jumped to 415, increasing to 722–730 in 1987, and reaching around 1,000 in 1993. In 1987, the total Indonesian student population in Arab and Persian nations was 1,742 with most of them being in Saudi Arabia (904 students) and Egypt (722 students). The rest of the students were in Iran (32), Libya (27), Syria (21), Sudan (10), Jordan (9), Iraq (8), Turkey (7), and Algeria (2) respectively. Unlike Indonesian students in Western countries, however, most Indonesian students who studied in Muslim countries were studying at undergraduate level. Influenced by the growing popularity of Islamic *harakah* in the Middle East, many of these students after their return home became strategic partners of the mosque activists in championing *harakah* ideologies.

Another major event in the Muslim World that influenced the development of the mosque movement in Indonesia was the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Although the majority of Iranians follow Shiite Islam, while Indonesians follow Sunni Islam, this did not discourage Indonesian Islamic activists from admiring the success of the Islamic revolution and even led a few circles of Indonesian Muslims, especially those of Arabic origin, to be attracted to Shi'ah teachings.¹³⁴ For most Indonesian Islamic activists, however, this did not lead to (internal) religious conversion. For them, the significance of the Iranian Islamic revolution simply lay in its ability to provide an Islamic concept of revolution.

Soon after the Iranian Islamic revolution, the new Islamic publishing houses, especially the Bandung-based Mizan publisher, published translations of the works of Iranian intellectual-revolutionaries such as Ali Shariati, Murtadla Muthahhari and Imam Khomeini. These works provided Indonesian

Islamic activists with additional inspiration and motivation for Indonesian Islamic Movements. Thus, Ali Shariati's term "*rausyan fikir*" [enlightened intellectuals],¹³⁵ which advocated intellectual engagement with the plight of human beings, appealed to activists of the mosque movement.

The tide of Islamism which coincided with the windfall of the oil boom had given rise to a climate of optimism in the entire Muslim world that envisaged the arrival of an Islamic renaissance. The "World of Islam Festival" in London in August 1976, which exhibited the glorious past of Islam, expressed the spirit of Islamic revivalism. In the lead-up to the 1980s, the Muslim World League began to proclaim the fifteenth century of the Muslim calendar (*hijriyah* — which started in 1981) as the era of Islamic resurgence. To mark this imagined historic moment, the Muslim World League conducted the very first Islamic Mass Media Conference which took place in Jakarta, the capital of the most populous Muslim country, 1–3 September 1980. The reverberations from this event further galvanized the Islamic zeal of the mosque movement in Indonesia.

The campus mosques continued to serve as the exemplary centres of the mosque movement. Slowly but surely, almost every secular university developed its own LDK, and every LDK formed collaborations with lecturers of Islamic subjects to make sure that the mentoring programme becoming part of the lecture. Slowly but surely, the original content and method of *dakwah* as offered by the LMD was overshadowed by that imported from the international *harakah*. Terminologies of the *dakwah* movements increasingly drew on Arabic terminologies and replaced the English that had been widely adopted by Islamic student movements in the previous decades. By the late 1980s, the mosque movement under the influence of the IM *harakah* began to be known as the *tarbiyah* (educational) movement, using the same code as the IM.

The *dakwah* activists of the late 1980s and the 1990s were more dedicated than the HMI/PII-dominated *dakwah* activists of the 1960s–1970s in their appreciation of mosque life. According to a well-known campus mosque activist of the 1990s, Fahri Hamzah, the mosque was not the main ground for the HMI/PII training and activities, and it was not until the late 1960s that the *dakwah*-oriented HMI/PII intellectuals began to turn to the mosque as their base. For the later *dakwah* activists, on the other hand, the mosque was not only the main ground for their training and activities from the very beginning but also, for many of them, the home at which they stayed. This intimacy with mosque life caused the internalization of an Islamic identity and Islamic mindedness of the later *dakwah* activists to be much deeper than that of the *dakwah*-oriented HMI intellectuals.¹³⁶ As such, the later *dakwah*

activists were more susceptible to the influence of more puritan/militant Islamic ideas offered by the international Islamic *harakah*.

Moreover, there were at least two other reasons for the deepening identification of the Indonesian *dakwah* activists with the international *harakah*. Muslims at the “edge” (new learners of Islam on the periphery of the Muslim world) tended to glorify the “centre” either as a reflection of their obsession with authenticity or as an over-compensation for their lack of authority in Islamic studies. For people with this kind of psychological predisposition, the Islamic ideas of the international *harakah* offered a sense of credibility and authenticity, since organic intellectuals of this *harakah* mostly came from the centre of the Muslim World (Middle East) or at least from those who had studied in the Middle East. At the same time, there was a serious shortage of in-depth Islamic literature written by Indonesian intellectuals.

In the deepening identification with the international *harakah*, the later *dakwah* activists formed a distinct response to the challenge of the modern world. As the majority of Indonesian Muslims had been intensely exposed to the process of modernization, and most of the campus *dakwah* activists had also been very familiar with modern science and technology, the later *dakwah* activists began to depart from the historical project of previous generations of Muslim intelligentsia. While the concern of previous generations was how to modernize Islam, the concern of the later *dakwah* period was how to Islamize modernity. Consequently, people like Imaduddin Abdulrahim and other *dakwah* activists of the 1960s and 1970s, who used to be viewed as too Islamist by the standard of that time, came to be regarded as too moderate by the standard of *dakwah* activists of the late 1980s and the 1990s. For instance, Abdulrahim did not insist that his wife wear the *jilbab* [veil], which came to be considered as a requirement for a true Islamic believer as well as an icon for the Islamization of the modernity. Slogans such as “Islam is the solution” and “Islam is the alternative” now reverberated throughout university campuses.

To consolidate groups of LDK and to strengthen the cooperation among them, LDK activists from diverse campus backgrounds organized the first inter-LDK meeting known as *Forum Silaturahmi* (FS)-LDK in the ITB’s Salman mosque in 1986. At the second inter-LDK meeting, held in the IPB’s Al-Ghifari mosque in 1987, the guiding principle [*khitah*] of the LDK was formulated: “the LDK struggle rests on Islam as the religion of Allah (*dinullah*) and as a way of life, and will be united through the tie of the profession of the faith (“There is no god but God; Muhammad is the Prophet of God”).¹³⁷ This informal forum formed a network that connected these *dakwah* activists to one another, thus empowering their collective identity and solidarity. The

forum also provided avenues for exchanging ideas, allocating resources, and strengthening networks.

The FS-LDK with its ideology and networks served as the basis for further socio-political action. When the political opportunity structure in the New Order's public sphere changed in the late 1990s, *dakwah* activists of the sixth generation of Muslim intelligentsia, composed largely of those who were born in the 1970s, began to translate the LDK network into a political action group. In the midst of the *reformasi* movement, the tenth inter-LDK meeting, which was followed by sixty-four out of the sixty-nine existing LDKs throughout Indonesia and held in the mosque of the *Muhammadiyah* University of Malang on 25–29 March 1998, agreed to transform the LDK network into *Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia* [KAMMI, the United Front of Indonesian Islamic University Students] with Fahri Hamzah of the UI as its first chairman. The acronym KAMMI was inspired by KAMI, the HMI-dominated student movement of 1966. In the newly established KAMMI, however, the HMI was not included and its role in the reform movement was also marginal. The KAMMI was to become the most powerful student front in the 1998 student movement and beyond.¹³⁸

The Development of the Renewal Movement

As the secular universities became the stronghold of the *dakwah* movement, religious institutions, especially the IAIN, became the strongholds of the renewal movement. There are several explanations for this phenomenon. In Islamic institutions, almost all students are members of the *santri* [devout Muslim] community. As such, the level of competitive ideo-political struggle among students in Islamic institutions was less intense than that in the secular universities. The perennial conflict within the IAIN is an endogenous one, between the traditionalist and reformist-oriented Islamic students. Because of the lack of competition with supporters of secular ideologies inside the campus, students at Islamic institutions by and large tend to be less motivated than Islamic activists in secular universities in their propagation of Islamic claims.

In addition, Nurcholish Madjid had a hypothesis that the lack of religious instruction in secular universities prompted Islamic activists there to be more appreciative of Islamic knowledge and symbols. Needless to say, this lack of religious teaching could also lead students in secular universities to secular-mindedness.¹³⁹ Following the same logic it could be argued that the relative lack of secular scientific instruction in the IAIN and *Pesantren* could lead students of this community to highly value secular knowledge

and symbols. Again, it could also be argued that overwhelming amounts of religious instruction could also lead students in Islamic institutions to Islamic conservatism.

Imaduddin Abdulrahim believed that the persisting residue of colonial hierarchies of knowledge made students in Islamic institutions feel inferior to students in secular universities. To overcome this sense of inferiority, he believed, students in Islamic institutions tended to over-compensate by showing off their erudition in and openness to, Western intellectual ideas (Asshiddiqie et al. 2002, p. 34). Pursuing this reasoning, we may assume that Islamic activists in secular universities tend to be obsessed with Arabic terminologies and Islamist ideas as an over-compensation for their poor mastery of Arabic and Islamic literature.

Moreover, for many of the IAIN students, Madjid was regarded as a hero. His double term as chairman of the HMI and his reputation as the most celebrated Muslim intellectual of his generation helped raise the self-confidence and intellectual leverage of the IAIN community. In this way, he served as a role model for many of the IAIN students and intellectuals and his renewal ideas provided a benchmark for a new generation of IAIN intellectuals. His period of study at the University of Chicago,¹⁴⁰ for his doctorate (1978–84), provided the inspiration for many IAIN scholars to study at Western centres of Islamic studies.

The receptiveness of a great bulk of the IAIN community to the renewal movement was reinforced by the pro-modernization and accommodation policy of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Since the Mukti Ali period (1973–78), this ministry began to strengthen the teaching of general subjects in the IAIN and to encourage Muslim scholars to obtain higher education at Western centres of study. Apart from the government's general admiration for Western scientific and technological achievements, this encouragement was intended to stimulate Muslim intellectuals to take a more "objective" view of religion's role and to appreciate the need to accommodate it to a secularized modern world. In doing this, as Ruth McVey noted (1989, p. 208), the Ministry of Religious Affairs had "tried to bridge the gap between the *santri* community and the state by providing Islam with spokesmen who can communicate easily with the regime and share its general perceptions."

The immediate impact of this government support was a shift in the main destination for overseas postgraduate study of IAIN scholars — from centres of Islamic studies in the Middle East to those in the Western world. Until the late 1960s, only a few Indonesian scholars with Islamic educational backgrounds pursued Islamic studies at Western universities. Among the very few were H.M. Rasjidi, Mukti Ali, Anton Timur Jaelani, Harun Nasution,

and Kafrawi.¹⁴¹ From the 1970s onwards, however, the flow of IAIN scholars to Western universities multiplied and continued to increase exponentially (see next chapter). It was returnees from Western universities who became the potential agents for the diffusion of renewal ideas among the IAIN community (and beyond) throughout Indonesia.

Renewal ideas also found fertile ground in the HMI. With the HMI being dominated by pragmatic and moderate intellectuals, renewal ideas provided the mainstream HMI members with an ideological legitimacy for their integration into the New Order polity and bureaucracy. During the period of Ridwan Saidi's chairmanship (1974–76), it was thought that the HMI would provide an institutional basis for renewal ideas. Madjid and his colleagues, however, did not support the implementation of this idea, on the grounds that formalization might lead to the stagnation of renewal concepts.¹⁴² Even so, HMI members continued to become a potential audience for renewal ideas.

Beyond the IAIN and HMI community, the renewal ideas appealed to the accommodationist Muslim politicians and bureaucrats. The latter were mainly those who typically had no strong interest in theoretical Islamic thinking but provided the practical mechanism for the grounding of renewal ideas within the New Order political structure. Representatives par excellence of these politicians and bureaucrats were Akbar Tandjung (chairman of the HMI, 1971–73) and Mar'ie Muhammad (prominent HMI activist). Behind the two, there was a block of pragmatic Muslim intelligentsia who aspired to political and bureaucratic positions but could not achieve them through the vehicle of political Islam. Their incorporation into the New Order bureaucracy and polity strengthened the Muslim "bloc within" that had been pioneered by the previous generation of Muslim intelligentsia.

For the Muslim intelligentsia of the bloc within, Madjid's slogan, "Islam, yes; Islamic party, no!", and the acceptance of *Pancasila* by major Islamic organizations after 1983 were particularly pertinent. These were viewed as indication of friendliness to the state orthodoxy and paved the road for a mutual rapprochement between the Muslim intelligentsia and the state as well as making the state more responsive towards Muslims' cultural and positional interests.

The effect of the renewal ideas of former HMI leaders reverberated throughout society following in the path of the development of the renewal movement within the NU. The main protagonist of the renewal movement within this traditionalist community was Abdurrahman Wahid (b. 1940), the NU's foremost intellectual and member of the most honoured family-line in that community. He was a grandson of the venerable founding father

of the NU, Hasjim Asj'ari, and also a son of a prominent NU *intelekulama*, Wachid Hasjim.

After eight years' study in the Middle East (first at Al-Azhar University, Egypt and then at Baghdad University, Iraq), Abdurrahman Wahid returned to Jombang (East Java), the stronghold of the Indonesian traditionalist community, in 1971. When he returned home having studied both Islamic and Western literature, he was soon confronted with two serious challenges within the NU community: the challenge of the government-promoted modernization and the beginning of NU's strained relationship with the government, following NU's significant results in the 1971 election. How to enable the traditionalist community to come to terms with modernization and the (state-defined) national interest soon became his main concern.

As an intellectual, Wahid was challenged to develop a reinterpretation of the NU traditionalist legal and theological thinking in order to better deal with the challenge of modernization and national interest, while at the same time remaining respectful of indigenous local traditions. This was reflected in his early works such as *Bunga Rampai Pesantren* [*Capita Selecta of the Pesantren*] (1979) and *Muslim di Tengah Pergumulan* [*Muslims in the Midst of Struggle*] (1981).

His renewal ideas following neo-traditionalist lines were enriched by his socialization with intellectuals of diverse communities, especially with the Jakarta-based renewal intellectuals. From the 1970s he was invited by Tawang Alun, Dawam Rahardjo and Adi Sasono (pro-renewal HMI intellectuals in the NGO sector) to take part in a project concerning *pesantren* community development, designed by two prominent Jakarta based-NGOs, the Social and Economic Research, Education, and Information Institute (LP3ES, est. 1971) and the Association for *Pesantren* and Community Development (P3M, est. 1983). Through his encounter with NGO activists, Wahid's intellectual ideas began to be imbued with the dominant themes among NGO activists: alternative development, democracy and human rights.¹⁴³

Wahid was also invited to join a circle of renewal intellectuals of neo-modernism gathered around an NGO organization, LKIS,¹⁴⁴ and around a pluralistic discussion forum known as *Majelis Reboan* [The Wednesday Circle] (est. 1984).¹⁴⁵ Both these institutions contributed to the reinforcement of Wahid's ideas on secularization, pluralism, non-sectarianism, inclusivism, and the contextualization of Islam.¹⁴⁶ This would lead to the formulation of his Islamic paradigm called "*pribumisasi Islam*" (indigenization of Islam). Through this paradigm, the traditionalist community found not only a new intellectual weapon to defend its historical religious practices from reformist-modernist

criticism, but also a new rationale for the subordination of Islam to the national interest.

Wahid's individual intellectual ideas partly reflected his genuine commitment to pluralism, the national interest, and democracy, but they were not entirely devoid of political interest. As a man committed to defend the interests of the traditionalist community, he attempted to ease the strained relationship between the NU and the authorities and to bring the NU along the accommodationist line. He came to see the necessity of accommodationism because of the continuing marginalization of NU politicians from the Islamic party, PPP. The government's imposition of *Pancasila* as sole political principle [*azas tunggal*] provided him with a means to draw the NU away from the PPP and to bring it closer to the government. Already in December 1983 he successfully influenced the NU national meeting in Situbondo (East Java) to accept *Pancasila* as *azas tunggal* and to return the NU to its original spirit [*khitah*] as a social and religious organization. Like Madjid's slogan "Islam, yes; Islamic party, no!", this return to the *khitah* is worth considering as a political strategy which used a non-formal political approach to strengthen the NU's bargaining power with the New Order regime. Shortly after the Tanjung Priok massacre on 12 September 1984, Wahid made the controversial decision to invite General L.B. Murdani to visit some NU *pesantren*. Partly as a result of this friendly move towards the government he was able to be elected as the Chairman of the NU's executive body *tanfidziyah* in December 1984. In 1988, he was also appointed as a Golkar representative in the Working Committee of the MPR.

While maintaining his accommodationist strategy, Wahid also was able to maintain the NU's reputation and his own in the eyes of civil society based on his participation in NGO activities and his outspoken championing of pluralism, democracy and human rights. In many cases, however, not all good things went together. His position as the defender of the interests of the traditionalist community interests drew him towards accommodation with the government, while his position as a free intellectual urged him to speak the truth to power. Because of this he became known as the most controversial Muslim intellectual. Whatever he seemed, however, as the chairman of the largest Muslim organization in the country, his renewal ideas made a significant contribution to the impact of the renewal movement.

The hegemony of the renewal discourse in the public sphere, which was made possible by the positive reception of "regimes of truth" (the state ideological apparatus and media exposure) in a Foucauldian sense,¹⁴⁷ would finally force the *Muhammadiyah* to support the renewal ideas, although in

a more limited way. The acceptance of the renewal ideas within the *Muhammadiyah* came rather later for at least two reasons. As a reformist organization, the *Muhammadiyah* could not easily bury its desire to maintain Islamic purity and authenticity. Moreover, prominent young figures of the *Muhammadiyah* such as Amien Rais and Syafi'i Maarif had a close relationship with the DDII. Even so, the exposure of these young intellectuals to another epistemic community and the intellectual network had a significant impact on their later intellectual development. This especially happened after Rais and Maarif undertook postgraduate studies in the United States. Both Rais and Maarif finished their Ph.D. programmes at the University of Chicago in 1981 and 1982 respectively. During their study at that university, Rais was supervised by three Jewish scholars with one of them being Leonard Binder,¹⁴⁸ while Maarif was supervised by, among others, a prominent liberal (neo-modernist) Pakistani Islamic thinker who also taught Madjid, Fazlur Rahman. Through their encounter with these intellectuals who were promoting liberalism, they began to be more sympathetic to the renewal ideas.

In November 1982 Amien Rais surprised the Indonesian public by his move towards the renewal line. In his interview with *Panji Masyarakat* (No. 376/1982), he rejected the existence of the Islamic state as a concept, because, according to him, it is not evident in the *Qur'an* or the *Sunna* [Way of the Prophet]. Next, he stated he could accept *Pancasila* as the state ideology, on the basis that Islam is above ideology and *Pancasila* itself does not contradict Islamic principles. Under the influence of young intellectual figures as Rais, the *Muhammadiyah* National Congress in December 1985 accepted *Pancasila* as its *azas tunggal*. Many *Muhammadiyah* intellectuals, however, tended to reject the idea of secularization on the basis that the concept is alien to Islamic society. The rejection of an Islamic state, in Rais' view, by no means meant the removal of religious values and guidance from public life. The first principle of *Pancasila*, he argued, implicitly recognizes the indivisibility of religion and public life. This latter view made it possible for him and other *Muhammadiyah* intellectuals to remain on good terms with activists of the *dakwah* movement. At the same time, this inhibited the further development of his liberal ideas. His renewal ideas were then focused on the rethinking of Islamic legal theories [*fiqh*], to enable Islam to respond better to the challenges of modern life, and then on the practical reform of the Indonesian political system.

The gestures of Muslim intellectuals and organizations towards the state orthodoxy freed the Muslim intelligentsia in the bureaucracy from the stigma of being against the New Order and helped break the psychological barrier to expressing and socializing cultural Islam within the milieu of the bureaucracy.

Muslim bureaucrats now openly organized communal prayers, religious services and the celebration of Islamic days. They also established at first small prayer houses [*mushalla*] but then gradually built mosques [*masjid*] near most government offices. Slowly but surely, Muslim bureaucrats dared to express their Islamic identity, expressed through new fashions like using Islamic greetings [*assalamu'alaikum*] and making the pilgrimage to Mecca. A rapprochement between nominal and devout Muslims within the bureaucracy began to take place, as the former were gradually incorporated into the "house" of cultural Islam. Many nominal Muslim bureaucrats began to learn more about Islam by inviting private Islamic teachers to their own houses, with the Suharto family being a notable example of this phenomenon.¹⁴⁹

There were some surprising results from these developments as exemplified by the following B.J. Habibie story. Once in the late 1980s, he said, Suharto led and opened the Cabinet meeting wearing a *peci* (black cap, as an icon of Muslim identity) and reciting *bismillah* (a phrase used by Muslims for various occasions and considered an act of piety). Habibie then asked him: "Why did you do that?" Suharto said: "Formerly, we were weak economically. That is why we needed the Catholic lobby for the international capitalist community and why it was difficult for me to express my own Islamic identity. But now we are sufficiently strong to assert our own identity."¹⁵⁰

The Development of the 'Third Way' Movement

There had been some moments and some opportunities where supporters of the *dakwah* and renewal movements could share some common ground. Both groups were frequently linked with each other over what Edward Said calls "worldliness". By this term he means an intellectual's constant engagement with the link between textuality (discursive consciousness) and the world (practical consciousness). It is a concern with the materiality of religious precepts and morality in the face of political, material and spiritual deprivation of human beings, for in this material being, so Said argues, is embedded the materiality of the matters of which it speaks: dispossession, injustice, marginality, subjection (Said 1983).

Realizing the urgent need to respond to human suffering and the negative impact of development, some Muslim activists of different intellectual inclinations began to move beyond Islamism and liberalism. By emphasizing the transformative dimension of Islam through the empowerment of civil society and "applied" morality and spirituality, these intellectuals constituted the "Third Way" Islamic movement in response to the New Order polity and orthodoxy. This Islamic movement was actualized through the "third sector"

in de Tocqueville's sense (1835); that is a new form of voluntary non-governmental organization known as *Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat* [LSM, Self-Reliant Community Institution] and the communities of Islamic spiritualism and art that began to flourish in the 1970s.

At the outset, proponents of the Islamic renewal movements with religio-socialistic inclinations such as Tawang Alun, Dawam Rahardjo, Utomo Dananjaya, and Aswab Mahasin began their engagement in this third way movement by joining the Social and Economic Research, Education, and Information Institute (LP3ES) a few years after its establishment in 1971. This prominent LSM was established by such well-known socialist intellectuals as Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, Emil Salim, Dorodjatun Kuncoro-Djakti, Nono Anwar Makarim and some others with funding from Friederich Naumann Stiftung (FNS, Federal Republic of Germany). In a later development, this LSM became a joint venture between socialist and Islamic activists, which resembled the close relationship between the great socialist and *Masjumi* leaders, namely, Sutan Sjahrir and Mohammad Natsir. The main concern of the LP3ES was to correct the negative impact of the development and repressive politics of the New Order by offering alternative development options and positioning itself as a counterbalance to and counterpart of the government, as well as being an intermediary institution between the state and society.¹⁵¹ About the same time, some other Muslim activists with HMI backgrounds such as Abdurrachman Saleh, Mohammad Assegaff and Abdul Bari joined the foremost NGO in the field of legal aid, the Foundation of Indonesian Legal Aid Institutions [*Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia*] (est. 1971). This NGO aimed to promote the rule of law by strengthening the bargaining powers and constitutional rights of the poor and marginal in society.

Following the emergence of the LP3ES and the YLBHI, several former leaders of the HMI/PII (Nurcholish Madjid, Dawam Rahardjo, Utomo Dananjaya, and A.M. Fatwa) in collaboration with NU intellectuals (Abdurrahman Wahid, Fahmi Saefuddin, and Abdullah Sjarwani) in 1974 established an Islamic LSM called *Lembaga Kebajikan Islam Samanhudi* [LKIS, the Samanhudi Institute for Islamic Benevolent Service] (est. 1974). Chaired initially by Madjid, this institute was intended to promote Muslim entrepreneurship, alternative development and Islamic research.¹⁵²

Next, in 1982 Adi Sasono in collaboration with Muslim intellectuals of the LP3ES began to establish the Institute of Development Studies [*Lembaga Studi Pembangunan*, LSP]. Like the LP3ES, the LSP sought to penetrate bureaucratic structures and influence policy from within, while at the same

time building up groups at grass-roots level as self-sustaining, economic units, and informing them of their rights and entitlements. The LSP's analysis highlighted the destructive impact of trans-national companies, the growing gap between rich and poor, and the marginalization of local skills and enterprise. This analysis was highly influenced by the perspective of dependency (neo-Marxist) theory, which underpinned much radical thinking about Indonesian alternative development and politics during the 1970s–1980s (Eldridge 1995, p. 74–75).

Shortly afterwards, there also appeared an LSM specializing in the *pesantren*-based community development known as *Perkumpulan Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat* [P3M, Association for *Pesantren* and Community Development] (est. 1983). This LSM brought together Muslim intellectuals of the LSP (Adi Sasono), LP3ES (Dawam Rahardjo and Utomo Dananjaya), the NU (Abdurrahman Wahid, Jusuf Hasjim, and Sahal Mahfudz) and the reformist group (Sholeh Iskandar and Hamam Dja'afar). The executive of this organization was also comprised of a younger generation of Islamic activists from various streams, such as Muchtar Abbas (former activist of the Salman mosque), Mansour Faqih (former HMI activist), Masdar F. Mas'udi (young NU activist) and some others. Other young Islamic activists emerged in various LSMs that mushroomed in the 1980s such as Fachry Ali, Muslim Abdurrahman, Habib Chirzin, Imam Ahmad and many more.

Furthermore, the emergence of the socially-oriented LSM provided an inspiration for the establishment of similar organizations specializing in the field of Islamic studies, publication and consulting. Various new Islamic centres began to emerge in the later part of the 1980s to provide spaces for self-actualization, especially for returnees from overseas study. Four notable examples will be given here. After his return to Indonesia in 1984, Nurcholish Madjid, with the support of his fellow renewal protagonists, founded the Paramadina Foundation in 1987 as a vehicle to propagate the so-called neo-modernist thinking to people of Jakarta's upper and middle class. Second, in 1986 Imaduddin Abdulrahim¹⁵³ collaborated with his disciple of the LMD programme, Hatta Radjasa, to found in 1987 the YAASIN *Yayasan Pembina Sari Insani* foundation, specializing in an Islamic version of Achievement Motivation Training. Third, Dawam Rahardjo and his intellectual colleagues (some of them were returnees from overseas study) founded in 1988 the Institute for Religious and Philosophical Studies (LSAF), as a vehicle to promote Islamic thinking relevant to the challenges of modern life and published through its prominent journal *Ulumul Qur'an*. Fourth, after his return to Indonesia in 1982, Djalaluddin Rahmat with

the support of some Shiite-influenced intellectuals founded the Muthahhari foundation in 1988, as a vehicle to promote the so-called “Islam alternative” with its emphasis on non-sectarianism.

Most of the LSMs, and also some of the Islamic centres, brought together Muslim activists of diverse religious affiliations. In implementing their agendas, this form of Islamic agency often gained official or logistical support from the Muslim intelligentsia in the “bloc within” and in the private economic sector; at the same time it also collaborated with a range of Islamic groups regardless of their theological and ideological inclinations. By involving people of multiple affiliations, the LSMs and their activists provided bridges between intellectuals and associations that made possible the mobilization of collective action. For proponents of the renewal movement, engagement in community development and critical discourse also provided a balance to their support for the state orthodoxy. In this way, they were able to preserve their reputation before the emergence of the pro-democratic and civil society movement.

In addition to the rise of LSMs and Islamic centres, the third way movement was also manifested in the revival of the Islamic spiritualism and art movement. Throughout the 1980s–1990s, the literature on Islamic Sufism was among the best selling books in the country.¹⁵⁴ Islamic orders [*tareqat*], such as *tareqat Tijaniyyah* and new forms of Islamic orders attracted new memberships from segments of the urban and upper middle class, regardless of their religious backgrounds. Foundations of various Islamic movements such as *Muthahhari* and *Darut Tauhid* in Bandung, *Paramadina*, *Sehati* and *Tazkiya Sejati* in Jakarta actively promoted studies on this subject. The interest of people with middle and upper class backgrounds in Islamic Sufism seemed to be a kind of compensation for their feelings of spiritual deprivation in the midst of the materialism and consumerism of metropolitan life.

The Islamic art movement was expressed in various art forms. In music, the representative par excellence of this movement was the Bimbo group. Emerging in the 1960s as “Trio Bimbo” (composed of three brothers, Sjamsuddin Hardjakusumah, Darmawan often referred to as Acil, and Djaka Purnama), this group originally performed Latin American and Spanish songs, reflecting the alienation of the Westernized uprooted generation of the 1960s. In the early 1970s, the youngest sister, Iin Parlina, joined the group and it began to move to Indonesian pop music. “We want to find our own musical character and are trying to formulate an Indonesian style,” said Acil (Sumarsono 1998, p. 134). Just as the group began to perform Indonesian pop songs, Sjamsuddin (then a student of the ITB) was becoming interested in the early activities of the Salman mosque. Inspired by the delivery of a

Friday prayer in this mosque, he began to write a religious song entitled *Tuhan* (God) in 1973, which became a hit throughout Indonesia as well as the turning point for the Bimbo's concentration on the genre of religious songs called *kasidah*. Through its collaboration with a prominent Islamic poet, Taufiq Ismail, the Bimbo's *kasidah* were given powerful lyrics which promised the beauty of religiosity and the serenity of religious devotion. These themes appealed especially to the urban middle class of diverse theological and ideological affiliations who were affected by rapid social change and spiritual deprivation amid the hustle and bustle of modern life.¹⁵⁵

How to respond to the contemporary problems of human beings by using the resource of Islamic traditions and spiritualism became the main concern of Muslim literati from the 1970s. Some Muslim *literati* made an attempt to draw on Islamic traditions and spiritualism to find new forms and inspiration for artistic themes and expression. This genre of *sastra Islam* [Islamic literature] was often referred to as transcendental or prophetic or *sufistic* literature.¹⁵⁶ Prominent figures of these Muslim literati were Danarto, Kuntowidjojo, Taufik Ismail, Abdul Hadi, Emha Ainun Nadjib, Mustofa Bisri, M. Fudoli Zaini, Ajip Rosidi, D. Zawawi Imron, Hamid Djabbar and Sutardji Calzoum Bachri.

In the performing arts, similar concerns were expressed through the emergence of Muslim theatre groups. Examples of these groups were Arifin C. Noer's *Teater Kecil*, the Yogyakarta-based *Teater Muslim* and *Teater Shalahuddin*, and theatres of campus mosques throughout Indonesia. In the art of painting, similar concerns had inspired some Muslim painters to use Islamic calligraphy. Prominent among these were the painters Ahmad Shadali, A.D. Pirous, Amang Rahman, Amri Jahja, and Abay Subarna. In the field of fashion, Muslim designers began to turn to Islamic dress. Most of these designers were women and some had been well known as movie stars. Representatives of these designers were Anne Rufaidah, Fenny Mustafa, Ida Royani, Ida Leman, and Sitoresmi Prabuningrat.

The emergence of this Islamic art movement and spiritualism represented the growth of a new Muslim *habitus* in Bourdieu's sense. In his sense, *habitus* is more than habit. It is a collective schemata of experience and perception which contains both a subjective expression of a particular identity and also an objective means for the naturalization and affirmation of a particular identity (Bourdieu 1977, p. 73). Thus, the Islamic art movement expressed the Islamic (artistic) identity of the new Islamized middle class, while at the same time serving as the principle of structuration and affirmation for the new Islamic identity of this community. By involving people of different religious affiliations and distancing itself from ideo-political disputes among

the Muslim community, the Islamic art movement also served as a meeting ground for the articulation of the general interests of the Muslim community.

The Development of the 'Second Sector' Movement

Another essential struggle, which was often overshadowed by the clamour of other movements, took place in the private economic sector, the second sector in de Tocqueville's sense. Generally speaking, the Muslim economy under the New Order underwent a serious devastation. Although the ruin of the *santri* economy started at least as early as the late-colonial period, the New Order economic regime hastened its decline. The deepening integration of the national economy into the world capitalist community along with the pro-growth and pro-conglomerate economic policy of the New Order economic technocrats destroyed the economic backbone of the *santri* merchant. As a result the traditional image of *santri* as merchant bourgeoisie was lost. Richard Robison puts this succinctly (1978, p. 23):

The largely Muslim *asli* [indigenous] merchant bourgeoisie have, in a very real sense, been overtaken by history. They are the victims of the penetration of foreign and Chinese capitalists with overwhelming financial and technological resources. They are also the victims of a tradition of politico-bureaucratic power (originating in the precolonial agrarian kingdoms of Java) which has successfully integrated itself into the neocolonialist structures of post-1949 Indonesia.

The most dramatic example of this phenomenon was the ruin of local indigenous small-scale businesses and petty trading, traditionally in the hands of the *santri* group. These for instance were clove-cigarette manufacturers in Kudus (Central Java), long-established garment industries in Majalaya and Majalengka (West Java), and small scale batik companies in Pekalongan and Pekajangan (Central Java).¹⁵⁷

Nevertheless, some Muslim businessmen, especially those from HMI backgrounds, were able to benefit from the New Order economic development programmes. Benefiting from a rapprochement between the regime and the Muslim community and from the network of *santri* bureaucrats and politicians, some groups of Muslim businessmen transformed themselves into (lesser) economic conglomerates. Representatives par excellence of these groups were the Bakri group (owned by the Bakri brothers), the Kodel group (owned by, among others, Fahmi Idris and Sugeng Sarjadi), the Bukaka Group (owned by the Kala brothers, Yusuf and Ahmad Kalla, and Fadel Muhammad), the Pasaraya group (owned by Abdul Latif), and the PKBI group (owned by the association of Muslim batik cooperatives).

Although these Muslim businessmen might not directly engage in the development of the *dakwah*, renewal and third way movements, their presence made a special contribution to the Indonesian Islamic movement. Apart from providing job opportunities for Islamic activists from diverse movements, they also frequently provided financial support for the Islamic projects of various movements. As each of the groups needed some finance, this sector was also a meeting ground of Muslim interests. The failure or success of this sector would have a definite impact on the future shape of Islamic movements.

CONCLUSION

The New Order began with a discourse on the betrayal of intellectuals. At critical historical junctures, when national politics was beset by repression and structural disunity, there was a recurring tendency for Indonesian oppositional intellectuals to condemn intellectual engagement in the formal political structure. In fact, this did not stop Indonesian intellectuals' preoccupation with politics. Moreover, those who had been cooperative with the power structure in the past tended to benefit more from regime change.

In the New Order political cosmology, conflicting civilian politics, and mass political mobilization was responsible for economic and political turmoil. This provided the justification for the realization of the military's long and keen interest to play a dominant role in Indonesian politics. With the promise of guaranteeing political stability for the sake of economic modernization, the military became the principal power broker of New Order politics in collaboration with civilian technocrats and the international capitalist community.

Economic development (modernization) and political stability became the state orthodoxy and the dominant discourse in the public sphere. Under the new political maxim, the national outlook changed from "*politik-sebagai-panglima*" [politics as commander] to "*ekonomi-sebagai-panglima*" [economy as commander]. For the sake of economic modernization, political stability was maintained through the control of political freedom and participation. The New Order soon transformed itself into a repressive-developmental regime.

Under the New Order's *rust en orde* policy, political Islam that was regarded as responsible for political disorder in the past became the first victim of political repression. Muslim intellectuals faced a dilemma, whether to take a cooperative or non-cooperative stance. The different responses to this choice caused internal ideological disputes in response to the new order's modernization-cum-secularization.

The second generation of Muslim intellectuals (Natsir's generation) tended to choose the non-cooperative option. Finding their political role obstructed, they turned to education and the *dakwah* movement. Among their last major contributions to the Islamic intellectual movement were the formation of cadres for the training of future leaders of the *dakwah* movement and the provision of motivational and financial support for the establishment of university mosques.

The third generation of Muslim intellectuals (Pane's generation), as children of the revolution, tended to choose the cooperative option. They generally shared a common nationalistic and political outlook with the military intelligentsia. The political role of this generation, however, was limited, because of their lack of competitive advantage particularly in terms of their educational qualifications.

The fourth generation of Muslim intellectuals (Madjid's generation) was divided by and large into two camps: proponents of the *dakwah* or of the renewal movements. The former tended to be critical of the state orthodoxy, while the latter tended to be more supportive. Supporters of the *dakwah* movement came largely from mosque activists of the secular universities, while supporters of the renewal movement largely came from the IAIN, HMI, groups of pragmatic politicians, and also from NU intellectuals and somewhat later from *Muhammadiyah* intellectuals. Despite their differences, both camps shared a common interest in action in the cultural field. Both also found a meeting ground in the "third way" (civil society and art) and "second way" (private economic) movements.

The *dakwah* movement made a major contribution to the Islamizing of the secular academic community, while the renewal movement made a major contribution to the so-called "greening" [*penghijauan*] or Islamization of the Indonesian bureaucracy and polity. The synergy of these achievements in conjunction with a conducive political opportunity structure would lead to the establishment of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intelligentsia (ICMI).

Notes

1. Quoted in Hassan (1980, p. 125).
2. Bulliet (1994, p. 195).
3. It remains unclear whether this "mandate" was issued at Sukarno's initiative or because of pressure from Suharto.
4. The PKI was physically and legally eliminated.

5. In March 1968 Suharto was appointed full president by the (provisional) MPRS, instead of by the newly elected permanent MPR, as the general elections were delayed until mid-1971.
6. Other views are: Geertz's description of the Indonesian state (in the 1950s and 1960s) as a state *manque*, Emmerson's account of the strengthening of the Indonesian bureaucracy, Feith's description of the New Order as a "repressive-developmental regime", Liddle's discussion of the institutionalization of the New Order and the "relative autonomy" of the politician, and Mackie's and MacIntyre's account of an increasing autonomous state. A good overview of these theories has been given by Jim Schiller (1996, pp. 1–27).
7. In *Repelita II* (Five Year Plan II, 1974/75–1978/79), the educational budget accounted for 10.0 per cent of the total; in *Repelita III* (1979/80–1983/84) the budget rose to 10.4 per cent, and jumped to 14.7 per cent in *Repelita IV* (1984/85–1988/89). See *Departemen Penerangan* (1983, 1988).
8. For the three countries' public expenditure on education as a percentage of the GNP between 1975 and 1989, see *UNESCO Statistical Yearbook* (UNESCO, 1976–90).
9. The accurate collection of higher education statistics in the 1960s was difficult. For example, based on the educational statistics of the Education Ministry, Thomas noted that total university enrolment in 1965 was 278,000. But he added that the true total enrolment for that year might have been less than that number (Thomas 1973, p. 13). Based on the records of the Ministry of Education and Culture (1997), total numbers of university students in 1965 were 46,000. This number certainly excludes students of the private universities and in diploma programmes.
10. Although it has to be borne in mind that other religions were also taught.
11. This number comprised 2,637,559 *madrasah ibtidaiyah* students, 80,961 *madrasah tsanawiyah* students, and 27,069 *madrasah 'aliyah* students.
12. This number comprised 3,167,669 *madrasah ibtidaiyah* students, 1,053,368 *madrasah tsanawiyah* students, and 356,486 *madrasah 'aliyah* students.
13. Beginning in 1997, almost all branches of the IAINs scattered in various cities were converted into *Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri* [STAIN, State Advanced Islamic School].
14. By 1990 the figure had become 10 per cent, to reach 12 per cent by 1999. See E. Tobing (*The Prospect*, 21 December 2003).
15. The *Merdeka* daily (est. 1945), the oldest of the newspapers that had been banned in February 1965, resumed publication on 2 June 1966. It was followed by the reappearance of Mochtar Lubis' *Indonesia Raya* (est. 1949) in 1968 and Rosihan Anwar's *Pedoman* (est. 1948), and the *Masjumi's Abadi* (est. 1951).
16. Among the media that survived during the Old Order and continued their publication under the new regime were the NU's *Duta Masyarakat* (est. 1953), *Kompas* (est. 1965) and *Sinar Harapan* (est. 1962). *Kompas*, a paper with

affiliations with the Catholic community, began to develop into the best informed independent newspapers. *Sinar Harapan*, a paper with affiliations with the Protestant community, also experienced new growth.

17. The daily *Harian KAMI*, the mouthpiece of the student movement, was an important newcomer headed by Nono Anwar Makarim along with such literary figures as Taufiq Islamil, Arief Budiman and Gunawan Mohamad as editors. Later, *Tempo* magazine with Gunawan Mohamad as its editor-in-chief emerged in 1971 and soon developed itself into the nation's premier weekly news magazine. Moreover, there also appeared after 1965 new army newspapers such as *Angkatan Bersenjata* and *Berita Yudha* along with the organ of Golkar, *Suara Karya*.
18. Among articles on intellectuals published in *Kompas* were S. Tasrif's "*Berachirlah kini zaman Pengkhianatan Kaum Intellektuil Indonesia*" [The Era of the Betrayal of Indonesian Intellectuals has now Come to Its End] (pub. 27 April 1966), and "*Julien Benda dan pengkhianatan kaum intelektuil*" [Julian Benda and the Betrayal of the Intellectuals] (pub. 12 May); Wiratmo Soekito's "*Apakah sebabnya Kaum Intellektuil Indonesia tak terkalahkan?*" [What made the Indonesian Intellectual Remain Undeclared?] (pub. 31 May); Satyagraha Hoerip's "*Apakah benar kaum intelektuil Indonesia tak terkalahkan?*" [Is it True that the Indonesian Intellectual Remains Undeclared?] (pub. 27 June), Soe Hok Gie's "*Antara Kemerdekaan Intellektuil dan Instruksi Partai*" [Between Intellectual Freedom and Party Instruction] (pub. 20 August), and M.T. Zen's "*Tugas Tjendekiawan: Mengisi Kemerdekaan*" [The Role of Intellectuals: To Give Meaning to Independence] (pub. 9–12 July).
19. Based on information from Maskun Iskandar (a former journalist of the *Indonesia Raya*) on 2 August 2001, Wira was a pseudonym of *Indonesia Raya* journalist, Djafar Husein Assegaf (currently he is the editor-in-chief of *Media Indonesia*).
20. Names directly attacked by the articles were Prof Sadli (for his criticism of foreign capital), Prof Ismail Suny (for his criticism on *Trias Politica*), Barli Halim (for labelling "text-book thinkers" those who did not support the "national identity"), Emil Salim (for his obsessive use of Sukarno jargon in his academic writing), and Prof R.M. Sutjipto Wirjosuparto (for his interpretation of history based on *Manipol-USDEK* doctrines).
21. Among intellectuals praised by the articles were Prof Bahder Djohan, Dr Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, and Dr Bagowi for their courage to say "no" to the ruling power, though they had to pay dearly with the loss of their official positions.
22. Wira's articles provided examples of this tendency. Among others Prof Sadli who had been the focal point of anti-foreign investment during the Sukarno regime became the initial chairman of the New Order's Committee of Foreign Investment.
23. Prof Sadli wrote a counter article in *Indonesia Raya* on 21 April 1969 followed

- by a similar articles by Prof Ismail Suny published in *Kompas* (22 April) and in *Indonesia Raya* (23 April). The polemic in *Indonesia Raya* also involved J. Soedradjad Djiwandono, "*Beberapa Tjatatatan Tentang Persoalan Pelatjuran Intelektuil*" [Some Notes on the Issue of the Prostitution of Intellectuals] (pub. 24 April), L.E. Hakim, "*Pelatjuran Intelektuil di Zaman Resim Soekarno: Sebuah Tanggapan*" [Intellectual Prostitution during the Sukarno Regime: A Commentary] (pub. 25 April), and M-Zen Rahman, "*Sebuah Tanggapan tentang Pelatjuran Intelektuil di Zaman Resim Soekarno*" [A Commentary on Intellectual Prostitution during the Sukarno Regime] (pub. 26 April).
24. *Ampera* was a popular Sukarno slogan as the acronym of *Amanat Penderitaan Rakyat* [Message of the People's Suffering]. The first *Ampera* Cabinet (July 1966–October 1967) was led by Sukarno.
 25. The military proportion of this cabinet was nine of twenty-three ministers. Civilian technocrats assumed eight ministries with three of them deriving from the Christian communities (Drs Frans Seda as the Minister of Finance, Prof G.A. Siwabessy as the Minister of Health, and Dr A.M. Tambunan, S.H. as the Minister of Social Affairs). Some four ministers derived from independent political figures and journalists (Sri Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX as the State Minister of Economic and Finance, Sanusi Hardjadinata as the Minister of Education and Culture, Adam Malik as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and B.M. Diah as the Minister of Information). At this juncture, there remained two representatives of the traditionalist Muslim community (K.H. Idham Khalid as the State Minister of Social Welfare without portfolio and K.H. Mohamad Dachlan as the Minister of Religious Affairs). Surprisingly, the modernist-cum-the *Masjumi's* intellectuals who had become the military's main partner in cracking down on the PKI and Sukarno regime had no single representative in the cabinet.
 26. For the etymology and genealogy of the term, see chapter 1.
 27. Anwar's articles in *Kompas* were "*Tanggung djawab kita dalam modernisasi*" [Our Responsibility in Modernization] (4–5 July), "*Inteligensia & Modernisasi*" [Intelligentsia and Modernization] (12 August), "*Modernisasi, waktu dan kerdja*" [Modernization, Time and Work] (29 August), "*Modernisasi & Agama*" [Modernization and Religion] (14 September), "*Modernisasi & Nilai*" [Modernization & Values] (30 November), "*Modernisasi & Pendidikan*" [Modernization & Education] (8 December).
 28. The first task of this team was to draw up a Programme for Stabilization and Rehabilitation, which was incorporated in decree no. 23 of the MPRS. Based on this Decree the guidelines for Indonesia's economic recovery were set out on 3 October, "specifically policies on a balanced budget, the balance of payments, rehabilitation of physical infrastructure, food production and agricultural development" (Thee 2002, p. 196).
 29. By the early 1990s, the real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) had expanded by over 450 per cent, and per capita GNP had reached almost US\$1,000. Rice yields had almost doubled, and production of most food crops had increased

substantially. Rapid industrial growth transformed Indonesia from an economy highly dependent on agriculture in the mid-1960s to one in which the manufacturing sector contributed more to GDP than agriculture in the mid-1990s.

30. Already in Suharto's interim cabinet, *Kabinet Ampera yang Disempurnakan* [the Revised Ampera Cabinet] (11 October 1967–6 June 1968) the military assumed eight out of twenty-three ministers, which was the largest portion compared to representatives of other political groups. Furthermore, the sphere of influence of the civilian ministers was further limited by the appointment of army officers to high positions in the civil service. As Harold Crouch noted (1978, p. 242): "Of the twenty departments concerned with civilian affairs in 1966, army officers held the position of secretary-general in ten and a naval officer was appointed in another. Of the sixty-four directors-general appointed at the same time, fifteen were army officers and eight were from the other three services." The dominant position of army officers in the central government was followed by a similar phenomenon in regional administration. At the beginning of 1966, twelve out of twenty-four provincial governors were military officers. Next, after the 1971 elections, the military officers assumed twenty-two out of twenty-six governorships (Crouch 1978, p. 244). In Suharto's *Kabinet Pembangunan IV* (1983–88), out of thirty-seven ministers, fourteen had military backgrounds. At the same time, about half of sub-cabinet positions such as secretaries-general, directors-general, and inspectors-general were held by seconded officers, and about three-quarters of the twenty-seven governorships and a small majority of district headships were occupied by the armed forces (Liddle 1996b, p. 19).
31. At the very beginning, Let.-Gen. Panggabean (b. 1922, a Protestant), and Maj.-Gen. Basuki Rachmat (Javanese-*abangan*) exercised great influence on political decisions. In addition, Maj.-Gen. Ibnu Sutowo, Brig.-Gen. Suhardiman (both Javanese-*abangan*), and Brig.-Gen. Achmad Tirtosudiro (former HMI leader) enjoyed Suharto's trust to take control respectively over Indonesia's oil and main export commodities, the giant trading corporation, PT. Berdikari, and the newly established National Logistics Board (*Bulog*).
32. The existence of this favoured inner circle caused not only envy and jealousy among those outside the inner circle but also internal conflicts within the circle. At the very beginning there emerged a severe tension between Alamsjah versus Ali Murtopo and Sudjono Humardhani. As Murtopo (Javanese-*abangan*) and Humardhani (Javanese-*abangan*) preferred to build collaborations with Christian and secular intellectuals, Alamsjah (descendant of a *santri* family) was forced to defend Islamic interests, though he himself was anti-Islamism. Suharto attempted to maintain the balance of power between his loyalists. With Murtopo and Humardhani being appointed (key) members of the ASPRI, Alamsjah was given a new task as the office head of the State Secretariat. In the end, however, the Murtopo-Humardhani axis won the competition when Alamsjah was appointed Indonesian ambassador for the Netherlands. The powerful

- competitive advantage of Murtopo derived from his control over the intelligence offices, while Humardhani's from his control over financial resources including the task of finding and developing off-budget sources of income for the new regime.
33. Members of the team were allocated fields of responsibility such as finance, politics, intelligence, social welfare, and other non-military affairs. At the time of its formation in August 1966 the *Spri* consisted of six army officers supported by two teams of civilian specialists. The two civilian teams were responsible for providing advice in the fields of economic policy and politics. The economic team consisted of the five members of the "Berkeley Mafia" (Widjojo Nitisastro, Sadli, Ali Wardhana, Emil Salim, and Subroto) plus a prominent PSI figure and economist, Sumitro Djojohadikusumo. The politics team consisted of Sarbini Sumawinata (PSI figure), Fuad Hassan (PSI sympathizer), Deliar Noer (former HMI leader) and some others. By 1968 members of the *Spri* had become twelve and it was widely considered as an "invisible kitchen cabinet". The twelve were Alamsjah Prawiranegara (coordinator), Sudjono Humardhani (economy), Ali Murtopo (foreign intelligence), Yoga Sugama (domestic intelligence), Surjo (finance), Abdul Kadir (social welfare), Slamet Danudirdjo (Economic development), Nawawi Alif (mass media), Sudharmono (general), Sunarso (politics), Isman (mass movements), Jusuf Singadikane (national projects).
 34. From 1968 Murtopo refined and expanded the existing *Opsus* [Special Operations] apparatus, demonstrating his special skill in recruiting a network of informal civilian intelligence gatherers.
 35. Established in 1967, the initial head of *Bakin* was General Sudirgo assisted by Ali Murtopo as the deputy head. In 1968 Sudirgo was replaced 1968 by Maj.-Gen. Yoga Sugama who had a close relationship with Murtopo's group.
 36. It was initially headed by Suharto from 1965 with the purpose of tracking down PKI supporters. In its operations, *Kopkamtib* was assisted by *Bakin*. In 1969 the head of *Kopkamtib* was transferred to the newly appointed deputy commander of the armed forces, General Panggabean (Batak-Christian). Under his command, it soon became the regime's main political control involving army commanders at various levels of the military hierarchy to take actions against perceived threats to security. In 1973, the office was headed by the newly appointed commander of the Armed Forces, General Sumitro (*abangan*-professional army), but he was soon dismissed in the wake of the Fifteenth of January Affair (*Malari*) of 1974. Shortly after, Suharto himself resumed command of the office, with Admiral Sudomo (Javanese-Protestant) as chief of staff. Under Sudomo's command, *Kopkamtib* became the most feared and oppressive agency of the regime, interfering in the activities of every organization and arresting people at will on charges of subversion.
 37. The regime made an attempt to reform the PNI leadership by appointing Hadisubeno, Suharto's old friend during his posting in the Diponegoro division,

as the new chairman of the party. In the meantime, it refused Muslims' demand for the rehabilitation of the *Masjumi* party, though it promoted the establishment of a new Muslim party, *Parmusi*, with the exclusion of prominent leaders of the *Masjumi* from the party leadership.

38. Suharto's plan for Golkar was initially to find a special place in Indonesian politics for functional groups with a capacity to stabilize the political system against the possibility of party dominance. The existence of the so-called Sekber-Golkar since 1964, which had already some ninety-two representatives in the DPR-GR, inspired him to transform this military-civilian partnership body into the structure of a state party without party politicians. The mandate to realize this ambition in a period of less than two years, was entrusted to his enthusiast assistants, Ali Murtopo and Sudjono Humardhani.
39. According to Kenneth Ward (1974, pp. 35–36), there were three groups of intellectuals surrounding Ali Murtopo who played a decisive role in the formation of Golkar. The first was the Catholic (Tanah Abang) group, consisting of Lim Bian Kie (Jusuf Wanandi), Lim Bian Khoen (Sofjan Wanandi), Harry Tjan Silalahi and Moerdopo. The second was the *abangan* (Gadjah Mada) group, consisting of Sumiskun, Sulisty, Sugiharto, Sukarno and Suroso. The third was the socialist (Bandung) group, consisting of Rachman Tolleng and Midian Sirait. All groups had a common ground in their antipathy towards (large) political parties and the rise of Islam and in their preference for the military's leading role in the modernization project.
40. R.E. Elson (2001, p. 187) rightly noted *Bapili's* strategies as follows: "First, the effort would be made to construct an ideology based on non-ideological themes: development, stability, order, unity.... Second, Golkar would simply use its access to government largesse to buy itself positions by establishing itself a patronage-dispensing apparatus.... Third, it would use its access to political power to turn matters to its advantage."
41. Golkar's government and military sponsorship made it easier to mobilize political resources. The minister for home affairs, Lt.-Gen. Amir Machmud (Suharto's right-hand man behind the Supersemar), was determined that his department, through the association of its employees (*Kokarmendagri*), would become the backbone of the Golkar. He introduced regulations in 1969 and 1970 which respectively prevented Golkar representatives in regional and local assemblies from having any party affiliation and disallowed military personnel and civilian Defence Department employees, as well as judges and public persecutors, from membership of parties. In approaching the election, civil servants were pressed to sign statements of "monoloyalty" to the government, implying support for the Golkar. At the same time, the minister together with the chief of the Election Commission's Logistics and Supplied Board, Ali Murtopo, placed heavy pressure upon local government officials to secure special "quotas" of the vote to be mobilized for the Golkar in their districts. The Golkar identification with both the armed forces and the government also facilitated election fund-raising and

strong-arm tactics. With an abundance of election funds, attempts were made to woo influential *kyai* by financing overseas tours and providing funds for their *pesantren*. An institutional arrangement to mobilize *kyai* support was made in January 1971 through the reviving of the more-or-less moribund Association to Improve Islamic Education (GUPPI) under the patronage of Sudjono Humardhani. The military's direct pressure on voters was also evident, especially in the villages and in pressing former PKI members and associates to vote for Golkar.

42. In the 1971 election Golkar won 62.80 per cent of the votes and 236 of the elected seats, way above the accumulated votes and seats generated by the other nine parties (PNI, NU, *Parmusi*, PSII, *Parkindo*, *Partai Katholik*, *Perti*, *Murba*, and IPKI). The PNI and *Parmusi* (the heir to the *Masjumi*), the two leading parties with respectively winning 22.3 and 20.9 per cent in the 1955 elections, suffered a serious decline winning only 6.9 and 5.4 per cent respectively. The only party to withstand the Golkar onslaught was the NU. Its vote percentage even slightly increased from 18.4 per cent in 1955 to 18.7 per cent in 1971.
43. The four existing Islamic parties (NU, *Parmusi*, PSII, and *Perti*) were merged into the United Development Party (PPP), representing the spiritual dimension of development. The five non-Islamic parties (PNI, IPKI, *Murba*, *Parkindo*, and *Partai Katholik*) were fused into the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), representing the national-material dimension of development. In early versions, Christian parties (*Parkindo* and *Partai Katholik*) actually belonged to the "spiritual" group. But they refused to merge into this group and chose to join the "national" group. Alongside the two groups, there was Golkar, which never claimed to be a political party, but rather, a representation of the "functional" dimension of development.
44. The CSIS was established by Chinese-Catholic intellectuals in collaboration with other Catholic and secular intellectuals under the patronage of Ali Murtopo and Sudjono Humardhani. Most of these Catholic-Chinese intellectuals, including the two brothers Lim Bian Kie (Jusuf Wanandi) and Lim Bian Khoen (Sofjan Wanandi), were former activists of PMKRI who showed in Elson's words "a passionate anti-communism and vigorous opposition to any threat of Muslim political ascendancy with the fierce personal discipline and unflinching corporatist ideas imparted to them by their mentor, the Jesuit priest Fr Jopie Beek" (Elson 2001, p. 146). According to Abdurrahman Wahid (1992), leaders of the Catholic community during the early period of the New Order were actually divided as to how to handle Catholic relations with the state and Islamic community: some supported the theory of *minus malum*, others favoured that of *mayos bonnum*. According to the former, supported by Ali Murtopo's group, of two harmful things the lesser was more favourable. Thus, in facing the dilemma of whether to choose the green of the military or the green of Islam (green was identified as the colour of both groups) it was preferable to choose the military, on the grounds it was easier to use as a tool for marginalizing

- political Islam. But according to the latter, the Catholic community was not supposed to pit the military against Islam, because its reverse impact would be to the detriment of Catholic interests. As alternative strategy was: whoever/ whatever brings advantage to Catholic interests is considered as friend. Those associated with this strategy were Chris Siner Keytimu, Eko Tjokrodjojo, Jakob Utama, Mangunwidjaja, John Titely, Einar Sitompul, Nababan, and Frans Magnis Suseno. This strategy was, however, overshadowed by the hegemonic influence of the former. For comparisons, see Dhakidae (2003, pp. 615–16).
45. The term corporatism is explained by Philippe C. Schmitter as follows (1974, pp. 93–94): “A system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and support.”
 46. The Cooperative Farmers Association (HKTI) and the All-Indonesia Fishers’ Association (HNSI) were respectively established in April and July 1973. In July 1975 the government promoted the establishment of a single *ulama* representative body: MUI (the *Ulama* Council of Indonesia). In different functional categories there could also be found *Kadin* (the Chamber of Commerce and Industry) as the representative body of business, PGRI (Indonesian Teacher’s Union) as that of teachers, KOWANI (Indonesian Women’s Corps) as that of women, KNPI (the National Committee of Indonesian Youths) as that of youth groups, PWI (Indonesian Journalists Association) as that of journalists, and so forth.
 47. There had been a striking disparity between the legal basis for domestic press operations and what happened in practice. Although Indonesia’s Press Act of 1966 declares that “no censorship or muzzling shall be applied to the National Press” (section 2, article 4), and that “freedom of the Press is guaranteed in accordance with the fundamental rights of citizens” (article 5.1) and that “no publication permit is needed” (chapter 4, article 8.2), the reality was that during an unspecified “transitional period” (applied until the end of the New Order) two related permits had to be obtained by newspaper publishers: the permit to publish, from the ostensibly civil Department of Information, and the permit to print, from the military security authority (*Kopkamtib/Laksus*). The official doctrine stated that the Indonesian press was “free but responsible”. And under the elastic precept of “responsibility”, the state gained the rationale purposefully to control media content and language. Journalists and critics laboured under the constant threat of censorship, bans and arrest (Sen and Hill 2000). In the aftermath of the so-called *Malari* Affair of January 1974, twelve publications were banned including Mochtar Lubis’s *Indonesia Raya*. Next in the aftermath of anti-government students protests of January 1978, seven Jakarta dailies plus

- seven student publications were banned. This would be followed by the banning of several other publications in the following decades.
48. President Suharto stated in his Independence Day address of 1973: "Correct and orderly language reflects a way of thinking, attitudes, and behaviour which are also correct and orderly. And this orderliness is the main key for the success of the creation and development of the nation" (Quoted in Hooker 1995, p. 272). In fact, what is defined as correct and orderly language is language that is fully subordinated to the state's politics of meaning. Even if people used "correct" language, if it was used to criticize the government, that language could be seen as "incorrect" language.
 49. For an elaborate discussion of language and power in the New Order period, see Y. Latif and I.S. Ibrahim (1996).
 50. For a further discussion of the New Order's efforts to deconfessionalize the Indonesian legal basis, see M. Cammarck (1997).
 51. Already on 16 December 1965, a "Coordinating Body of Muslim Activities" [*Badan Koordinasi Amal Muslim*] was formed, uniting 16 Islamic organizations which wanted to work towards a rehabilitation of the *Masjumi*. In a service of thanksgiving [*tasyakkur*] for the gradual release of last Muslim political prisoners, which was conducted in the well-known Al-Azhar mosque (Jakarta) on 14 August 1966, former top leaders of the *Masjumi* with about 50,000 eye witnesses called on the new regime to rehabilitate Islam after its oppression in the times that had passed (Boland 1971, p. 148).
 52. These Muslim organizations were *Muhammadiyah*, *Al-Djamiatul Wasliyah*, *Gasbindo*, *Nahdlatul Wathan*, *Nahdlatul Anwar*, *SNII*, *KBIM*, *Persatuan Umat Islam* (PUI), *Porbisi*, *HSBI*, *PITI*, *Al-Irsyad*, and *Wanita Islam* (DPP Golkar 1994, p. 102). The decision of Muslim organizations to withdraw from Golkar would be described by the late Lukman Harun (a *Muhammadiyah* leader) as "the biggest political mistake the Muslims had ever made in the New Order era". Interview with the late Lukman Harun (10 September 1998).
 53. In October 1969 the religious representative body (*KINO-Keagamaan*) disappeared from the *Sekber-Golkar*. After the elections of the 1971, Catholic and Christian intelligentsia (such as Jusuf Wanandi, Cosmas Batubara, and David Napitupulu), socialist intelligentsia (such as Rahman Tolleng and Midian Sirait), and *abangan* intelligentsia (such as Sukijat and Pitut Suharto) held strategic positions in the military-led central executive board of Golkar of the 1973/78 period. It was not until the 1983–88 period that a few of the Muslim intelligentsia (mostly from HMI backgrounds), such as K.H. Tarmudji, Akbar Tandjung, Ibrahim Hasan, Anang Adenansi, and Qudratullah, were included among the 42 members of Golkar's central executive board (DPP-Golkar 1994, pp. 102, 165–68).
 54. Quoted in Solihin Salam (1970, pp. 69–70), and H. Crouch (1988, p. 260).
 55. In the conflicting relationship between Alamsjah and Murtopo's *Aspri* group,

- Alamsjah tended to side with the Islamic community. In continuing disputes among Suharto's inner circle, however, Murtopo's group won Suharto's confidence when Alamsjah was made the Indonesian ambassador for the Netherlands in early 1970s (Interview with the late Lukman Harun, 10 September 1998).
56. For further discussion of problems encountered in the establishment of the *Parmusi*, see Ward (1970) and Salam (1970).
 57. This is not to say that NU was fully free from government intervention. According to Greg Fealy, one of the indications of government intervention in NU internal affairs in this period was that there was no NU *Muktamar* [national conference] between 1967–79. Fealy, personal communication (8 April 2004).
 58. But it has to be borne in mind that the size of each of these cabinets varied. Christians in the First Development Cabinet were Frans Seda, G.A. Siwabessy, and A.M. Tambunan; those in the Second Development Cabinet were M. Panggabean, Radius Prawiro, G.A. Siwabessy, and J.B. Sumarlin; those in Third Dev. Cabinet were M. Panggabean, J.B. Sumarlin, Ali Murtopo, Radius Prawiro and Cosmas Batubara; those in the Fourth Development Cabinet were J.B. Sumarlin, Cosmas Batubara, Radius Prawiro, Sudomo, J.H. Hutasoit, plus L.B. Murdani (as the military chief of command).
 59. The percentage of Catholics and Protestants in the parliament was respectively 8.3 per cent and 9.4 per cent in 1971, 7.5 per cent and 9.2 per cent in 1977, 9.6 per cent and 8.1 per cent in 1982, and 7.4 per cent and 9.4 per cent in 1987.
 60. The percentage of Muslims in the Parliament was 79.2 per cent in 1971, 80.7 per cent in 1977, 79.7 per cent in 1982, and 81.2 per cent in 1987.
 61. Although a Muslim intellectual (former STI student and PII activist), Mukti Ali had no strong ties to any major Islamic group.
 62. Born in 1908 as son of Haji Rasul, Hamka gained popularity as a leading *ulama-intelekt* in the 1970s and 1980s. He was a prolific writer who wrote novels, essays, history, and works on Islamic subjects, including a Qur'anic commentary. His leadership position in the MUI did not last long due to his various disagreements with the government policies.
 63. A similar view had actually been propounded by Sukarno in his speech at the University of Indonesia on 7 May 1953. To clarify his controversial speech in Amuntai (South Kalimantan) on the position of Islam within the nation-state, he stated as follows: "...if I say that this state is a nation-state, by no means do I forbid you all to promote communist state, communism, communist ideology, or to promote Islamism, Islamic ideology, Islamic ideals, or even if there is one among us who aspires to socialism, nazidom, fascism, he/she has full rights to promote that nazism" (Soekarno 1999, pp. 2–3).
 64. An English translation of this Sjafruddin's letter can be found in *Indonesia*, no. 38 (October 1984).
 65. Examples of these books are *Tandjung Priok Berdarah* (PSPI 1998), *Fakta:*

- Diskriminasi Rezim Soeharto terhadap Umat Islam* (Tim Peduli Tapol 1998), *Di Bawah Bayang-Bayang Soekarno-Soeharto* (Jaiz 1999), *Dari Mimbar ke Penjara* (Fatwa 1999), *Negara dan Peminggiran Islam Politik* (Karim 1999), and *Kasus Peledakan BCA 1984* (Soeropranoto 2000).
66. He was born a Muslim, became a Protestant for his marriage with a teacher of French, but for a later marriage in the 1990s re-converted to Islam.
 67. This kind of blackmail was frequently launched in the lead-up to the general elections. In June 1977, a month before the general election, this militant group was associated with a fictive rebellion called *Komando Jihad* [Holy-War Command], while prior to the 1982 elections it was associated with the so-called "*Islam Jamaah*" [Islamic Community]. In fact, the operations of these militant Muslims were masterminded by the intelligence offices. Concerning the *Komando Jihad* rebellion, Murtopo's agents had spread rumours about the communist comeback among former *Darul Islam* activists who were still under army surveillance and had promised them weapons to fight the leftist threat. Some former *Darul Islam* leaders believed these rumours and then were trapped in the political game of Ali Murtopo's group. When brought to trial several years later, some of them argued in vain that they had been working as intelligence agents for *Opsus* and vehemently denied the existence of a *Komando Jihad*. According to Sutopo Juwono (head of the *Bakin*, 1969–74): "Ali Murtopo is belonging to this group. So for instance, you talk about Komando Jihad. It's not a new issue. From the beginning on he has this opinion. I had to stop that, at the time. He had the opinion that we must create issues...But I can't stop that because he's always going to the president" (Quoted in D. Jenkins 1984, p. 59). In the eyes of Indonesian Human Rights Group, Tapol: "The prime purpose of the Komando Jihad canard was to link Muslim activism in the public mind with alleged terrorist activities and to intimidate the Muslim community as a whole" (Tapol 1987, p. 15). The emergence of the so-called *Islam Jamaah* in the early 1980s also reflects a similar case. It was often associated with a militant Islamic group under the leadership of Imran bin Muhammad Zein which had been responsible for the attack on the Cicendo police station in early months of 1981 and the hijack of a civilian aircraft (Garuda DC-9 Woyla) on 31 March that year. In fact, as admitted by Iqbal and Umar Abdoeh (two accused participants of the Cicendo attack), *Islam Jamaah* was the creation of Ali Murtopo, and Imron's group only later realized that it had been infiltrated and provoked by original activists of Murtopo-created *Islam Jamaah*, such as Najamuddin (*Sinar Harapan*, 3 April 2003; Tapol 1987, p. 16).
 68. On the list of Muslim trial verdicts up to the 1987, see Tapol (1987, pp. 112–14).
 69. It is said that two local military officials had entered the *As-Sa'adah* mosque without taking off their boots and then deliberately obscured an announcement of a religious lecture on the mosque wall with muddy water. Under the uneasy relationship between the Islamic community and the security regime, this

- incident soon transformed itself into a riot with hundreds of people being killed by gunfire. For an elaborate description of this incident, see PSPI (1998).
70. This name refers to a group of fifty people who composed a petition and delivered it to parliament on 13 May 1980. It strongly criticized President Suharto for adopting a narrowly self-serving interpretation of *Pancasila*, and for promoting the collaboration of the military with Golkar, when the military should stand above all social forces. It also criticized his accumulation of wealth.
 71. Three weeks after the Tanjung Priok massacre, several bombs exploded on 4 October 1984 at branches of the Chinese-owned Bank Central Asia (BCA) in Jakarta; on 24 December, explosions occurred at a Catholic church and a Protestant seminary in Malang (East Java); on 21 January 1985, a series of explosions destroyed nine stupas on the upper terraces of the Borobudur temple; and on 16 March, seven people were killed when a bomb went off prematurely on the *Pemudi Ekspres* night-bus to Bali as it approached Banyuwangi on the eastern tip of Java (Tapol 1987; Soeroproto 2000).
 72. See *Pandji Masjarakat*, no. 167, 15 January 1975.
 73. Among those who were present at this meeting were Mohammad Natsir, Prawoto Mangkusasmito, Mohamad Roem, M. Rasjidi, Taufiqurrahman, Mansur Daud Dt. Palimo Kayo, Hasan Basri, and Agus Cik (Angek 2000, pp. 2–3).
 74. For the history and development of the DDII, see Angek (2000), DDII (2001).
 75. For more elaborate discussions of this seminar and this issue, see Hassan (1975, pp. 64–104).
 76. For a list of books and other publications on *dakwah* issues during 1969–80, see Anshari (1986, pp. 195–98).
 77. One of the success stories of this project was *Pesantren Darul Falah* in Bogor; a boarding Islamic school which offers both religious and general subjects and with a special emphasis on training in modern agriculture. Among the leading figures of this *pesantren* were Gaffar Ismail (father of a well-known poet, Taufik Ismail), Soleh Widodo (son-in-law of Mohammad Natsir, a lecturer at the IPB), and Aziz Darwis (a lecturer at the IPB).
 78. Examples of DDII-sponsored *pesantren* which offered secular subjects to students with *Pesantren* backgrounds were *As-Syafi'iyah* in Jakarta and *Pesantren Al-Huda* in Tasikmalaya; while examples of the *pesantren* which offered in-depth Islamic study to students from secular university backgrounds were *Pesantren Ulil Albab* in Bogor and *Pesantren Budi Mulia* in Jakarta.
 79. Interview with Adian Husaini, a former Islamic activist of the IPB and *Ulil Albab* as well as a young leader of the DDII (23 May 2001).
 80. Natsir's strong lobby in the Arab world gave the DDII leverage to influence authorities in the Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs. During the period of the 1970s and early 1980s, the DDII became a partner of this Ministry in recruiting students for overseas studies in the Middle East.
 81. Among the few were Achmad Tirtosudiro (former vice-chairman of the HMI,

- 1947–50) and Bustanil Arifin (a former student of the HIS *Muhammadiyah* of Sigli who had strong networks among activists of the HMI) who held relatively strategic positions in the New Order polity. Tirtosudiro (b. 1922) was first appointed the head of the newly established National Logistics Board, Bulog (1966–73) and then became the Indonesian ambassador for the Federal Republic of Germany (1973–76) and Saudi Arabia (1982–85). Arifin (b. 1925) was first the successor of Tirtosudiro as head of Bulog (1973–93), and then became the vice-minister (*menteri-muda*) of the Trade and Cooperative Ministry (1978–83), and finally the Minister of the Cooperative Department (1983–88, 1988–93).
82. The first five had studied in the STI/UII before getting their degrees from different universities: Pane from the UGM in 1953, Ghazali from *Universitas Islam* Jakarta in 1960, Ali from Karachi University in 1955, Harjono from *Universitas Islam* Jakarta in 1963 (he also obtained a Ph.D. degree from the same university in 1968), Anton Timur Djaelani from PTAIN in the mid-1950s.
 83. Noer (chairman of the HMI, 1953–55) obtained his Ph.D. degree in political science from Cornell University (USA) in 1963; Ali obtained his Master's degree in Islamic Studies from McGill University (Canada) in 1957; Nasution obtained his Master's in Islamic Studies from McGill University in 1965; Djaelani obtained his Master's from McGill University in 1959; Halim got his M.B.A. from University of California, Berkeley in 1959, Suny got his Masters in Civil Law from McGill University in 1960, and Baiquni obtained his Master's in Physics in the late 1950s and his Ph.D. some years later from the University of Chicago.
 84. Bintoro obtained his Master's from the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh in 1960; Subchan had attended a non-degree programme in Economic Development at the University of California Los Angeles (UCLA, 1961–62); Imaduddin obtained his Master's in Electrical Engineering from Iowa State University in 1965; and Hasan obtained his M.B.A. from Syracuse University in 1965.
 85. This is a general tendency in Indonesian society which prevailed till today.
 86. For further discussion of the difference between the “formal” and “material” approach to the struggle of Islam, see Mintaredja (1971).
 87. Noer was appointed a member of the political team of Suharto's *Spri* (1966–68) and then became the Rector of the Jakarta-based IKIP (Teacher's Training College, 1967–74). Bintoro was appointed to the personal staff of the president (1966–67) and then became the secretary of the National Planning Board (Bapennas, 1967–68). Suny was appointed a member of the DPR-GR/MPRS between 1967–69 but was recalled in 1969 because of his fierce criticism of the Election Bill. Ghazali was appointed a member of the DPR-GR/MPRS between 1970–71. Later, Metareum (chairman of the HMI, 1957–60) was permitted by the government to replace Naro as the general chairman of the PPP (1989–94), while the rest mostly occupied academic positions.

88. Other *santri* higher bureaucrats in the early 1970s were Barli Halim (the chairman of the Indonesian Investment Coordinating Board/BKPM, 1973–80), Achmad Baiquni (director-general of the National Atomic Agency/BATAN) Madjid Ibrahim (a senior bureaucrat in *Bappenas* and then Governor of Aceh), Bakir Hasan (a senior bureaucrat in the Department of Trade), Hariry Hady (a senior bureaucrat in the *Bappenas*). For other names, see Rahardjo (1993, p. 326).
89. The PMII's intellectual development was also inhibited by NU's political involvement in the formal political structure in the early years of the New Order. As the NU continued to be preoccupied with politics, many leaders of the PMII were absorbed into the NU party and then into the PPP. The factionalism within the NU would in turn imply polarization within the PMII, comprised of supporters of Idham Chalid and those of Subchan Z.E. Because of the strong links between PMII and NU, intellectuals of the PMII shared a common conservatism with the NU leaders. An effort to make the PMII more independent from the NU was made through the so-called "Murnajati Declaration" in 1972 (Wahid 2000). Nevertheless, it took sometime to be effective. Moreover, the PMII continued to have serious difficulties recruiting a large membership within secular universities. The persisting residue of colonial hierarchies of knowledge which had coalesced with a prolonged campaign of Islamic reformism-modernism caused members of secular universities in general to look down on the traditionalist Islamic teaching. In addition, the heterodoxy of traditionalist teaching also tended to be ill-matched with the psycho-religious inclination of secular university students who tended to prefer religious authenticity and certainty as an escape from the plurality of life-worlds within the milieu of the secular university.
 Like the links between PMII and NU, the strong IMM links with *Muhammadiyah* ideology constricted the room for manoeuvre of the IMM intellectuals. For the same reason, the appeal of this organization to students from secular universities was far less than that of the HMI. Its major recruits continued to derive from *Muhammadiyah* higher educational institutions.
90. The modernity of this *pesantren* refers to its adoption of modern teaching methods and educational technology as well as the use of English and Arabic as languages of instruction and daily conversation. Although it was established by modernist-reformist *ulama*, Ahmad Sahal, Zainal Fanani and Imam Zarkasji, it is oriented to accommodate Islamic students from different religious groups and orientations, as reflected by its motto: "Pesantren Gontor stands above and for all groups."
91. For further descriptions of his intellectual biography, see Malik and Ibrahim (1998, pp. 121–38).
92. For the educational background of these intellectuals, see chapter 4.
93. Interview with Imaduddin Abdulrahim (26 November 1998).

94. Natsir was from Sumatra and was also well-known as a *Persis* intellectual in the 1920s–1930s.
95. *Pandji Masjarakat*, nos. 28, 29, 30; the articles are dated 1 Muharram 1388H./ 29 March 1968.
96. The term “Snouckism” here referred to the architect of the Dutch association policy, C. Snouck Hurgronje.
97. *Liga Indonesia* (p. 39). Quoted in Hassan (1975, p. 43).
98. A similar view had actually been expressed by Amien Rais, a former HMI activist but now representing himself as a leader of the IMM. In his article in *Suara Muhammadiyah* (no. 16, August 1967) entitled “*Agama, Modernisasi, dan Mahasiswa*” [Religion, Modernization and University Students], among other things, he stated that in the effort to overcome the misery and backwardness of Indonesians, students belonging to the “1966 Generation” had a vital role to play as “agents of modernization”. Admitting that modernization “has become a national consensus”, he regretted the existence of what he called some selfish elements in Indonesian society who wanted to use the idea of modernization as a bandwagon for particularistic political goals. He then gave the following example (p. 10): The PMKRI (the Catholic Students Organization of Indonesia), for instance, in its Members’ Deliberating Council held in Bandung last month adopted “modernization” as its national programme. But, in addition to that, it categorically stated that in order to accomplish renewal in Indonesia, the state should not manage matters pertaining to religion. This statement implied insistence on the abolition of the Department of Religion and its divisions... The motive behind PMKRI’s attitude is simple; that is, to hit the Muslim community (whose toleration has been excessive) which forms the majority of the population. For a further discussion of Indonesian Muslims’ response to modernization, see Hassan (1975).
99. Interview with Imaduddin Abdulrahim (26 November 1998).
100. Ibid.
101. For further discussion of this issue, see Wahib (1981, pp. 144–93).
102. Among the early recruits were Imaduddin Abdulrahim, Ahmad Sadaly and A.M. Luthfi (of the ITB), Endang Saefuddin Anshari and Rudy Sjarif (of Padjadjaran University), Jusuf Amir Feisal (of IKIP Bandung), Daud Ali, Djurnalis Ali and Ichtijanto (of UI), A.M. Saefuddin and Soleh Widodo (of IPB), Sahirul Alim and Amien Rais (of UGM), Rofiq Anwar (of Diponegoro University), Daldiri Mangundiwardjo, and Fuad Amsjari (of Airlangga University), Gadin Hakim, Bachtiar Fanani Lubis and Faiz Albar (of North Sumatra University). Interview with A.M. Luthfi (3 September 1998).
103. Interview with Utomo Dananjaya (29 November 2000).
104. Interview with Utomo Dananjaya, one of Madjid’s closest friend (29 November 2000).
105. The congress commissioned Nurcholish Madjid, Imaduddin Abdulrahim,

- Endang Saifuddin Anshari and Sakib Mahmud to perfect the NDP draft that had been prepared by PB HMI. In fact, Madjid contributed a larger share of ideas to the final version of the NDP (Sitompul 2002, p. 246).
106. For the content of the NDP, see Sitompul (2002, pp. 323–508).
 107. Interview with Nurcholish Madjid (18 September 1998). Later in 1983, Madjid and Roem continued their discussion about the idea of Islamic state through letters between Jakarta-Chicago, as Madjid at this time was a graduate student at the University of Chicago, reaching agreement that the idea of an Islamic state is alien to the Islamic scriptures. See Santoso (1997).
 108. Interview with Utomo Dananjaya (7 December 2000).
 109. See Ahmad Sadri's *Max Weber's Sociology of Intellectuals* (1992, p. 72).
 110. For a further discussion of the polemics on Madjid's renewal ideas, see Hassan (1975, pp. 133–217), Rasjidi (1972), Anshari (1973), Islamic Research Center (1970).
 111. The term "independent mosques" here refers to the mosques that were not funded and controlled by government authorities and also not directly attached to any major Islamic organization.
 112. The mosque of the North Sumatra University, known later as *Masjid Dakwah*, is the only campus mosque that had emerged in the 1950s. At the very beginning of its establishment in 1952–53, however, it was only a relatively small mosque with its functions until the 1960s being confined to ritual and community interactions. Interview with Bachtiar Fanani Lubis (11 November 2000).
 113. Interview with Imaduddin Abdulrahim (26 November 1998) and the public relations officer of the Salman mosque, Budi Prayitno (13 December 2000).
 114. Interview with Adian Husaini, a former activist of Al-Ghifari (23 May 2001).
 115. Interview with Chairil Anwar, an early activist of the UGM (*Shalahuddin*) mosque (11 November 2000), Muhammad Nuh, an early activist of the ITS (*Manarul Ilmi*) mosque (11 November 2000), and Muchtar Abbas, an early activist of the ITB (*Salman*) mosque (29 November 2000).
 116. The term "movement intellectual" here is borrowed from Ron Eyerman, and means an intellectual of a particular social movement (Eyerman and Jamison 1991, pp. 94–119).
 117. The principal instructors of the LMD were Imaduddin Abdulrahim, Endang Saifuddin Anshari, Miftah Faridl, and Sakib Mahmud. All of them were former leaders of the HMI's dakwah institute, LDMI.
 118. Interview with Muchtar Abbas (29 November 2000).
 119. Interview with Imaduddin Abdulrahim (26 November 1998).
 120. For more elaborate description of the LMD, see R. Rosyad (1995), H.K. Dipojono (2002, pp. 215–21) and H. Radjasa (2002, pp. 212–14).
 121. Among prominent figures of the following decades who had joined this training were Hatta Radjasa (secretary-general of PAN and minister of research and

- technology in the Megawati cabinet), Al-Hilal Al-Hamdi (minister of manpower in the Abdurrahman Wahid cabinet), M.S. Ka'ban (secretary-general of the PBB), Didin Hafiduddin (venerable leader of the *tarbiyah* [*dakwah*] movement), Mutammimul Ula (leader of the Justice Party, PK/S), Hermawan K. Dipojono (executive director of the Salman Foundation in the early 2000s), Muchtar Abbas (a well-known NGO activist) and Faisal Basri (a leading economic analyst). For a complete account, see the Salman Database (2001).
122. Some of the well-known figures of the *remaja masjid* movement were Toto Tasmara (Cut Meutiah), Jimly Asshiddiqie (Al-Azhar), Faisal Motik (Sunda Kelapa) and Bambang Pranowo (Istiqomah).
 123. BKPRMI stands for *Badan Koordinasi Pemuda dan Remaja Masjid Indonesia*.
 124. For the history and development of the BKPRMI, see DPP-BKPRMI (2000).
 125. This will be discussed in the next chapter.
 126. The translator was A. Mu'thi Nurdin.
 127. All Islamic *harakah* share a common denominator in terms of their obsession with the implementation of the *syari'a*. They differ from each other, however, on the method [*manhaj*] to achieve this obsession. Some consider a cultural or non-political approach as the most effective means, while others consider a political approach to be so. Those who favour a political approach also differ from each other on the political system as the space for the implementation of the *syari'a*. The IM tolerates representative democracy within the boundary of the nation-state, while *Hizbut Tahrir* rejects representative democracy and the nation-state and is obsessed with the re-creation of the *khalifah* [international Islamic state]. This difference in *manhaj* often leads to internal Islamic disputes among members of different *harakah*.
 128. Interview with Mutammimul Ula, an early Indonesian follower of the IM (3 December 2003).
 129. Translated by A. Rakhman Zainuddin, the main message of this book is that only Islamic authenticity can provide authentic guidance.
 130. The situation changed in the late 1990s when the *Salafi* movement controlled the institution.
 131. Ridho happened to be an activist of PII and HMI.
 132. In the 1990s these three activists would become leading figures of the *tarbiyah*-party, *Partai Keadilan* (Justice Party).
 133. Interview with Mutammimul Ula, an early Indonesian follower of the IM (3 December 2003).
 134. The influence of Shi'ah teaching among circles of Indonesian Muslims was countered by the DDII which developed a strong network with the Saudi Arabia-dominated Muslim World League. Saudi Arabia was hostile theologically and politically to the influence of the Iranian Islamic Revolution and the DDII expressed similar apprehension about a possible increase in Shi'ah followers in Indonesia.

135. The term "*rausyan fikr*" became popular among Indonesian Islamic activists following the translation of Syari'ati's work, "*Ideologi Kaum Intelektual: Suatu Wawasan*", by the publisher Mizan in 1984.
136. Interview with Fahri Hamzah (15 August 1998).
137. For the history of LDK, see Y.S. Hadi (2000) and A. Rahmat and M. Najib (2001).
138. For a further discussion of the development of the *tarbiyah* movement in the 1990s, see Hadi (2000), Rahmat and Najib (2001) and Damanik (2002).
139. Interview with Nurcholish Madjid (18 September 1998).
140. During his study at the University of Chicago, Madjid was supervised by, among others, the prominent Pakistani liberal (neo-modernist) Islamic thinker, Fazlur Rahman.
141. Rasjidi obtained his Ph.D. from the Sorbonne University (France) in 1956; Mukti Ali and Anton Timur Jaelani received their Master's from McGill University in 1957 and 1959 respectively; Harun Nasution, his Ph.D. from McGill University in 1968; and Kafrawi, his Master's from McGill University in 1969.
142. Interview with Utomo Dananjaya, one of the most enthusiastic supporters of renewal ideas (29 November 2000).
143. Interview with Dawam Rahardjo (10 September 1998) and Adi Sasono (2 September 1998).
144. We will return to this NGO later in this chapter.
145. *Majelis Reboan* was an experiment to develop an open and pluralistic "public sphere" in situations of authoritarian control. Beginning as an informal discussion forum of renewal intellectuals with HMI and PII background, such as Nurcholish Madjid, Utomo Dananjaya, Eky Sjahrudin, and Usep Fathuddin, participation in the *Majelis Reboan* was extended to involve intellectuals of diverse backgrounds, including non-Muslim intellectuals such as Franz Magnis Suseno and Mudji Sutrisno (Catholics) and Victor Tanja (a Protestant).
146. Interview with Nurcholish Madjid (18 September 1998) and Utomo Dananjaya (29 November 2000).
147. For a further explanation of the term "regimes of truth", see Foucault (1980, p. 12).
148. Leonard Binder is an expert in Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies who has written much about Islam. His most important book is *Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development Ideologies* (1988). Interview with Amien Rais (17 September 2003).
149. Among well-known religious gurus of Suharto's family were Qosim Nurseha and Quraisy Shihab.
150. Habibie told this story to leaders of ICMI's youth forum (MASIKA) on 5 May 1998. Interview with the then chairman of MASIKA, A. Hamid (29 August 1998).

151. For a further discussion of the history and development of the LP3ES, see I. Ahmad (2001).
152. Interview with Utomo Dananjaya (29 November 2000).
153. In the aftermath of anti-government student demonstrations in January 1978, Abdulrahim was arrested and imprisoned for a short period of time without trial. Soon after being released from prison he left the country to pursue a Ph.D. degree in the United States (with Natsir's support and a scholarship from the King Faisal Foundation). Even after completing his Ph.D., however, he was still regarded as an Islamic extremist and continued to be under the surveillance of the security regime. He decided to return home under the guarantee of Alamsjah Prawiranegara.
154. Interview with Putut Wijanarko and Hernowo, the manager and editor of the Mizan publisher house (13 December 2000).
155. For an elaborate discussion of the role of the Bimbo's *kasidah* in the "Islamic turn", see Hasbullah (1999).
156. For a further discussion of the emergence and development of transcendental or prophetic literature, see A. Hadi (1999).
157. For a further discussion of this issue, see L. Castles (1967) and then compare with J. Burhanuddin (1992).

6

THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF INDONESIAN MUSLIM INTELLIGENTSIA (ICMI)

The emergence of ICMI cannot be isolated from the Muslims' historical trajectory and the presence of various contemporary Islamic movements in Indonesia.

Dawam Rahardjo (1993)¹

*For Suharto, ICMI is a short term marriage of convenience.
He thinks he can control [ICMI modernists] if they go too far.
I'm afraid the strategy will backfire.*

Abdurrahman Wahid (1994)²

Suharto's increasing satisfaction through the 1980s with his ideological and economic handiwork coincided with the waning influence of the old political brokers within the New Order polity. As Elson observed (2001, p. 244): "Ali Murtopo's star, for so long in the ascendant, had begun to wane following his heart attack in 1978 (he died in May 1984), while Sudjono Humardani's influence faded in the early 1980s with the arrival of more professional and technically skilled bureaucrats."

This brought a new political alignment within the inner circle of Suharto's patronage structure. The Golkar leadership during Sudharmono's period (1983–88) heralded the diminishing influence of Murtopo's group, as Sudharmono preferred to accommodate Islamic activists.³ The appointment of Murtopo's intelligence protégé, L.B. Murdani, as the military commander in March 1983 temporarily sustained the influence of the non-Muslim lobby. The dismissal of Murdani as commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces

in 1988, however, marked the turning point in Suharto's attitudinal and strategic relations with the military elites. The president began to welcome the promotion of Islamic-friendly-military officers sometimes referred to as the "green army".

Friendly overtures by Muslim organizations towards the state orthodoxy encouraged the regime to accommodate Muslim representatives in the leadership of the New Order polity and bureaucracy. During the 1983–88 period, some representatives of the Muslim intelligentsia began to play important roles on Golkar's central executive board (DPP-Golkar). This group of Muslim intelligentsia was comprised of Akbar Tanjung (as the vice secretary-general), K.H. Tarmudji, Ibrahim Hasan, Anang Adenansi, and Qudratullah (DPP-Golkar 1994, pp. 165–68). About the same time, Muslim intellectuals in the government bureaucracy such as Mar'ie Muhammad, Bedu Amang, Muslimin Nasution, Sajuti Hasibuan and some others were appointed to upper echelon positions.

At about this time, the socio-economic base of the Muslim intelligentsia changed. The fourth generation of the Muslim intelligentsia began to challenge the long domination of the secular intelligentsia in the bureaucratic sector of the economy. Moving outside the traditional economic sector of the (old) *santri*, that is petty trading and commercial farming (for the modernists) or land owning (for the traditionalists), this Muslim intelligentsia in the bureaucracy was often referred to as the neo-*santri*.

The government's policy of good will towards Muslim interests was also obvious through its increased support for cultural Islam, indicated by a sharp increase in its subsidies for mosques and religious schools.⁴ In addition to government subsidies, President Suharto himself, under the auspices of a presidential foundation for the support of Islamic initiatives (the *Amal Bakti Muslim Pancasila*), actively sponsored the construction of mosques and *dakwah* activities. During the 1970s and 1980s it had established 400 mosques and provided financial support to 1,000 Muslim proselytizers (*da'i*) who were sent to remote districts and transmigration zones.⁵

As the rapprochement between the Muslim community and the government continued to develop, the composition of Suharto's Fifth Development Cabinet (1988–93) contained an unprecedented number of *santri* technocrats.⁶ The government accommodation of Muslim intellectuals was also signalled by the appointment of Abdurrahman Wahid, Nurcholish Madjid and several other prominent Muslim figures as Golkar representatives in the MPR.

Alongside the elevation of Muslim figures to the ruling elite, the government made a further gesture of friendliness towards Muslim interests

in legal and cultural matters. A new National Education Act [*Undang-Undang Pendidikan Nasional*], which supported Islamic instruction in public schools and appeared to grant more security to private religious schools, was passed after exhaustive drafting in 1989. At the same time, a law on Islamic religious courts, well known as “*Undang-Undang Peradilan Agama*” [The Religious Judicature Act] was also passed.⁷

As Muslim intellectuals became more and more acceptable within the New Order polity and bureaucracy, the socio-economic achievement of this regime had its own unintended consequences. The growing accumulation of private capital, the explosion of higher educated graduates and a burgeoning urban middle class, the deepening integration of the national economy into the global capitalist community, and also the changing mood in international relations, increased the possibilities for oppositional manoeuvrings.

However, no hegemony is so powerful that it exhausts all resources for resistance. When there is power there is resistance. James C. Scott, in *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts* (1990), shows the limits within which a ruling ideology actually operates and that even the most subordinate groups are able to penetrate and demystify the prevailing ideology. In Scott's view, a hegemonic ideology tends to create contradictions that enable it to be criticized in its own terms.

As the New Order state became more and more hegemonic, political repression was experienced not only by Islamic and leftist groups, but also by other segments of the nation. In effect, counter-hegemony movements gradually involved a broad spectrum of Indonesian society. Apart from Islamic and student action groups, opposition also involved civil society oriented NGOs, literary, art and cultural activists as well as independent journalists. Moreover, opposition also came from resentful groups of former ruling elites, who had been expelled from formal political structures. The disintegration of New Order legitimacy as a result of the economic crisis of the 1997–98 provided a catalyst for these scattered opposition groups to unite in a common historical bloc.

Thus, the deepening acceptance of Muslims into the New Order polity took place at the very time that oppositional movements were in the ascendancy and the Suharto regime was declining. This paradoxical situation was a backdrop to the establishment of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intelligentsia (ICMI).

This chapter describes Muslims' efforts to form an ensemble of Muslim intellectual collective actions; examines the background behind ICMI's establishment, its actual political achievements, its internal contestations and its external opposition. Special attention is given to the factors that led some

leading figures in ICMI to join the resistance movement in the last months of Suharto's regime and also to ICMI's political dislocation following Suharto's resignation. The chapter concludes with discussions of the Muslim intelligentsia's political achievement during the early years of the reform (*reformasi*) era, from the rise of Habibie's interregnum in May 1988 until the turn of the century.

EDUCATIONAL PROFILE OF THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE BOOM TIME OF MUSLIM SARJANA

The 1980s–1990s was the “harvest” time for the Indonesian Muslim intelligentsia in various movements. Not only did the number of Muslim intelligentsia with higher education qualifications reach an unprecedented level, but also the number of those with postgraduate degrees from overseas study, especially from Western centres of learning, was far greater than in any period of Indonesian history.

The educational attainment of the Indonesian population by religion, based on the Indonesian Intercensal Survey of the Indonesian Bureau of Statistic (BPS), shows that from 1976 to 1995 the Muslim population experienced a steady educational improvement, especially after the late 1980s. This can be seen in the figures for the Muslim population in the age group 20–29 years who completed undergraduate education (hereafter, UE).⁸ In 1976, there were only 16,218 Muslims in this age group who had completed UE. This figure is about 0.009 per cent of the total Muslim population in this age group but it represents 75.3 per cent of the total Indonesian population in this age group (from various religious backgrounds) who completed UE. In 1985, there were 71,516 Muslims of this age group who had completed UE. This figure is about 0.2 per cent of the total Muslim population in this age group or 76.0 per cent of the total Indonesian population in this age group who completed UE. In 1995, Muslims of this age group who completed UE rose to 553,257. This figure is equal to 1.8 per cent of the total Muslim population of this age group or 77.5 per cent of the total Indonesian population who completed UE (see Table 6.1).

The educational achievement of Muslims in this age group remained far below that of the Christians (Catholic/Protestant/Others) and Hindus. The ratio of Christians and Hindus with UE attainment to the total proportion of Christians and Hindus of this age group was much higher than that of the Muslim population. Even so, there is an indication that Muslims experienced a significant educational improvement between 1985–95. While the proportion of Christians and Hindus completing UE as a percentage of

TABLE 6.1

The Undergraduate Educational (UE) Attainment by Religion of the Indonesian Population in the Age Group of 24–29 Years

Year	Muslim			Christian			Hindu		
	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C
1976	16,218	0.0%	75.3%	4,191	0.4%	19.4%	520	0.1%	2.4%
1985	71,516	0.2%	76.0%	18,706	0.7%	19.8%	3,024	0.5%	3.2%
1995	553,257	1.8%	77.5%	132,657	4.1%	18.5%	16,604	2.8%	2.3%

Source: Based on the BPS's Indonesian Intercensal Survey of the 1976, 1985 and 1995.

A = total number of the particular religious group completing UE (of this age group)

B = percentage of A to the total number of the particular religious group (of this age group)

C = percentage of A to the total population (of this age group) completing UE (which is 21,537 in 1976, 94,024 in 1985 and 713,808 in 1995 respectively).

Total Muslims of this age group = 16,270,299 (1976), 24,521,402 (1985) and 29,353,740 (1995)

Total Christians of this age group = 1,024,557 (1976), 2,628,280 (1985), and 3,173,710 (1995).

Total Hindus of this age group = 335,252 (1976), 524,307 (1985) and 579,931 (1995).

the total number of those who completed UE of this age group began to decline, the Muslim proportion continued to increase (see Table 6.1).

Of course, not all of these higher-educated Muslims belonged to the devout Muslim (*santri*) community. With the deepening Islamization of the academic world and of official life throughout the 1970s–1980s, however, there developed greater concentrations of Islamic-oriented higher-educated people than ever before. This achievement was reinforced by the increased credibility of Muslim intellectuals as a result of greater numbers of those with Ph.D. and Master's degrees from overseas study.

Because the mosque movement was composed largely of those with science and engineering backgrounds, many activists of this movement were able to work as scientists and engineers in government agencies and strategic industries, especially those affiliated to the Habibie-led Ministry of Research and Technology. Thus, men like Suparno Satira, Zuhul Abdul Qadir, and Nur Mahmudi Ismail (a former LMD recruit, Salman activist, and Al-Ghifari activist respectively) worked for agencies under this ministry.⁹ This ministry was the most active government agency to promote the development of

human resources. Embarking on a policy of overseas study through foreign scholarships, in 1986 it began to offer its own scholarships known as the Overseas Development Programme (OFP) under World Bank sponsorship.¹⁰ With these scholarships many more former activists of the mosque movement were able to pursue their postgraduate studies in Western countries.

For Islamic activists from non-science and engineering backgrounds, their opportunities to pursue overseas studies were enhanced by the availability of other scholarships such as the so-called “OTO *Bappenas*” and the MOF of the Finance Ministry sponsored by the World Bank.

Meanwhile, the most serious effort to send IAIN graduates to Western Universities was undertaken by the Ministry of Religion during the period of Munawir Sjadzali (1983–88, 1988–93). The main objective, according to Sjadzali, was to integrate what he called “Islamic intellectualism” with (secular) “National intellectualism”, specifically to enable Islamic scholars with IAIN backgrounds to better communicate with the intelligentsia from secular university backgrounds (Dhofier 1992, p. 20). Data from the Ministry of Religion shows that between 1987–94 alone, no fewer than 153 IAIN lecturers completed their postgraduate study in Western universities and 103 staffs were still participating in the same programme. By the late 1990s, 90 per cent of the IAIN lecturers who joined the so-called “*program pembibitan*” (training programme for preparing staff for postgraduate study) preferred Western universities to those of the Middle East (*Departemen Agama* 1998).

As a result of these educational achievements, the Muslim intelligentsia was now a ubiquitous phenomenon and even beginning to dominate socio-political discourse in the Indonesian public sphere. Consequently, Muslim intellectuals in the 1980s–1990s were much more confident than their predecessors, while also demanding greater public roles in society.

The effect of the ongoing *dakwah* movement, in conjunction with the introduction of general subjects in religious educational institutions and religious subjects in secular educational institutions, caused the distinction between the category of *ulama* and *intelektuil* to become blurred. Many *intelektuil* emerged as leading religious figures, while many *ulama* emerged as leading spokesmen on secular issues. Moreover, with the proliferation of religious universities there were more and more *ulama* with academic degrees, while the introduction of general faculties in religious universities caused confusion about whether graduates from these institutions should be called *ulama* or *intelektuil*. In sharing a wide commonality in their knowledge base and exposure to modernity and higher education, the terms *ulama* and *intelektuil*, as far as they related to the group of degree holders, were no longer mutually exclusive. During this period, even the existing mediating terms such

as “*intelek-ulama*” and “*ulama-intelek*” began to crumble, as both terms still implicitly recognized a distinction between *ulama* and *intelektuil*.

A new code was needed to mark the fusion of the two categories. The meeting ground of this fusion was not in the word “*intelektuil*” or “*ulama*”, but rather in the neutral Indonesian neologism, “*cendekiawan*” [intellectual or intelligentsia].¹¹ The term “*Cendekiawan Muslim*” was increasingly used in the Indonesian public sphere from the 1980s onwards, especially as a signifier for the explosive development of Muslim *intelek-ulama* and *ulama-intelek*. The terms *intelektuil* and *ulama*, however, remained in use signifying their original (Indonesian) meanings.

DISCURSIVE PRACTICES AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE

The period 1988–93 was the last five year phase of the first long-term Indonesian Development plan (PJP I).¹² Approaching the second term, official discourse and ceremonies began to be infatuated with a new slogan, “take-off” [*lepas-landas*], which proclaimed the next phase in Indonesia’s miraculous development. At the same time, the Indonesian economy underwent a radical change. The private and industrial sectors became the driving force of the national economy. By 1991, manufacturing’s share of GDP began to exceed that of agriculture and private banks began to hold larger sums in deposit than state banks (Thee 2002, pp. 198–201).

With the success of the industrial sector, President Suharto came to realize that technological advancement through the advancement of human technical capability was the best route towards Indonesia’s “take-off”. By late November 1984, he had said: “I’m especially conscious of just how important it is to master science and technology for the progress of our nation in the future. To be able to achieve take-off, in the coming years we need to make greater progress in the fields of science and technology” (*Kompas*, 29 November 1984).¹³ Apart from economic considerations, Suharto’s fascination with the mastery of high technology seemed to be motivated by his need to show to the world that Indonesia had succeeded under his leadership. In this context, Suharto rested his ambition on his energetic and ambitious minister, B.J. Habibie, a famous Indonesian technologist with a German university background, *Technische Hochschule Aachen*, and the long-serving minister of research and technology (1978–98).¹⁴

In supporting the drive towards technological advancement, Habibie developed a new economic vision which differed radically from that of the established economic technocrats. In his view, the sustainability of Indonesian economic development could not rely simply on the principle of “comparative

advantage", based on an abundance of natural resources and cheap labour. Rather, it should be based on the principle of "competitive advantage" based on the "added values" of high technology and the availability of highly trained and skilled labour. In this context, the mastery of science and technology (S&T) through human resource development (HRD) should become the main priority of future Indonesian development. With the enthusiastic support of Suharto, Habibie developed an empire of high-tech strategic industries ranging from aircraft to ships and even weapons. Alongside these ambitious projects, S&T and HRD issues became the dominant discourse in the public sphere of the late New Order era.

As the regime was dreaming of take-off, the achievement of economic development began to produce a reverse impact. The increasing Indonesian dependency on foreign debt and the global capitalist community made the country's economics and politics more vulnerable to foreign influences and changes in the international economic environment. Furthermore, as the price of oil began to fall after 1982, the government began to develop a more efficient, deregulated and market-oriented economy. This was followed by a shift from state-dominated import substitution towards a private-initiative export oriented economy. This lifted the bargaining power of the private sector. As Hill and Mackie noted (1994, p. xxv): "The international connections of private commercial conglomerates have undoubtedly tipped the balance of power between the state apparatus and these private actors in the latter's favour." Moreover, the deepening integration of the national economy into the global capitalist community provided a catalyst for Indonesia's exposure to Western liberal and democratic values.

By the early 1990s, a sizeable urban (educated) middle class, numbering around fifteen million people, had emerged for the first time in the nation's history (Hill and Mackie 1994, p. xxv). The growing number of higher-educated people together with the increasing urban middle class was responsible for a rise of expectations and critical aspirations. When the circulation of the elite at the centre of the political structure became congested, the opportunities for this class to wield political power were constrained. The long waiting list of power aspirants put pressure on political elites inside the political structure, leading to fierce internal political struggles among cliques and circles in the New Order's bureaucracy and polity.

Although economic growth was sustained and the proportion of tertiary students remained relatively small, the problem of "intellectual proletarianization" which had happened in the past became even worse. The main cause lay in the mismatch between supply (the output of the tertiary institutions) and demand (the job market).¹⁵ The proportion of social science

students among all university students in the country until the period 1988–90 was about 76.8 per cent. At the same time, the proportion of social science graduates among the total unabsorbed output of tertiary institutions (by the job market) was more than 60 per cent.¹⁶ The threat of unemployment was even more frightening for students of non-elite private universities. Spending more money for tuition fees and other expenses than students in the public universities, graduates of the (non-elite) private universities tended to be marginalized in the job market. Being more aware politically but deprived economically, these upcoming intellectual proletarians were a time-bomb for future political unrest.

All these consequences of development put pressure on the government to give greater concessions to demands for openness in the public sphere. From the late 1980s, “*keterbukaan*” [openness] became a counter-hegemonic discourse in the public sphere. In the Independence Day address of August 1990, Suharto himself embraced the idea of greater freedom of expression, though he saw this simply as a lessening of his executive roles. Even so, such political rhetoric elicited muted criticism and calls for more substantial reforms (including significant modifications to the military’s dual function) and even calls for the president to stand down at the end of his current term (Elson 2001, p. 268).¹⁷

The winds of openness provided an impetus for intellectuals and the mass media to be more openly critical of the government. Towards the end of the 1980s, the student movement that had long been silenced began to revive on a limited scale. The focus of their attention was concentrated on local and sectoral issues such as protesting against the government’s confiscation of agricultural lands and the government-sponsored lottery (SDSB).

Despite these moves, it was obvious that the long established repressive security regime remained intact. The freedom for critical journalism and student protests remained restricted. On 29 June 1987, a newly established newspaper, *Prioritas* (est. 1985) was banned because of its alleged “cynical, insinuating, and tendentious” reporting. In October 1990, the government closed down a popular Jakarta-based tabloid, *Monitor*, after it had published a readers’ popularity poll which ranked the Prophet Muhammad eleventh after President Suharto (who ranked first), Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, and the editor of the tabloid itself, Arswendo Atmowiloto. This press repression culminated in 1994, when three well-known publications, *Tempo*, *Editor* and *Detik*, were banned after reporting the government’s plan to buy ex-East German warships for excessive sums of money. Meanwhile, on 5 August 1989, six student activists from the ITB¹⁸ were arrested and imprisoned after protesting against the visit of the then minister of home affairs, General Rudini, to the ITB

campus. This was followed by the imprisonment and abduction of other intellectual activists in the following years.

In this transitory phase between repression and openness, factional conflicts within the ruling elite became even more intense. It was this situation in 1990 that made possible the realization of a long standing Muslim ambition to establish an association of the Indonesian Muslim intelligentsia, to be called *Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Se-Indonesia* (ICMI). Emerging as the only major Islamic organization granted legal status during the New Order, in the midst of the growing oppositional movements, ICMI was the most controversial intellectual association in Indonesian history. It became a focus of political debates and media attention in the late New Order era. Its political significance, however, did not last long, as the country was soon engulfed by a wave of *reformasi* [reform].

The economic crisis that mired the country after mid-1997¹⁹ provided a catalyst for people to question the New Order's legitimacy and to imagine a future without Suharto. Suharto had survived crises before and had even emerged stronger as a result. This time, however, the economic crisis was too serious especially since it was exacerbated by a broad constellation of non-economic crises. The ruling elite displayed severe internal disunity. Scattered opponents had begun to unite in a common cause, while international support, especially from the financial institutions, had diminished.²⁰ All these and other factors occurred simultaneously and created so much pressure that Suharto found himself losing support. In effect, he had no choice but to step down on 21 May 1998.

EARLY EFFORTS TO UNITE MUSLIM INTELLECTUALS

There have been two major contending academic perspectives on ICMI's arrival on the Indonesian public scene. The first came from its critics. They argued that the rise of ICMI was part of Suharto's strategic plan to mobilize Muslim support as compensation for the potential diminution in ABRI's support for him and to detach Muslim intellectuals from more radical, political elements at the grass-roots. The second came from the perspective of more sympathetic scholars. They argued that the genesis of ICMI should be understood as a natural consequence of the growing number of the new educated-middle class Muslims who needed an arena for self-actualization and to give voice to the continuing economic and political marginalization of the *ummat*.

The first perspective was represented by an American political scientist, R. William Liddle, who argued that the rise and prominence of ICMI could

best be understood “as part of the president’s political strategy and tactics rather than as the expression of the demands of the Indonesian Muslim community” (Liddle 1996, p. 631). He characterized the second perspective as a failure to understand the relationship between the state and political Islam in late New Order Indonesia. “They all miss the crucial determining factor, which is the role played by President Suharto as pre-eminent shaper both of the political system and the forces within it” (p. 620).

To this charge, however, the same criticism can be raised. If the rise of ICMI was simply the result of Suharto’s initiative, how can we explain the enthusiasm of tens of thousands of non-Jakarta (non-elite) ICMI members who joined ICMI without being conscious of its elite personal political interests? How can we explain half a million buyers of P.T. Abdi Bangsa’s shares in *Republika* (ICMI’s daily newspaper), who did not enforce their rights and never demanded public accountability of their shares? How can we explain the fact that some leading figures in ICMI (say, Amien Rais and Nurcholish Madjid) played critical roles in pressuring Suharto to step down?

The second perspective was represented by American anthropologist, Robert W. Hefner, who argued that “the effort to establish an association of Muslim Intellectuals did, at least in the first instance, originate within the Muslim community” (Hefner 1993, p. 20). In contrast to the first view, he proposed that “however much it was to be drawn into bureaucratic intrigues, the idea for ICMI was not originally a matter of government engineering; its origins lay in a state-society interaction with longer and more contested history” (Hefner 1993, p. 20). Viewing ICMI simply as an arm of government, Hefner argued, reflects a tendency among Western scholars to see religion as no more than instrument for achieving more “genuine” political-economic ends. This is despite the fact that many devout Muslims view politics not as ends in themselves, but as means for the creation of a greater good, the realization of Islamic ideals in society (Hefner 1993, p. 29). Hefner quoted Benedict Anderson’s views:

We are so accustomed to thinking...only of politicians using religion for political ends, that it is extremely hard for us to understand what politics might look like if we could see it through religious eyes, or in a religious perspective, and thus imagine the possibility of religious people using politics for religious ends (Hefner 1993, p. 27).

Concerning this argument, however, there are some questions that can be raised. If Suharto had no specific role in ICMI’s establishment, why then did he support the establishment of a confessional-based association that had been depicted by one senior Indonesian general as “the biggest disaster to

hit the New Order” (Vatikiotis 1994, p. 133). Furthermore, if ICMI were an organization which used politics for merely religious ends, how should we understand the following view of Adi Sasono, a leading organic intellectual of ICMI: “It is difficult to organize the masses for purposes of democratization and de-militarization if we don’t use the reason of religion” (Quoted in Ramage 1995, p. 75).

The shortcomings of both perspectives are obvious. Both are looking for reality through one-sided spectacles. To borrow B. Smart’s depiction (following Derrida), both share a common cosmology of modernist metaphysics based on “a series of metaphorical binary oppositions, in which one element is accorded a privileged status” (Smart 1997, p. 402). The first perspective, as articulated by Liddle, reflects a lack of historical insight, a lack of comparative perspective, and a lack of understanding of the general theory of social movements.

To judge ICMI simply as a Trojan horse for the president’s political strategies and tactics just because the power-centre backed the process of its formation risks ignoring the mirror of history. The support ICMI gained from the authorities is not a unique historical phenomenon, as similar cases had recurringly happened throughout Indonesian history. The success of R.M. Tirta Adhi Surjo in establishing *Soenda Berita* (1903) and particularly *Medan Prijaji* (1907), which has been celebrated in Pramoedya’s historical novels for pioneering the “language” of nationalism, was partly ascribed to “the access he had to Governor General van Heutsz, which provided him with protection from bureaucratic harassment” (Shiraishi 1990, p. 34). Such access to the political authorities, however, did not prevent Surjo from pursuing his own political intentions as he could maintain his spirit of resistance and emancipation.²¹

In other cases, the establishment of *Budi Utomo* (BU) and *Sarekat Islam* (SI) was also achieved with the blessing of Governor-General Idenburg (Shiraishi 1990, p. 35; Van Neil 1970, pp. 95–96). This official blessing, however, does not necessarily mean that SI was simply Idenburg’s Trojan horse — Dutch officials would later translate SI as “*Salah Idenburg*” [Idenburg’s Mistake]. In a similar manner, Japanese scholar Mitsuo Nakamura (1999, p. 89) has severely criticized Liddle’s view on the emergence of ICMI:

Liddle even stated that ICMI should be regarded as an instrument designed and used by Soeharto for his own purposes. However, Soeharto did not complete his seventh term: ICMI did not work to safeguard him. Instead, it worked to replace him with Habibie. What went wrong? After the second congress of ICMI, a number of Islamic activists were appointed to strategic positions in the government through their ICMI connections. Some of them

were determined to take over power from Soeharto sooner or later, with or without Habibie.

Apart from historical precedents, the rise of the Muslim intellectual movement during the 1970s–1990s is in fact not unique to Indonesia. In Algeria, there was a continuing tension between the so-called “*arabophone*” intelligentsia [Islamist intelligentsia] *versus* “*francophone*” intelligentsia [secular modernizing intelligentsia]. According to an Algerian scholar, Lahouari Addi (1997, p. 93), “whilst it was assumed that independence would bring them together and serve to create a new elite, it pushed them further apart and even set them against each other.” In Turkey, a similar clash occurred between the so-called “*aydin*”²² [Muslim intellectuals] *versus* “*entelektüel*” [secular intellectuals]. In Egypt, a triangular tension took place between the so-called “*mufakkir Islamy*” [Muslim intelligentsia] *versus* the “secular intelligentsia” plus a conflict within the “*mufakkir Islamy*” between the moderate Muslim intelligentsia *versus* the radical one — under the banner of “*Jama’at Islamiyya*” (Abdullah 1991; Denoeux 1993). These examples strongly suggest that the rise of ICMI cannot be ascribed solely to Suharto’s initiative because similar phenomena can be found elsewhere in the Muslim world.

Last but not least, Liddle’s exaggeration of the Suharto factor is inappropriate in terms of the general theory of social movements.²³ Eyerman and Jamison (1991, pp. 55–56) offer some premises to understand the phenomena of social movements. Among other things, they state:

- (1) Social movements go through a kind of life cycle, from gestation to formation and consolidation. Social movements seldom emerge spontaneously; instead they require long period of preparation.
- (2) No social movement emerges until there is a political opportunity available, a context of social problems as well as a context of communication, opening up the potential for problem articulation and knowledge dissemination.

In addition, for the social movement to appear on the public scene, political opportunity is a decisive factor. This point recalls the theory of “political process”. The central focus of this theory is the relationship between institutional political actors and action, and the importance of the so-called a “political opportunity structure”. When challenging the established political structure, social movements interact with actors who enjoy a consolidated position in such an establishment. Based on comparative studies, Donatella della Porta and Mario Diani (1999, pp. 9–10) highlight the following research findings:

Other empirical research indicated important new variables, such as...the availability of influential allies (Gamson 1999).... Sydney Tarrow integrated

these empirical observations into a theoretical framework for his study of protest cycles in Italy, singling out the degree of openness or closure of formal political access, the degree of stability or instability of political alignments, the availability and strategic posture of potential allies (1983, p. 28) and political conflicts between and within elites (1989a, p. 35).

Based on theories of social movements, Suharto's support for ICMI can be viewed as a signal of the availability of a positive political opportunity which could be used to transform the well-prepared Muslim intellectual movements into a loosely organized Muslim intelligentsia association. Exaggerating the "Suharto factor" runs the risk of ignoring the fact that ICMI might have its own political agenda, even though the formal rhetoric of ICMI's leading figures kept insisting that ICMI was simply a "*gerakan kebudayaan*" [cultural movement] free of political interests.

Having analysed the shortcomings of the first perspective we now turn to examine the second one. To fully appreciate its historical background, the second perspective as articulated by Hefner, fails to reveal the essence of ICMI's struggle within the web of actual power relations. By saying that "its origins lay in a state-society interaction", this perspective reflects Marxist theories which lock the power locus into the relations between ruler and ruled and exaggerate the importance of the state in the maintenance of power relations. This monolithic view of power has been criticized by Foucault for its narrow understanding of the nature of power and its relations. The power struggle not only takes place along the axis of state and society relations, but also occurs in clashes of individuals and groups within society. ICMI's power struggle is better understood by situating it in this broader context of power relations.

It is worth noting that the second perspective characterized ICMI's historical project as the struggle for the Muslim middle class. In fact, there are several problems in describing ICMI struggle in terms of class action. First, the Indonesian intelligentsia's road to power did not really originate from its class (economic) position, but rather, from its privileged status group as a modern-educated stratum of Indonesian society. Second, ICMI membership did not really represent the (Muslim) middle class, but rather, a structurally differentiated stratum of the Muslim intelligentsia both economically and educationally (see Table 6.4). The great bulk of its members belonged to the middle income level. A few others emerged with their wealth substantially enhanced, in many respects coming to share economic power with the owners of capital, while the rest were distinctly proletarianized. Third, the power struggle among groups of the intelligentsia had seldom been articulated in terms of class but mostly in terms of cultural solidarity groupings. Last but

not least, conflicts among groups of the Indonesian intelligentsia and between the Muslim intelligentsia and the state reflected not only clashes of economic interest but also cultural and symbolic ones which cannot be reduced to a struggle for "class" (economic interests).

In the light of these theoretical perspectives, the rise of ICMI can be understood as the result of an interactional process. That is, the combination of a long period of Islamic intellectual movements in various fields and ideological orientations and the availability of political opportunity resulting from changes in Suharto's patronage structure. Intellectual networks and the cognitive structure of previous Muslim intellectual movements provided the preconditions for the mobilization of Muslim intellectuals for ICMI, while Suharto's support opened up a new possibility for the materialization of a long-awaited union of Muslim intellectuals. The rise of ICMI also reflected a combination of power struggles between state and society and between various groups within society (particularly within the stratum of intelligentsia) as well as a combination of the power struggle for politico-economic interests (class) and that for cultural-identity (status).

As more and more concessions were given to the Muslim community and as Muslim intellectuals began to dominate socio-political discourses in the Indonesian public sphere, it was natural for the Muslim intelligentsia to want to play more decisive roles in the New Order polity and bureaucracy. Moreover, by the late 1980s, the fourth generation of the Muslim intelligentsia, composed largely of those who were born in the 1930s and 1940s, was too old to remain on the periphery of political power. Behind this generation was a long queue of the fifth generation of Muslim activists who were waiting for a change in political opportunities for their upward mobility.

Having been fragmented into a variety of groupings because of different responses to New Order political repression and modernization, Muslim intellectuals were now, under a conducive political opportunity structure, united by a common will to reproduce a new social cohesion to strengthen Muslim bargaining power. This aspiration could be motivated by an ideal collective will to deepen the Islamization process of the Indonesian polity or simply by pragmatic individual power interests. Rhetorically, this ambition was often disguised by the slogans of Muslim participation in and contribution to development, especially in the field of S&T and HRD development.

To strengthen the political bargaining power of the Muslim intelligentsia, the formation of a Muslim intellectual united front was considered as vital. Throughout the 1980s there had been experiments in uniting Muslim intellectuals in particular collective actions and associations. In 1980, Muslim

intellectuals in Surabaya and its surrounding area began to form the Intellectual Community of *Al-Falah* [*Cendekiawan Muslim Al-Falah*, CMF] led by Fuad Amsjari.²⁴ The headquarters of this intellectual community was in the Al-Falah mosque, which was well-known as a DDII affiliate. In early 1984, the CMF organized a wider meeting of Indonesian Muslim intellectuals in line with its ambition to form an Indonesian society of Muslim intellectuals.²⁵ This meeting was attended by Muslim intellectuals from Surabaya, Malang, Yogyakarta, and Bandung.²⁶

Then in December 1984, the MUI organized a meeting of Muslim intellectuals in Jakarta, attended by thirty-one participants from Jakarta, Bandung, Bogor, Yogyakarta, Banda Aceh, Medan, Padang, and Makassar. The meeting recommended strengthening cooperation among Muslim intellectuals with a special concern to assist the MUI in providing consultation teams. The meeting was followed by the "Symposium of Muslim Intellectuals to prepare for the Industrial and Information Society", held in Ciawi (Bogor) in March 1986, attended by more than 100 Muslim intellectuals. Soon after the symposium, a special meeting of Muslim intellectuals was conducted in Cibogo (West Java) on 7–8 May 1986 resulting in the establishment of the Communication Forum of Indonesian Development [*Forum Komunikasi Pembangunan Indonesia*, FKPI] (Anwar 1995, pp. 253–54). This forum did not include the word Islam or Muslim to avoid raising government's opposition. With Achmad Tirtosudiro as its chairman and Dawam Rahardjo as its main organizer, the forum proposed the establishment of an association of Indonesian Muslim intellectuals and even prepared its statutes. Afraid of government rejection, however, the MUI asked the FKPI leader to postpone the implementation of such an idea.²⁷

The next effort to unite Muslim intellectuals in a common action front was attempted by Imaduddin Abdulrahim. For two years after his return to Indonesia, he was not allowed to give speeches or lectures on campuses (except in mosques). During this time he witnessed from a distance the fragmentation within the Muslim intellectual community, while also learning from Aswab Mahasin that the existing FKPI was not performing effectively as an organization of Muslim intellectuals. His strained relationship with Nurcholish Madjid had been restored through a close family relationship during their study in the United States and he had the ambition to reconcile Muslim intellectual disputes on a large scale. With some minor financial support from Alamsjah Prawiranegara he organized a meeting of Muslim intellectuals in Yogyakarta in early 1989. The meeting was attended by about fifty participants from diverse Islamic movements including prominent Muslim intellectual figures such as Nurcholish Madjid, Endang Saefuddin Anshari and Syafi'i

Ma'arif. The meeting reached agreement about the establishment of a Muslim intellectual association, but the security apparatus suddenly used force to break up the meeting.²⁸

The failure of early efforts to establish a Muslim intellectual association on a large scale reflected the difficulty of realizing such an ambition without the blessing of the (political) power holder. As well, until the end of the 1980s the influence of the old "Islamophobic" political brokers within the security regime remained relatively strong.

THE RISE OF ICM

History is often created in an unimaginable way. Soon after the Yogyakarta meeting, Imaduddin Abdulrahim was invited (for the first time) to give a religious speech on campus by the Malang-based Brawidjaja University to celebrate *Isra Mi'raj* [the Night Journey of the Prophet] day. The then rector of the university was a former HMI activist, Z.A. Ahmady, who took the risk of inviting Abdulrahim to speak publicly on the campus. The principal organizers were student activists from the engineering faculty, under the leadership of Eric Salman, who admired Abdulrahim for religious and academic reasons. The encounter between campus Islamic activists and the pioneer of the campus *dakwah* provided them some food for thought.²⁹ Apart from this event, Dawam Rahardjo also happened to meet with Islamic activists of the university because his daughter was a student there. While visiting his daughter, he was frequently invited to give religious lectures in the university's Raden Patah mosque.³⁰ The meeting of the campus junior Islamic activists with their senior mentors paved the road for informal inter-generational intellectual networks.

The students were forcefully struck by the ongoing cleavages among the Muslim intelligentsia. They were bothered by the leadership polarization in the Muslim community, reflected by the emergence of the Salman group, the Paramadina group, the Al-Falah group, the Shalahuddin group and so on. In February 1990, they suggested the idea of a symposium which would bring together Muslim intellectuals from all over Indonesia. Originally the symposium was to be conducted between 29 September–1 October 1990 with the theme "The Muslim intellectual's contribution to the 'take-off' era of development". They gained support in principle from the rector of the Brawidjaja University and the rector of the *Muhammadiyah* University of Malang, Malik Fadjar, though the Brawidjaja rector raised objections to the heavy costs of the seminar. Even so, for these students, with key figures among them being Eric Salman, Ali Mudhakhir, Mohammad Zaenuri, Awang Surya

and Mohammad Iqbal,³¹ there was no possibility of retreat. Using their personal and limited resources, they began to visit centres of the Islamic epistemic community throughout Java to raise support from prominent Muslim intellectuals. They met with Abdulrahim and Rahardjo in May 1990.

Both Abdulrahim and Rahardjo had long dreamt of bringing together Muslim intellectuals from diverse movements both from the “bloc within” and “bloc without” to form a kind of Muslim intellectuals’ “historical bloc”. The students’ proposal of a symposium offered a promising channel to materialize their ambitions. After discussing this idea with Rahardjo, Abdulrahim told the students: “If you want to create history, this symposium should not be an ordinary one. It has to be a vehicle for establishing an association of Indonesian Muslim intellectuals.”³² To make the dream come true, he recommended the students revise their proposal and meet with B.J. Habibie to ask him to be a keynote speaker at the symposium, as well as to lead the association. Abdulrahim had received advice from Alamsjah Prawiranegara that it was important to make Habibie a patron if the association were to succeed. Apart from his reputation as a leading Indonesian scientist and a committed (non-activist) Muslim, his close relationship with Suharto would be very useful. In fact, the students had long admired Habibie for his scientific achievements and for his religious commitment, after reading his short biography in the *Kiblat* magazine.³³ They therefore agreed with Abdulrahim’s suggestion.

Representatives of the students were able to meet for the first time with Habibie in the *mushalla* of his office, Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology (BPPT), after the Friday prayer on 2 August 1990. Habibie responded to the idea of a symposium positively and asked the students to send him a formal letter and proposal. In their letter, the students requested a special meeting with Habibie to explain the programme comprehensively. This meeting occurred on 23 August 1990, led by student representatives, Eric Salman and Ali Mudhakir, who were accompanied by Abdulrahim, Rahardjo and Syafi’i Anwar. Once again Habibie stated his willingness to come to the symposium. Concerning his nomination as the chairman of the proposed association of Muslim intellectuals, Habibie did not mind in principle, but said that as a minister he had to get permission from the president. To do this, he needed to be able to give the president some proof that Muslim intellectuals requested him to lead the proposed association.³⁴

After Habibie’s positive response, these students with the help of Abdulrahim’s and Rahardjo’s circles of Muslim activists began to collect signatures of Muslim intellectuals as proof that they supported the

establishment of the association and Habibie's nomination as chair. In this effort, people with multiple affiliations and wide-ranging personal networks provided a useful bridge to mobilize the support of intellectuals from diverse Islamic movements. For example, Nurcholish Madjid only agreed to give the students his signature after Abdulrahim called him. To persuade Yogyakarta's intellectual circles, a letter from Rahardjo, as a *Muhammadiyah* functionary and former activist in Yogyakarta, to Amien Rais, "the godfather" of Yogyakarta's Muslim intellectuals, was very effective. When the students finally handed the list of signatures to Habibie on 25 September 1990, they had been able to collect 49 signatures with 45 of them being the signatures of Ph.D. graduates.³⁵

While the students were collecting signatures, Achmad Tirtosudiro took the initiative to ask Nurcholish Madjid to write a paper on the basic concept of the proposed association which could be given to Habibie and President Suharto.³⁶ In his paper, Madjid basically argued that when the majority of Muslims accepted *Pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution as the basis of the Indonesian state and social organization, the issue of the ideo-philosophical foundation of the nation had been settled. As a result of the success of New Order development programmes, there had been an unprecedented increase in the number of Muslims with higher education. Unfortunately, Madjid said, internal disputes within the Muslim intellectual community inhibited their optimum contribution to national development. He then suggested that one way of addressing the problem would be to establish a Muslim intellectuals' association. He named this proposed association *Ikatan Sarjana Muslim Indonesia* (ISMI, Association of Indonesian Muslim *Sarjana*), which would strengthen scientific research and development (R&D) through an interdisciplinary approach as a means of perfecting the development process (Madjid 1990).

After receiving the symposium proposal, the support of the 49 signatories and Madjid's paper, Habibie arranged an appointment with President Suharto. To his surprise, during their six-hour meeting Suharto advised him to accept the offer. Habibie had been worried that his acceptance would distance him from the long-identified "*abangan*" president, but Suharto was able to demonstrate his knowledge of the finer points of Islamic doctrine and assure Habibie that this project was significant. Suharto also promised to ensure that other senior ministers would offer their support.

Suharto's positive response reflected the changing alignment within the ruling elite following instances of acute internal elite rivalry in the lead up to and in the aftermath of the presidential election of 1988. Among other factors, the elite rivalries were driven by the souring of Suharto's relationship

with General L.B. Murdani. On 10 February 1988, a month before the presidential election and just two months after Suharto had granted Murdani a twelve-month extension of service, he suddenly relieved Murdani of his post as military commander and replaced him with Try Sutrisno (army chief of staff and former presidential adjutant — 1974–78). Speculation had it that Murdani's break with Suharto was the result of Murdani's criticism of Suharto's favouritism towards his children's business interests and Murdani's refusal to favour them with lucrative military procurements. Apart from this view, R.E. Elson noted other underlying factors as follows (2001, p. 259): "Murdani's apparent incapacity to appreciate the fresh socio-political currents in Indonesia's new society, his obsession with developing intelligence networks, and his unblinking firm-mindedness and his lack of political suppleness had inevitably set him against the President."

The tension between the two people culminated in the matter of the vice-presidential election. Suharto had made a decision to grant the then Golkar chairman, Sudharmono, the position of the vice-president, as a reward for his acute political sensitivities, his vast experience in the bureaucracy and his success in building patronage networks. In the eyes of the army, however, Sudharmono was not, nor should he be expected to be, a popular choice as vice-president. His hostile competition with Murdani for favour within the upper echelons of the New Order was well known. Moreover, senior officers could hardly respect him for his "civilian" military background.³⁷ They were also highly conscious of his efforts as state secretary (1973–88), at least in a later period, to distance them from the lucrative contracts from which they had prospered. Instead, Sudharmono favoured Suharto's children. Thus, in the lead up to the vice-presidential election, Murdani launched a campaign among the military representatives in the MPR to deny Sudharmono the vice-presidential post (Elson 2001, p. 260).³⁸ This Murdani-led political manoeuvre could not prevent the elevation of Sudharmono to the post of vice-president, but it strained the relationship between Suharto and many military officers, especially the Murdani loyalists.

The long-standing ambition of some Muslim figures to establish an association of Muslim intellectuals now found a favourable political opportunity in the context of Suharto's need to find a new strategic partner to compensate for possible lessening of military support for him. Although it started as a students' project, the Muslim symposium became a major political event for the national elite. The title of the symposium capitalized on the contemporary discursive obsession with Indonesia's "take-off" through S&T and HRD development, namely, "The National Symposium of Muslim Intellectuals on the Development of Indonesian Society in the 21st Century".

Opened by President Suharto in the presence of several ministers and the military commander, as well as upper echelons of New Order bureaucrats on 6 December 1990, this three-day historic event was attended by more than 500 Muslim intellectuals from diverse movements all over Indonesia. On the second day of the symposium, some 460 invited participants affixed their signatures to the charter for the establishment of a new intellectual association and elected B.J. Habibie unanimously as its chairman. The name of this new association was not "*Ikatan Sarjana Muslim Indonesia*" [ISMI, Association of Indonesian Muslim *Sarjana*], as proposed by Madjid, but rather "*Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Se-Indonesia*" [ICMI, Association of Indonesian Muslim *Cendekiawan*], as proposed by Habibie and other intellectuals.

The shift from the term "*sarjana*" [degree holder or scholar] to "*cendekiawan*" (intellectual or intelligentsia) indicated a radical departure in the politics of meaning and signified very different political implications. If *sarjana* had been used, the association's membership might have been restricted to degree holders and would have emphasized its links with academic interests. By using the term *cendekiawan*, which was defined by Habibie as "everyone who had a concern with human suffering and a sense of responsibility for the betterment of social life", the membership of the association was open to a larger constituency, while its scope of activities could transcend the boundaries of academic interests. With its broad membership and its range of activities, the collective nature of this association soon shifted from an ensemble of individual intellectuals to a communal grouping of the Muslim intelligentsia. As such, even through its name, this association reflected a politically-laden collective entity.

POWER GAMES: CONSOLIDATION AND CONTESTATION

With the establishment of ICMI, urban Muslim intellectual movements of the 1970s–1980s, which involved the fourth and fifth generation of Muslim intelligentsia, had arrived at a turning point. Although ICMI's arrival could be seen as the natural institutionalization of previous movements, once the ideas engendering these movements become formalized in an established political structure, "they had for all intents and purposes left the space of the movement behind" (Eyerman and Jamison 1991, p. 60). The institutionalization of the Muslim intellectual movement in the form of a single organization (ICMI) transformed the activities of the movements into an interest group.³⁹ To become an interest group, ICMI inevitably adapted to the existing power structure. This paralysed the dynamic force of these social movements.

Resembling Tjokroaminoto's rhetoric about the SI's political void in 1913, the ICMI functionaries insisted that ICMI was not designed as a political organization and would never become a political organization. As an interest group, however, ICMI could not escape the necessity of articulating collective interests and identity in the public sphere. Although its main objective was to empower human resource development through the improvement of the quality of faith, the quality of thinking, the quality of work, the quality of professionalism and the quality of life, it could not hide its inherent nature as a political vehicle.

As a political vehicle, ICMI encompassed conflicts of interest and controversies. The appointment of Habibie as its chairman, an "outsider" with no experience in Islamic activism, was made in the hope that he could bridge the gap between factions of the Muslim intelligentsia. He performed this role effectively to a large extent. Yet, he could not escape his bias towards his own origins as a technocratic bureaucrat.

Just five weeks after the establishment of ICMI, the seeds of internal conflict began to emerge. In the structure of the ICMI leadership, announced by Habibie on 13 February 1991, Habibie adopted the matrix system usually applied in large business corporations such as in the Boeing aircraft industry. In this system, there was no place for the position of secretary-general — a position that was expected to be held by Dawam Rahardjo, a man who had played a critical role in the establishment of ICMI as well as being a representative of the "bloc without". Although Islamic intellectuals from non-bureaucratic backgrounds, who were sometimes referred to as "the real ICMI",⁴⁰ anticipated that they would play a major role in ICMI's leadership, Habibie had his own way. The leadership composition of ICMI's boards (a board of counsellors, a board of advisers, a board of experts, and an executive board) was dominated by bureaucrats many of whom had no Islamic credentials. Habibie defended his decision by arguing that later through social interaction and social learning in ICMI, these (nominal Muslim) bureaucrats would experience the process of Islamization.⁴¹

Whatever Habibie's reason, the dominant representation of Muslim bureaucrats paralysed intellectual criticism. The "real" ICMI activists were not happy with the prospect of this newly established association. The unity of Muslims intellectuals in ICMI did not bring an end to their heterogeneity. ICMI was characterized by diversity, by contestation, and by various opposing positions. They clashed with each other especially on the basis of the difference in intellectual backgrounds and in the level of Islamic-mindedness as well as competing for access to the inner circle of the New Order power holders.

The emergence of ICMI also raised criticism and controversy in the public sphere. There had been no single intellectual organization in Indonesian history whose scale of controversies and media coverage were equal to those of ICMI. This is indicated by the number and range of publications about it.⁴²

Throughout the 1980s there were only ten articles in the media on “intellectuals”, with none of them making a specific reference to Muslim intellectuals. During that period, the term “intellectual” was mostly used in relation to intellectual labour and the academic world, having no direct links with any political struggle. In contrast, throughout the 1990s there were 116 articles on the “general intellectual” (with no specific reference to the Muslim intellectual) and 108 articles on the “Muslim intellectual”. Of the total 224 articles, there were only 7 articles published before ICMI’s establishment with 5 of them being on “general intellectuals”. Thus, it is obvious that the rise of ICMI was a major impetus for the formation of an Indonesian intellectual discourse on the intellectual in the 1990s.

The articles of the 1990s reflect a clash of discourse among Indonesian intellectuals over the meaning of “intellectual”. This was reflected in text production, inter-textual relations and text signification. Articles on the “general intellectual” were published most frequently in *Kompas* (46 times), a newspaper that had a close relationship with the Catholic community. Articles on the “Muslim intellectual” were published most frequently (22 times) in ICMI’s newspaper, *Republika*, which was launched publicly on 3 January 1993 (see Table 6.2). The authorship of the 46 *Kompas* articles on the general intellectual reflected the dominant voice of Christian (Catholic/protestant) intellectuals (13 authors with 15 articles),⁴³ followed respectively by the voice of secular intellectuals (13 authors with 13 articles),⁴⁴ and the voice of NU intellectuals and Abdurrahman Wahid’s intellectual circle (3 authors with 6 articles),⁴⁵ while the remaining articles expressed the voice of ICMI’s members and other Muslim intellectuals (11 authors with 12 articles).⁴⁶ On the other hand, the authorship of *Republika* articles reflected the dominant voice of ICMI intellectuals (12 authors with 18 articles) with only one article being written by a non-Muslim intellectual.⁴⁷

The most crucial competing discourse dealt with the very definition of the concept of “intellectual”. As Zygmunt Bauman has argued (1989, p. 8):

Definitions of the intellectual are many and diverse. They have, however, one trait in common, which makes them also different from all other definitions: they are all self-definitions. Indeed, their authors are the members of the same rare species they attempt to define. Hence every

TABLE 6.2
Articles on Intellectuals in Jakarta-Based Newspapers, 1990–99

Name of Newspaper	Number of Articles on General Intellectuals	Number of Articles on Muslim Intellectuals	Total Number
<i>Angkatan Bersenjata</i>	–	2	2
<i>Berita Buana</i>	–	13	13
<i>Bisnis Indonesia</i>	3	3	6
<i>Jakarta Post</i>	3	2	5
<i>Kompas</i>	46	14	60
<i>Media Indonesia</i>	15	23	38
<i>Merdeka</i>	16	1	17
<i>Pelita</i>	6	21	27
<i>Republika</i>	9	22	31
<i>SinarHarapan</i> /*	11	2	13
<i>Suara Pembaruan</i>			
<i>Suara Karya</i>	7	5	12
Total Number	116	108	224

* *Sinar Harapan* was closed down by the government in September 1986. Four months later, *Suara Pembaruan* arose as its successor.

definition they propose is an attempt to draw a boundary of their own identity. Each boundary splits the territory into two sides: here and there, in and out, us and them.

The contending perspective in defining the intellectual is also obvious when articles in *Kompas* are compared with those in *Republika*.

The *Kompas* articles on “general intellectuals” were highly biased towards personal characteristics of the intellectual. Twenty articles exclusively defined intellectuals in terms of their personal characteristics, while five articles added to these personal characteristics the social function and structural position of the intellectual. These articles associated the intellectual with a free and independent agency, a person of ideas, a creative and constructive individual, a person who has a moral commitment, idealism and wisdom, and who dares to speak truth to power.

On the other hand, *Republika*’s articles on Muslim intellectuals were highly biased towards the social functions of the intellectual. Seventeen of the twenty-two articles associated intellectuals with their specific functions in the society, among others, as agents of change, as articulators of collective

will and identity, as educators and defenders of society, as the bridge between the elite and the masses and between the government and the *ummat*, and as interpreters of the cultural foundations of society.

The inter-textual chain also became part of a competing discourse. To support their ideas, authors attempted to connect their textual arguments to other texts written by perceived authoritative scholars on this issue. Ninety seven out of 224 articles were embellished with citations of opinions of particular scholars with only 51 of them stating the reference. The sources of the citations in these articles derived disproportionately from foreign non-Islamic scholars/sources (97 people and sources). The number of citations from foreign Islamic scholars/sources was only 9, while those from domestic scholars/sources were 46.

The scholar most frequently cited in the articles was Julien Benda (11 times), a man who strongly opposed intellectual engagement in politics. Other sources that were cited were Edward Shils (7 times), Clifford Geertz (6 times), William Liddle (5 times) and Antonio Gramsci (4 times). Julien Benda's famous condemnation of "the betrayal of the intellectuals" was frequently cited as a weapon to attack ICMI's political passion and partisanship. Antonio Gramsci's view on the intellectual as determined by his/her relationship to power was used as a contending perspective.

The vehemence and extensiveness of the discursive contestation on the definition of "intellectual" reflected a power struggle between proponents and opponents of ICMI. As Sara Mills argued (1999, pp. 96–97), ideological struggle is the essence of discursive structure, and the discursive structure is the site where the power struggle is played out. Both parties of the polemic in *Kompas* and *Republika*, however, missed a very crucial point. They seemed to take it for granted that ICMI was a collective representation of "intellectuals". In fact, it was a collective representation of the Muslim "intelligentsia". Although the original intention of ICMI's establishment was to provide a forum for reconciling disputes among Muslim intellectuals, once ICMI had been established and had recruited a large membership and transformed itself into an interest group, it no longer expressed the voice of individual Muslim intellectuals but rather the collective interests of the Muslim intelligentsia.

ICMI's formation was attacked by its opponents basically because of its sectarianism and exclusiveness, its political accommodationism, and its lack of commitment to the empowerment of democracy and civil society. Such accusations had their own justifications, but at the same time reflected clashes of political interests.

The first powerful opposition came from the then chairman of the NU, Abdurrahman Wahid, and his intellectual circle. His opposition partly reflected his genuine commitment to plurality and democracy. But at the same time, it also seemed to reflect his apprehension about NU's political position. The latter proposition was even raised by Rofiqul Umam, the then chairman of the Jakarta chapter of the NU's youth organization, *Ansor*. In his article in *Media Indonesia* (8 December 1995) Umam argued that the NU's return to the spirit of 1926 was a strategic approach to promote a good relationship between the NU community and the state, in order to strengthen NU's ability to meet the interests of its community. The presence of ICMI with its strong human resources, according to him, could endanger that strategy.

The combination of Wahid's commitment to plurality and his political envy forced him to form collaborations with other opposition intellectuals. This led to the establishment in March 1991 of *Forum Democracy*, a working group of about forty-five prominent intellectuals of different religious backgrounds under the chairmanship of Abdurrahman Wahid.⁴⁸

The second opposition came from secular and Christian intellectuals, especially those who had played strategic roles in the formation of the New Order. Men like Rahman Tolleng (a socialist intellectual) and Harry Tjan Silalahi (of the CSIS) who had been architects of the New Order were very critical of ICMI's political accommodationism.⁴⁹ For intellectuals of minority (religious) groups, there was a reasonable fear that the emergence of ICMI might lead to the Islamization of Indonesian politics which could undermine minority rights and religious tolerance. Apart from this reason, however, the opposition of the secular and Christian intellectuals was not devoid of some political resentment. As J.M. Barbalet noted (1998, p. 68): "Resentment is a feeling that another has gained unfair advantage. Social actors experience resentment when an external agency denies them opportunities or valued resources (including status) which would otherwise be available to them." According to Barbalet, resentment can emerge as the emotional consequences of membership in groups undergoing a loss of position. Groups that used to be dominant economically and politically develop resentment congruent with status defensiveness directed to those perceived as threatening their establishment (1998, p. 75).

Last but not least, opposition also came from military officers, especially Murdani loyalists. This was represented by the strong criticism of ICMI by Gen. L.B. Murdani, Lt.-Gen. Harsudijono Hartas, Maj.-Gen. Sembiring Meliala and many others.⁵⁰ For the military intellectual, the politicization of Islam by ICMI and the confessionalization of Indonesian politics could

jeopardize the legitimacy of *Pancasila* as the state ideology. As Murdani noted: "ABRI is always most powerful in dousing SARA [disturbances based on ethnicity, religion, race, and class] problems."⁵¹ Apart from this ideological reason, however, this military criticism also reflected resentment at the ascendancy of an external agency which could threaten their political establishment. This perception was justified by the "de-militarization" issue articulated by some members of ICMI, including Dawam Rahardjo, Adi Sasono and Sri Bintang Pamungkas. In the lead up to the election of the Vice-President in 1993, Rahardjo opposed emphatically the nomination of General Tri Sutrisno as expressed in his interview with the weekly *Detik* (10 March 1993). On many occasions Sasono stressed the necessity of democratization and an eventual reduction in the military's political role, while Pamungkas was well known as a vocal critic of military involvement in politics. For senior military figures, all these criticisms were evidence of the anti-military character of ICMI (Ramage 1995, pp. 96–97).

Beyond the political controversy, ICMI's membership continued to grow attracting Indonesian Muslim intelligentsia from diverse Islamic streams and movements across the country and even from some overseas countries. A common assumption has been to view ICMI as a "*neo-Masjumi*" organization or a representation of reformist-modernist intellectual collective action. Serious research suggests a different conclusion. Although the central leadership of ICMI was dominated by intellectuals from the reformist-modernist intellectual tradition, ICMI membership in regional and local units attracted a vast number of intellectuals with traditionalist family backgrounds.

Some intellectuals from traditionalist backgrounds might have joined ICMI for the sake of pragmatic politics or to support their bureaucratic careers.⁵² For many of them, however, their incorporation into ICMI reflected a shift in their religious disposition and affiliations. This was indicated in my survey of the religious and social characteristics of ICMI membership.

For the purpose of this study, some 500 questionnaires were distributed by post to members of ICMI throughout Indonesia from September to December 1998.⁵³ Selection of names was based on the cluster-random sampling method to represent all ICMI's regional units (ORWIL) throughout Indonesia. The total number of questionnaires was equal to 2.7 per cent of the total registered ICMI members up to June 1998; that is 18,377 (ICMI Database 1998). Unfortunately, only 210 of the 500 questionnaires were returned by the respondents. With regard to the religious stream of their parents and the respondent themselves, the result was as follows. For the religious affiliation of their parents, 70 out of 210 respondents revealed that their parents belonged to the NU, 54 belonged to the *Muhammadiyah*, 18

belonged to other Islamic organizations, and 68 did not belong to any major Islamic organization. When the question turned to the religious affiliation of the respondent, the results were particularly interesting. Sixty six (66) respondents revealed that they belonged to the *Muhammadiyah*, 34 belonged to the NU, 21 belonged to other established Islamic organizations, while 89 reported that they did not belong to any established Islamic organization (see Table 6.3).

TABLE 6.3
Survey of Religious Affiliation of Parents and Children of ICMI Members
N = 210

Religious Affiliation of	NU	<i>Muhammadiyah</i>	Other Established Islamic Organizations	Not Affiliated to Any Established Islamic Organization
Parents	70	54	18	68
Children	34	66	21	89

The responses to the survey show that the shift in religious disposition and affiliation had occurred especially among students from traditionalist family backgrounds. In contrast to their parents, most of them were no longer attached to any established Islamic organization, and only a few of them had shifted to *Muhammadiyah*. Those who had no affiliation to any established Islamic organization were potential recruits for the HMI and *dakwah* movement, or they had already been exposed to HMI and *dakwah* movement. Twenty out of 70 respondents whose parents were affiliated to NU had joined the HMI, while some of the rest had joined the mosque movement. Thus, the exposure of intellectuals from traditionalist family backgrounds to HMI and the *dakwah* movement seemed to be one of the preconditioning characteristics for their decision to join ICMI.⁵⁴

By 1997, the total number of registered ICMI members was 10,501. This number rose to 18,377 by June 1998 (ICMI Database, 1998). The actual ICMI membership including followers, however, was much larger than this registered membership. Many of those who were well-known as ICMI activists did not fill in registration forms. In addition, in running its programmes ICMI developed some autonomous bodies whose participants were not

necessarily direct members of ICMI. Of the 10,501 total registered memberships of 1997, there were at least 154 members with Ph.D. degrees and 506 members with Master's degrees. The educational background of the majority of ICMI members was undergraduate education (9,009 members). The remaining ICMI members did not have higher educational backgrounds. There were 711 ICMI members with upper secondary school backgrounds, 85 members with lower secondary school backgrounds, and 36 members with primary schooling only (ICMI Database 1997, see Table 6.4).

TABLE 6.4
Educational Background of Registered ICMI Members in 1997

Educational Level	Total Number
Ph.D.	154
Masters	506
Undergraduate Education	9,009
Upper Secondary School	711
Lower Secondary School	85
Primary School	36
Total Number	10,501

Source: ICMI Database 1997.

ICMI's institutions and programmes continued to develop as its membership grew. Structurally it was organized into departments within which local units (ORSAT), regional units (ORWIL) and the central core unit (ORPUS) operated. A number of specific activities were organized by autonomous bodies. In September 1992, the Centre for Information and Development Studies (CIDES) emerged as ICMI's think-tank. To provide a voice for the Muslim community, the *Republika* newspaper began to operate publicly in January 1993. To assist poor but talented students, ICMI inaugurated the ORBIT scholarships. To help small businesspeople gain access to credit, ICMI set up a *syari'a* financial institution called *Baitul Maal wa'-Tamwil* (BMT). To develop micro-enterprises at the grass-roots level, ICMI together with the MUI established the Foundation for Micro Enterprise Incubation (YINBUK). To provide alternative ideas for regional development, ICMI formed the Council of Regional Development Studies (MKPD). To provide a discussion forum for young Muslim intellectuals, ICMI formed the Young Intellectual Discussion Forum (MASIKA). To improve the reading habits of Indonesian society, ICMI promoted the so-called "Movement for

Book Donations" [*Gerakan Wakaf Buku*]. A special effort was made to improve the quality of instruction in the field of Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, Biology and English with the creation of the MAFIKIBB.⁵⁵ Last but not least, to promote human resources and technological development in the Muslim World, ICMI initiated the establishment of the International Islamic Forum for Science, Technology and Human Resources Development (IIFTIHAR).⁵⁶

Most of these institutions and programmes involved the support of government bureaucrats and the bureaucracy. Thus, their lifespan heavily depended on individual commitments of particular bureaucrats and was susceptible to positional changes within the bureaucracy. For this reason, their sustainability was fragile.

Despite ICMI's achievement in the socio-cultural field, its significance continued to be measured by both insiders and outsiders in terms of its political influence. When asked their perceptions of ICMI's significance for the Muslim community, some 210 of the surveyed ICMI members replied as follows: seventy-seven of the 210 respondents (36.6 per cent) stated that the greatest ICMI contribution was its role as a unifying factor among Muslim intellectuals and as a bridge between the government and the *ummat* as well as a channel for the actualization of Islamic aspirations. Fifty-three out of the 210 respondents (25.2 per cent) stated that ICMI helped bring Muslims from the periphery to the centre of Indonesian politics leading to a better Muslim political representation. Thirty-two out of the 210 respondents (15.2 per cent) stated that ICMI helped create a more Islamic bureaucratic environment, improved the image of Islam and boosted the self-confidence of the *ummat*. Only 37 out of the 210 respondents (17.6 per cent) viewed ICMI's significance in terms of its contribution to the problems of society, such as social welfare, education and human resource development. The remaining respondents viewed its contribution in terms of the combination of the above three roles. The emphasis on the ICMI's political dimension was more obvious in the perspective of outsiders. Critical views of ICMI tended to ignore its achievements in the cultural field.

ICMI's Political Achievements

What then was ICMI's actual achievement in politics? Stimulated by intense media coverage of ICMI, towards and after the general elections of 1992, the Indonesian mass media speculated about a "greening" (Islamization) process [*ijo royo royo*] in Indonesian politics. In reality, this process of Islamization was not as remarkable as the public perceived it to be. Samsudin Haris (1997, pp. 95–97) found that Muslim representatives in the DPR only

increased by 1 per cent, from 80.8 per cent in 1987 to 81.8 per cent in 1992. Muslim representatives in the Golkar faction of the DPR increased by 1.1 per cent, from 78.3 per cent in 1987 to 79.4 per cent in 1992. Yet, there were very few ICMI members among these new Muslim representatives and fewer still of the ICMI activists from non-bureaucrat backgrounds. Suharto did not appoint any ICMI activists from the NGO or *dakwah* intellectual backgrounds as member of the 1992 MPR (Ramage 1995, p. 100).

A similar phenomenon appeared in the composition of the Sixth Development Cabinet (1993–98). Although there were now only four non-Muslim representatives in the cabinet, which marked a decline compared to previous cabinets, Suharto did not elevate any ICMI activist from a non-bureaucrat background to this cabinet. To please the Muslim intelligentsia, the cabinet did contain some ten ICMI members from the bureaucracy. Still, only three out of the ten ICMI ministers were really active members of ICMI. These three ministers were B.J. Habibie and his allies of the BPPT, Wardiman Djojonegoro and Haryanto Dhanutirto. B.J. Habibie (the chairman of ICMI) was reappointed for a fourth term as the minister of research and technology, Wardiman (the executive secretary of ICMI) was appointed as the minister of education and culture, and Dhanutirto (an assistant of the ICMI chairman and also a Golkar functionary) was appointed as minister of transport, post and telecommunications.

The remaining ICMI ministers in the Sixth Development Cabinet were only nominal ICMI members who were appointed to ICMI's boards because of their high status in the government bureaucracy. These included Azwar Anas, Beddu Amang, Harmoko, Saleh Afiff, and Sujudi (all were members of the ICMI's Board of Advisers), Tarmizi Taher, and Harjono Sujono (both were member of the ICMI's Board of Experts).⁵⁷ Thus, it is possible that these bureaucrats were appointed as ministers because of their bureaucratic backgrounds and/or loyalty to Suharto/his family rather than because of their affiliation with ICMI.

Even so, the "ICMI-zation" process did happen on a micro-scale, especially in particular departments whose ministers were active ICMI members. Wardiman Djojonegoro, who admitted that he was an *abangan* Muslim with some degree of *Islamophobia* until the rise of ICMI, disclosed the fact that during his tenure as minister, about thirty per cent of the upper echelons of the Department of Education and Culture contained ICMI members.⁵⁸ The intensity and density of media coverage on ICMI had also inspired authorities at the provincial and municipal level to join ICMI or at least to support its activities.

As ICMI ministers had strong bureaucratic backgrounds, they had intensely internalized the bureaucratic culture of the New Order. The dominant feature of this bureaucratic culture was characterized by, among other things, corruption, cronyism, and so-called “*Bapakism*” [loyalty without reserve to a patron]. In this respect, ICMI ministers were not more trustworthy or “cleaner” than their secular counterparts; they sometimes looked even worse because of their lack of experience in the art of bureaucratic manipulation. At the same time, the influence of these bureaucratic figures within the ICMI, made it difficult for ICMI as an organization to promote intellectual criticism. This was obvious in its silence when the three well-known publications, *Tempo*, *Editor* and *Detik*, were banned in 1994.

Unhappy with their political gain in the wake of the 1992 election, the so-called “real ICMI” activists hoped for better fortunes in the next term. Yet, it was obvious that ICMI activists from a non-bureaucratic background could not easily adjust themselves to the political culture of the New Order’s ruling elite. Just a few months after the formation of the Sixth Development Cabinet in March 1993, Amien Rais (Assistant to ICMI’s chairman during the 1990–95 period and head of ICMI’s Board of Experts during the 1995–2000 period) broke a New Order political taboo by raising the issue of the presidential succession. At this stage in the New Order to canvass publicly the idea of the president stepping down was unthinkable. Rais’s pointed criticism continued to be expressed in his regular column in *Republika* from late 1996. The most important of his articles was entitled “*Inkonstitusional*” [Unconstitutional] published on 9 January 1997. In this article, he exposed the exploitative and corrupt practice of the gold mining industry as operated in Busang (East Kalimantan) and West Papua (Freeport), which involved Suharto’s family and cronies. This article enraged the Suharto family and led to Rais’s position in ICMI being questioned.

To save the collective (political) interests of ICMI, Rais agreed to step down from his position as the head of ICMI’s Board of Experts on 24 February 1997. Some months before this event, another ICMI notable and PPP parliamentarian, Sri Bintang Pamungkas, found himself sentenced to almost three years in jail for insulting the president during a lecture at a Berlin university in April 1995. He was expelled from parliament and the board of ICMI. These events turned Suharto and his family against the non-bureaucrat ICMI activists. In the lead up to the general elections of 1997, several of the non-bureaucrat ICMI activists previously nominated as Golkar representatives to the DPR/MPR, such as Adi Sasono and Dawam Rahardjo, were removed from the list.

This situation was quickly exploited by Abdurrahman Wahid to rebuild the NU's alliance with the New Order power brokers. During the election campaign, he frequently appeared with Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana (Suharto's daughter and a then deputy chairman of Golkar) at public appearances before the traditionalist community. Thus, the result of the 1998 election placed no single ICMI representative in the MPR. Jimly Asshiddiqie (vice-secretary of ICMI) did become an MPR member, but in his capacity as a representative of the MUI. Other ICMI members only became members of the DPR/MPR as a result of their positions as members of Golkar or other political parties.

The composition of the seventh (last) Suharto cabinet reflects the same pattern. As the country began to feel the impact of the economic crisis (after mid-1997) and to experience social unrest, Suharto created a cabinet of loyalists. Habibie was appointed vice-president, despite strong opposition from a major faction of Golkar and the military.⁵⁹ Habibie's appointment was probably made on the basis of his perceived-political "naivety" that did not threaten Suharto's position. At the same time, Suharto did not want to share power with any of the critical intellectuals of the ICMI.

The list of cabinet members announced on 14 March 1998 contained only one ICMI member from a non-bureaucrat background, Tuty Alawiyah, as the minister of women's affairs. Nevertheless, as a vice-head of ICMI's Board of Advisers, she was not a vocal figure in ICMI. Her appointment as a minister also seemed to reflect her long established relationship with Suharto's late wife (Tien Suharto) and his daughter, Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, rather than her ICMI membership. Other ICMI members who were appointed as ministers were from bureaucratic (including Golkar) backgrounds. One was an active deputy chairman of ICMI's Executive Board, Haryanto Dhanutirto (as minister of food, horticulture and medicine), four were passive members of ICMI, namely Fuad Bawazier, Rahardi Ramelan (both were members of ICMI's Board of Advisers), Muladi (a vice chairman of ICMI's Board of Experts) and Quraish Shihab (an assistant to the ICMI chairman) who became the minister of finance, the minister of research and technology, the minister of justice and the minister of religious affairs respectively.⁶⁰ Thus, until the last Suharto cabinet, ICMI activists from non-bureaucrat backgrounds failed to gain political positions within the New Order power structure *via* ICMI. It was this failure which became a catalyst for their later support for the reform movement.

The Shift to the Reform Movement

Many of the non-bureaucrat ICMI intellectuals reached the conclusion that there was no place for them in the New Order polity. Thus, when student

demonstrations supporting the reform [*reformasi*] movement began to occur, men like Adi Sasono, Dawam Rahardjo and even Achmad Tirtosudiro joined Amien Rais in advocating change. On 9 April 1998, Achmad Tirtosudiro in his capacity as an acting chairman of ICMI (following Habibie's appointment as the vice-president) made a public statement that student demonstrations should not be banned. On 4 May, Adi Sasono (a general-secretary of ICMI)⁶¹ wrote an article in *Republika* warning the government that social unrest at the grass-roots level was a prelude to social revolution and called on the authorities to meet the people's demands for reform. On 6 May, ICMI officially conducted a press conference stating that in response to the public's demand for reform, no group should try to prevent the possibility of an Extraordinary Session of the MPR or of a cabinet reshuffle.⁶² On 14 May, Tirtosudiro and Sasono explicitly welcomed Suharto's statement in Egypt concerning his willingness to step down (*Republika*, 15 May 1998).

ICMI intellectuals with their divergent political inclinations then played a critical role in historic moments surrounding Suharto's resignation. Amien Rais became the icon of the resistance movement. His principal support came from the sixth generation of Muslim intelligentsia, especially those affiliated with the United Front of Indonesian Islamic University Students (KAMMI). On 12 May 1998 he led the formation of a resistance front, *Majelis Amanat Rakyat* (MAR, People's Mandate Council), consisting of fifty-five prominent reformists representing a broad spectrum of society.

About the same time, another ICMI intellectual with moderate tendencies, Nurcholish Madjid, drafted a proposal for a peaceful accelerated transfer of power. Following his discussions with some military officers (among others, Chief-of-Staff for Territorial Affairs Lt.-Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono) on 14 May, two days later he convened a press conference in the lobby of the Hotel Wisata. At the conference, Madjid proposed that parliamentary elections be brought forward from 2003 to January 2000, while an extraordinary session of the MPR and a presidential election should take place by April 2000. In addition, he also demanded a formal apology from Suharto and the return of the Suharto family's ill-gotten wealth.

On the evening of 18 May, the state secretary, Saadillah Mursjid, summoned Madjid to meet with Suharto in his private residence at Jalan Cendana. Suharto agreed in principle with Madjid's proposal and said he planned to establish a reform committee [*Komite Reformasi*] to implement it. However, Madjid told the president that the events that had transpired that day had already rendered his proposal impossible. Not only had the parliamentary speaker, Harmoko, called on Suharto to step down that afternoon, but the ICMI had done so as well. Madjid explained that his

original timetable now seemed far too distant. He then told Suharto delicately: "The people's understanding of reform is that you step down."⁶³

Suharto made an attempt to buy time. On 19 May, he invited nine Muslim leaders, including Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid, but excluding Amien Rais, to Jalan Cendana. In summoning these Islamic leaders, Suharto seemed to be making one last attempt to "divide and conquer" — a tactic that had long been a hallmark of his rule. Before the meeting with Suharto, most of these leaders, except Abdurrahman Wahid and several others, assembled at Malik Fadjar's house where Amien Rais was staying. Foreseeing Suharto's tactics and fearful of being branded as traitors to reform, the group pledged not to accept the reform committee [*Komite Reformasi*] if it was proposed by Suharto. In the meeting with Suharto, Madjid once again explained that no reform measures would succeed without the president's resignation: "You must find a way to end your presidency gracefully and honourably."⁶⁴

As a group, these Islamic leaders did not accept Suharto's proposals. As individuals, however, they might have had something different in their minds. In a public appearance later that same afternoon, Wahid bluntly demanded that the students quit demonstrating and give Suharto a chance to work on reforms. To many, this statement by a prominent campaigner of democratization was puzzling. Kevin O'Rourke offered the following analysis: "The only explanation for his continued support for Soeharto was that his arch-nemesis, Amien Rais, was leading the anti-Soeharto movement. Even amid this national drama, it appeared to many that Wahid was more concerned with defeating his modernist rivals than with bringing down Soeharto" (O'Rourke 2002, p. 128).

Another ICMI figure who played a critical role in the twilight of the Suharto era was Habibie. Inside the New Order ship that was about to sink, Habibie was a vice-captain who had been ignored by his superior. Suharto had rejected the idea of one Muslim delegation, who proposed the transfer of power to the vice-president, on the basis that Habibie's capability was questionable. When he learned of Suharto's comments about him, Habibie expressed outrage and humiliation. This provided him with a pretext to stand firmly against his longstanding political mentor. It was not until the resistance movement became violent, his reform proposal met with no response, and the DPR/MPR chairman and even his key ministers urged him to step down that Suharto began to think of transferring power to the vice president.

On 20 May, Suharto asked another ICMI member, Yusril Ihza Mahendra, who was the president's speech writer and legal adviser, to prepare a legal document for the transfer of power to the vice president. On 21 May, Suharto

finally resigned from the presidency and announced that vice-president Habibie would serve out the remainder of his term through 2003 and that a new cabinet would be formed immediately (O'Rourke 2002, pp. 128–30).

The resignation of President Suharto and the rise of Habibie as his successor brought about a new political opportunity structure. Habibie's lack of political legitimacy, his public image as Suharto's protégé and the uncertainty of his period of tenure caused many figures such as the economist Kwik Kian Gie to refuse his invitation to join the cabinet. This situation was a major step forward for ICMI figures with non-bureaucratic backgrounds. Finally they had representatives in the cabinet.

Representatives of ICMI members with NGO and *dakwah* backgrounds in the Habibie cabinet were Adi Sasono, A.M. Saefuddin, and Malik Fadjar, who became minister of cooperatives and small enterprise, minister of food, horticulture and medicine, and minister of religious affairs respectively. Other ICMI activists who were appointed for the first time as ministers were those with bureaucratic and Golkar backgrounds, namely Muslimin Nasution as minister of forestry and plantations, and Soleh Solahuddin as minister of agriculture, Marzuki Usman as minister of tourism, arts and culture, and Fahmi Idris as minister of manpower. The remaining ICMI ministers were among the twenty last ministers of Suharto who were reappointed in Habibie's cabinet, including Tuty Alawiyah, Muladi and Rahardi Ramelan. Thus, the principal members of the Habibie cabinet were a combination of former ministers from Suharto's legacy with new recruits mostly from ICMI. It was this combination of ministers not committed to reform and inexperienced newcomers that formed Habibie's transitional government and had to face the challenge of financial crisis and political reform.

THE DECLINE OF ICMI

Habibie actually had a constitutional mandate to continue Suharto's term through 2003. Article 8 of the 1945 Constitution stipulated that if the president "stops serving", the vice-president will complete the remainder of the president's term. Nevertheless, the nation's general mood urged otherwise. Habibie had no choice but to follow public opinion which demanded new parliamentary elections as soon as possible. He finally scheduled the elections for 7 June 1999.

Three weeks after Habibie occupied the presidential office, it was still unclear whether or not he would run for another term himself. On two separate occasions in the second week of June 1998, he declared that he would not run in the next presidential election.⁶⁵ Achmad Tirtosudiro and other

ICMI figures, however, warned that it was too early to arrive at such a conclusion and recommended he test public opinion.⁶⁶ Thus, on 29 June, Habibie clarified his previous remarks and stated that he had not yet decided whether to seek election to another term.⁶⁷ Later, with the enthusiastic support of his inner circle, he decided to join the contest for the presidential election, expecting to use Golkar as his main vehicle.

Notwithstanding Habibie's willingness to join the presidential contest, the significance of ICMI as a political vehicle had begun to diminish. The decision of Habibie's minister of home affairs, Sjarwan Hamid, in early June to lift the ban on political party formation gave rise to the euphoria of a new-found freedom to engage in political expression. This soon resulted in the proliferation of parties of all kinds numbering well over 100, with 48 parties being eligible to take part in the elections. Realizing that parties would now become the main path to political power, ICMI figures began to loosen their attachment to ICMI and establish parties in their own right.

Under the free public sphere and political fairness of the reform era, the Muslim intelligentsia showed their original diverse nature. Fuelled by a mixture of ideological differences, modernization-driven political pragmatism, elite rivalries, and the sudden explosion of freedom, Muslim groups competed with each other to establish their own political parties. As a result, Muslim politics became more fragmented than it had ever been.

Initially there was an idea of establishing a replica of *Masjumi* by merging the PPP with *Masjumi*'s heirs gathered around the DDII, with Amien Rais as its chairman. In fact, Amien Rais now emerged with different political interests. In the face of the hegemonic discourse of pluralism and inclusivism, as championed by the renewal movement, Forum Democracy, and mainstream mass media, he had long been stigmatized as sectarian. As he began to project himself as a rising Indonesian leader, this stigma seemed to haunt him. His encounter with intellectuals of diverse identities during the reform movement seemed to stimulate him to explore pluralism as a political ideology.⁶⁸ Thus, he now felt that the Islamic "dress" was too tight. He preferred to establish a pluralistic party that came to be known as the National Mandate Party (Indonesian PAN).

Having failed to attract Amien Rais, PPP continued on, a survivor of the Suharto era, with Hamzah Haz as its new chairman. The DDII activists established the Crescent and Star Party (Indonesian PBB) under the chairmanship of another ICMI member, Yusril Ihza Mahendra. Unable to agree with Amien Rais's ideals for PAN, followers of the *dakwah* or *tarbiyah* [Islamic educational] movement, who had rallied behind him during the

struggle for reform, came out with their own party, the Justice Party (Indonesian PK), with Nurmahmudi Ismail (an activist of ICMI's IIFTIHAR) as its president. Encouraged by his position as the minister of cooperatives and small enterprise, Adi Sasono established the People's Sovereign Party (Indonesian PDR) as a vehicle to achieve his power interest through the advocacy of a "people's economy" [*ekonomi rakyat*].

Other ICMI figures from NU backgrounds, such as Jusuf Hasjim and Sholahuddin Wahid (a younger brother of Abdurrahman Wahid), formed the *Ummat* Awakening Party (Indonesian PKU). Meanwhile, Abdurrahman Wahid and the mainstream NU leaders formed a pluralistic party, the National Awakening Party (Indonesian PKB). There were also several other small parties which used Islamic names to attract followers.

Apart from these parties, the New Order hegemonic party, Golkar, underwent an unprecedented scale of "Islamization". The leadership of this party came to be dominated by members of the Muslim intelligentsia with HMI backgrounds. Although this party had a secular basis, members of the Muslim intelligentsia in this party were part of the spectrum of Muslim politics. In particular critical moments, they would share a common political stance with other groups of Muslim politics.

Like Golkar, PAN and PKB based their ideological principles on *Pancasila*. The networks of the main figures and the constituency of these latter two parties, however, were closely associated with Islamic organizations. Like PAN and PKB, the PDR took *Pancasila* as the party's basic ideology and its leadership also came from Muslim activists. Its constituency, however, was not associated with any particular Islamic organization. The rest of Muslim parties took Islam as their political ideology. Yet, even for these Islam-based parties, the influence of the hegemonic discourse of pluralism was evident. This is especially true in that most of these parties made an attempt to free themselves from being branded as exclusive parties by emphasizing their nationalistic outlook and by claiming themselves as open parties in their statutes.

With this severe internal fragmentation, Muslim politics faced serious difficulties in mobilizing political resources and support. Moreover, the image of Muslim intellectuals' position as being at the centre of power from the period of the late Suharto era up to Habibie's interregnum also had its own political liability. Islamic leaders were now identified with the *status quo* and the policies of the New Order. In effect, Islam that had previously been identified by people at the grass-roots level as an alternative resistance ideology was now perceived as a ruling ideology. In hoping for political redemption,

a vast number of *wong cilik* [poor people] gave their allegiance to a “secular” messianic vision, which was offered by the image of oppressed Sukarnoism, embodied in Sukarno’s daughter, Megawati.

These factors along with other shortcomings contributed to the poor election results of Muslim parties. In the general elections of 1999, the total percentage of Muslim parties, including PKB, PAN and PDR, based on the total votes in the parliamentary election was only 36.38 per cent. While the total percentage of Muslim parties based on the total seats of the elected members of DPR (462) was 37.46 per cent (173 seats). There were 11 Muslim parties which gained at least one seat in the parliament, namely PKB, PPP, PAN, PBB, PK, PNU, *Partai Persatuan* (PP), *Partai Politik Islam Indonesia Masjumi* (PPIIM), PDR, PSII, and *Partai Kebangkitan Ummat* (PKU). Based on total votes, the PKB got the highest percentage (12.60 per cent of the total votes), followed by PPP (10.70 per cent), PAN (7.11 per cent), PBB (1.94 per cent), PK (1.36 per cent), PNU (0.64 per cent) and then 5 other remaining parties with 2.03 per cent. Based on total seats in the DPR, however, PPP obtained the largest proportion; that is 58 seats or equal to 12.55 per cent of the total 462 elected members of the DPR. It was followed by PKB (51 seats = 11.04 per cent), PAN (34 seats = 7.36 per cent), PBB (13 seats = 2.81 per cent), PK (7 seats = 1.52 per cent), PNU (5 seats = 1.08 per cent), and then five other parties with 1 seat each (5 seats = 1.1 per cent). By comparison, the Megawati-led PDIP (the heir of Sukarno’s PNI) obtained 33.73 per cent of the total vote and 33.12 per cent of total seats (153 seats), while Golkar got 22.43 per cent of the total votes and 25.99 per cent of the total seats (120 seats).

With no single party gaining a majority of seats in the parliament, it was obvious that whoever wanted to win the presidential election had to find a special formula for building a broad coalition. At ICMI’s Coordinating Meeting [*Rakornas*] held in Bandung on 9 July 1999, the association recommended the establishment of an Islamic axis and the collaboration of this axis with Muslim activists in Golkar.

To follow up this recommendation, Achmad Tirtosudiro, in his capacity as the acting chairman of ICMI, organized a meeting of representatives of major Muslim parties and Golkar at his house (Kuningan) on 29 September 1999. Attending this meeting were, among others, Amien Rais (PAN), Yusril Ihza Mahendra (PBB), Nurmahmudi Ismail (PK), Zarkasji Nur (PPP), and Eky Sjahrudin and Marwah Daud Ibrahim (Golkar). The following day, a similar meeting was held in Tirtosudiro’s house involving, among others, Amien Rais and Dawam Rahardjo (PAN) and Akbar Tanjung and Marwah Daud Ibrahim (Golkar). At this juncture, it was agreed that Habibie would

be the candidate for the presidency, but disputes occurred in deciding the candidate for the vice-president, and for the positions of the speaker of the DPR and MPR.⁶⁹ Even so, the idea of establishing a strategic alliance among Muslim parties continued to grow in the midst of a heightened anti-Habibie sentiment. This finally led to the creation of the so-called “*Poros Tengah*” [the Central Axis], which claimed it was mediating between proponents and opponents of Habibie.

Although it had been anticipated that Habibie would be the sole Golkar candidate for president, it soon appeared that he had no such stronghold in the party. Already during his candidacy for vice-president in 1997, there had been strong anti-Habibie opposition in Golkar. Now, although the eastern parts of Indonesia, as the main Habibie constituency, contributed to a larger portion of the Golkar seats in the DPR/MPR, Akbar Tanjung took powerful control over the party. Following Suharto’s resignation, Habibie did not take over the leadership of Golkar’s Patrons Board, a position formerly held by the president. When this position was removed from the party, he was no longer Golkar’s top official. This gave Akbar Tanjung room for political manoeuvring.

Akbar’s ambition to become the president or at least vice president was not in line with Habibie’s preference for the military commander, Wiranto, to assume the position. Internal Golkar competition together with hostile public opinion led to parliamentary rejection of Habibie’s presidential accountability speech on 14 October 1999.⁷⁰ As a result, Habibie withdrew from the presidential election.

The end of Habibie’s presidency marked the end of ICMI’s political role in the Indonesian polity. As political parties became the major means for the actualization of the intellectuals’ preoccupation with politics, ICMI lost its political attraction. Designed “as a vehicle for Muslim intellectuals’ contribution to the developing of Indonesian society in the 21st century” (as proclaimed in its first symposium in Malang), ICMI’s fighting spirit had been quenched even before the dawn of the new century.

With the collapse of the Habibie regime, many of ICMI’s institutions and programmes began to crumble. Their establishment had been motivated by *ad hoc* political interests under the sponsorship of the inner circle of the New Order power holders. With the change in regime, many of these institutions lost their relevance and supporting base. The enthusiastic CIDES, for instance, disappeared soon after the collapse of Habibie’s transitional government.

Even so, this by no means terminated the political life of ICMI’s individual members, and is certainly not the end of Muslim intellectuals’ strategic position in Indonesian politics. When Akbar Tanjung was unable

to fulfil the formal requirements for presidential candidacy,⁷¹ the alliance between the Central Axis and Golkar successfully elevated Abdurrahman Wahid to the presidential position.

Individual Muslim intellectuals played important roles during the period of the Wahid presidency. In the first Wahid cabinet, there were at least six ministers with an ICMI background, excluding nominal ICMI members,⁷² plus other Muslim intellectuals from different organizational backgrounds. Beyond the executive posts, the leadership of other high state institutions was clearly dominated by intellectuals with an Islamic organizational background. The speaker of the DPR (Akbar Tanjung), the speaker of MPR (Amien Rais), the chairman of the Supreme Advisory Council, DPA (Achmad Tirtosudiro), the chairman of the Supreme Court (Bagir Manan), the chairman of the Audit Board for State Finance, BPK (Satrio Budihardjo Judono) were intellectuals from a HMI and/or ICMI background.

The ability of Amien Rais and Abdurrahman Wahid to become the speaker of the MPR and president respectively, although their parties (PAN and PKB) only won respectively 7.36 per cent and 11.04 per cent of the total seats in the MPR, partly reflects the powerful influence of the Muslim intellectual lobby in the MPR. This was achieved because of the improvement in individual capacity of Muslim intellectuals and the more Islamic friendly-political elite (compared to previous periods of the Indonesian history), as a result of the Islamization of the Indonesian intelligentsia and bureaucracy in the last decades of the New Order.⁷³

When Megawati replaced Abdurrahman Wahid as the Indonesian president on 23 July 2001, the Muslim representatives in the cabinet and other state institutions remained about the same.⁷⁴ Thus, the journey of Muslim intelligentsia through the century, to move itself from the periphery to the centre of Indonesian politics, had arrived at its destination. The affiliation with political parties within the milieu of a free public sphere as well as free and fair elections provided the means and opportunities for the elevation of Muslim intellectuals to state officials. In essence, however, these political gains were made possible because of their remarkable educational achievements.

This achievement can easily be seen in the contrast between the educational qualifications of the nationalist and Islamic political figures. Previously, the pre-eminent leader of nationalist politics, Sukarno, was a degree holder, while the pre-eminent leader of Muslim politics, Natsir, was only a secondary school graduate (AMS). By the end of the twentieth century, however, the pre-eminent leader of nationalist politics, Megawati Sukarnoputri, was only a secondary school graduate (though she did attend university for a

short time), while leaders of Muslim political parties were degree holders. In effect, despite the unconvincing results of Muslim parties in the 1999 elections, Muslim intellectuals' representation in the public sphere was very influential.

Having achieved full participation in the political process, many Muslim intellectuals, especially those of the fourth and fifth generation, tended to be less obsessive about their Islamic identity. A well-known Islamist figure such as Amien Rais was now willing to accommodate people of different identities in his party and also had no more ambition to reinstate the Jakarta Charter. At the same time, many Islamic activists no longer objected to joining non-Muslim parties. Thus, figures such as Zulvan Lindan and Heri Akhmadi felt free to join the PDIP. Political pragmatism also had its own positive dimension. For the sake of power, Muslim parties did not hesitate to build alliances with non-Islamic parties. As a result, the distinction between Muslim parties and secular parties became blurred.

Muslim parties and identities continue to survive and the contestation of political identities will also continue. Nevertheless, the Muslim intelligentsia's willingness to forget and to share substantial consensus with other identities has begun to bloom. This is a significant watershed for national reconciliation.

Meanwhile, after the decline of ICMI, a new generation of the Muslim intelligentsia emerged but continue to show the almost characteristic tendency to diversity. A new generation of *dakwah* activists, led by the fifth generation of Muslim intellectuals but comprised largely of those of the sixth generation (mostly born in the 1970s–1980s), after exposure to the post-modern global conditions became more deeply incorporated into the global Islamic *harakah*. Nevertheless, they were by no means homogenous. Contestation and rivalries occurred between followers of different *harakah* over the difference in *manhaj* [method of reasoning], intellectual networks, and leadership competition. The most influential Indonesian *harakah* was that under the influence of *Ikhwanul Muslimin*, namely KAMMI and its political party, the Justice and Welfare Party (PKS).

On the other hand, a new generation of PMII activists, influenced by Abdurrahman Wahid's liberal thinking, experienced an unprecedented degree of liberalization. In parallel with this development, the renewal movement continued under the leadership of young intellectuals from IAIN and NU backgrounds in collaboration with young Islamic-friendly secular intellectuals from secular university backgrounds. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, these young protagonists of Islamic renewal ideas began to promote the so-called network of liberal Islam [*Jaringan Islam Liberal*, JIL]. New

intellectuals of this movement such as Ulil Abshar-Abdallah and Saiful Muzani in their exposure to the post-modern global condition went deeper than their predecessors in their appreciation of Western liberal-secular values.

Thus, the exposure of Muslim intelligentsia to post-modern conditions and the deepening globalization at the turn of the new millennium resulted in an antithetical tendency. One extreme gravitated towards Islamic fundamentalism, while the other extreme gravitated towards Western liberalism and secularism. Yet, the majority of Muslim activists continue to accept and to extend the hybridity between different cultural traditions.

The energy of Islamic fundamentalism continued to be checked by the energy of Islamic liberalism. The internal varieties of Indonesian Islam provided a built-in mechanism for Islamic moderation. Under these conditions, the possibility of transcending ineluctable religio-cultural differences, to soften and render them tolerable to civil order, continued to be imaginable.

CONCLUSION

The preponderance of Muslim intellectuals in the twilight of the New Order and beyond reflects the limits of political repression. Every act of repression or discrimination has its own reverse impact. A hegemonic power and ideology tends to create contradictions that permit subordinate groups to penetrate the prevailing ideology in its own terms. Behind the stick of political repression, the New Order provided the carrot of economic and educational development.

As happened in the colonial period, Muslim frustration with politics meant the shift of the Muslim struggle to the realm of culture and education. As a result, by the 1990s the Muslim intelligentsia had a better competitive educational advantage than at any other time in the past.

With a better educational competitive advantage, Muslim intellectuals of diverse backgrounds began to demand greater political participation. Since the modernization programme of the New Order did not encompass change in the political power structure, the Muslim intelligentsia's desire for power necessitated their further accommodation with the existing power structure. To strengthen their bargaining power they produced an ensemble of Muslim intellectuals which finally led to the formation of ICMI.

In fact, Suharto's support for ICMI was not followed by significant changes in his basic power structure. Until his last cabinet, virtually none of ICMI's organic intellectuals from non-bureaucratic backgrounds were elevated to the cabinet. This caused general disappointment among the so-called "real

ICMI” members. As the country became mired in economic crisis, which undermined the very foundations of the New Order’s political legitimacy, organic intellectuals of ICMI began to join the resistance movement. Suharto’s resignation and his replacement by Habibie provided the opportunity for ICMI figures with strong Islamic credentials to achieve considerable political power and influence.

The inception of the reform era marked the strong emergence of Muslim intellectuals as a political and functional elite, a situation that had never occurred in any political transition in Indonesian history. At the same time, Muslim intellectuals’ encounter with intellectuals with different identities, especially during the resistance movement, provided them with a new experience in dealing with “identity in difference” and “difference in identity”. As a result, they became more willing to share substantial consensus with other political groups. Insofar as political fairness and correctness continue to prevail, there is room for optimism that Indonesia will achieve the virtue of political civility.

Notes

1. *Republika* (29 November 1995).
2. Quoted in A. Schwarz (1994, p. 197).
3. The representative par excellence of Murtopo’s group in Golkar, Jusuf Wanandi, was moved from his previous positions as Golkar’s secretary of the organizational planning and general affairs (1973–78), and vice-treasurer (1978–83) to become the head of the Department of Foreign Affairs.
4. During the period of the Third Development Cabinet (1978–83), the number of subsidized mosques was 8,671, during the Fourth Development Cabinet (1983–88), this number jumped to 12,390 (*Departemen Penerangan* 1983 and 1988). During the Third Development Cabinet, the number of classrooms (in religious private schools) that had been renovated under the sponsorship of the government was 26,280; during the Fourth Development Cabinet this number had jumped to 50,734 (*Departemen Penerangan* 1983 and 1988).
5. See *Tempo* (8 December 1990).
6. There were now at least five former HMI activists, Akbar Tandjung, Azwar Anas, Saadillah Mursjid, Nasrudin Sumintapura, and Hasjrul Harahap, in addition to other *santri* technocrats who had no strong connection to any major organized Islamic group such as B.J. Habibie, Munawir Sjadzali, Bustanil Arifin, Saleh Afiff, and Arifin M. Siregar.
7. This act significantly enhanced the legal and institutional standing of the Islamic courts by providing formal legal guarantees of their security and increasing the level of state support. The act also strengthened the standing of the Islamic courts in relation to the civil courts by eliminating a rule dating from the

nineteenth century which had required that decisions of Islamic courts be ratified by a civil court to be enforceable. For a critical perspective of this act, see Cammack (1997).

8. This figure does not include those who attended non-degree programmes (the diploma I, II and III programme) and also does not include the Muslim population in other age groups.
9. Later, Satira would become a senior executive in the Indonesian Aircraft Industry (IPTN), Qadir would become the minister of research and technology in Habibie's cabinet, while Ismail would become the minister of forestry in Wahid's cabinet.
10. This would be followed by other scholarships such as Science and Technology Manpower Development (STMDP, 1989–95) and Science and Technology for Industrial Development (STAID, 1990–98).
11. For the etymology of the term, see chapter 1.
12. The long term of Indonesian development planning was twenty-five years.
13. Quoted in Elson (2001, p. 264).
14. Habibie was well known for his special relationship with Suharto. Suharto's attachment to him had a personal element, reflecting not just Suharto's own small role in his childhood in Makassar but also certain qualities in Habibie that endeared him to Suharto. As Elson noted (2001, p. 265): "Habibie, like Suharto, was a 'can do' man. Suharto also admired his willingness to forgo his own profitable career in Germany to serve his country. Most of all, perhaps, he succumbed to Habibie's willingness to flatter and accommodate him."
15. The Indonesian manufacturing industry was characterized by the dominant presence of footloose industries or industries with low technological content. This kind of industry relied heavily on unskilled labour and provided limited job opportunities for higher educated people. At the same time, for graduates in the social sciences, absorption into the job market became more and more difficult.
16. For a further discussion of this issue, see Y. Latif (1994).
17. As Elson noted (2001, p. 268): "Such calls emanated from senior civilian intellectuals such as former minister and close colleague Mashuri and Golkar figure Marzuki Darusman, as well as retired generals such as Sumitro, Sayidiman Suryohadiprodo and Nasution, and the Petition of 50 group of which Nasution was a member (which was, to Suharto's apparent annoyance, invited to discussions at the parliament in mid-1991)."
18. The six imprisoned students were M. Fajrul Rahman, Moh. Jumbuh Hidayat, Ammarsyah, Arnold Purba, Bambang L.S., and Enin Supriyanto.
19. Indonesia's financial crisis was precipitated by a crisis of confidence. Following the depreciation of the Thai baht in July 1997, which through the "contagion effect" led to similar currency depreciations in the Philippines and Malaysia, foreign investors and creditors in Indonesia also became jittery and scrambled

- to reduce their exposure to Indonesia. The snowball effect of this situation resulted in the severe Indonesian economic crisis (Thee 2002, p. 232).
20. The decline in Suharto's international support was signalled by the IMF's refusal of the proposal of the currency board system (CBS) put forward by Suharto and his economic team. For further discussion of this issue, see Steve H. Hanke (*Tempo*, 11 May 2003).
 21. To quote from Shiraishi's phrase (1990, p. 34): "Tirtoadhisoeerjo created his own journalistic style in *Medan Prijaji*, militant and sarcastic in tone.... Though the title of the newspaper was *Medan Prijaji*, it was no longer the forum for only the *priyayi*,...but as its motto says, 'the voice for all the (native) rulers, aristocrats, and intellectuals, *priyayi*, native merchants, and officers as well merchants of the subordinated peoples made equal (in status) with the Sons of the Country."
 22. *Aydin* is a Turkish neologism to describe enlightened people (intellectuals), which is relatively free from Western overtones. In contemporary developments, this term is widely used by Muslim intellectuals to distinguish themselves from their secular intellectual counterparts who have been attached to the term "*entelektüel*" (Meeker 1994, pp. 86–87).
 23. Some might argue that ICMI cannot be viewed as a social movement, for it does not express a sense of progressivity. In Eyerman and Jamison's observation, however, social movements are not necessarily progressive nor need they always be morally commendable. In the twentieth century, there were various movements with a wide range of cultural and political agendas, from the fascist and communist to the "reactionary modernism" of the Nazis and religious fundamentalism (1998, p. 10).
 24. Among members of the CMF were Fuad Amsjari, Samsuri Martojoso, Usman Affandy, Muhammad Usman, Latief Burhan, Nizar Hasjim, Munawar Thohir, and Sukanto. Interview with Fuad Amsjari (9 November 2000).
 25. At this juncture, Amsjari claimed that his group had already introduced *Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia* (ICMI) as a proposed name for this society. Interview with Fuad Amsjari (9 November 2000).
 26. Among intellectuals who attended this meeting were Fuad Amsjari and Mohammad Thohir of Surabaya, Usman Affandy of Malang, Sahirul Alim of Yogyakarta and Rahmat Djatnika of Bandung. Interview with Fuad Amsjari (9 November 2000) and Usman Affandy (25 November 2000) and Muhammad Thohir (27 October 1998).
 27. Interview with Dawam Rahardjo (10 September 1998) and Ahmad Zacky Siradj (23 September 1998).
 28. Interview with Imaduddin Abdulrahim (26 November 1998).
 29. Interview with Imaduddin Abdulrahim (26 November 1998) and with one of the event's organizers, M. Zaenuri (10 November 2000).
 30. Interview with Dawam Rahardjo (10 September 1998).

31. All of these students were students of the engineering faculty as well as activists of the Raden Patah mosque.
32. Interview with Imaduddin Abdulrahim (26 November 1998).
33. Interview with M. Zaenuri (10 November 2000).
34. Interview with Dawam Rahardjo (10 September 1998).
35. Interview with M. Zaenuri (10 November 2000).
36. Achmad Tirtosudiro had been close to Habibie since he became the Indonesian ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany (1973–76). At that time Habibie was well-known as an outstanding Indonesian technologist and as a vice president of Germany's aircraft industry, MBB (1974–78).
37. Sudharmono had a background in military law and had never commanded troops.
38. The result of Murdani's manoeuvre was the nomination by the PPP faction of Djaelni Naro (former right-hand man of Murtopo), withdrawn only at the last moment under intense pressure from Suharto.
39. Interest groups are generally defined as organizations, "separate from government though often in close partnership with government, which attempt to influence public policy" (Wilson 1990, p. 1).
40. The term "the real ICMI" was actually a matter of self-claim. It was commonly associated with Islamic activists from a non-bureaucratic background. These included university lecturers (especially exponents of the *dakwah* movement), NGO activists, *ulama-intelekt*, and Islamic artists and entrepreneurs. Lecturers of state universities having no "structural position" (such as rectors, deans, etc.) were not considered as bureaucrats. Golkar's functionaries were considered as bureaucrats. Thus, "the real ICMI" basically referred to those who had not yet been fully integrated into the New Order's polity and bureaucracy.
41. Interview with Habibie's right-hand bureaucrat, Wardiman Djojonegoro (1 September 1998).
42. For the purpose of this study, I asked the clippings centre of the Jakarta-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) to collect all articles on 'intellectuals' whose titles contained the words *intelektual*, *cendekiawan* and *inteligensia*, published by Jakarta-based newspapers in the 1980s and 1990s. The Jakarta-based newspapers are *Angkatan Bersenjata*, *Berita Buana*, *Bisnis Indonesia*, *Jakarta Post*, *Kompas*, *Media Indonesia*, *Merdeka*, *Pelita*, *Republika*, *Sinar Harapan*/*Suara Pembaruan*, and *Suara Karya*.
43. The thirteen Christian intellectuals are Mudji Sutrisno, Parakitri, Th. Sumartana (2 articles), Alex Dungal, Anton Hagul (2 articles), William Liddle, Adrianus Suyadi, L. Wilardjo, F.H. Santoso, F.M. Parapat, Ignatius Haryanto, Ignas Kleden, and P.J. Suwarno.
44. The voice of secular intellectuals was represented by Adig Suwandi, Prasetya Irawan, Hendardi, Koentjaraningrat, Ahmad Bahar, Julia I. Suryakusuma, Hermanto E. Djatmiko, Harimurti Kridalaksana, A.H. Pudjaatmaka, Saratri Wilonoyudho, Budi Susanto, Usadi Wiryatnaya, and Jiwa Atmaja.

45. The voice of NU intellectuals and Abdurrahman Wahid's intellectual circle was represented by Mohammad Sobary (3 articles), Mohammad Fajrul Falaakh (2 articles) and Ali Masykur Musa.
46. The voice of ICMI's members and other Muslim intellectuals was represented by Bambang Pranowo, Aldrian Munanto, Samsul Hadi, Hajriyanto Y. Thohari, Muchtar Sarman, Novel Ali, Abdul M. Mulkan (2 articles), Mubyarto, Heru Nugroho, Tajuddin Noer Effendi, and Mochtar Buchori.
47. These 12 ICMI intellectuals were Adi Sasono, Kuntowijoyo (2 articles), Nasir Tamara (2 articles), M. Dawam Rahardjo (3 articles), Fachry Ali (3 articles), M. Rusli Karim, Aslam Nur, Baharuddin Lopa, Anwar Harjono, Sutjipto Wirosardjono, Novel Ali, and Affan Gafar. The voice of non-Muslim intellectuals was represented by Victor I. Tanja, while the remaining were other activists (Afnan Malay, Yudi Latif, and Fachri Hamzah).
48. Among prominent intellectuals of the Forum Democracy were Abdurrahman Wahid, Bondan Gunawan, Djohan Effendi, Y.B. Mangunwidjaja, Todung Mulya Lubis, Rahman Tolleng, Marsilam Simanjuntak, Daniel Dhakidae, Mudji Sutrisno, D. Riberu, Franz Magnis Suseno, Arief Budiman, Ghafar Rahman, Aswab Mahasin, and Sutjipto Wirosardjono (the last two were also members of ICMI). The inclusion of the last two ICMI members was useful for avoiding the impression that it was designed in direct opposition to ICMI.
49. Tolleng joined the Forum Democracy which was very critical of ICMI while Silalahi criticized ICMI intellectuals for their inability to read Suharto's political motives behind ICMI's establishment. For Silalahi's criticism in this context, see Ramage (1995, p. 85).
50. For a further discussion of the military criticism of ICMI, see Ramage (1995, pp. 122, 155).
51. Quoted in Ramage (1995, p. 127).
52. Interview (*via* email) with Abdurrahman Ma'sud, an NU intellectual who joined ICMI (15 November 1999).
53. I provided envelopes and stamps to make it easy for respondents to return the questionnaires.
54. Engagement in the HMI and *dakwah* movement as a precondition for the incorporation of some intellectuals from NU family backgrounds was also admitted by Muhammad Thohir and Muhammad Nuh, two ICMI functionaries from NU and HMI backgrounds. Interview with Muhammad Thohir (27 October 1998) and Muhammad Nuh (11 November 2000).
55. MAFIKIBB stands for *Matematika, Fisika, Kimia, Biologi dan Bahasa Inggris*.
56. The IIFTIHAR was organized by ICMI in collaboration with the Muslim World League, the Islamic Development Bank, the International Federation of Arabic and Islamic Schools, the Commission on the Scientific Miracle of the *Qur'an* and the *Sunna*, and the International Institute of Islamic Thoughts.
57. Azwar Anas was a former minister of transport in the Fifth Cabinet. In the Sixth Development Cabinet he was appointed the coordinating minister for

people's welfare and poverty eradication. Beddu Amang was a former deputy head of Bulog and was appointed the minister of food and head of Bulog. Harmoko was reappointed the minister of information for a third term. Saleh Afiff was a former minister of the bureaucratic reform of the Fourth Cabinet, the minister of the national planning of the Fifth Cabinet and he was appointed the coordinating minister for economics, finance, and industry. Sujudi was a former rector of the UI and was appointed the health minister. Tarmizi Taher was a former deputy of the religious minister and was appointed the minister of religion. Harjono Sujono had been the head of the Family Planning Agency since 1983 and was appointed the state minister for family planning.

58. Interview with Wardiman Djojonegoro (1 September 1998).
59. Harmoko at that time was Golkar chairman (1993–98) and mobilized Golkar's support for his nomination as the vice-president. At the same time, a faction within the military nominated General Hartono.
60. Some other appointed ministers in the Seventh (last) Suharto Cabinet were included on ICMI's boards, but simply reflected ICMI's accommodation with those who held powerful positions in the bureaucracy.

Their positions were either on the Board of Counsellors or Board of Advisers. These ministers who were nominal ICMI members included Hartarto Sastrosunarto (the coordinating minister for supervision and administrative Reform), Ginandjar Kartasasmita (the coordinating minister for economic, finance and industry, Harjono Sujono (now the coordinating minister for people's welfare and poverty eradication), Ali Alatas (the minister of foreign affairs), Mohammad Hasan (the minister of trade and industry, Abdul Latief (the minister of tourism, arts and culture), Subiakto Tjakrawerdya (the minister of cooperatives and small enterprise), Akbar Tandjung (the minister of public housing).

61. In the second term of ICMI's board (1995–2000), Habibie as the re-elected chairman began to respond partially to the real ICMI's repeated call for a position of secretary-general, by creating the position of "*sekretaris umum*" [general secretary]. Being less prestigious than the position of secretary-general, this position was given to Adi Sasono (a spokesman of the real ICMI).
62. *Kompas* (7 May 1998), *Republika* (7 May 1998).
63. Interview with Nurcholish Madjid (18 September 1998). See also O'Rourke (2002, p. 127).
64. For a detailed description of these events, see O'Rourke (2002, pp. 121–35).
65. See *Jakarta Post* (13 June 1998) and also O'Rourke (2002, p. 147).
66. Based on Achmad Tirtosudiro's statement before the meeting of ICMI's Executive Board on 14 August 1998.
67. See *Jakarta Post* (30 June 1998).
68. Shortly after Suharto's resignation, a prominent Protestant intellectual who had joined the MAR, the late Th. Sumartana, invited Amien Rais to give a talk before Protestant clergymen in Solo. After the event, Amien was asked by one

- of his fellows, Samsul Rizal Panggabean, about how he felt about giving a talk in a church. He said, "I felt like a newlywed. I should have done this earlier." Conversation with Samsul Rizal Panggabean (14 August 1998).
69. Interview with Marwah Daud Ibrahim (1 October 1999) and with Tatat Rahmita Utami, the office manager of ICMI who attended the meetings (1 October 1999).
 70. The main formal reason for opposition parties to reject his accountability speech was his decision to offer a referendum for the self determination of East Timor without parliamentary procedures.
 71. Late at night after Habibie's presidential accountability speech was rejected, a meeting was held in Habibie's house (in Kuningan) attended among others by Akbar Tandjung, Amien Rais, and Marwah Daud Ibrahim. At this meeting, Akbar persuaded Habibie not to withdraw from the presidential contest with a promise that he would consolidate Golkar support. Habibie refused to do so and appointed Amien Rais to replace him. Amien Rais refused Habibie's offer, on the ethical grounds that he had just been appointed the speaker of the MPR and had nominated Abdurrahman Wahid as a presidential candidate. Finally, Akbar got his own way by deciding to join the presidential contest. However, he failed to fulfil the formal requirements for nomination before the deadline of 15 October 1999. Interview with Marwah Daud Ibrahim (16 October 1999).
 72. Ministers of the ICMI background were Yusril Ihza Mahendra, Jusuf Kalla, Nurmahmudi Ismail, Yahya Muhaimin, Tolchah Hasan, and Hasbalah M. Saad. Ministers of the nominal ICMI affiliation included Alwi Shihab and Juwono Sudarsono.
 73. The powerful influence of the Muslim intellectual lobby was also indicated by the approval of the Educational Law of 2003 by the parliament and president, which contained among other things compulsory religious education in public and private schools and the provision that every student acquire religious instruction from teachers with similar religious backgrounds.
 74. Muslim intellectuals also held dominant roles in the (new structure of) the General Election Committee (KPU), the (new structure of) the National Commission for Human Rights (Komnas HAM), the newly established Constitutional Court [*Mahkamah Konstitusi*], and other new independent commissions which played important roles in determining the future shape of national politics.

CONCLUSION

*When I come to ask what is signified in their turn
by these fundamental desires of political passions,
I find they appear to me as the two essential composites of man's will
to situate himself in real life.
To want real life is to want (a) to possess some material advantages,
and (b) to be conscious of oneself as an individual...to feel yourself distinct
from other men...*

Julien Benda (1928)¹

*To Allah belong the East and the West:
whithersoever Ye turn, there is Allah's Face.
For Allah is All-Embracing, All-Knowing.*

Qur'an (2: 115)

The end of a century and of a study is a moment for retrospection and reflection. The turn of the twenty-first century is just a numerical event, which does not necessarily contain historical significance. In the Indonesian context, however, historical events at the dawn of the new century invoked a parallelism with those at the dawn of the twentieth century.

The crisis of the liberal economy in the NEI in the twilight of the nineteenth century provided the impetus for the regime change in the Netherlands, which marked the beginning of the ethical “reform” era in the colony. Speaking from the throne in 1901, Queen Wilhelmina promised that the Netherlands would bear ethical responsibility for the people of the Indies. Education and social welfare were regarded as the moral duty of the government. This accelerated the formation of the intelligentsia as the new elite of the Indies society.

Apart from economic crisis and regime change, the dawn of the twentieth century also heralded the inception of Islamic reformism-modernism concomitant with the deepening penetration of Western secularism in the Indies life-world. These contesting new intellectual currents in their encounter with historic indigenous intellectual traditions had a great impact on the formation of the Indies intelligentsia. Some members of the intelligentsia gravitated toward Western secularism, while others gravitated toward Islamic reformism-modernism. Most of them, however, gravitated toward “translation”, by celebrating hybridity and syncretism — the fusion between different intellectual currents and cultural traditions. These varieties of responses combined with differences in socio-economic underpinning to give rise to the diversity of intellectual-political traditions of the intelligentsia.

A century later, the crisis of the New Order economy in the twilight of the twentieth century provided the impetus for the regime change, which marked the beginning of the new ethical reform [*reformasi*] era in Indonesia. Speaking from the house of parliament around the turn of a twenty-first century, leaders of the politicized intelligentsia — in some ways the offspring of the Dutch *Ethici* — promised the government would bear ethical responsibility for the Indonesian people. Education and social welfare were once again regarded as the moral duty of the government along with the responsibility of eradicating corruption, collusion and nepotism (KKN).

Almost one hundred years after the implementation of the Dutch Ethical policy, many regimes have crumbled, political and economic systems have risen and fallen, generations of the Indonesian intelligentsia have passed on. But the Indonesian intelligentsia continue to be the kernel of the Indonesian elite. Although the social prestige of the intelligentsia has lessened as a result of the quantitative explosion of educated people, the basic mentality of the current intelligentsia continues to reflect the long-standing *priyayi* attitude: elitism. Under the spirit of elitism, populism continues to be strong as a discursive consciousness, but weak as a practical consciousness.

Since the intelligentsia's *de facto* control over the private capitalist mode of production is weak, this elitism led to the intelligentsia's preoccupation with politics. This became even more important during the economic crisis. Individuals and groups of the intelligentsia contested with each other to gain control over the state economy and bureaucracy. High political and bureaucratic positions continue to be seen as the climax of an “intellectual” career. In the face of a repressive political regime, intellectual discourse on the “intellectual” has frequently been dominated by a Bendaian platonic view of the intellectual as necessarily an outsider, living in self-imposed exile and on the margins of society. But soon after the regime change, most of those who

had been designated as *intelektuil* or *cendekiawan* — even proponents of intellectual independence — were overcome with the desire for political power.

Apart from the economic crisis, regime change, and the intelligentsia's preoccupation with politics, the dawn of the twenty-first century heralded the deepening penetration of global Islamic fundamentalism, concomitant with a deepening penetration of global mass-culture and Western liberal values. Some members of the intelligentsia were obsessed with the notion of Islamic purity, unity and certainty, while some others were entranced by Western liberal values. Still, the majority of them celebrated hybridity — the fusion between different cultural traditions. The difference in this cultural orientation would once again contribute to the plurality of intelligentsia's collective identities.

From time to time, the struggle for material-political interest and the struggle for meaning-identities have been at the heart of the intelligentsia's power struggle, even though aspects of material-political interests and the construction of meaning-identities have been subject to historicization and transformation. From time to time, economic crisis has become a major impetus for political and regime change, while political changes and challenges have become a major factor in changes in religious thinking and movements.

With the intelligentsia being the ruling elite of Indonesian society, intellectual life has always been the heartland of social conflict and disagreement. This is not to say that no agreement ever occurred. "Intellectual conflict", said Randall Collins "is always limited by focus on certain topics, and by the search for allies... Conflict is the energy source of intellectual life, and conflict is limited by itself" (Collins 1998, p. 1).

Ideological conflicts between different intellectual traditions of the intelligentsia do not necessarily lead to mutual rejection, as they may also lead to mutual rapprochement. Ideological conflicts between the first generation of the modernist Muslim intelligentsia and its communist counterparts, for instance, resulted in the construction of "Islamic socialism", which was highly influenced by Marxist thoughts. In the intermingling of diverse intellectual-political traditions, radical and puritan views were drawn into more moderate positions, while conservative views were forced to adopt certain elements of the radical and puritan views. In addition, internal varieties within Islam prevented its presence in politics from becoming monolithic. Internal contestation within Islam combined with pragmatic political interests forced particular sectors to make alliances with political groups outside Islamic intellectual-political traditions.

Furthermore, social identities of the intelligentsia are not only defined by religious orientation, but also by various sets of lived relationships (class,

ethnicity, educational status, and so forth). Thus, there have always been social elements that cut across diverse groups of the intelligentsia and opportunities for multiple affiliations. This has made possible the creation of “historical blocs”. Otherwise, Indonesia would never have existed. In short, the Indonesian intelligentsia continues to present itself as a collective expression in terms of “identity in difference” and “difference in identity”.

In such a way, the shape and development of the Muslim intelligentsia could not escape the presence and influence of significant “others”. The different Muslim perceptions of “others” would lead to different power strategies and identity formulations of the Muslim intelligentsia. Thus, however strong the nostalgic fundamentalist quest for authenticity and certainty, it is subject to imitation and uncertainty.

Throughout the twentieth century, Indonesian Muslims faced a serious challenge from the rapid modernization and secularization that transformed some fundamental aspects of their religio-political system. On the other hand, the strengthening of Islamic influence in the educational field and the public sphere and the ongoing formation of Muslim political parties and movements is also a fact. The dialectic between secularization and Islamization continued to be the chief feature of Indonesian polity and society, and both processes occurred simultaneously.

This recognition of persisting continuities is not to ignore the presence of discontinuities. In the early twentieth century, the state was an alien colonial state practising irreversible power relations (domination); education was a privilege of particular status groups, while the intelligentsia was a new prestigious social stratum; the public sphere was limited in its degree of freedom and in its quantity of participants, while discursive practices in the public sphere were initially centred on micro-cultural issues. At the end of the twentieth century, the hegemonic New Order state crumbled to be followed by the installation of the Reform Order [*Orde Reformasi*] state in which reversible power relations as “strategic games between liberties” prevailed to an unprecedented degree; education had become theoretically accessible to all citizens, while the social prestige of the intelligentsia began to decline; the public sphere experienced an unprecedented degree of freedom and participation, while discursive practices became saturated with political issues, in which intelligentsia of various academic disciplines pretended to be experts in political analysis.

Between the early and the late twentieth century, many generations of the intelligentsia succeeded each other. Each generation emerged with different mindsets and knowledge interests, different educational access and achievements, different political opportunity structures, different dominant discourses and

public sphere participation, different codes, and different formulations of ideologies and identities. Thus, alongside diachronic continuity there have been synchronic changes.

As far as the Muslim intelligentsia is concerned, the dynamic approach of this study reveals that throughout the twentieth century there had been diachronic Muslim intellectual networks across generations that made possible the continuity of Muslim intellectual political traditions. At the same time, there had been synchronic changes in the formulation of Muslim intelligentsia's identities and ideologies across generations. The interactive approach of this study reveals that ideological formulation and power strategies of a particular generation of Muslim intelligentsia cannot be isolated from the influence of the previous generation, the presence of significant others and the interplay of various arenas of power relations. The inter-textual approach in this book reveals the inter-dependence of inter-generational texts of Muslim intelligentsia and the relationality of diverse texts as well as of discursive and non-discursive formations. All these can be seen in the following section.

THE CONTINUITY IN HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF MUSLIM INTELLIGENTSIA

Throughout the twentieth century, Muslim awareness of the relative lack (size) of an Islamic-oriented intelligentsia and the powerful influence of educated people in competitive political struggles provided the impetus for each generation of the Muslim intelligentsia to bear a common historical project of "Islamizing the Indonesian educated community". Until the 1970s, this project was approached especially through the modernizing of Islamic institutions and expressions. Beginning in the 1980s, however, the ubiquity of modern technology and civilizations in the Muslim world along with the deepening penetration of global Islamic fundamentalism led some segments of a new generation of the Muslim intelligentsia to move from the approach of "modernizing" Islam towards that of "Islamizing" modernity.

Throughout the century, the historically structured intellectual institutions, traditions and collective identities inherited from the previous generations of the Muslim intelligentsia became the springboard for the reproduction and reformulation of those institutions, traditions and identities by the following generation. Because of this inter-connectedness and inter-dependence of Muslim intellectual thinking and discourse between generations, there was no such a thing as originality in ideas of a particular generation.


The long-term intellectual and institutional chains of the Muslim intelligentsia can be seen in Figure 7.1. This schema only represents Weberian ideal types, that is, analytical constructs which may or may not correspond in detail to actual cases but which help us analyse the general pattern of intellectual and institutional genealogies of the Muslim intelligentsia.

The genealogy of Indonesian Muslim intelligentsia rooted in the emergence of prototypes of *ulama-intelekt* and *intelekt-ulama*. Sjeikh Achmad Khatib can be designated as the prototype of the Indonesian clerical-intelligentsia [*ulama-intelekt*]. He had been exposed to Western education before continuing his study to Mecca. His major concern and erudition was, however, in religious knowledge. Agus Salim can be designated as the prototype of Indonesian Muslim intelligentsia [*intelekt-ulama*]. His major educational background was Western schooling (HBS, the prestigious school of his generation). But he was able to improve his religious knowledge in Mecca under the mentorship of Achmad Khatib. As well as being erudite in modern scientific knowledge he was also literate in religious knowledge.

Khatib influenced later Islamic intellectual movements through his students. Some of his students became leaders of the reformist-modernist movements such as Mohd. Tahir b. Djalaluddin, M. Djamil Djambek, Abdullah Achmad, Abdul Karim Amrullah (Haji Rasul), M. Thaib Umar (of West Sumatra), and Achmad Dachlan (of Yogyakarta), while some other became leaders of the traditionalist Islamic movements such as Sjeikh Sulaiman al-Rasuli (of West Sumatra) and Hasjim As'ari (of East Java). Some of Khatib's students had been exposed to Western elementary schools, such as Djamil Djambek and Abdullah Achmad — and notably Agus Salim, while some others taught themselves Western language and knowledge. Being erudite in religious knowledge, as well as literate in modern knowledge, most of Khatib's students listed here constituted the first generation of Indies *ulama-intelekt*.

The first generation of reformist-modernist (RM) *ulama-intelekt* pioneered the establishment of *madrasah*, modern Islamic organizations, publications and other institutions. The most prominent cultural-educational organization along the reformist-modernist line was *Muhammadiyah* in Java and *Sumatera Thawalib* in West Sumatra. Following in the footsteps of the RM *ulama-intelekt*, slightly later the first generation of traditionalist *ulama-intelekt* such as Wahab Chasbullah in Java and Siradjuddin Abas in West Sumatra became the forerunners of the establishment of *madrasah* in the traditional community. The exemplary centre of the modernized Islamic school in the traditional community was *madrasah Salafijah Sjafi'ijah* of the *Pesantren* Tebuireng (East

FIGURE 7.1
A Schema of the Genealogy of Muslim Intelligentsia



Java) under the headship of Kjai Ma'sum and then Mohammad Iljas. The well-known early organizations in the traditional line were *Nahdlatul Ulama* in Java and *Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah (Perti)* in West Sumatra.

Meanwhile, Salim and other members of the first generation of Muslim intelligentsia, such as Tjokroaminoto, Abdul Muis and Surjopranoto, pioneered the development of modern Islamic political movements through their major role in the leadership of *Sarekat Islam (SI)* and early Islamic political parties.

Intellectual linkages between the first and second generation of *ulama-intelekt* were mediated by *madrasah* and other modernized Islamic institutions. In addition, Indonesian student societies in the Middle East, especially in Egypt (*Djama'ah al-Chairiah*), also played an important role as breeding grounds for the second generation of *ulama-intelekt*. Prominent personalities of the *Djama'ah al-Chairiah* were Muchtar Lutfi, Fathurrahman Kafrawi and Kahar Muzakkir. Upon their return to the home country Lutfi played an important role in the transformation of the *Sumatra Thawalib* into the first political organization of West Sumatra, *Persatuan Muslimin Indonesia (PERMI)*; Kafrawi joined the NU, involved in the Advanced Islamic School (STI) and *Masjumi* Party; Kahar Muzakkir joined the *Muhammadiyah*, became the first director of the STI and was involved also in the *Masjumi* party.

Intellectual linkages between the first and second generation of the Muslim intelligentsia were mediated by Islamic political parties, associations (*Masjumi* [non-party]), and student associations. Members of the second generation of Muslim intelligentsia were exposed to parties and associations of the first generation, while intellectuals of the first generation influenced the second generation in the establishment and activities of student associations. The main vehicles for the transmission of ideologies and intellectual traditions from the first to the second generation of Muslim intelligentsia (MI) were *Jong Islamieten Bond (JIB)* and *Studenten Islam Studieclub (SIS)*. A forerunner of the second generation of Muslim intelligentsia was Sukiman Wirjosandjojo, the first Muslim intellectual with a Netherlands university background. The most prominent intellectuals of the second generation of MI were Samsuridjal, Mohammad Natsir, Kasman Singodimedjo, Mohammad Roem, Prawoto Mangkusasmitho, Jusuf Wibisono, and M. Rasjidi with Mohammad Natsir being the most celebrated. While the most celebrated RM *ulama-intelekt* of this generation was Haji Abdul Malik Karim Amrullah (Hamka).

The first generation of the reformist-modernist (RM) *ulama-intelekt* made a significant contribution to the formation of the second generation of Muslim intelligentsia. The Islamic literacy of this generation was made

possible through its exposure to *madrasah*, publications, and *dakwah* of the RM *ulama-intelekt*.

The first generation of traditional *ulama-intelekt* made a small contribution to the formation of the second generation of Muslim intelligentsia. Its sphere of influence was confined by and large to the second generation of traditionalist *ulama-intelekt*. Most prominent personalities of the traditionalist *ulama-intelekt* of the second generation were Wachid Hasjim, Fathurrahman Kafrawi, and Mohammad Iljas. As well as being erudite in religious knowledge, Hasjim took a private lesson in European languages and modern scientific knowledge; Kafrawi was a graduate of Al-Azhar (Cairo) who acquired both religious and secular subjects, while Iljas was a HIS graduate. These three figures of the traditionalist *ulama-intelekt* became the forerunners of the traditionalist (NU) intelligentsia.

The second generation of MI and *ulama-intelekt* (both reformist-modernist and traditionalist ones) played a major role in the establishment and leadership of the STI, *Masjumi* Party and NU Party. These institutions became the main breeding grounds for the constitution of the third generation of Muslim intelligentsia. With the support of intellectuals of the second generation, the third generation of MI pioneered the establishment of the first post-colonial student youth associations. Three students of the STI, Anwar Harjono, Lafran Pane and Jusdi Ghazali, respectively led the formation of GPII, HMI and PII. Other prominent intellectuals of the third generation were Ahmad Tirtosudiro, Harun Nasution, M.S. Mintaredja, Mukti Ali, Dahlan Ranuwihardjo, Deliar Noer, Maisaroh Hilal, Tedjaningsih and Zakijah Daradjat (the last three being women).

The second generation of traditionalist *ulama-intelekt* began to contribute to the formation of the Muslim intelligentsia. Fathurrahwan Kafrawi and Wahid Hasjim were both involved in the leadership of the *Masjumi* Party and in the development of the STI. Some students of a traditionalist background also began to enrol in universities, especially the STI, and to join HMI and PII. Thus, in the rise of the third generation of MI there emerged the embryo of a traditionalist intelligentsia. At this juncture, however, students with a traditionalist background such as Toha Masduki and Mukti Ali had not yet created a separate traditionalist student association.

The HMI and PII along with the *Masjumi* and NU political parties became the main catalysts for the intellectual-political linkages between the third and fourth generation of Muslim intelligentsia. The equality of access to education and the establishment of IAIN increased educational opportunities for the Muslim intelligentsia. Forerunners of the fourth generation of Muslim intelligentsia were Imaduddin Abdulrahim, Ismail

Hasan Metareum and Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo for the modernist intelligentsia and Subchan Z.E. for the traditionalist intelligentsia. Prominent personalities of this generation were Nurcholish Madjid, Amien Rais, Djohan Effendi, Ahmad Wahid, Dawam Rahardjo, Endang Saifuddin Anshari, Usep Fathuddin, Utomo Dananjaya, Djalaluddin Rakhmat, Ida Nasution, Zoer'ani Djamal and Aniswati (the last three being women)² for the modernist and Mahbub Djunaedi, Chalid Mawardi, Abdurrahman Wahid and Hasyim Muzadi for the traditionalist. By the rise of the fourth generation of Muslim intelligentsia, there emerged separate organizations of traditionalist students such as IPNU and PMII. At this time, *Muhammadiyah* student activists also established the *Muhammadiyah* student association, IMM.

Meanwhile, senior members of the Muslim intelligentsia from the third and fourth generation established an association of Muslim *sarjana* (*Persami*) under the leadership of Subchan Z.E. (of the NU) and H.M. Sanusi (of the *Muhammadiyah*). After the withdrawal of the traditionalist intelligentsia from *Persami*, an association of the traditionalist *sardjana* (ISII) was formed.

The old and new post-colonial student associations became the transmission chains of Muslim intellectual-political traditions from the fourth to fifth generation of Muslim intelligentsia. Under the New Order's repressive-developmentalism, however, intellectuals of the fourth generation split into two main factions: proponents of the Islamist "*dakwah*" movement and those of the liberal "renewal" movement. Islamic activists of the secular universities became the main recruits of the former, while Islamic activists of state Islamic institutes (IAIN) and NU educational institutions became the main recruits of the latter. This division influenced the ideological construction of the Muslim intellectual tradition of the following generation.

The *dakwah* training institutions (LMD), religious circles on university campuses and independent mosques, and Islamic mentoring programmes became the main vehicles for the transmission of the Islamist *dakwah* ideology from the fourth to the fifth generation of Muslim intelligentsia. On the other hand, the HMI, PMII, NGOs, and student and intellectual circles of the IAIN and NU became the main catalyst for the transmission of renewal ideas. Prominent personalities of the *dakwah* movement of the fifth generation of MI were Hatta Radjasa, Nur Mahmudi Ismail, Mutammimul Ula, and Hidayat Nur Wahid. Prominent personalities of the renewal movement of this generation were Azyumardi Azra, Din Syamsuddin, Fachry Ali, Masdar Farid Masudi, Komaruddin Hidayat, Marwah Daud Ibrahim and Khofifah Indar Parawansa (the last two being women).

In further developments, the HMI split into two organizations after opponents of the so-called *asas tunggal* formed an underground HMI called

HMI-*Majelis Pertimbangan Organisasi* (MPO). The PII for its opposition to *asas tunggal* went underground. Because of their bias towards NU and *Muhammadiyah*, PMII and IMM were less attractive for independent-minded students.

Thus, by the rise of the fifth generation of Muslim intelligentsia, historic “extra” (trans-campus) student organizations such as HMI, PMII and IMM began to lose their credibility and appeal. Muslim intellectual and student movements continued to be divided by and large into two major intellectual currents: “rejectionism” (anti state-orthodoxy) of the *dakwah* movement *versus* “accommodationism” (pro state-orthodoxy) of the renewal movements. To survive under the New Order repression, members of the fifth generation of Muslim intelligentsia, especially those who were born in the 1960s, became the mute generation.

Despite their differences, proponents of the *dakwah* and the renewal movements of the fourth and fifth generation united in 1990 to establish the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intelligentsia (ICMI). In opposition to ICMI, a small group of Muslim intellectuals under the leadership of Abdurrahman Wahid collaborated with a small group of secular and Christian intellectuals to establish *Forum Demokrasi* (*Fordem*).

Alongside the ICMI presence, the transmission of conflicting intellectual traditions continued. The Campus *Dakwah* Bodies (LDKs) of the secular university, underground student organizations, and the newly adopted global Islamic *harakah* (movements) became the main transmission chains of the *dakwah* (Islamist) intellectual tradition from the fifth to the sixth generation of Muslim intelligentsia. On the other hand, HMI and PMII along with discussion groups of the IAIN and NU young intellectuals became the main transmission chains of the renewal (liberal) Muslim intellectuals. Some figures of the *dakwah* movement of the sixth generation of MI were Adian Husaini, Anis Mata, Eric Salman, and Moh. Tubagus Furqon (all belong to the transitional generation/forerunners of the sixth generation), Alfian Tanjung, Fahri Hamzah, Febry Nur Hidayat, Andi Rahmat, and Mukhammad Najib. Some figures of the liberal movement of the sixth generation of MI were Ulil Abshar-Abdallah, Luthfi Assyauckanie and Saiful Mujani (all belong to the transitional generation/forerunners of the sixth generation), Burhanuddin, Novriantoni, Nong Darol Mahmada and Aisyah Yasmina (the last two being women).

In 1998, *dakwah* activists of the sixth generation of Muslim intelligentsia established a new student association, KAMMI. Somewhat later, liberal activists of the fifth and sixth generation of the Muslim intelligentsia set up

a network of liberal Islam [*Jaringan Islam Liberal*, JIL]. Still, the majority of Muslim intelligentsia fell between the Islamist and liberal intellectual positions.

Over time, membership of the Muslim intelligentsia steadily increased in keeping with its continuing educational improvement both in quantity and qualifications. Consequently, the Muslim intelligentsia's credibility in discursive practices and its bargaining power in bureaucratic (positional) allocations became stronger and stronger. In contrast, Muslim political parties consistently failed to attract a majority vote and became a divisive factor for the Muslim intelligentsia.

From time to time, Muslims' frustration with politics provided the impetus for their return to support for cultural-educational movements. As the educational qualifications of the Muslim intelligentsia became better and better, it generally became more and more elitist in social relationships and orientation. As a result, its cultural-educational movements catered more and more to the educated urban middle class. Generally speaking, as the elite became more and more "Islamized", the masses became less and less so. This being the case, the re-introduction of a democratic political system following Suharto's resignation made Muslim political parties, at least temporarily, less attractive at the grass-roots level.

At various times during the twentieth century, Muslims' awareness of their political precariousness and fragmentation — in the face of perceived external threats — had frequently provided the impetus for the rise of movements for Islamic unity. These movements usually called for Islamic fraternal solidarity [*ukhuwah Islamiyah*] recurrently mediated through an "All Islam Congress". Thus, despite internal varieties and contestations within Islamic intellectual-political traditions, there has always been a centripetal force for Islamic unity. The first generation of Muslim intelligentsia and clerical-intelligentsia were united in the SI and MIAI. The second generation of Muslim intelligentsia and clerical-intelligentsia were united in the *Masjumi* (non-party and party) and in the Constituent Assembly. The third generation of Muslim intelligentsia were united in Islamic paramilitary groups and student youth associations (GPII, HMI, PII and *Persami*). The fourth generation of Muslim intelligentsia were united in the anti-communist and anti-establishment student fronts of 1966 (KAMI and KAPPI) and to some extent in ICMI. The fifth and sixth generation of Muslim intelligentsia were united in order to remove Suharto from the presidency.

The reverse is also true. Whenever there was a centripetal force for Islamic unity there was always a centrifugal force for Islamic disunity. During the colonial period of the 1920s, Muslim leaders' calls for Islamic political unity

— in the face of the growing influence of communism and secular nationalism — produced an unintended result: the disappointment of traditionalist *ulama* caused by the domination of reformist-modernist intelligentsia and clerical-intelligentsia in the leadership of All Islam Congresses and in the Indies Muslim delegation to the Caliphate Congress in Mecca. During the early years of the new independent republic, Muslim leaders' calls for Islamic political unity through the *Masjumi* — as a response to the political dominance of the secular nationalist leaders — produced a centrifugal force: the establishment of *Perti* as a separate political party and the secession of PSII and NU from the *Masjumi*. During the early years of the New Order period, Muslim leaders' calls for Islamic integration — in the face of the New Order marginalization of political Islam — produced a further unintended result: the birth of the “renewal” movement. During the late years of the New Order period, Muslim leaders' calls for Islamic intellectual unity through ICMI — for the sake of better Islamic political gains — produced a centrifugal force: the rise of *Fordem*. In the beginning of the *reformasi* era, Muslim leaders' calls for Islamic political unity through the formation of an Islamic axis, “*poros tengah*” [middle axis] — following the unconvincing election result of Muslim political parties — produced an unhappy end: personal rivalries between Muslim political leaders.

In short, the Muslim intelligentsia continues to present itself as a collective expression in terms of “Muslim identity in difference” and “difference in Muslim identity”. Within its unity, there is a room for diversity; within its diversity, there is a room for unity. Whether it is united or divided depends on the dominant synchronic outlook and perception of threats and rewards, which are conditioned and constructed by political opportunity structures, discursive formations, characteristics of the public sphere as well as the economic and international climate.

DISCONTINUITY IN THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF MUSLIM INTELLIGENTSIA

Alongside the diachronic continuity, the historical development of the Muslim intelligentsia exhibited recurring synchronic changes and small deviations concomitant with the rise of each new generation of the intelligentsia. This change and transformation was evident in the formulation of Islamic ideology identity. The notion of Islamic ideology and identity differed from generation to another as a result of differences in the political opportunity structure, the structure of intellectual conflicts, cognitive structures, discursive formations, and the condition of the public sphere.

The formative phase of the first generation of Muslim intelligentsia occurred during the 1900s–1910s. It was a period when issues of social welfare resulting from the Ethical Policy, along with the propaganda of Marxism and socialism, influenced intellectual discourse. As a response, the formulation of Islamic ideology by the first generation was framed under the rubric of “Islamic socialism”.

The formative phase of the second generation took place during the 1920s–1930s. It was a period when the Indonesian intelligentsia began to experience ideo-political cleavages, the rise of Indonesian nationalism and the call for independence became the main concern of intellectual discourses. In response to the secular conception of nationalism and state, championed by secular nationalist leaders, the formulation of Islamic ideology of the second generation was framed under the rubric of “Islamic nationalism and the Islamic state”.

The formative phase of the third generation took place in the 1940s and early 1950s. It was a period when the “revolution for independence” and “constitutional democracy” became the main intellectual concerns. In sharing a common revolutionary and nationalist spirit with other groups of the intelligentsia, the ideological formulation of Islamic ideology of this generation attempted to maintain harmony between the so-called *keislaman* [Islam-ness] and *keindonesiaan* [Indonesia-ness].

The formative phase of the fourth generation took place in the late 1950s and the 1960s. It was a period when severe ideo-political conflicts during the guided democracy era as well as the need for political alliances along the axis of pro- and anti-establishment (the Old Order regime) influenced the intellectual position. As a result, alongside the continuing attempt to formulate Islamic ideology based on the harmony between *keislaman* and *keindonesiaan*, there emerged an attempt to reproduce the formulation of the Islamic ideology of the second generation. The first attempt came out with the renewal ideology, while the second attempt came out with the Islamist [*dakwah*] ideology.

The formative phase of the fifth generation took place in the 1970s and early 1980s. It was a period when the repressive-developmentalism of the New Order became hegemonic in the public sphere. With limited opportunities for political-intellectual articulation and manoeuvre, this generation emerged as a mute generation which could only serve as an incubator for the consolidation of the renewal and *dakwah* ideologies. As a result, there emerged two antithetical Islamic ideological formulations: accommodationism (appropriation of the secular-state orthodoxy) *versus* rejectionism.

The formative phase of the sixth generation took place in the late 1980s and 1990s. It was a period of the late modernization of the New Order and the globalization of the post-modern condition. By this time, the public sphere began to show a certain degree of openness which provided the catalyst for the deepening penetration of global Islamic fundamentalism as well as global mass-culture and Western liberal values. This contributed to strengthening of the degree of Islamic-mindedness as well as liberal-mindedness of different segments of this generation, compared with previous generations. There emerged two major contending ideological formulations: Islamic revivalism *versus* Islamic liberalism, although large numbers of this generation continued to celebrate hybridity of various cultural traditions.

The change in ideological formulation reflects changes in discursive formation. Islam and socialism became the dominant intellectual discourse of the first generation. Islam and nationalism/the nation-state became that of the second generation. Islam and independence-revolution was the dominant intellectual discourse of the third generation; Islam and modernization-secularization that of the fourth generation; "Islam alternative and alternative development" that of the fifth generation; and Islamizing modernity and liberalizing Islam that of the sixth generation.

Religious attitude and identities had also been subject to change. The "fundamentalist" groups of the early decades of the twentieth century, such as *Muhammadiyah* and *Persis*, became far more moderate by the end of the twentieth century. The conservative groups of the early decades of the twentieth century, such as NU, became the catalyst for the liberal Islamic movement by the end of the century. In contrast to earlier times, an unprecedented number of activists from the Islamic fundamentalist movements of the late twentieth century came from non-*santri* family backgrounds. At the same time, many students from NU and *Muhammadiyah* backgrounds no longer affiliated with these organizations as they preferred to join new Islamic collectivities such as the *tarbiyah* (*dakwah*) group and other Islamic *harakah*.

At the individual level, changing religio-political attitudes and identities were exemplified by some Islamic intellectuals. Agus Salim had a strong religious upbringing but soon became a secular man after being exposed to Western education (HBS). His encounter with Achmad Khatib in Mecca and Tjokroaminoto in the SI, however, reactivated his religious identities. Abdullah Achmad was a protagonist of the reformist-"fundamentalist" movement of West Sumatra. His interaction with Dutch officials and the Dutch subsidy for his *madrasah*, however, changed him into a moderate-accommodationist. Young Nurcholish Madjid was known as the "Young Natsir" (Islamist). Nevertheless, his adventurous and critical mind in combination with the

pressure of New Order modernization, his socialization with liberal Islamic circles, and his encounter with Western civilization converted him to become a protagonist for Islamic “renewal” ideas. Imaduddin Abdulrahim was well known as a central figure of the *dakwah*-“rejectionist” intellectuals in early years of the New Order. Soon after ICMI’s establishment in 1990, however, he became a moderate-accommodationist intellectual. Amien Rais was once known as an exclusive-Islamist. Nevertheless, his encounter with liberal scholars at the University of Chicago and his further interaction with secular and non-Islamic leaders during the “reform movement” of 1998, transformed him into a moderate-inclusive personality.

Change and transformation also took place in Muslim education. In the early twentieth century, only a few *santri* (devout Muslims) were educated in *sekolah* [Western system of education]. Most *santri* at this juncture were educated in *pesantren* and *madrasah*. Consequently, the membership of the early generation of Muslim intelligentsia was small. The majority of *santri* were more erudite in religious knowledge than in general knowledge. By the end of the twentieth century, the majority of *santri* were educated in state-run *sekolah*. Even the curriculum of the *madrasah* contained more general subjects than religious ones. Consequently, the membership of the Muslim intelligentsia became disproportionately larger; at the same time, the majority of them became more erudite in general knowledge than in religious knowledge. This will have a significant influence on the future religio-political attitude of the Muslim intelligentsia. Lack of religious knowledge can be a precondition for a liberal outlook. Or, the opposite may be the case. Sometimes insufficient exposure to religious teaching can also raise the value of religious knowledge. A thirst for religion can ignite a religious spirit. Religious spirit without erudition in religious knowledge is a precondition for fundamentalist attitudes.

No less important was the transformation in the structural position of the Muslim intelligentsia. The early generation of the Muslim intelligentsia preferred to leave their positions in the government bureaucracy and associate themselves with the *kaoem mardika* [the independent community] of the Muslim petty bourgeoisie. With the continuous deterioration of the *santri* economy, however, members of later generations of the Muslim intelligentsia sought employment in the government bureaucracy. Thus, by the end of the twentieth century, the image of the *santri* as trader was overshadowed by the image of the *santri* as neo-bureaucrat.

The political leverage of the Muslim intelligentsia also changed from one generation to another. The first (Salim) generation of the Muslim intelligentsia had a powerful political influence signalled by the political magnitude of the

SI. The second (Natsir) generation was overshadowed by the powerful influence of secular nationalist leaders, but remained able to hold national political leadership in the early 1950s. The third (Pane) generation showed the weakest political influence; its educational and political career was overtaken by history. The fourth (Madjid) generation was initially overshadowed by the military and secular intelligentsia but finally developed a strong political influence in the late Suharto era and in early years of the reform era. The political influence of the fifth and sixth generation of Muslim intelligentsia remains to be seen. With better educational qualifications, however, it is expected that their political influence will be strong, though the political affiliation of their membership will be more dispersed than ever in the past. This situation is, however, again subject to change as other groups of the Indonesian intelligentsia are also not static.

Next, codes of the Muslim intelligentsia have also changed from one generation to another. The first generation of Muslim intelligentsia was part of the *bangsawan pikiran* [the nobility by intellect]. It also belonged to the *Kaoem Moeda* [Young Group] of the newly educated people in opposition to the *Kaoem Toea* [Old Group] of the old aristocracy. In keeping with this pattern, the first generation of reformist-modernist *ulama* associated themselves with the Islamic *Kaoem Moeda* in opposition to Islamic *Kaoem Toea* of the conservative-traditionalist *ulama*.

In further developments, the term “*bangsawan pikiran*” was transformed into *kaoem terpeladjar* [educated community] beginning in the 1910s, into *intellectueelen* [intellectuals] beginning in the 1920s, into *intelligensia* [intelligentsia] beginning in the late 1930s, and into *cendekiawan* [intellectual/intelligentsia] beginning in the late 1960s.

The newly born intelligentsia, educated in secular-oriented Western schools, tended to be poor in religious knowledge and detached from the *ulama* and Islamic epistemic community. In the interaction between the Muslim intelligentsia and reformist-modernist *ulama*, however, members of the Muslim intelligentsia gradually became literate in religious knowledge while some *ulama* became literate in general knowledge. Thus, there emerged the so-called *intelek-ulama* [modern intellectuals/intelligentsia who were literate in religious knowledge] and *ulama-intelek* [*ulama* who were literate in modern scientific knowledge]. Later in the century, the traditionalist *ulama* followed in the footsteps of the reformist-modernist *ulama* in incorporating general subjects and modern educational apparatus to their schools. As a result there also emerged the traditionalist *ulama-intelek*. This situation was sustained until the 1960s.

Beginning in the 1970s, the distinction between the category of *ulama* and *intelectueelen* (*intelektuil*) began to blur — following the introduction of a large portion of general subjects to religious schools/universities along with the religious instruction and — *dakwah* movement to the public secular schools/universities. Many *intelektuils* emerged as leading religious figures, while many *ulamas* emerged as leading spokespeople of secular issues. At this juncture, even the existing mediating terms such as “*intelek-ulama*” and “*ulama-intelek*” began to crumble, as both terms implicitly presumed to recognize the distinction between *ulama* and *intelektuil*. A new code was needed to mark the fusion of the two categories. The meeting ground of this fusion was not in the word “*intelektuil*” or “*ulama*”, but rather in the neutral Indonesian neologism, “*cendekiawan*” [intellectual or intelligentsia]. The term “*cendekiawan Muslim*” began to gain popularity in the 1980s.

The public sphere was also transformed not only in the scope of its participants but also in its degree of freedom. Originally the site of discussion for exchanging ideas among a small group of Western educated people mostly of the *priyayi* origin, it soon expanded beyond this limit to include clerical-intelligentsia and other groups of Indonesian society. By the 1920s it had already become the site of conflicting power struggles between political groups and organizations. With the continuous changes in political systems, the degree of freedom of the public sphere swung between restriction and openness. The continuous change in the nature of the public sphere became a major drive for continuing change in the ideological formulation and discursive formation of the Muslim intelligentsia.

The change in the ideological formulation and discursive formation in turn changed Muslims’ perception of Islamic political institutions and affiliations. Under a general nationalist ideology with a religious tinge, the early SI’s presence in the 1910s represented what Muis called “*nationalistisch-Islamistisch*” organizations which attracted both devout and nominal Muslims of diverse religious and cultural inclinations. The decision to make the Islamic principle the sole basis of SI (PSII) in the 1920s limited the meaning of “Muslim” and the constituency of this organization to a particular segment of the Muslim community. The credo of “Islam, Yes; Islamic Party, No”, which emerged during the New Order, opened the possibility for Islamic activists to join Golkar. As a result, Golkar that previously had been seen by Muslims as non-Islamic institution became an arena for the actualization of Muslims’ political interests. The hegemonic discourse of pluralism and inclusivism in the late Suharto era influenced the Muslims’ construction of political parties during the reform era. In the past, Muslim parties had never opened their

membership to non-Muslims. By late twentieth century, even a long-acclaimed "Islamist-Natsirist" such as Amien Rais considered an Islam-based party as too restricting and preferred to establish a pluralistic-oriented party (PAN). Many members of the Muslim intelligentsia also became more willing to enter secular-nationalistic parties. At the same time, even the Islam-based party opened itself, at least in rhetoric, to non-Muslim membership. As a result the distinction between Islamic and non-Islamic parties became blurred.

POSTSCRIPT

The dynamic, interactive, and inter-textual approach of this study has attempted to examine the development of Muslim intelligentsia from many different positions and perspectives as well as to see the diversity of impulses and interactions which influenced the development of the Muslim intelligentsia. The study, however, has been unable to cover all elements, perspectives and impulses related to the historical development of the Muslim intelligentsia. These include the rising influence of young NU intellectuals and the expansion of the *tarbiyah* movement in the 1990s because the focus of attention for this period is given to the formation of ICMI. For the leading role of young NU intellectuals in contemporary liberal Islamic movements and the magnification of the *tarbiyah* group's influence in contemporary Islamist movements, further studies are needed to analyse the specific development of the traditionalist and *tarbiyah* intelligentsia, especially after the 1980s.

This book also virtually ignores the Islamic intellectual movement in the realm of *Sufi* orders, for its main focus is directed to the relationship of the Muslim intelligentsia and power. The current attraction of Islamic spiritualism for segments of the urban middle and upper classes has influence on the socio-political attitudes of particular groups of the Muslim intelligentsia. Thus, it is important that a specific study be devoted to this subject.

In emphasizing the collective entity of Muslim intelligentsia, rather than individual Muslim intellectuals, this book has tended to ignore the role of independent intellectuals who might not have joined any major Muslim student and intellectual association/movement. A specific study might examine the possible existence of Muslim intellectuals of this kind. In focusing on the most prominent organic intellectuals of each generation, this study has virtually ignored the role of female intellectuals. With the growing concern about the issue of empowering women in politics, a specific study on the development of female intellectuals is recommended.

By limiting itself to the genealogy of Muslim intelligentsia, the book also does not devote sufficient discussion to the genealogy of other intellectual

traditions of the Indonesian intelligentsia. Just as the development of the Muslim intelligentsia cannot escape the influence of other intellectual traditions, the reverse is also true and the development of secular intellectual traditions cannot escape the influence of Muslim intellectual traditions. Thus, a specific study is necessary to examine the development of other traditions of the Indonesian intelligentsia and their interaction with the Muslim intelligentsia.

In emphasizing the cultural-political dimension of the development of the intelligentsia, this work also pays little attention to a micro-analysis of the transformation of economic and occupational positions of the intelligentsia. As the structural position of the intelligentsia determines its status within society, a specific study is needed to deal with this issue.

Looking ahead, it can be said that despite the declining social prestige of the intelligentsia, the intelligentsia for some decades to come will remain the ruling elite of the Indonesian polity. The percentage of people with tertiary education backgrounds at the turn of the twenty-first century was less than ten per cent of the total Indonesian population, so educational qualifications will remain a major factor in determining the elite recruitment pattern. This situation will continue to benefit individual intellectuals and intellectual traditions that have a strong investment in the educational sector. The victory of a particular party in the general election may not translate into actual positional gains in the broad spectrum of political administration and government bureaucracy, unless supported by powerful human resources. At the same time, as long as the non-state economy remains unable to absorb a great percentage of university graduates, many individual intellectuals of particular intellectual traditions who have strong educational qualifications will be forced to join powerful political parties in their effort to gain strategic political and bureaucratic positions. The willingness of these segments of the highly educated intelligentsia to join powerful political parties, regardless of the parties' principles and traditions, will help blur the distinction between diverse established-political traditions.

Indonesia is just a tiny spot on earth, but it is part of the planet. It cannot escape from global currents. It is, to borrow the title of Pramoedya Ananta Toer's historical novel, *A Child of All Nations*. As the wave of world capitalism and religious revivalism of the previous centuries penetrated Indonesian societies, so too the wave of globalism and post-modernism that penetrated Indonesia from the late twentieth century will bring new directions. Indonesia will become a *centrum* for the tension between the wave of cultural homogenization and cultural heterogenization. The deepening penetration of global mass-culture and Western liberal-secular values will run

simultaneously with that of global religious resurgence and fundamentalism. The end result, at least in the near future, is unlikely to be “either or” (total secularization or Islamization), for each pole has its own arenas and strategies to survive. In effect, the hybridity and the fusion of different cultural traditions will continue to be the main characteristic of the Indonesian polity and intelligentsia. Every effort to homogenize Indonesian society has to transform a reversible power relation into the practice of “domination”. Every expression of domination will contain within it discrimination and repression and finally produce its own reverse impact.

One century is long enough for historical writing but short enough for a nation and members of the nation to forget. The domination by authoritarian governments and particular groups in the past limited the margin of liberty and space for political manoeuvre of many segments of the nation. This resulted in a long painful remembering for various groups of the Indonesian society. As the *reformasi* era attempts to bring back democracy and freedom to the public sphere, domination will gradually turn to reversible power relations. In a position to choose and to influence freely the lexis and praxis of other peoples, there is a chance for various segments of the nation to share a sense of being “partners” in a whole, a sense of sharing a common substance. This makes it possible for diverse segments of the nation to transcend ineluctable divisions and to cultivate the virtue of civility.

As the intelligentsia continues to be the political elite of the nation, it is in their hands that the future of the nation resides. For a better future for the nation, the main responsibility of the intelligentsia is to transform populism from discursive consciousness into practical consciousness. It is unlikely that the main source of national political problems lies in the backwardness of the people, but rather in the reluctance of the elite to free itself from the past and the *status quo*. The politicization of the past and the mystification of the *status quo* have to give a way for the release of national reconciliation and reconstruction. It is time for the Indonesian intelligentsia of diverse groups to unite in a common historical calling: to serve and save the nation.

Notes

1. Quoted from the second printing of the Beacon paperback edition (1959, pp. 25–26).
2. Aniswati was a younger sister of NU intellectual, Subchan Z.E., but associated herself with the HMI and modernist intellectual community.

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This book plays a crucial role not only in the Islamic discourse and activism, but also in the formation and development of the Indonesian nation-state as we see it today. It is an important contribution to the literature on the origin and distinctive dynamics of Islamic intellectualism in the world's largest Muslim country. It is a must-read for those who wish to gain an understanding of the struggle of Muslim intellectuals in Indonesia.

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